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Abstract 
 
 
The Thai Ombudsman was initially established to handle complaints of 
grievances from individuals in dealing with government bodies. Subsequently, the 
Ombudsman was empowered with additional mandates and powers. To understand the 
viability of this new arrangement, this thesis examines the legislative framework of 
the Thai Ombudsman using existing well-accepted standards in ombudsman design 
and explores the actual practice of the Thai Ombudsman. The empirical findings of 
this thesis indicate that despite some weaknesses and shortcomings, the Thai 
Ombudsman has served well its main constitutional objectives in redressing 
administrative grievances and improving administration. Most of its institutional 
features meet standard practice. However, the thesis argues that some of the new 
functions do not fit easily into the jurisdiction of the Office because they call for 
different expertise and resources, attributes that the Ombudsman is not suitably 
designed for or does not sufficiently possess. Further, the new functions require the 
Ombudsman to operate in a manner which risks compromising its core values. Thus, 
rather than strengthening the position of the office, the additional functions weaken 
the institution, damaging its effectiveness and credibility. This thesis illustrates these 
points by testing the Thai Ombudsman’s experience within an analytical framework 
based upon theorising on the ombudsman institution and the leading guidelines on the 
ombudsman available in the professional and academic literature. Ultimately, the 
thesis argues for the reform of the Thai Ombudsman scheme, including recommending 
the removal of unsuitable functions. The thesis also identifies weaknesses in the 
operation and legislative framework of the Thai Ombudsman Office which should be 
addressed by policy makers, so that it can provide the maximum benefit to the system 
of government administration and to the individual citizens. Finally, the thesis uses the 
findings with regard to the Thai Ombudsman to construct a theoretical template of the 
factors that should be used to determine whether or not an ombudsman scheme should 
be used to deliver additional functions beyond those of the core ombudsman model.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
One of the current trends in governance and legal development in Thailand 
over the last 40 years has been the ongoing move to establish an efficient system of 
safeguards of civil rights and liberties, and in so doing to institute effective curbs on 
state powers in order to promote democracy. An important step in this direction was 
instituted by the Constitution of Thailand 2540 B.E. (1997).1 This constitution, as 
revised by the Constitution of Thailand 2550 B.E. (2007),2 was considered by many 
to be the most radical political and administrative reform in Thailand so far in its 
creation of a number of new accountability institutions i.e. an Ombudsman, 3  a 
National Counter Corruption Commission, an Electoral Commission, a 
Constitutional Court and Administrative Court. All of these new institutions were 
designed with the aim of minimizing bureaucratic domination, the corruption of 
politicians and the instability caused by coalition governments.4 These institutions 
were designed to control the political process, and to a certain extent to provide – in a 
sense as intended by the constitutional drafters- ‘a fourth branch of the state’,5 an 
inspection branch of the constitution to complement the traditional executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches. When the 1997 Constitution was abolished by a 
military coup in 2006 and replaced by the 2007 Constitution, these new institutions 
remained, with their functions and powers largely unchanged, and in some cases 
expanded.  
This thesis is focussed on the study of one of key constitutional innovations  
of the 1997 constitution, the Ombudsman, and offers an exploration of the 
                                                                 
1
 Hereafter the 1997 Constitution. An entire chapter (Chapter XI) o f the Constitution is devoted to the 
Ombudsman, providing for the establishment of the institution, the manner in which the Ombudsman 
is appointed, the extent of his ju risdiction, h is powers , the procedure to be followed when 
investigating, and other matters, including that an annual , see Andrew Harding, Peter Leyland, ‘The 
constitutional courts of Thailand and Indonesia: Two case studies from South East Asia’, Journal of 
Comparative Law, 2008, 3(2): 118: 132, 136); Tom Ginsburg,  ‘Constitutional afterlife: the continuing 
impact of Thailand’s postpolitical constitution’, International Journal of Constitutional Law , 2009, 7 
(1): 83. 
2
 Hereafter the 2007 Constitution. 
3
 There are three Ombudsmen, but this work will address them collectively in a singular form. 
4
 James R Klein, ‘The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 1997: A Blueprint for Participatory 
Democracy, the Asia Foundation Working Paper Series, March 1998. 
5
 Borwornsak Uwanno, ‘Depolit icising key  institutions for combating corruption: The new Thai 
constitution’, King Prajadhipok’s Institute Journal , 2000, p. 190, retrieved 4 December 2013, 
http://press.anu.edu.au//wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ch11.pdf.  
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underlying premise of the reforms that the introduction of the ‘fourth’ branch would 
enhance scrutiny and democracy. It should be noted, however, that in the final stage  
of this thesis the 2007 Constitution was abolished by a military coup, which seized 
state power on 22 May 2014.  This thesis, therefore, has in part become an historical 
analysis of a defunct constitutional arrangement.  But this study has not become 
irrelevant and the value in understanding and interrogating the effectiveness of the 
pre-coup system of government as it relates to the Ombudsman remains strong. This 
is because first the Ombudsman institution remains in place, notwithstanding the 
coup, and secondly, the coup leader, in his plan to restore democracy has appointed a 
Constitution Drafting Committee to craft a new constitution. 6  In this respect, the 
timing of this thesis is arguably rather fortuitous as it is now the time to consider 
successes and failures of past political reforms and the previous Constitutions in 
order to gather information for deliberation in the drafting of a new constitution that 
genuinely suits the context of Thai society and democratic development. The author 
believes that, based on the evidence that these 1997 constitutional innovations have 
survived through the coup in 2006, was affirmed in the 2007 Constitution and at 
present have continued to function under martial law, this may suggest the 
continuation of these oversight mechanisms beyond the survival of the formal 
constitutions as a legally binding document; and therefore it is likely that they will be 
retained in the new constitution.  As Ginsberg observed, despite its formal rescind by 
the coup, the 1997 Constitution has brought a change to the Thai  constitutional 
model. 7  It is hoped that the new constitution will foster democratic development, 
create government that truly represents the Thai people and provide a system that 
supports the work of the executive branch and restrain the use of its power under the 
rule of law.  
It is in the context of a re-evaluation of all aspects of the Thai Constitution, 
therefore, that this thesis focuses on the Ombudsman institution. 8  The 1997 
Constitution established the Ombudsman as an independent and non-partisan officer 
to deal with grievances where no remedy is available in court, because the matter 
was not justiciable as no legal right was infringed. The Ombudsman is to investigate 
complaints from citizens about the way in which they have been treated by 
                                                                 
6
 Aekarach Sattaburuth, ‘New charter framework by Dec 29’, Bangkok Post, 20 November 2014. 
7
 Ginsburg, n. 1, 72. 
8
 This thesis confines its discussion to the public sector ombudsman with  general jurisdiction. 
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government officials, where it finds them justified, proposing a remedy to restitute 
individual rights, and helps to enhance the reputation of government. The 1997 
Constitution might be described as creating a traditional and classic form of 
ombudsman, one which is based upon ombudsman schemes from around the world. 
This idea will be explored further in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The 2007 Constitution, 
however, enlarged the Ombudsman’s remit by entrusting it with two important 
additional functions: first, monitoring and evaluating compliance with the 
Constitution’s provisions, as well as providing recommendations on necessary 
constitutional amendments; and second supervising the ethical conduct of political 
office holders and government officials. The former function allows the Ombudsman 
to scrutinize whether the execution of public administration by the executive and its 
administrative branch is carried out according to the state policy set forth in the 
constitution, while in the latter the Ombudsman is empowered to determine alleged 
breaches of ethical conduct of both the holders of political positions and all kinds of 
public officials which will initiate disciplinary action for public officials and the 
removal procedures for persons who hold political positions. The 2007 constitution, 
therefore, transformed the Thai Ombudsman into a very expansive form of 
ombudsman scheme, one which is arguably unique in the ombudsman world, as will 
be explored further in Chapter 4. 
The Ombudsman is an important constitutional mechanism to ‘safeguard the 
rights of the people’ and also to contribute more in ‘inspecting the exercise of state 
power.’ However, so far the efficiency of the Ombudsman’s institution in Thailand 
has not been very high, as the empirical research in this thesis will demonstrate. This 
apparent lack of efficiency could be due to the relative ‘novelty’ and insufficient 
practical experience of this institution. However a recent study on the Thai 
Ombudsman has suggested that the Office is failing and that this is partly caused by 
it possessing too many diversified functions.9 It may also be that the critics of the 
ombudsman in Thailand fundamentally misunderstand the manner in which the 
office operates. The ombudsman office is generally established to fulfil certain 
functions or to fill gaps in existing constitutional provision, as circumstances require 
                                                                 
9
 Siriya Promradyod, Problems in Legal Position of the Thai Ombudsman , Master’s Degree  Thesis, 
Thammasat University, Bangkok, 2010. 
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and statutory authority allows.10  Its value lies in its ability to perform well those 
functions and responsibilities that other institutions cannot do and it is unwise to 
measure its success by the same means as, for instance, the courts . 11  But the 
criticisms need to be taken seriously, for it is also argued that an ombudsman office 
should not try to do too much or to aspire to take over the roles of other institutions 
or to perform tasks for which it is not well fitted; otherwise its effectiveness will be 
reduced and will risk abolition or emasculation. 12  There is a sense that the 
Ombudsman scheme in Thailand may be falling into this trap. 
In view of this adverse consequence, it is very much appropriate to undertake 
a comprehensive analysis of the functioning of the institution to discover any 
limitation in its structure or function affecting the work of the Ombudsman in order 
to suggest steps that might be taken to strengthen the institutions’ position as a 
mechanism for administrative justice. Underpinning this study is the belief that the 
Ombudsman is designed to fulfil the constitutional aspiration to protect the citizens 
against the exercise of state power by public officials in the performing of public 
functions.  In the furtherance of this goal, in this Introduction Chapter the following 
aspects are identified, and justification for each is advanced: the research questions 
of the thesis, the methodological approach that will be adopted to answer the 
questions, and the potential contribution of the thesis to the wider academic literature. 
The chapter ends with an overview of the organisation of the thesis.   
 
1.2 The aims of the research  
The study is underpinned by the widely accepted constitutional theory that 
the ombudsman institution has unique advantages in providing administrative 
                                                                 
10
 Trevor Buck, Richard Kirkham and Brian Thompson , The Ombudsman Enterprise and 
Administrative Justice,  Ashgate, Surrey, 2011, p. 16;  Mary  Seneviratne, Ombudsman Public Service 
and Administrative Justice, Butterworth, London, 2002, p. 7. 
11Seneviratne, n. 10, p. 11-12; Ibrah im al-Wahab, The Swedish Institution of Ombudsman , Stockholm, 
Centraltryckeriet AB Boras, 1979, p. 14-15; Vicotr O Ayeni, ‘Ombudsman Institution and Democracy 
in Africa-A Gender Perspective’, The International Ombudsman Yearbook , 61, 1997, p. 17-18; 
Dennis Pearce, ‘The Ombudsman: Review and Preview-The Importance of Being Different’, The 
Ombudsman Journal, No. 11, 1993, at 35. 
12
 Roy Gregory & Philip Giddings, ‘The ombudsman institution: growth and development’, in Roy 
Gregory & Philip Gidd ings (eds.), Righting Wrongs: The Ombudsman in Six Continents, IOS Press, 
Amsterdam, 2000, p. 1-20;  L Hurwitz, The State as Defendant Governmental Accountability and the 
Redress of Individual Grievances, Aldwych  Press, London, 1981, p. 102. 
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justice.13 The normative vision commonly offered in favour of an ombudsman is that 
the institution offers an independent mechanism to receive and consider complaints 
from aggrieved citizens against government officials in carrying out their duties. 
Such a service is necessary given the limitations inherent in the political measures 
offered to redress individual grievances and the cumbersome procedure and strict 
legal approach of judicial review in handling administrative justice. 14  It is also 
acknowledged that the ombudsman institution is an evolving concept and its limits 
have yet to be identified.15  Around the world offices have been assigned to perform 
an increasing variety of functions in addition to its traditional role in administrative 
justice. The experiences of ombudsman schemes globally have shown that the office 
can be successful in some roles while they may have only limited contributions to 
make in other roles.  In this regards, this study is also informed by the argument in 
the main literature by both scholars and practitioners that while it is important that an 
ombudsman can adjust to respond to the need required by the context in which it has 
been adopted, it is equally important that in order to be effective there are essential 
institutional design features of the ombudsman that must be adhered to whatever the 
exact mandate.16  
                                                                 
13
 Stephen Owen, ‘The expanding  role of the ombudsman in the admin istrative state’, University of 
Toronto Law Journal, 40, 1990, 70-686; P Nikiforos Diamandouros  ‘Legality  and good 
administration: is there a d ifference?’,  Speech at the Sixth Seminar of Nat ional Ombudsmen of EU 
Member States and Candidate Countries on ‘Rethinking Good Administration in the European 
Union’, Strasbourg, France, 15 October 2007,  retrieved 26 November 2013,  
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/speeches/en/2007-10-15.htm;  Buck et al., n. 10. 
14
 Marten Oosting, ‘The Ombudsman and h is environment: A  global view’, The Ombudsman Journal, 
No 13, 1995, p. 1; Richard Kirkham, ‘The 21st Century Ombudsman Enterprise’, paper presented to 
the IOI biennial conference, November 2012, Wellington, New Zealand,  retrieved 23 May 2013, 
http://www.theioi.org/downloads/o32s/Wellington%20Conference_04.%20Plenary%20II_Richard%2
0Kirkham%20Paper.pdf.; M A Marshall and Linda C Reif, ‘the Ombudsman: Maladmin istration and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution’, 34, Alberta Law Review, 1995, 215. 
15
 Charmaine A J Pemberton-Carrington, ‘The Ombudsman and development: Structural Adjustment 
and its effect on the Ombudsman institution’,  The Ombudsman Journal, No. 13, 1995, p. 141; Christ 
Field, ‘Recent evolutions in Australian Ombudsmen, presentation to the Australian Institute of  
Administrative Law National Forum 2009, retrieved,  2 January 2012, 
http://www.aial.org.au/Publicat ions/webdocuments/Forums/Forum63.pdf; Anita  Stuhmcke, ‘The 
Evolution of Classical Ombudsman : a view from the antipodes’, Int. J. of Public Law and Policy, 
Vol.2, No.1, 2012, at. 1; P Jiay ing and L I Cheong, Comparative Study of Ombudsman Systems of 
Asia, comparative Studies of Ombudsman Systems in Asia jointly sponsored by the Commission 
against Corruption of Macao, China, and the Macao Foundation, 2008.  
16 John McMillan, ‘The expanding Ombudsman Role: What fits? What doesn’t?’, presentation to 
Australia Pacific Ombudsman Region meet ing in  Melbourne on  27 March 2008, retrieved 15 
November 2013,  
http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/files/27_March_2008_The_expanding_Ombudsman_role_What_fits_
What_doesnt.pdf.; Pearce, n. 11,  p. 17;  Anita Stuhmcke, ‘Discretion, Direction and the Ombudsman: 
To Steer the Ship or to Choose the Ship?’, Conference Papers Wellington, 2012, retrieved 15 
November 2013, http://www.theioi.org/publications/wellington-2012-conference-papers; Stephen 
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Set within this context, this thesis has three main goals. First, it aims to 
examine the functions of the Ombudsman institution in Thailand to discover how it 
measures up to its objectives, as well as standard practice in the ombudsman world. 
Secondly, the thesis aims to review its institutional design. It is especially concerned 
with whether it is in line with the standard features of the ombudsman that can be 
identified from a range of literature and guidance on the topic. Thirdly, the thesis 
aims to establish whether the Thai Ombudsman operates with an excessive remit and 
identify whether its existing collection of roles is appropriate (or incompatible with 
the ombudsman’s principle).  
This aim is achieved through the following research strategies:  
• examining the conditions underpinning the establishment and 
evolution of the institution of the Ombudsman in Thailand; 
• analysing the generic concept of the institution of the Ombudsman 
and considering its place in the system of government in Thailand 
• studying the regulatory framework of the Ombudsman 
• identifying key functions of the Ombudsman 
• studying specific features of the Ombudsman 
• examining the additional functions of the Ombudsman and their 
implications on the standing of the office; 
• looking into the effectiveness of the Ombudsman in Thailand in terms 
of its practical impact and considering the ways in which it may be 
improved to enhance this impact 
This thesis is written from a socio- legal perspective in the sense that it does 
not look at the law alone but considers also how law surrounding the Ombudsman in 
Thailand has been implemented and enforced in the context of broader social and 
political theories.17  Frequently in the study of the ombudsman it is not ‘law’ as such 
that has attracted the interest of scholars, rather the focus of attention has tended to 
be upon actual performance of the institution.  It is pointed out that what matters in 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Owen, ‘The Ombudsman: Essential Elements and Common Challenges’, in L inda C Reif (ed.), The 
International Ombudsman Anthology, Kluwer Law International, the Hague, 1999, p. 51-71. 
17
 S Wheeler and P A Thomas, ‘Socio-Legal Studies’ in D J Hayton (ed .), Law’s Future(s), Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2002, 271;  John Baldwin and Gwynn Davis, ‘Empirical Research in Law’, 
Chapter 39 in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet, The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies, Oxford 
University  Press, 2003, p. 880-881. 
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the end is not the theory of ombudsmanship, but the impact of the role.18 Central to 
the study is the analysis of the empirical findings as to whether the Thai Ombudsman 
can perform according to their legal mandate and expectation and whether the 
scheme can adhere to its essential features.   
 
1.3 Methods 
This study adopts a socio- legal perspective of which its approach has been 
described as essentially descriptive and explanatory.19  However this study in a broad 
sense makes a primary evaluation of the Thai Ombudsman scheme, in line with 
Danet’s approach in which she describes evaluation as ‘the analysis of a set of 
activities to test whether they contribute effectively toward the pursuit of some goals 
or goal.’20 There are many approaches that could be taken towards the study of the 
Ombudsman. In this study empirical research is considered appropriate as empirical 
research in law aim to study the institutions, rules, procedures and personnel of the 
law through direct methods rather than secondary sources, with a view to 
understanding the way they operate and what effects they have. 21   In this thesis 
therefore the enquiry concerns the actual performance of the scheme. This 
performance will be examined so as to find out how the legal mandates of the Thai 
Ombudsman have been translated into action. This empirical study of the 
performance of the Thai Ombudsman is supported by an examination of its 
institutional features in order to establish whether the structure of the scheme best 
guarantees that the minimum conditions for an effective ombudsman institution exist.  
The research conducted in this thesis is primarily documentary, supplemented 
by a series of elite interviews. 22  For documentary analysis, the document used 
published materials; official documents include statutes, Parliamentary debates, 
annual reports, investigation reports, complaints statistics, and articles by 
ombudsmen, newspapers, journals and periodicals. The aim of this mode of research 
is to investigate a range of academic, theoretical and policy-based opinions on the 
ombudsman institution, the purpose for establishing the Thai Ombudsman office, the 
                                                                 
18
 Fredrik Uggla, ‘The Ombudsman in Latin America’, Journal of Latin American Studies, Volume 
36, Issue 03, August 2004, p. 423-450.   
19
 Baldwin and Davis, n. 17, p. 880. 
20
 B Danet, ‘Towards a Method of Evaluation the Ombudsmen’, Administration and Society, 10(3) 
335, 1978, 340.   
21
 Baldwin and Davis, n. 17, p. 880.  
22
 List of the interviewees and justification for this method is discussed below under Section 1.5. 
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expectation of it and the powers and functions of the Thai Ombudsman as provided 
by law and its actual practice. Complaints statistics have also been used to gauge the 
performance of the Ombudsman as they are useful in revealing the volume of 
complaints, their subject matter, the proportion investigated and the outcomes.  The 
annual reports and statistics can reveal important measures about the operation of the 
office, including the statistics available relating to the work load, throughput times, 
the number of justified complaints and whether the matter was rectified.  
 Interviews are also important in order to investigate in more detail the 
information found in the documents, and to discover perceptions of the system. 
Interviews give atmosphere and colour to a study, sometimes revealing entirely new 
information and thus offering another dimension of understanding. 23   The data 
obtained from desk-based research will be supported by data obtained through a 
series of elite interviews using semi-structured questions. They can reveal any gaps 
in the documentation, and the underlying motives and how the Ombudsman and the 
parties concerned perceive what they do.24 The perception of stakeholders could be 
an important tool in order to find the performance and effectiveness of the institution.  
The method adopted  in this thesis correspond with method employed in previous 
research on an individual ombudsman scheme.25 
 
1.4 Original contribution 
Before the establishment of the Ombudsman in Thailand, a number of studies 
were conducted into the potential benefits of an ombudsman to Thailand. However 
since the office’s establishment there has been no comprehensive review of its legal 
framework or its actual functions alongside an empirical study of its work and the 
perceptions of the Ombudsman amongst concerned stakeholders. This thesis 
therefore offers an original contribution, particularly by providing the first 
descriptive data from empirical research on the practice of the Thai Ombudsman, an 
analysis which has not been conducted before. In addition there has been no holistic 
low level or high level review of the work of the Ombudsman since it was introduced. 
                                                                 
23
 F Brookman, L Noakes and E Wincup, Qualitative Research in Criminology, Ashgate, Aldershot, 
1999, p. 137. 
24
 Baldwin and Davis, n. 17, p. 880. 
25
 For example,  Mary Seneviratne, ‘Researching Ombudsman’, in Reza Banakar and Max Travers 
(ed.), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research,  Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland Oregon, 
2005,  p. 161. 
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The study provides the first critical qualitative analysis of the overall Thai 
Ombudsman system, in so doing, contributes to a wider academic discourse on the 
inherent strengths and limits of the Ombudsman as a constitutional institution.  The 
results of this research could assist constitutional drafters and policy–makers to 
identify areas of organisational and institutional reform, in order to improve the 
Ombudsman’s effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness, and in the process, 
promote democratic governance in Thailand. 
It is also claimed that this thesis will add to the still underdeveloped literature 
on the ombudsman globally. The ombudsman institution is one that is relatively 
young in constitutional terms. Around the world, many schemes have been 
established and their operation and interface with other constitutional institutions has 
received widespread academic attention in many countries and nearly every 
continent. The empirical findings from my work contribute to inform and update 
existing theoretical perceptions as to when and how the ombudsman is at its most 
effective. Further there is an increasing body of literature on the institution in the 
West but the literature on ombudsmen in Asia is few. 26  This research can serve as a 
collection and synthesis of data that can be utilized in further research and also 
provide base literature for those who want to conduct further resea rch and ascertain 
the foundational criteria for adopting a successful ombudsman scheme. 
 
1.5 The Structure of this thesis 
This thesis has 10 chapters which are divided into three main parts:    
Part One - theoretical foundation 
Following on from the introduction, Part One (consisting of Chapters 2, 3 and 
4) draws on the constitutional theory of the liberal democratic modern state to 
understand why an ombudsman might be needed and what it is that an ombudsman 
scheme is designed to achieve. It starts from the premise that a basic separation of 
powers by itself cannot guarantee adequate protection of citizens from abuses of state 
                                                                 
26
 The Ombudsman has arrived in Asia only in 1972 when the first ombudsman office was established 
in the Indian province of Maharashtra, see Alice Tai, ‘Diversity of Ombudsmen in Asia’, Conference 
Papers, Stockholm, 2009, retrieved 23 May 2013, 
http://www.theioi.org/downloads/74sji/Stockholm%20Conference_29.%20Back%20to%20the%20Ro
ots_Alice%20Tai.pdf. 
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powers by government. Chapter 3 reflects on a normative understanding of what 
is/should be the role of an ombudsman system and the essential features that an 
ombudsman scheme should possess, which will be used for the assessment of the 
Thai Ombudsman in Part III.   The chapter focuses on the ombudsman’s accepted 
core function, which is the pursuit of administrative fairness, and explores the 
ombudsman’s essential features which reflect the principle and manners of operation 
that support such role. Chapter 4 explores the major non-traditional roles practiced 
by the existing ombudsman schemes namely fighting corruption and human rights 
protection. The chapter identifies changes to the fundamental features of ombudsman 
schemes which are necessary to accommodate such non-traditional roles and also 
explores the difficulties experienced by such schemes and the factors that affect its 
effectiveness.  This study is done by examining the evidence on the spread of 
functions in the experiences of ombudsman schemes around the world from the 
existing literature and will use the experiences to inform the potential problems in the 
functioning of the Thai Ombudsman. 
 
Part Two - Empirical studies 
Part Two of this thesis consists of Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. The fifth chapter 
will demonstrate that the Thai Constitution has attempted to control the use of the 
state’s powers by introducing new independent bodies, with one of them being the 
Office of the Ombudsman. The purpose for the establishment of the Thai 
Ombudsman and the constitutional mandate that has been allocated to it will be 
identified. The following chapters present the findings. Chapter 6 identifies that the 
primary function of the Ombudsman is to redress administrative grievances and 
improve administrative practice.  It goes on to explore the evidence of the 
Ombudsman’s effectiveness in delivering upon this function.  Chapter 7 focuses on 
the non-traditional functions of the Thai Ombudsman, namely reviewing complaints 
about the constitutionality of public sector activity, monitoring and evaluating 
implementation of the provisions of the Constitution by government agencies, and 
monitoring the enforcement of code of ethics for political office holders and state 
officials. Here to, evidence is uncovered as to the degree to which the Ombudsman 
has been able to deliver upon these functions. In this section, Chapter 8 focuses on 
the Thai Ombudsman’s institutional features, in terms of its legal arrangements and 
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how they are implemented in reality. The robustness of such arrangements are 
interrogated.  
Throughout this thesis, and in this Part II particular, I have examined and 
analysed the functions of the Ombudsman based on its performance and activities as 
collected through my empirical studies. The data obtained from desk-based research 
is supported by data obtained through a series of elite interviews using semi-
structured questions. Interviews have been undertaken with the following people: the 
Thai Chief Ombudsman Panit Nitithanprapas; Ombudsman Professor Sriracha 
Charoenpanich; Dr. Issarabhath  Teerabhathsiri, Director, the Thai Ombudsman 
Office; Wasan Thepmanee, Public Relations Officer, The Thai Ombudsman Office; 
Surachai Liengboonlertchai, a member of the 2007 Constitution Drafting Assembly 
(CDA), former First Vice-President of the Senate (at the time the interview with the 
author was taken place) and  President of the Senate, who gave opinions on the Thai 
Ombudsman and; Soonton Maneesawat, Professor of Public law and a State 
Councillor;  Banjerd Singkaneti, Professor of Public Law and a member of the Law 
Reform Commission of Thailand; and Kamol Suksomboon, Inspector-General/ 
Deputy Permanent Secretary to Office of the Prime Minister. 
Elite27  interviewing has for long been a key qualitative research method for 
social research 28  and its justification in socio- legal studies has been argued. 29 
Through this form of research, interviews are utilised for the purposes of allowing 
researchers to ask open-ended questions and enabling the respondent to talk freely so 
as to best elicit the interviewees’ own accounts of their experiences and perspectives. 
In this respect, conducting interviews with elites is a useful technique, not only for 
                                                                 
27
 There are various definition of ‘elite’ but the dominant defin ition  that emerges from reviewing the 
elite interviewing literature focuses on people in powerful positions: those in senior political and 
executive roles, see e.g. R Peabody, Webb Hammond, S Torcom, J Brown, LP Thompson, C  
Kolodny, ‘Interviewing Political Elites ’, PS: Political Science and Politics, 1990, 23(3) at 451; L 
McDowell,  ‘Elites in the City of London: some methodological considerations ’, Environment and 
Planning, 1998 , 30, 2135; S Rivera, P M Kozyreva, E G Sarovskii, ‘Interviewing Po lit ical Elites’, 
PS: Political Science and Politics, 2002, at  683; B L Leech, ‘Interview Methods in Po lit ical Science’,  
PS: Political Science and  Politics, 2002, at 663, D Lilleker, ‘Doing Po lit ics, Interviewing the Polit ical 
Elite: Navigating a Potential Minefield’, Politics, 2003, 23(3) at 207. 
28
 E.g. D R Matthews, US Senators and Their World, Vintage Books, New York, 1960; L A Dexter, 
The Sociology and Politics of Congress, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1969.    
29
 L Dexter,  Elite and Specialized Interviewing , Northwestern University Press, Evanston USA, 1970; 
Keohane King, and S Verba,  Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 
Princeton University Press , New Jersey, 1994, 25-6; A Paterson, The Law Lords, Macmillan, London, 
1982; Trevor Buck, Administrative Justice and Alternative Dispute Resolution: the Australian 
experience, Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA), DCA Research Series 9/05, London: DCA , 
2005.  
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gathering rich detail about the thoughts and attitudes of key elites concerning the 
central issues of the research, but also to serve the purpose of confirming the 
accuracy of information that has previously been collected from documentary 
sources. Elite interviews can also be to test ideas and hypotheses about the subject-
matter with participants who are very knowledgeable and have a relevant interest in 
exploring those ideas with the interviewer.  
As with all research techniques, elite interviewing has to be treated with 
caution, which is why in this thesis care has been taken in most instances to support 
the findings obtained from the interviews held with other data. Due to the social 
status of elite research participants, the literature on elite interviewing frequently 
points to issues around the power imbalance between interviewers and elite 
interviewees.30 In particular, the unequal power relationship in an interview can have 
an impact upon the reliability of data quality gathered via the interview.31 One major 
concern is that interviewees are in a position to manipulate information.32 In addition, 
the elites tend to feel that they represent their organizations to the outside world and 
therefore it is not uncommon for researchers to hear the ‘public relations’ version 
instead of their personal account.33 
Whilst being aware of the risk, the potential for being manipulated was not a 
major factor in this study. For one of the interviewees there was already an 
established contact with (the interviewee is the founder of the Law Department 
(Professor Sriracha Charoenpanich) where the author is working). This connection 
helped also to decrease the perceived gap in status between the researcher and all the 
elite interviewees. It is suggested that gaining the interviewees’ trust and establishing 
rapport with them proved invaluable in obtaining the interviewees’ own perception.34     
In this research the author, a PhD student writing an academic research, was deemed 
by the office holders as a ‘neutral outsider’ which, according to Welch, is trusted as 
she/he can be perceived not to pose any threat to the interviewees’ status and 
                                                                 
30
 C Welch, R Marschan-Piekkari, H Penttinen, N Tahvanainen, ‘Corporate elites as informants in 
qualitative international business research’. International Business Review, 11, 2002, 625. 
31
 Anna Boucher, Ahmar Mahboob & Lydia Dutcher, ‘Power and solidarity in elite interviews ’, A 
paper for the American Political Science Association General Meeting, Chicago , 28 August – 1 
September, 2013. 
32
 D Richards, ‘Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls ’, Politics, 1996, 16(3), 201; Lilleker, n. 27, 
211.  
33
 Robert Mikecz, ‘Interviewing Elites: Addressing Methodological Issues ’, Qualitative Inquiry, 2012, 
18(6), 484. 
34
 Welch, n. 30; E C Sabot, ‘Dr. Jekyl, Mr. H(i)de: The contrasting face of elites at interview’, 
Geoforum, 1999, 30.  
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position.35  Building on this observation, in my experience the elites perceived the 
interview as an opportunity to have an informed discussion. Welch found that of 
various feedback procedures the most successful was sending a draft report  to key 
informants for the purpose of checking accuracy and obtaining additional data. 36 In 
this regard, the draft research report was sent to the key informants for the same 
reasons. 
Part Three – Evaluation and conclusion 
Chapter 9 is an analysis chapter which brings together the problems in the 
operation of the Ombudsman that have been identified and discussed in the forgoing 
chapters. Based on the analysis, this thesis argues that, despite limitations and 
shortcomings the Ombudsman has already made an important contribution to the 
protection of citizens’ rights and helped improve administrative practice. However, if 
it were to make an even better contribution then some changes would be needed to 
the areas of performance issues, mandates and institutional design.  The chapter 
offers recommendations for improvement of the scheme and remarks in relation to 
the ombudsman scheme in general.  The final chapter, Chapter 10, will be a short 
chapter which summarises the findings of earlier chapters.  
 
                                                                 
35
 Welch, n. 30. 
36
 Welch, n. 30, at 624.  
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Introduction 
 
 ‘If the state is strong, it will crush us; if it is weak, we will perish.’1 
 
This thesis works from the premise that the best argument for deployment of 
an ombudsman institution is that the office is a vital constitutional tool in the aspiration 
of promoting good government and administrative justice. In this section of the thesis 
I will start from the premise that a ‘good government’ is created to protect individual 
rights and promote the welfare of society.2 To guarantee that individuals enjoy their 
private lives, a government is therefore vested with public powers sufficient to 
discharge its duties.3 But, once established, there is a risk that in carrying out its 
functions, government power can become excessive. 4 In order to prevent such an 
outcome, a liberal constitution secures individual rights and controls the exercise of 
state power. It does this by creating a framework wherein governmental institutions 
can work efficiently, but within the restraint and control of mechanisms that limit 
governmental power. 5 Debates about the ombudsman enterprise fit squarely within 
this requirement to construct appropriate control mechanisms.  
Famously, the doctrine of the separation of powers has been a key liberal 
constitutional technique used to achieve such control. The doctrine’s tripartite model 
creates a ‘check and balances’ system to prevent one person or a group of persons 
possessing dominating powers and to tackle the risk of arbitrariness and abuse of 
power.  This way the rule of law can be achieved and the rights and liberties of the 
people are protected.  But in the modern state administration system, control through 
the tripartite model alone may not be sufficient to provide satisfactory control over the 
exercise of public powers. The scale of state activities has risen resulting in the 
                                                          
1
 Paul Valery as quoted by Vito Tanzi, ‘The Changing Role of the State in the Economy: A Historical 
Perspective’, IMF Working Paper, 1997, p.1, retrieved 11 December 2011, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp97114.pdf. 
2
 This practice is based upon a classical liberal theory of governance; see generally Richard A. Epstein, 
The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited Government, Harvard University 
Press, 2013.  
3
 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690), Chapter 2,  based on the paperback 
book, John Locke Second Treatise of Government, edited, with an Introduction, by C B McPherson, 
Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1980. 
4 William Pitt, speech, Hansard (House of Lords), 9 January 1770, col. 665.  
5
 For example, Eric Barendt, An Introduction to Constitutional Law, Oxford University Press, London, 
1998, p. 21;  Bruce Ackerman, 'The New Separation of Powers', 113 Harvard Law Review, 2000, p. 
685. 
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increase in the discretionary powers given to the executive. This has led to a need for 
additional protection against administrative arbitrariness. In particular, a regular 
experience which evolving constitutions has been the lack of available redress for 
those aggrieved by administrative decisions while promoting good administration in 
public service is becoming an increasingly important issue.6 
These challenges to the control of governmental power are of especial concern 
in new or emergent democracies, where human rights violations and corruption remain 
endemic problems.7  In particular, there is real scepticism about the efficiency of 
democratic control alone to reward or punish politicians through free and fair elections. 
Meanwhile, judicial review is restricted to questions of legality only.  Therefore, there 
is a widely accepted argument that the actions of governments must be subjected to 
additional external examination by organisations outside of the ordinary political and 
legal processes.8  The overall goal remains making government accountable to its 
citizens, but the addition of new tools of accountability is necessary. 
As a result of these pressures, ‘accountability institutions’9 have been created 
in many countries across the world. These bodies operate independently, and often 
outside the legislative and judicial spheres.  Their purpose is to oversee governmental 
actions in the areas of the particular body’s specialised functions. One of these 
‘accountability institutions’ is the ombudsman. From the first ombudsman created in 
Sweden (1713), the institution of the ombudsman later spread to European and some 
Commonwealth countries, and from the mid-1950s onwards ombudsman institutions 
have spread quickly around the world. The worldwide spread of the Ombudsman idea 
is well-covered and therefore there is no need for detailed description of that 
phenomenon here. 10 Suffice it to say, for the purposes of our discussion, that starting 
                                                          
6
 Daniel C Esty, ‘Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law’, 115 
Yale Law Journal, 2006, 1490.  
7
 Andreas Schedler, ‘Introduction’,  in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F Plattner (eds.), 
The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 
London, 1999.   
8
 ibid., also Trevor Buck, Richard Kirkham and Brian Thompson, The Ombudsman Enterprise and 
Administrative Justice, Ashgate, Surrey, 2011, p. 16. 
9
 ibid. 
10
 For example, L B Hill, ‘International Transfer of the Ombudsman’ in R L Meritt (ed.) Communication 
in International Politics, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1972; L B Hill, ‘Institutionalization, the 
Ombudsman, and Bureaucracy’,  Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 68, 1974, 1075; Donald C Rowat ‘The Spread of 
the Ombudsman Plan in Western Europe’ Occasional paper no 21, IOI, February 1983; G E Caiden 
(ed.) International Handbook of the Ombudsman: Evolution and Present Function, Greenwood Press, 
Westport 1983; Donald C Rowat, ‘The Spread of the Ombudsman Idea in the United States’, Occasional 
Paper no. 26, IOI, April 1984; Donald C Rowat,  The Ombudsman Plan: The Worldwide Spread of an 
Idea, 2nd edn., University Press of America, Lanham, 1985; B Thomson, ‘Spatial Diffusion of the 
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from the early 1950s and within half a century the ombudsman concept rapidly became 
a worldwide known idea, a universally acknowledged oversight mechanism for 
promoting better administration. 11   According to the International Ombudsman 
Institute (IOI), there are now ombudsmen in around 175 countries around the world.12 
The role of the ombudsman is deemed by some as worthy of consideration alongside 
the role of ’traditional’ constitutional institutions, that is, the legislature and the 
judiciary, in upholding certain constitutional values, such as the rule of law and good 
administration.13   
This thesis adopts from the premise that a complete study of the ombudsman 
ought to begin with an analysis of the roles of the modern constitution, in order to 
identify the potential contribution of the ombudsman within it. Therefore Part I of the 
thesis concerns this important context for the subsequent discussion. Part I is divided 
into three chapters. Chapter 2 will describe the evolving constitutional doctrine of 
separation of powers as a tool to restrain the exercise of public power. It will then 
address the strengths and weaknesses of the separation of powers doctrine as a 
constitutional device to control government in the modern state. Chapter 3 focuses on 
the theoretical context in which the ombudsman operates. It reviews literature on the 
traditional role of ombudsman and then seeks to understand the basic institutional 
design characteristics of the ombudsman institution. Chapter 4 examines various 
models as developed in ombudsman practice around the world and will chart the 
conferral of additional functions on the ombudsman institutions.  The aim of this part 
of the thesis is to understand the contribution of the ombudsman to the overall 
governance system in modern democracies. 
                                                          
Ombudsman Institution: African Adaptations of a European Innovation-The Consolidation Problem’, 
10 The Ombudsman Journal 57, 1992; John Robertson, ‘The Ombudsman Around the World’, in Linda 
C Reif (ed.),  The International Ombudsman Yearbook 112, 2, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
1998. 
11
 Buck et al., n. 8, p. 53. 
12
 International Ombudsman Institute, February 2015, IOI Regions, retrieved 4 February 2015, 
http://www.theioi.org/ioi-regions. 
13
 Buck et al., n. 8, p. 52. There are several ways in which the role of the ombudsman in the constitution 
can be conceptualised, see Chris Gill, ‘The evolving role of the ombudsman: a conceptual and 
constitutional analysis of the ‘Scottish solution’ to administrative justice’, Public Law, October, 2014, 
pp. 674-9. 
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Chapter 2 
Positioning the Ombudsman in the Constitutional 
Structure 
It is widely accepted that the exercise of public power must be constrained by 
the constitution in order to protect the rights and liberties of the citizen, and to prevent 
arbitrary government. 14  In most liberal democracies, constitutional thinking has 
majored on the legislature and judiciary, which respectively provide legal and political 
control over the executive branch. However, experiences in many countries have 
demonstrated flaws in these traditional mechanisms and over at least the last century 
constitutional design has steadily evolved to incorporate a new variety of institutions, 
including the ombudsman, to provide additional control over the government in areas 
in which traditional control is not effective.  
This chapter explores the background context for the emergence of the 
ombudsman and the framework within which it operates. It is divided into four 
sections. The first section describes the importance of the constitution as a tool in 
limiting state power and protecting the rights and liberties of the people, including the 
key constitutional features of liberal democracy: the separation of powers. The second 
section discusses the control provided by the constitutional mechanisms such as the 
legislature and the judiciary and the inadequacy of such control. Section three 
addresses the emergence of new institutions, especially the ombudsman, as additional 
machinery in the constitution. Section four provides overview of constitutional 
development in Asia. The chapter ends by addressing concerns that Thailand is not yet 
ready for a constitution fully based on liberal democratic values.  
      
2.1 Constitutions and controlling of public power 
At the core of constitutional theorizing in the liberal tradition is the idea that 
the primary state function is the protection of life, liberties, and property, together with 
                                                          
14
 Thomas Fleiner, Lidija B Fleiner, Constitutional Democracy in a Multicultural and Globalised 
World, Springer Science & Business Media, Berlin, 2009, p. 155. 
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all other functions that are necessary to the civic organization of society. 15   A 
government is created to carry out these tasks.16  This perspective is as true as in 
Thailand as any other country or society in the world. In order to function effectively 
it must possess the capacity to govern. But, history has shown that those who hold 
public power, without adequate oversight and control, can use it arbitrarily or to serve 
their own interest. If we consider the histories of many countries around the world, we 
can see continual attempts to make those who exercise governmental power respect 
and recognize the fundamental rights and liberties of individuals.  
 
2.1.1 Constitutions as a means of protecting individual rights and liberty 
A key method to restrain the government from arbitrary use and abuse of power 
has been to subject those who hold public power to law; early examples of this method 
are the Magna Carta in England and the Hindu Dharmasatra.17  Today a hallmark 
endeavor to limit government power by law is the acceptance of the written 
constitution as the fundamental law of the polity. Constitutions are designed to control 
the exercise of political power by determining the form of state governance, organise 
the structure of mechanisms in administering the state, regulate the exercise of their 
powers and, most importantly, provide a legitimate source of political power.18   
                                                          
15
 In this thesis I do not intend to explore the foundations of public law theory in great depth. However, 
the conclusion that the preservation and promotion of the liberties of the individual is the central 
function of the constitution is a common one amongst theorists in this area. For an introduction see 
Fleiner et al., n. 14, p. 155.  
16
 The necessity of government is reflected in the manner that Thailand’s constitution has evolved. The 
function of the government was first elaborated in writing by the 1932 coup leader in the first statement 
issued after the successful overthrow of King Rama VII, which ended the absolute regime of the 
monarch. In governing the state, the coup aimed to achieve six objectives: 
1) Maintain the nation’s economic and political independence.  
2) Maintain public safety and reduce crime. Nurture economic prosperity. Ensure job security for 
all people.  
3) Adopt national economic plan and guarantee well-being - no one will be left to starvation. 
4) Ensure equal rights for all.  
5) Protect people’s freedom and liberties provided that it is not contrary to the above. 
6) Provide education for all people. 
17
 Influenced by Indian civilisation, royal judgment or decision of The Thai monarchs necessarily had 
to be consistent with the Thammasat or the Thai version of the Hindu Dharmasatra, see S Viraphol, 
‘Law in Traditional Siam and China: A Comparative Study’, 65 Journal of the Siam Society 81, 1977, 
at 93-100.  
18
 Larry Alexander, ‘Constitutionalism’ in  Thomas Christiano, John Christman (eds.), 
Constitutionalism Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy, San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 
07-04, 2005, retrieved 12 August 2014, SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=802885;  Starting with the 
Constitution of the United States (1787), constitutions have generally been confirmed in a single 
codified document, containing provisions that limit the exercise of power of the government or other 
holders of public powers and guarantee basic rights and freedoms, the first French Constitution (1791) 
prescribed rights guaranteed by the Constitution (such as the right to assemble peaceably and without 
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Since at least the First World War, countries around the world have regularly 
adopted constitutions which observe to a certain extent human rights, the rule of law, 
judicial review, limited government and the separation of powers. 19  Increasingly 
written constitutions have become the standard form for democracy, protection of 
basic rights and the rule of law.20 Thailand is one example of this wider trend.21 
 
2.1.2 The traditional theories of separation of powers 
Merely endowing democratic and statutory legitimacy to public powers, 
subjecting public bodies to law or expressly prescribing fundamental rights under the 
constitution would not be adequate to prevent the government from becoming 
despotic, as long as governments are run by human beings who, if left unrestrained, 
will be tempted to abuse power.22 A key solution to this dilemma in liberal writing has 
been the doctrine of separation of powers as a model for the government of a state that 
can prevent dangerous concentrations of power forming. 
 Montesquieu formulated the doctrine of the separation of powers by dividing 
state functions and each function is assigned to three separated parallel branches which 
are: the legislature makes the law; the executive puts the law into effect; and the 
judiciary uses the law to settle disputes. 23  His reasoning was that if the executive and 
the legislative functions of government are exercised by the same person or body, there 
is a danger of the legislature enacting oppressive laws which the executive will enforce 
                                                          
arms) as ‘natural rights’ that the legislative  power may not make any law infringe upon (i.e. right to 
assemble peaceably and without arms). The Federal Republic of Germany (1949) set forth certain rights 
as ‘basic rights’ and stipulated that they cannot be restricted. 
19
 For example, Louis Henkin, ‘A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influence and Genetic 
Defects’, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 533, 1992 - 1993; M J C Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of 
Powers, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1998, p. 7.  
20
 For example constitution of Australia (1900), Mauritius (1968), Cyprus (1960), Tanzania (1965); for 
descriptions of how constitutionalism has swept to the world, see generally Samuel Huntington, The 
third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century, University of Oklahoma Press, 1993; Bruce 
Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Evolution, Yale University Press, 1992; S A de Smith, The New 
Commonwealth and its Constitutions, Penguin, London, 1973, Part I; Mary Kaldor & Ivan Vejvoda 
(eds.), Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, Continuum, London, UK. 2002; Ian Jeffries, 
The Countries of the Former Soviet Union at the Turn of the Twenty-first Century, Routledge, New 
York, 2004; more discussion see  Jörg Menzel , ‘Constitutionalism in Southeast Asia: Some 
Comparative Perspectives’, in  Clauspeter Hill and Jörg Menzel  (eds.), Constitutionalism in Southeast 
Asia, Vol. 3, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Singapore, 2009, pp. 9-11. 
21
 This issue is to be discussed in more depth in section 2.2.3. 
22
 E G Henderson, Foundations of English Administrative Law, Harvard, 1963, p. 5. 
23
 Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois (1748), in Anne M Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold 
Samuel Stone (eds.), Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1989. 
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to attain its own ends. The same applies to the judiciary, which therefore should be 
separated from the legislature and the executive. The doctrine is thus widely referred 
to as the tripartite institutional system.  
The doctrine of separation of powers has become the essence of liberal 
constitutions since the eighteenth century, guaranteeing limited government in order 
to safeguard the rights of the people. For example, Madison addresses the means to 
create appropriate check and balances and advocates a separation of powers within the 
government in the drafting of the US Constitution.24 Likewise, the French Declaration 
of Rights of Man of 1789, article 16 states ‘Any society in which the safeguarding of 
rights is not assured, and the separation of powers is not established, has no 
constitution.’ 
The separation of powers doctrine in modern times serves as a key principle of 
liberal constitutional thought on how the institutional structures within a constitution 
should be arranged,25 with many recent developments designed to refine and safeguard 
a clearer separation of the three branches.26    
 
2.2 Inadequacy of control under the separation of powers  
Despite its influential position in conceptual liberal democratic thought and its 
practical strength as described above, the tripartite model is viewed by many as an 
insufficient means to cope with the changes in the government structure that have 
occurred over the last century. Two features of modern governments commonly 
identified as undermining the effectiveness of the tripartite structure in restraining the 
power of the executive are the partisan support in the political party system and the 
                                                          
24
 James Madison, ‘Federalist, No. 51’ (1787), in Ira C Lupu, ‘The Most-Cited Federalist Papers’, 
Constitutional Commentary, Vol. 15, Issue 3, (Fall 1998), University of Minnesota Law School. 
25
 Eric Barendt, ‘Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government’, PL 599, 1995, at 599; Roger 
Masterman, The Separation of Powers in the Contemporary Constitution, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2011, p. 16. 
26
 See the introduction of the Supreme Court in the UK, ‘A clearer separation between those who make 
the law and those who administer it’ as remarked by Lord Phillip of Worth Matrervers, Press Notice 
01/09 ‘Supreme Court of the United Kingdom comes into existence’, 1 October 2009, retrieved 11 
December 2011, www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/pr_-0109_2_.pdf; for debates in Australia see 
Andrew Bartlett Senator for Queensland, ‘Australian Democrats, Separation of Powers’, 25 March 
2009, retrieved 8 February 2013,  
http://www.democrats.org.au/docs/ActionPlans/PrimeMinister_SeparationPowers_2007.pdf Prime 
Minister & Cabinet; the United State Senate,  
http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm. 
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rise of administrative power.27 This section will discuss briefly how the executive has 
grown stronger than the legislature in modern states undermining constitutional 
‘checks and balances’ and how the tripartite model cannot, by itself, effectively work 
to constrain the executive power as it had been ideally hoped for.  
2.2.1 The separation of powers and the political party system 
Political parties are widely considered as essential to a modern representative 
democracy because they offer choices for the citizens to select among different ideas 
of how they want to be governed, as well as providing candidates the opportunity to 
participate in elections.28 Nevertheless, the input of political parties can also result in 
another effect: the domination of the executive, that is, in modern party-based politics 
the executive branch can dominate and control the legislature.  Along these lines, there 
is a large literature on the impact of political parties in relation to the inadequacy of 
the tripartite model as a constitutional design to safeguard the liberties of the citizen 
against tyranny and arbitrary use of power.29  
Research has found that disciplined partisan support for political parties are a 
major factor in undermining the effective scrutiny of the executive by the legislature.30 
In parliamentary systems, the legislative branch can scrutinize the government by 
debates, through questions in parliament and the use of committee hearings. The 
executive branch or the government of the day cannot operate effectively without the 
support of the majority of the legislature. In this way, the separation of power between 
the executive and the legislature can help discipline an omnipotent legislature or 
executive. However, it is pointed out that this system requires appropriate checks and 
balances between the two branches to work effectively, which means there are 
conflicts of interest between the executive and the legislature, while agreement from 
both the two bodies is required for public policy.31  
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However, in reality the government frequently has majority support in 
parliament and party discipline makes sure that legislators vote with their respective 
parties. As the governing party leader normally becomes head of the government, it is 
less likely that a member of the party will scrutinize his party leader as doing so might 
risk losing his chance of nomination for election or more severely lead to expulsion 
from the party.  As a result, the concern is that ‘individual self-preservation leads most 
MPs to support the leadership through thick and thin’. 32  In addition, a majority 
government can adopt legislation which it needs for implementing its policy as voting 
on bills is largely controlled by the whip, while bills that lack support from the 
government are likely to fail.  Consequently, the majority of bills adopted by 
parliament are initiated and sponsored by the executive. The executive dominance 
inevitably weakens the effective scrutiny of the executive by the legislative branch and 
undermines its effectiveness in performing its primary role as a legislative body.33  
Party discipline and executive monopoly are common aspects of nearly all 
parliamentary systems that have adopted the Westminster style, 34  for example 
Australia, 35  Ireland, 36  India, Thailand 37  and Canada, 38  where strong majority 
governments face little challenge from the legislatures because of party discipline.  
Thailand provides a good illustration of the accountability problems that can result 
from an excessive reliance on Parliamentary democracy to deliver accountability. In 
Thailand, the opposition parliamentarians are seen as having little chance of winning 
a no-confidence vote because they lack a majority in the lower house, and party 
discipline ensures that the executive will get support from the controlling party. In fact, 
since the adoption of a democratic parliamentary system of government 79 years ago, 
many motions of no confidence have been lodged, but no government has been 
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removed as a result of a confidence vote. In an attempt to address this situation, the 
2007 Constitution, Section 122 prescribes: 
Members of the House of Representatives and senators are 
representatives of the Thai people and free from any mandate, 
commitment or control, and shall honestly perform the duties for the 
common interests of the Thai people without conflict of interest.  
Notwithstanding this constitutional provision, in the most recent vote of no 
confidence on 28th November 2011 against the Justice Minister Pracha Promnok, the 
Minister survived with a result that showed no sign of free vote, suggesting party 
discipline is still enforced strongly.  
In a presidential system the separation between the legislature and the 
executive is more distinct, as the executive is not drawn from the legislature. 
Nevertheless, the US system of checks and balances can also be undermined by the 
influence of political parties which create alliances among public officeholders and 
therefore erode the boundaries between the legislative and executive branches. 39 
Jackson observed that the rise of the party system has added extra power to the 
executive branch beyond what is granted to it by the constitution because ‘party 
loyalties and interest are sometimes more binding than the law’.40 The President as a 
political leader can use his power to control the other branch effectively. Strong 
executives in the presidential system can happen even when the three institutions are 
not controlled by the same political party.  
 According to Ackerman,41  when a legislative impasse occurs, one of the 
options that Presidents can use to get through the gridlock of impasse is using unilateral 
decrees to solve pressing problems; this power often exceeds their constitutional 
authority. However instead of protesting, representatives are relieved that they can get 
away from making hard political decisions. Succeeding presidents have used these 
precedents to expand their decree power further and the emerging practice following 
the decrees may even be codified by subsequent constitutional amendments. He 
concluded this cycle has already happened in countries like Argentina and Brazil, and 
to a lesser degree, in the United States, the homeland of presidentialism.  
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 Though the political party system tends to unite the politicians across the 
boundaries of the legislative and the executive institutions, executive dominance over 
the legislature is not absolute.  The restraint of the executive branch can be effected 
through various restraining mechanisms upon government such as general elections, 
the existence of the opposition in parliament, and the scrutiny by the judiciary of 
decisions and acts of the executive authorities. However, judges in general have 
seemed reluctant to involve themselves too much in substantive policy and political 
issues, as they do not want to transgress in the areas that the doctrine of separation of 
powers defines as executive or legislative functions.  
An illustration of the above phenomenon is a decision by the Thai Supreme 
Administrative Court in 2007. In the case the court rejected a petition filed by a Thai 
non-governmental organization (NGO) requesting it to issue an emergency order to 
halt the signing of a free-trade agreement (FTA) between Thailand and Japan. The 
reasoning of the court was that it did not have the authority to issue an emergency 
order blocking an act which was the exercise of executive power provided by the 
Constitution.42  
There are additional limitations to the court’s ability to act, such as that it will 
only adjudicate the legality of governmental actions when there is an actual case 
brought before it by disputing parties. Further, mechanisms responsible for bringing 
cases to the court, such as public prosecutors and the police, are under the executive’s 
supervision and perceived as not as effective when dealing with their own high-ranking 
officials. An illustration of this problem can be seen in the United States, where the 
public lack of confidence in the ability of the executive branch in investigating the 
Watergate affair led Congress to pass an Ethics Act43 to overcome public doubt by 
establishing an investigating office independent from the executive branch influence.  
Similarly in Thailand, the 2007 Constitution44, provided for the established Code of 
Ethics ensuring ethical standard of each kind of person holding political position or 
government official.   The Constitution stipulated that violation or failure to comply 
with ethics standards by a government official or state official is deemed to be in 
breach of discipline and can lead to removal from office. 
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 Executive dominance of the constitution has been widely observed as a major 
challenge that reduces the scope for transparency and accountability in the exercise of 
public authority because less scrutiny increases the risks of abuse and misuse of 
power.45 Following these lines, there is much discussion in the recent literature on the 
deficiencies of the existing restraining mechanisms under the tripartite structure of the 
democratic constitutional framework. It is accepted that the separation of powers is 
essential in controlling the government but suggested that the existing mechanisms of 
the tripartite model may not be enough to effectively keep the exercise of public 
powers under control.  Violations of human rights, abuses of authority by the holders 
of state power at all levels in many democratic countries are pointed out as a sign of 
weakness of the traditional mechanism.46  
 
2.2.2 The growth of administrative agencies and administrative power 
The state faces many challenges that come with modernization such as 
pollution, uneven wealth distribution, child labour, public health and social order.  
Society’s demand for governments to solve social and economic problems has led 
governments to take an active role as a regulator.47 The function of governments in the 
twenty - first century has become geared more towards the realization of educative, 
disciplinary and regulatory goals rather than simply control of material resource.48 In 
Asia this trend started in the mid-1990s, when the developmental state model gave 
way to a liberal regulatory model.49 With expanded responsibility for improving the 
life of the citizen, the legitimate functions of government no longer rest on the 
eighteenth-century constitutional concept of limited government in which functions 
were largely confined to ‘military, police and court’.50 The minimal state intervention 
in personal liberties and economy has been abandoned; the modern state has accepted 
the necessity for intervention.51   
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The tasks of the modern state to improve the life of citizen through provision 
of services and regulation have brought large areas of daily life under legislation. A 
huge volume of legislative and regulatory documents shows how wide-ranging are the 
activities of the state in matters of welfare and public order. In response to the growth 
of its responsibilities, the executive branch in modern state has grown in size, structure 
and power compared to the eighteenth century. 52    However, owing to measures to 
reduce public expenditure, ideology, and a need to improve efficiency of public 
services, the trend has been partially reversed in recent years, with moves to extensive 
privatization and contracting out in some countries. 53   Even here though, the 
government still undertakes a considerable amount of regulation of social and 
economic affairs and solve public problem which become more complex.54 Thus new 
state apparatus continue to be created.  Public tasks nowadays are entrusted to a wide 
variety of administrative organs which are diverse in terms of structure from central 
government departments, regional and local authorities, to quasi-autonomous bodies 
such as state enterprises and regulatory agencies, and also to the private sector.55 
This trend is mirrored in Thailand. In the early 1950s, influenced by Europe, 
there was a rapid expansion in the public sector, especially the establishment of state 
enterprises in various sectors such as energy, transportation (air, sea and land), banking 
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and etc., of which the numbers amounted to 107 in 1961. 56  Though, the Thai 
government gradually privatized state enterprises from 1961 onwards,57  the 2007 
Constitution provided for more extensive list of basic rights and liberties58  such as the 
right to standard public health services,59 the right of the elderly (over 60 years of age) 
with insufficient income to receive aid from the State.60 The fact that the Constitution 
locates all those items in a Chapter headed ‘Rights and Liberties of the Thai People’ 
means that all state organs are now bound to make, enforce and interpret laws to ensure 
that these social rights are realized. In the meantime the numbers of ministries has 
grown from twelve in 1892 to twenty at present.    
According to Loughlin, the modern government no longer presents itself as a 
coercive institution that commands people but it organizes and regulates social 
relations.61  Therefore while the despotic power of the sovereign has declined because 
of institutional constraints, there has emerged in the modern state a new kind of power 
exercised by public authorities on the people through regulatory measures or 
“administrative power”. Administrative power, exercised by thousands of officials to 
carry out legislation and policies, which encompasses all aspects of people’s day-to-
day life, can affect people more than the operation of both the criminal and civil justice 
systems combined.62  
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Administrative power involves the exercise of discretion. Discretionary power 
provides the capacity to choose courses of action, a flexibility which is essential for 
individualized justice and for creative justice for which legal rules cannot completely 
provide.63 But discretionary power also creates possibilities for arbitrariness.64 Though 
discretionary powers are not new in governance, the growth of state regulations, the 
complexity of contemporary society and the growing dependence on specialist, 
technical, scientific knowledge and expertise results in the extended reliance on 
discretionary powers. Besides, contemporary politicians and administrators tend to be 
of the opinion that, because administrative agencies have specialized knowledge and 
power to achieve the legislature’s objectives, administrative discretionary power can 
be used by public officials, who have powers and duties to deliver services or enforce 
the rules, as an instrument to achieve social and economic policies .65  
While administrative agencies are part of the executive branch, the autonomy 
of a significant amount of administrative bureaucracy based on their specialization has 
caused concern over the remoteness between the elected government minister and the 
actions of government administration.   The dividing line between making policy and 
executing functions changes the nature of executive responsibility for the daily task of 
administrative agencies, even though in a parliamentary system ministers are supposed 
to remain in control of the performance and policy of the administration.  Therefore, 
the focus is drawn towards how to make public authorities accountable toward 
citizens.66 
 The Thai administrative system is influenced by ideas from its former British 
colonial administration.67 But due to a different political and cultural environment it 
has gained some distinctiveness.68 First the Thai bureaucracy is powerful,69 partly 
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because it possesses expertise while governments have been short-lived. A lack of 
continuation in policy has been evident due to a lack of democratic continuity of 
government has been broken several times by the trend towards military coups. 
Therefore in Thailand a reliance is placed on the administration’s knowledge and 
expertise. Secondly there is a financial relationship between the public administration 
and private entrepreneurs in such a way that existing legal and constitutional 
constraints to protect public interest have to be reassessed.70 It therefore can be seen 
that the discussion above with regard to the growth of government administration and 
its power is particularly valid in Thailand. 
 
2.2.3 Limitations of traditional institutional control over administrative 
power 
Administrative power can be considered legitimate because it is deployed to 
further the principle of liberties and equality for all.71  Administrative law is concerned 
with the control of the discretionary power of public administration and with finding 
ways and means of controlling administrative discretion.72 This entails subjecting the 
exercise of administrative power by public officials to review and there are a variety 
of means available by which this can be achieved.  
Internal review of public officials’ administrative decision-making can be 
secured by the intervention of their superiors who usually are entitled of their own 
motion to reverse, modify, substitute or annul the decision. In this capacity superiors 
can review both the merit and the legality of decisions and can impose disciplinary 
measures.  
In some jurisdictions, where an internal appeal procedure for administrative 
disputes is provided for, an aggrieved individual can challenge the administrative 
decisions affecting his rights and interest by way of appealing to the superiors, or in 
some cases appealing to administrative tribunals where the merit and legality of the 
decisions can be checked.  However, the ability of such mechanisms to secure justice 
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is compromised where there are doubts over the impartiality and independence of such 
forms of internal control.73   
Available forms of external control by independent machineries include 
scrutiny by the legislature and judicial review by a court of law. In many parliamentary 
systems, an aggrieved person can also write to an MP for representation.  Though the 
legislature is the traditional body for people to air their grievances, it can be argued 
that political redress is uncertain and parliamentary procedures are probably not a 
suitable avenue for impartial fact finding because of political considerations, such as 
the interest of the government of the day.74 Political considerations can have such an 
effect that the personal element of an individual case may have been overlooked and a 
satisfactory remedy for the complainant is not followed, even if his case is debated.75 
The court is trusted for its judicial independence and ordinarily said to be the 
most effective means of redress, as no administrative action can be taken in the same 
case in contradiction to the court’s decision. But the expense, lengthy and complicated 
procedure involved in judicial cases can deter aggrieved people from pursuing their 
complaints by this means. The fact that legal precision is essential in court could make 
the length of a trial difficult to predict. Thus, in terms of the numbers of cases handled 
and direct redress provided, judicial review is arguably not the most effective way to 
provide an effective check on administrative decision making. 76  In Thailand, this 
tendency is reflected in an old saying that ‘it is better to eat dog dung than to go to the 
court’.  Nonetheless, the availability of judicial review may have a very strong 
beneficial impact in making public officials more compliant with the law when making 
administrative decisions.   
While the courts have demonstrated their ability to intervene for the protection 
of the citizen, judicial review by ordinary courts or administrative courts is usually 
concerned with legality not merit. The courts normally do not revise the 
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reasonableness or the wisdom of the decision, as doing so the court is deemed to 
substitute their discretion on the matters for that of the specialized administrators or to 
supervise the administrative decisions, which is not the role of the court.77 This end 
result mirrors similar restrictions placed on judicial review elsewhere.  
Besides, there are other cases that tend to fall out of the court’s jurisdiction as 
injustice does not always amount to unlawfulness. It is reported that sometimes 
aggrieved persons, who have no legal right to take legal action have difficulties in 
seeking redress, which can go beyond mere financial compensation.78  Therefore, it 
occurs frequently that a citizen will have a grievance for which no judicial remedy 
exists. For instance, a case where a public official fails to act according to proper 
standards of administrative conduct or maladministration is in many countries 
excluded from the court’s jurisdiction.79  
To summarise, the lack of effective control by the traditional institutions under 
the constitution, particularly in the context of 21st century administrative functions and 
powers, raises concerns about the ability of the constitution to adequately protect 
individual liberties and expectations of modern government. Such concerns have 
resulted in the development of new concepts and mechanisms, such as the concept of 
good administration and the creation of independent “accountability institutions” to 
protect the rights of the individual. It is these latter developments that are explored 
next. 
 
2.3 Good governance and additional machinery 
One of the arguments for the necessity of implementing the concept of good 
governance in public service raised by international development organizations, such 
as the World Bank, United Nation Development Programme, or Asian Development 
Bank, is that the enormous expansion of the size and scope of activities of welfare 
states in different countries has not always resulted in meeting people’s needs.80 While 
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there is no single definition of the concept of good governance, the term has been used 
in academic literature and by international organisations to refer to the standard 
whereby public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resources in a 
manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for transparency, 
responsibility, accountability, participation, responsiveness (to the needs of the 
people); and rule of law.81 As such, the concept of good governance calls for both 
legality and quality in public administration. Since the 1980s, trends in governments 
around the world have been towards improving the performance of the public sector.82  
Government officials are not only required to adhere to law in conducting public 
affairs but the concept of good governance must be observed.  
In response to this challenge, many Asian government departments have 
introduced a stream of measures and guidelines for their staff to improve efficiency 
and quality in the performance of their public duties. For example, good practice 
guides have been produced. 83  Administrative law is aimed to provide good 
administrative practice.84  Good administration is aimed at improving the quality of 
decision making and practice in the administrative process of public bodies. This does 
not mean that the law cannot be enforced to promote good administration, as the 
ultimate goal of administrative law is to provide good administrative practice. 85 
Evidence to support this claim is that administrative law prescribes the aspects of 
decision making procedure to be followed by public officials. Decision making in 
contradiction to the procedure prescribed by law may be annulled by the court. But 
good administration is concerned with issues that cannot easily captured by legislation, 
such as providing customer-focused public services;86 and the performance of public 
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bodies are to be judged by the extent to which they satisfy the people for whom public 
services are provided.87   
Good administration is one of the strategies of the Thai government’s recent 
political and administrative reform which has the ultimate goal of making the political 
and administrative system more efficient in responding to the needs of the people, for 
example the promulgation of the Royal Decree on Good Governance (2003) and the 
Organization of State Administration Act (No. 5) B.E. 2545 (2002). 88  The 2007 
Constitution, Section 74, requires government officials to act in compliance with the 
law in order to protect public interests, and provide to the public convenience and 
services in accordance with the principle of good public administration. Section 78 
sets out the state administration policy, which includes encouraging state agencies to 
apply the principle of good public administration in the performance of their official 
duties.  
  
2.3.1 Ombudsman 
Together with the developments above, in many countries new 
‘accountability institutions’ have been created, including the ombudsman;89 
this movement is often cited as a response to the eroding public trust in 
politicians and political institutions and the deficiencies of traditional control 
by the legislature and the courts in protecting and defending people who are 
affected by administrative actions.90 As described above, in liberal 
democratic nations the control of the exercise of public power has 
traditionally been focused on the legality or the lawfulness of governmental 
acts, a goal which is established on the fundamental principle of the rule of 
law. Therefore the controlling mechanism as well as procedure has tended to 
emphasise the legality check provided by the courts or other independent 
bodies, such as Corruption Commissions, Auditor Generals and Human 
Rights Commissions. 
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Common experiences worldwide, however, have shown that requiring 
governments to act lawfully is not, by itself, adequate, as in many cases government 
agencies, in performing their duties, act in accordance with law but still deliver results 
that can lead to significant injustice or unfairness. However, this is not because state 
actions in modern government are intended to be oppressive. Rather, in most situations 
bureaucracies have to respond to the demand for public services by individuals.  
Unfairness therefore is not normally a result of ill will, but, because of the complexity 
of the tasks assumed by public administration, there are errors that lead to confusion, 
unreasonable delay, misleading advice, loss of documents or mistakes in calculations, 
which in most cases are due to human errors, or sometimes there are shortcomings in 
the procedure by which the administrative decisions are made. This can cause feeling 
of indignation, distress or loss of opportunity and in many cases there will be financial 
loss.91   
One consequence of this realisation has been an effort to create new institutions 
that can scrutinize and eradicate forms of unfairness insufficiently captured by legal 
definitions, and thereby secure good governance in public administration. In this 
respect, it is widely accepted today that the ombudsman is capable of being a facilitator 
of good governance and the institution is promoted on its effectiveness in securing 
high standards of conduct of public officials, with the result is that it has become an 
almost permanent part of most constitutions.92  
 The 1997 Constitution represented the outcome of efforts to reform political 
and government administration. It is underpinned by the need to improve transparency 
and efficiency, and strengthen the accountability of government and administration. It 
required that seven related laws were passed, for example, the Official Information 
Act in 1997 provides greater access to official information, prescribing that, in 
principle, all official information must be publicly available with clear and limited 
number of exceptions. The 1997 Constitution also required for the first time the 
establishment of seven ‘accountability institutions’, namely the Administrative Court, 
the Constitution Court, the National Election Commission, the National Human Rights 
Commission, the State Audit Commission, the National Counter Corruption 
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Commission and the Ombudsman, in order to strengthen the Constitution’s ‘checks 
and balances’ and administrative decision-making.  
The Ombudsman of Thailand, designated as ‘the Ombudsman for National 
Assembly’, was established with an expectation that it will be both an alternative 
means to solve peoples’ grievances caused by administrative injustice and as a 
legislative mechanism to provide a check on public administration with a focus on fair 
and appropriate use of public power. 
2.4 Constitution building in developing countries  
 
In the course of the last two centuries a set of western modern political and 
legal practices - including elements such as the rule of law, human rights, the 
separation of powers, political checks and balances, civil liberties, a written 
constitution, review of the constitutionality of governmental actions - has spread to all 
corners of the earth as after WWII decolonisation led to a flurry of state-building all 
over the developing world.93 As Fukuyama observed, ‘the mission of modern politics 
is to tame the power of the state, and to direct state activities towards what is regarded 
as legitimate by the people it serves, and to subject the exercise of state power to the 
rule of law’.94 However, while it is argued that modern state and liberal democratic 
constitutionalism in its Western form may be regarded as having universal appeal and 
application far beyond the Western nations in which it originated; there is a concern 
that it is implemented in name only in many other parts of Africa, Asia and the Middle 
East.95  
As the ombudsman schemes have been adopted widely in developing countries 
over this period, the wider concern about the transplant of Western Constitutionalism 
is relevant to this thesis. Pertinent to this issue is that the occasional tendency to regard 
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the ombudsman as part of the democratic product and one which can usually only 
function properly in a liberal democratic environment.96 This problem is particularly 
relevant in this study because Thailand is a new democracy that has adopted the 
ombudsman concept, partly due to the influence of western advocates of the institution. 
But the quality of the democracy in Thailand has been questioned due to the regular 
occurrence of military coups. 
To address this issue, in this section, therefore, I propose to begin by 
acknowledging the difference in the political context that informs the work of the 
ombudsman in developing countries.  This Chapter first presents the constitutional 
development in Asia, then addresses concerns the implication of the different political 
contexts in developing countries on the effectiveness of the ombudsman. To evaluate 
these concerns, reference is made to the actual work of ombudsmen in developing 
countries and an argument is made that actual experience in many developing countries 
indicates that an ombudsman scheme can be effective, even in less favourable 
environments. The discussion then proceeds to focus on the constitutional weaknesses 
in Thailand (the Thai context is discussed in more details in Chapter 5). This section 
concludes by contending that imperfections of ombudsman schemes in developing 
countries, such as the Thai Ombudsman, do not necessarily follow from operating in 
a country where democratic and/or rule of law arrangements remain relatively new and 
unstable. Instead, as this thesis will demonstrate, the problems associated with an 
ombudsman scheme still need to be situated within an analysis of the particular design 
and its fit within the overall constitutional set-up.  
 
2.4.1 Constitutionalism in Asia  
A democratic wave has swept across globe since the early to mid-1980s, partly 
as a result of the superior technological, military, and economic power of the West. 
97Southeast Asia is no exception. Since 1993 exercises in constitutional reform have 
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been undertaken in a large number of Asian states.98 This reform process has included 
the transplant of constitutionalism and ‘western’ constitutional practices to Asia. Even 
those countries that were not colonized, such as Thailand and Meiji era Japan, have 
tended to adopt Western legal forms prophylactically, as part of an effort to retain 
independence. A key part of the process has been that the basic framework for liberal 
constitutional democracies in legal terms has been provided by a state's constitution, 
as part of the current trends in governance and legal development aimed at establishing 
a modern, efficient and internationally harmonised system of safeguards of human 
rights and civil liberties.99  
In the initial scholarship about constitutional building in developing countries, 
there has been a tendency in the west to presume that Asian political and legal 
traditions may not be comparable to western constitutional democracies, thus creating 
doubt as to whether direct institutional transplants could be successful.100 In such 
analyses various inhibiting factors for full civilian rule are identified. Thus the 
experience of liberal democracy in Asia is associated with instability,101 governments 
dominated by the strength of the military, legacies of the struggle for independence, 
the existence of various justifications for the suppression of free speech, 102  and 
instances of changes of government being affected by coup rather than through 
constitutional processes.103 Further proponents of the so-called Asian values104 offer a 
                                                          
98
 Cheryl Saunders, ‘Towards a Global Constitutional Gene Pool’, 4 National Taiwan University Law 
Review, 2, 2009, at 17. The first big wave of constitution making occurred around the end of World War 
II with constitutions adopted in Thailand, the only state in the region that was never colonised, with the 
first having been adopted in 1932, Indonesia (1945/1949/1950), North Vietnam (1946), Burma, 
Cambodia and Laos (1947) and Malaya (subsequently Malaysia) in 1957. Singapore and Brunei 
transformed pre-independence autonomy constitutions into sovereign state constitutions in 1965 and 
1984 respectively. In August 1995 Sri Lanka initiated constitutional changes based on federal principles, 
divesting the central government of a range of powers and establishing a clearer division of powers 
between the centre and the regions. Myanmar's Constitutional Convention has met periodically since 
early in 1993. 
99
 Fukuyama, n. 94. 
100
 For example, in his later study on the Third Wave of democratization, Huntington still held that 
‘conceivably Islamic and Confucian cultures pose insuperable obstacles to democratic development’.   
101
 Graham Hassall & Sean Cooney, ‘Democracy and Constitutional Change in Asia’, Asian Studies 
Review, 1993, 17:1. 
102
 For example, the ‘development first’ argument, presented by Singapore over many years, was based 
on the assumption that ‘Western’ constitutional values, such as individual freedoms and a pluralistic 
political system, would hinder economic development. 
103
 Hassall & Cooney, n. 103. 
104
 Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia were the main proponents of Asian values. However Asian 
values have later mutated into ‘Singapore exceptionalism idea in the period before the Asian Crisis in 
1997, see Laurence Wai-Teng Leong, ‘From “Asian Values” to Singapore Exceptionalism’, in L 
Avonius & D Kingsbury (eds.), Human Rights in Asia: A Reassessment of the Asian Values Debate, 
Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2008,  pp. 121-240;  Kevin YL Tan, ‘State and Institution Building 
through the Singapore Constitution’ , in Thio Li-ann & Kevin YL Tan (ed.), The Evolution of a 
39 
 
discourse which is incompatible with liberal and democratic constitutionalism.105 For 
example it is sometimes argued that Asian societies favour authority over liberty, 
emphasize duties over rights, and place community above individuals. Therefore, it is 
often viewed that the attempts to impose western theories and institutions of 
constitutionalism in the course of the last two centuries have often failed and that 
constitutionalism has a reputation as a legal gloss for authoritarian rule, despite 
successful democratic development in countries such as Japan, Taiwan and South 
Korea.106  
However, subsequent scholarship on the state of constitutionalism in Asia in 
the early twenty-first century, on the contrary, argues that there is now considerable 
evidence of its positive reception, albeit that constitutionalism comparatively is not 
practiced identically to equivalent arrangements in the West.107 Such convergence 
includes the need for constitutional control through judicial review as well as the 
establishment of the Constitutional Courts in some Asian countries (e.g. in Thailand 
and Indonesia). Further, in a significant number of Asian countries since the late 
nineteenth century, demonstrable convergence frequently includes the need for a 
dispute resolution mechanism of some other kind to the judiciary.108 There is also 
evident convergence of constitutional principles at the highest level of generality: 
democracy, the rule of law, separation of powers, judicial independence, human rights 
protection and constitutionalism. 109 
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Therefore, at present, though originating from Western modernity, 
constitutionalism has moved beyond transplantation in Asian soils and grown up 
considerably in its own distinct ways.110  The end solution is uneven, partly because 
the degree of democratisation varies across Asia, with there existing well-developed 
democracies;111 new, fragile, unstable or low-quality democracies;112 and what might 
be termed semi democracies. 113  It should not, therefore, be expected that emerging 
democracies will achieve the same progress in a few decades. But there is no necessary 
obstacle to constitutionalism in Asia. Recent studies have argued that the claim that 
some of the key cultural traits of Southeast Asia, as witnessed by its early history, ever 
obstructed actual constitutional transformation towards western concepts of liberal 
democracy, are overstated. By contrast, there is evidence that whether 
constitutionalism eventually triumphs in a particular jurisdiction is determined more 
by politics and the contingency of historical events, such as wars and foreign 
interventions, than by culture and values.114  Constitution building in the context of 
Asian developing countries could be considered still in its infancy. Indeed, progressing 
in terms of constitutionalism in developing countries may not be easy, but there is little 
evidence that these difficulties are due to an unfavourable tradition towards democratic 
political culture, as had been argued previously. 
2.4.1 The constitutional challenges in Thailand 
With regard to its transformation to liberal democracy, Thailand, like other Asian 
neighbours, also has to confront a number of serious obstacles. While this study 
identiﬁes various factors and related issues in the constitutional landscape of emerging 
democracy that would normally make the performance of the Thai Ombudsman 
institution difﬁcult and problematic (see Chapter 5 for more details on the Thai 
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context), it also argues that the impact of these problems should not be overstated in 
terms of their capacity to obstruct the operation of the Thai Ombudsman.  
Concerns that the overseeing power of the military renders the Constitution 
ineffective  
Ever since the establishment of parliamentary democracy in 1932, Thailand 
has experienced chronic political instability as constitutional governments have been 
periodically and routinely dismantled by military coups. This tendency is similar to 
the situation in many developing countries, as the military are often the dominant 
power group in the country. Their dominance is not complete, however, because of 
divisions within the military and the opposition of other forces within the society.  It 
can also be argued that the military do not want complete dominance,115 and that even 
though coups do still occur regularly, in a country such as Thailand one can identify a 
steady downgrading of the intervention of the military.116 This is because of divisions 
within the military and the opposition of other forces within the society which attempt 
to push the military out of politics.117 Also the military can no longer so easily justify 
the necessity of authoritarian rule, as the nation’s sovereignty is no longer under threat 
from neighbours as before.  
The strengthened role of political parties and parliament, a fast economic 
growth rate over the past two decades, and changes in public attitude, which has 
become more favourable to democratic, civilian rule, can also be claimed to have 
reduced the military's influence.118  The nation's high economic growth rates119 have 
led to a more sophisticated and educated populace that is determined to retain stability 
and democracy. 120  The military are not in a position to dominate a more sophisticated 
and educated populace, as they have dominated groups in the past. Indeed, despite 
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frequent military interventions, the democratization process of Thailand has been 
hailed as one of the most promising in all South-East Asia.121 
 
Concerns that the political process is still very young and weak  
The traditions of elections, campaigning, accountability, civil liberties, and the 
other attributes of modern democracy in new democracies have been said to be young 
and weak and vulnerable to attack from non-democratic institution, such as the 
military. Likewise in Thailand, while the democracy development has shown some 
progress, recent widespread civil unrest and a recent military coup has disrupted a once 
such a promising democracy and have led to a more pessimistic outlook.122   An 
additional problem that usually exists in a new democracy is, therefore, a weak system 
of the rule of law. But this section argues that, despite the concerns that the Thai 
democratic political process is young and weak, there is not much evidence that the 
rule of law has been improperly disrespected. This result can arguably be attributed to 
an effective administration, legislature and the judiciary, as well as a generally 
favourable governance environment in the Thai society. (This argument is referred to 
again in Chapter 9, in analysing the operation of the Thai Ombudsman.) 
While the normal features of democracy, such as elections, campaigning, 
accountability and civil liberties, in Thailand may remain weak, there remain some 
institutions in the Thai governance which still perform better, such as the 
administration and the legislature and the judiciary. According to Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, Thailand’s performance on the measures of ‘Government 
Effectiveness’ and ‘Regulatory Quality’ measured by the World Bank is very positive 
which means Thailand’s overall levels of state capacity are quite high for developing 
countries. 123   This is because, as argued by Neher, the Thai bureaucracy is 
professionalised and differentiated, an outcome which has resulted from a ‘relatively 
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organic and largely home grown process of state formation and development, launched 
in the mid-nineteenth century’.124 Besides the country’s parliament and government 
are capable of producing high-quality legislation and of implementing government 
policies throughout the national territory. Further, Thailand does have a modern justice 
system distinguished by relatively high levels of institutionalization and a moderate 
degree of efficiency. A recent survey by the Asia Foundation confirmed that the 
judiciary is considered by the public to enjoy the highest degree of integrity and 
impartiality. 125  
In terms of social and cultural context, Thai society provides a fairly favourable 
environment for the rule of law and democracy. While demonstrations are also 
common in Bangkok, Thai traditional values have helped to stop governments from 
remaining unduly repressive and closed, and have aimed at reconciliation and 
consensus. Even the coup d’états that occur in Thailand are not the full affront to 
democracy and the rule of law that they may at first sight seem. Csernatoni pointed out 
that coup d’états in Thailand should not be described as a fully-fledged coup d’état, 
but rather fall into the category of a military-type intervention, through which the 
military usually hands back political power to civilian politicians in a relatively short 
period of time. 126   In Thailand coups are a widely accepted political act and a 
traditional form of power seizure in the Thai society, with the coups themselves usually 
bloodless. It also should be noted that the transition to democracy has not been as 
dramatic as in those nations where the ideological path has been longer. Thus an 
underlying social stability and consensus has allowed continued economic growth 
despite military coups and frequent political turmoil. Economic and social 
development has reached a level in Thailand where parliamentary democracy can be 
firmly established.127 Since 1933, Thais have actively participated in elections. Voter 
turnout at national parliamentary elections has been between 40 and 65 percent. Civil 
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liberties in Thailand have also been respected in comparison to its neighbours. Since 
1978, the constitution has affirmed citizens' rights to free speech and a free press, with 
prohibitions only on insulting the monarchy, advocating a Communist system of 
government, or publishing materials threatening to national security. Since 1979 
freedoms of assembly, speech, and religion have also been widespread, except in the 
brief periods of martial law.128 (The only areas of speech that are persistently curtailed 
pertain to the royal family.) Although Buddhism is the state religion and the King must 
be a Buddhist, freedom of religion is respected for the nation's Muslims, Christians, 
Taoists, and Animists.  
2.4.2 The reception of the ombudsman in developing countries 
In the late 20th century, Asian countries experiencing modernisation began to 
introduce the ombudsman as an element of a modern state through attempts to 
strengthen the roles of civil society, administrative accountability, and control of 
government by people. 129  This is partly due to the fact that the ombudsman has 
received attention from the World Bank which often attached an ombudsman scheme 
as a component part to judicial and administrative reform packages.130 Given the fact 
that the ombudsman came late to Asia, the Asian Ombudsman Association was 
established to strengthen the effectiveness of the ombudsman institutions in the region 
by encouraging information exchanges and cooperation among Asian countries. 131  
In the literature on the ombudsman, while it is suggested that the ombudsman 
is all the more necessary for the developing world where democracy exists but is 
young, unconsolidated, fragile, unstable or otherwise of poor quality,132 doubts are 
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often expressed that an ombudsman institution can work well. As with institutional 
transplants generally, it has been argued that few countries in developing countries 
offer a political and social panorama conducive to a liberal democratic invention such 
as the ombudsman, which is better understood as ‘an institution for more developed 
countries’.133  
This concern is supported by the empirical evidence which suggests that a 
number of ombudsman schemes in many developing countries have run into a wide 
variety of difﬁculties and inadequacies that, relatively speaking, make it much less 
effective and its operation problematic in varying degrees.134 While it is observed that 
the effectiveness of an ombudsman ofﬁce is undermined by many factors, the most 
visible challenges to the effectiveness of the ombudsman in new democracies are 
circumstances: where the ombudsman has been subjected to ‘politicized’ positioning; 
where the ombudsman institution’s budget and staff has been reduced by the 
government; and where the government fails to provide the ombudsman with the 
political, financial, and infrastructure support necessary to give the institution 
effectiveness and legitimacy within the political and social context in which it 
operates.135 
But a careful examination of the operations of the ombudsman systems in 
various parts of the developing countries indicate that although they suffer from many 
problems and limitations, the institution can be claimed to have done a fairly good job 
in varying degrees. For example, in Peru the Defensoria del Pueblo is noted for its 
relative effectiveness in playing a significant role in addressing the urgent needs and 
demands of Peruvian citizens in an often adverse political and institutional terrain, 
through the articulation and facilitation of rights.136  
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In this respect, an allusion to O’Donnell’s works may be useful in 
understanding the work of an ombudsman in developing countries. According to 
O’Donnell, in whose works there is a focus on horizontal accountability institutions in 
new democracies, common key problems in developing countries are of weak 
democratic institutions, and an environment where the rule of law is low, creating a  
‘weak institutional environment’ that leads to institutional weakness. 137 He points out 
that a problem with a weak institutional environment is that ‘a weak or uneven rule of 
law has long enabled powerful actors to violate or ignore certain rules with 
impunity’,138 thus even where formal rules are in place, enforcement depends on the 
de facto discretion of the rulers which results in variations in actual compliance. An 
example cited to support this assertion is that despite the existence of a U.S.-style 
constitutional provision guaranteeing lifetime tenure security to Supreme Court 
justices in Argentina, it is found that between the 1940s and the mid-2000s nearly 
every incoming president purged or packed the Court leading to the conclusion that 
there is no relationship between levels of de jure and de facto independence in Latin 
American judiciaries.139  
Notwithstanding the problems, O’Donnell cautions that this does not mean that 
all formal institutions are uniformly weak in developing countries (nor all uniformly 
strong in developed ones). This explains why one finds considerable variation in 
institutional strength within one particular region (in his study, Latin America), across 
countries and within national territories. 140  Following this logic, a study on the 
effectiveness of the ombudsman in Latin America showed that while there are 
difficulties in a hostile environment, an ombudsman can make significant contribution 
                                                          
137
 Guillermo O’Donnell,  ‘On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A 
Latin American View with Some Postcommunist Countries’, World Development 21, No. 8:1355–69, 
1993; Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’, Journal of Democracy 5, 1994, No. 1: 55-69; 
Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Illusions about consolidation’, Journal of Democracy 7(2), 1996:34–51; 
Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Polyarchies and the (un)rule of law in Latin America: a partial 
Conclusion,’ in J Mendez, Guillermo O’Donnell, P S Pinheiro, The (Un)rule of Law and the 
Underprivileged in Latin America, (ed.), Univ. Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1999, pp. 303–337; 
Guillermo O’Donnell, Democracy, Agency, and the State: Theory with Comparative Intent, Oxford 
University, Press Oxford,  2010.  
138
 See O’Donnell (1993, 1999), n. 137. 
139
 Gretchen Helmke, Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina, 
Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, cited in Steven Levitsky, María Victoria Murillo, 
‘Building Institutions on Weak Foundations: Lessons from Latin America’,   
140
 Steven Levitsky, María Victoria Murillo, ‘Building Institutions on Weak Foundations: Lessons from 
Latin America’, Paper presented at the conference “Guillermo O’Donnell and the Study of 
Democracy”, in Buenos Aires, March 26-27, 2012, retrieved at, 
http://www.isp.org.pl/uploads/filemanager/BuildingInstitutionsonWeakFoundationLessonsfromLatin
AmericaLevitskyMurillo.pdf. 
47 
 
if the following factors exist to facilitate remedial measures for effectively dealing 
with the problems: the capacity of the first appointee and personnel; the robustness of 
the institution's foundations (this topic will be explored further in Chapter 3, 4 and 7); 
and successful alliance-building in order to enhance accountability.141 
 The ombudsman institutions in Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Lithuania, and 
Hungary have also been cited as leading ombudsman institutions which survived the 
initial difficulties and can serve as models for other institutions in terms of their role 
in consolidating democracy in the former communist bloc. 142   A study of the 
ombudsman’s impact on the democratisation process indicated that the ombudsman 
helped reinforce democratic principles for the good governance and restore a climate 
of confidence between governments and citizens.143 In general, according to the 2000-
2001 Washington-based Freedom House survey, countries succeeding in the 
ombudsman concept have higher freedom rates than those lagging behind.144 
 It is also noteworthy that in fact new ombudsman institutions in developing 
countries have significantly contributed to the evolution and expansion of the 
ombudsman beyond the classic oversight function of the Scandinavian ombudsman.145 
This is because in developing countries an ombudsman is often established in the 
context of a domestic process of democratisation and rule of law reform. Given this 
collective reform moment which coincides with its formation, the ombudsman is often 
vested with a wide array of competencies, much wider than ombudsmen in more 
established democracy in terms of constitutional control of legal norms and acts and 
control of the administration.  
 In short this section contends that while it can be seen that the transplant of the 
ombudsman has been problematic, the model has proved to be dominant in developing 
countries. It has further argued that however imperfectly, the ombudsman model does 
have a place in a developing country and it should not be assumed that this institution 
will fail because of the potentially unfavourable context of its working environment. 
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Moreover, although the Thai constitution is imperfect, it still retains the basic 
foundations of liberal democracy, and this study will go on to argue that all the 
evidence indicates that the imperfection of the Thai Ombudsman has more to do with 
itself, rather than the overall pressure it faces as a result of political instability.  
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has laid down the background and context necessary to understand 
the need and justification for the ombudsman institution. Liberal constitutional theory 
is based on the need to control the exercise of public powers in order to safeguard the 
rights and liberty of the individual. For this purpose constitutional mechanisms have 
been created and structured to prevent the excessive use of state power through 
political and legal means by the legislature and judiciary. However the degree to which 
these traditional means can deliver constitutional accountability is limited.  The courts 
have no concern with the conduct of public authority, as long as it proceeds within 
legal powers.  But in fact not all administrative grievances are caused by illegal acts.  
Legislative control can oversee both legality and appropriateness; however the 
executive monopoly has diminished the capacity of impartial scrutiny. Further, the 
elected, besides having limited time and resources, are more interested in formulating 
policies and making sure that they are executed closely to policy. Therefore, by itself, 
political control is also not always a suitable means by which to control massive day-
to-day administrative operation and resolve individual grievances. Meanwhile, the 
expansion of modern government functions and power has created a more fertile 
ground for invasion into individual rights and liberty.  
Against this background an idea to introduce a machinery to add more 
protection for citizens has emerged. The concept of the ombudsman as an instrument 
to ensure that a public organisation performs its functions effectively and properly 
delivers the services to the citizens is fit for the purpose of the constitution to provide 
effective control.  Its role is not to replace or interfere with the power of the existing 
institutions, but it can work to supplement their authority and effectiveness where there 
is a gap in the existing system.146   
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In the next chapter, we will turn to the office of the ombudsman in more detail. 
The theoretical benefits and ideal construction of the ombudsman institution, as well 
as its core characteristics will be studied. This next chapter will provide a thorough 
understanding of the institution of the ombudsman before the central subject of this 
thesis – that is, the Thai ombudsman – is investigated in Part II of the thesis. 
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Chapter 3  
The Tradition Roles of the Ombudsman 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter the emergence of the ombudsman institution was 
theoretically linked with accounts of the liberal democratic constitution based on the 
traditional tripartite system.  The exercise was undertaken in order to demonstrate the 
potential for constitutional deficiencies which an ombudsman might be created in 
part to fill. The aim of this chapter is to examine in more detail the institution and its 
roles. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, since the office began to appear and has taken 
firm hold as an accountability instrument in the late 1960s, there has been a massive 
proliferation of such institutions throughout the world.1  One important factor for 
such wide adoption is the Ombudsman‟s ability to tackle a common problem found 
in contemporary societies with a modern welfare state: the increasing need to more 
effectively monitor and check the rapidly expanding power of the administrative 
machinery.2  Frequently, this problem has led to the ombudsman being introduced as 
a complaint handler. But today although improving administration may remain the 
ombudsman‟s core importance, complaints handling is only one of several functions 
discharged by ombudsman offices. 3   
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There has been a growth in the range of functions performed by the office, a 
trend which normally resulted from the need to accommodate technological, social, 
economic and political circumstances. This development means that there has arisen 
some questions posed by ombudsmen and academics as to what the scope of the new 
functions should be and how the ombudsman maintains effectiveness in the light of 
the functions it is required to deliver.4 In this regard, in the ombudsman literature 
significant attention is given to the essential organisational characteristics of an 
ombudsman, adherence to which is often recognized as an important basis for a 
successfully functioning ombudsman's office and is seen as key to the effectiveness 
and growth of the ombudsman‟s office.5 Scholars and ombudsmen alike appear to be 
in consensus that the institution will continue to adapt and be successful if it adheres 
to the essential characteristics, even where an ombudsman is also utilised to perform 
additional roles with those roles varying depending on the context in which it 
operates.6 Conversely granting further functions to the office can lead to problems if 
their introduction is not made in line with the essential characteristics.7 This means 
that there is a need to improve the current understanding of the institutional type and 
the conditions under which it could function best. 
 This premise is one that will be explored in this thesis. The issue is 
particularly relevant to Thailand where the ombudsman office has struggled in 
performing its functions to full success for the last thirteen years, with a concern that 
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due to the expansion of roles given to the office there has been an adverse effect on 
the ombudsman‟s effectiveness in performing its core operations. 
In this work I distinguish two clear variants: the core role of the ombudsman, 
which is often referred to as the „traditional‟ or „classical‟ role, and the „non-
traditional‟ roles or „additional‟ roles that have been given to the ombudsman over 
the years (which will be studied in the next chapter).8 This approach is taken because 
it is likely to be useful in the sense that it gives a clearer picture of the theory and 
methodology of the ombudsman, how this relates to the institutional design and its 
essential features, and the effectiveness of the ombudsman and the challenges it faces 
when it assumes different roles. Later in this thesis, these differences will become 
apparent in the set-up of the Thai Ombudsman.  
This chapter begins with a review of literature on the traditional role of 
ombudsman and then seeks to understand the basic institutional design 
characteristics of the ombudsman institution. Ideas established here will be used to 
assess the ability of the Thai Ombudsman to perform the traditional roles of the 
ombudsman and extracts standards from the literature on characteristics of the 
ombudsman institution that could be used to develop evaluation criteria that will be 
applied to the Thai Ombudsman Office. 
 
3.1 The traditional roles of the ombudsman 
While there are different interpretations of the „ombudsman‟ concept and the 
institution cannot be precisely defined, the roles common to all ombudsmen are 
usually understood to be resolving complaints and improving administrative 
practice.9 These two roles are normally discussed together in the ombudsman 
                                                 
8
 Linda C Reif, „Ombudsman and Human Rights Protestation and Promotion in the Caribbean: Issues 
and Strategies‟, in Victor O Ayeni, Linda C Reif, H Thomas (eds.), Strengthening Ombudsman and 
Human Rights and Institutions in Commonwealth Small and Island States, Chameleon House Limited, 
London, 2000, pp. 160-163.  
9
 Roy Gregory, „Building an Ombudsman Scheme: Statutory Provisions and Operating Practices‟, in 
Linda C Rief (ed.),  The International Ombudsman Anthology: Selected Writings from the 
International Ombudsman Institute, Kluwer Law International, the Hague, 1999, p. 130; Reif, 
„Ombudsman and Human Rights Protection and Promotion in the Caribbean‟, n. 10; Short, n. 6, p. 70; 
and Stuhmcke, „The Evolution of Classical Ombudsman‟, n. 5, p. 11; and Thomas Pegram, „The 
Politics of Accountability: The Institution of the Ombudsman in Comparative Perspective‟, paper 
presented at the II REPLA Annual Workshop, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, 26–28 March, 
2008; and African Research Center, „Information, Coordination, Training, Advocacy and Research 
Needs of the African Ombudsmen and Mediators Association‟, Report, GIZ, June 2011, p. 8; Alice 
Tai, „The Impact of Social and Political Environment and Their Influence on the Work of the 
Ombudsman: Hong Kong‟, in Reif (ed.), The International Ombudsman Yearbook , Vol. 5,  n. 3, p. 73. 
53 
 
literature as „redress and control‟10 or „firefighting and firewatching‟.11  The word 
“role” as used here implies both the overall functions and the procedures which the 
ombudsman operates in attempting to perform his roles.  
 
3.1.1. Resolving individual complaints 
Many ombudsman offices have the core role of investigating individual 
complaints against the state.12 This role has been reflected in a number of 
descriptions of the ombudsman institution formulated by ombudsman associations 
around the world. For example the International Ombudsman Institute‟s Bylaws 
identify the classical legislative ombudsman as „[T]he office of a person … whose 
role is to investigate citizen complaints concerning administrative acts or decisions of 
government agencies…‟.  
The International Bar Association (IBA) likewise describes the ombudsman 
as: „[A]n office …who receives complaints from aggrieved persons against 
government agencies, officials, and employees or who acts on his own motion and 
who has the power to investigate, recommend corrective action, and issue reports‟.13  
The African Ombudsman Association provides that the ombudsman „is an 
independent, impartial public official with authority and responsibility to receive, 
investigate the complaints of ordinary citizens about the actions of government 
departments and institutions, and, when appropriate, make findings and 
recommendations‟.14  
The Asian Ombudsman Association does not give a definition of the 
ombudsman but a review of the enabling statutes of members of the Asian 
Ombudsman Association reveals that most of them have the power to conduct 
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investigations to identify and correct weaknesses in procedures practices, or rules in 
public administration.15  
The definitions and the ombudsman practice noted above demonstrate that an 
ombudsman operates in the sphere of public administration, a task which 
fundamentally involves the translation and application of broad legislative policy to 
individual situations. This raises a complex challenge for the ombudsman as it is 
widely recognised that the office generally does not have the right to intervene in the 
exercise of executive discretion or interfere with the merits of differing social and 
economic policies or the adjudication of cases, issues which are the remit of the 
legislature and the courts.16  
Characterised by its roles, the ombudsman therefore functions to supplement 
pre-existing mechanisms of remedial justice by which citizens can assert their 
individual interest against the administration. The ombudsman is capable of 
performing such roles because it yields three major effects: increased access to 
justice; effective dispute resolution and review of improper administrative practice. 
Each of these areas are discussed in turn below.  
Increased access to justice 
It is telling that the purpose of adopting the ombudsman system in many 
countries was to supplement existing provisions, such as parliament, the court, and 
internal complaints procedures in protecting citizens against expanding 
administration.17 It was deemed necessary since governments were having an 
increasing impact on citizens‟ lives.18 As observed in the previous chapter, there are 
problems with the basic separation of powers model in terms of delivering individual 
justice.  The political process does not always provide a practical way by which an 
individual citizen can obtain a remedy for an administrative grievance. Litigation is 
too often associated with complicated procedures, high cost, and the length of time 
consumed. Conversely, filing complaints through the internal dispute resolution route 
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provided by departments of administrative entities offers a more economical and 
convenient way forward than judicial proceedings, and can work effectively in 
dealing with administrative faults. The internal complaint system, however, is 
inevitably hampered by intricate human relationships and the perception that it lacks 
independence.19 
Contrary to other approaches, the ombudsman system possesses the benefits 
of being independence, procedural convenience, the inquisitorial method and wider 
admissible scope.20  In theory, an ombudsman's ability to employ inquisitorial 
investigation to examine complaints can minimize the inequality of power, — 
particularly as regards technical knowledge — that generally exists between a 
complainant and government agencies.21  The fact that disputants are not equally 
matched in terms of power could advantage the stronger party, disadvantage the 
weaker one, and result in injustice. The inquisitorial process, together with the 
powers that the ombudsmen possess to gain access to information, gives the 
ombudsman an advantage of finding the sort of evidence needed to resolve 
administrative complaints. In this way the complainant is assisted too in terms of 
gaining access to information, since in most cases it is the  ombudsman who takes 
the burden of gathering evidence and the ombudsman who prepares the argument 
and shapes conclusions. Further, where the office is connected to the legislature, in 
principle parliamentary support gives the ombudsman a status to level the playing 
field between public authorities and an individual citizen. Therefore the ombudsman 
can more effectively counter any inequality of arms that might otherwise diminish 
the fairness of the process.22 
Before their introduction, it was often argued that there was no need for an 
ombudsman in countries that possess strong administrative courts and legal 
systems.23  However, the long standing history of the Swedish Ombudsman meant 
that that the parallel existence of an ombudsman and a Supreme Administrative 
Court in Sweden provided evidence that they could exist in tandem without an 
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unnecessary duplication of functions.24 France‟s introduction of the ombudsman 
system in the early 1970s is typical of the generally accepted relationship between 
the courts and the ombudsman.  In France the ombudsman was established „to 
complement the work of the Conseil d'État.25 The process of the ombudsman‟s 
investigation is informal and flexible. The complainant pays no fee and there is an 
element of personal touch. In essence, an ombudsman and the administrative court, 
while their roles may overlap to some extent, operate in quite different ways and 
hence fulfilling a different need.26    
An argument for the parallel existence of the court and the ombudsman is that 
in general it is unrealistic to expect people to pursue complaints in the courts. It was 
even argued that in many cases, the citizen bore with injustice because he could not 
afford or does not wish to pursue litigation.27 There is no doubt that a certain amount 
of jurisdictional overlap with existing administrative or judicial recourses is 
inevitable but in general the ombudsman has discretion to refuse to investigate 
complaints before all administrative recourses have been exhausted or if the matter is 
before the courts. For this the office of ombudsman was introduced to fill that deficit: 
to ensure that public members in dealing with government departments have the right 
and opportunity to obtain an independent review of administrative decisions and in 
turn increase the opportunities for redress.  
Effective dispute resolution mechanism  
As well as improving the capacity for citizens to access justice, ombudsman 
schemes can offer a remedial service much more in tune with the needs of the 
complaint. In much recent work in the UK, this goal has been referred to as 
proportionate and appropriate dispute resolution.28   
In recognition of the fact that many complaints are resolved without the need 
for investigation and recommendation; during the 1970s many ombudsman offices 
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began to develop a more flexible approach to complaint handling. This approach 
diverged significantly from the „investigation and report‟ mode of operation which 
had characterized the office in earlier years, and has been referred to as „the 
intervention method‟29. Owen emphasized that the primary role of the ombudsman is 
„to strive for the mutually acceptable resolution of a problem rather than necessarily 
finding of faults or the absence of it, the office should attempt to provide informal 
mediation services wherever such an approach may be productive‟.30  
Ombudsman offices have increasingly focused on the possibility of 
conciliation, and on facilitating a solution satisfactory to the complainants and the 
agencies concerned as quickly and informally as possible.  This function may not be 
explicitly stated in legal provisions in most countries, but, through a range of 
techniques the ombudsman nowadays plays an important role in mediating conflicts 
between individuals and government agencies. For example in may ombudsman 
scheme today, in the cases where the complaints can be resolved satisfactorily by a 
telephone call, the ombudsman will not usually conduct, or continue with, a formal 
investigation.    The UK Ombudsman under Ann Abraham made it clear that the 
office seek to achieve a solution without full investigation in order to bring a 
satisfactory and more flexible response to a complaint.31  Reflecting this evolution of 
practice, the British Columbia Ombudsman has been given a statutory mandate to 
consult with an authority to attempt to settle the complaints at any time during and 
after investigation.32  
Often cases are resolved by telephone calls and with minimum formality, and 
not so much on the investigation and the identification of what has gone wrong. 
Citizens generally do not understand workings and policies of the government. The 
ombudsman can assist with the complainants by gathering facts for both parties and 
let the parties communicate with one another and find resolution. The ombudsman 
intervenes to facilitate communication between these departments and the citizens. 
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Such an approach is particularly appropriate with administrative disputes that do not 
require complex presentation of evidence. In the Netherlands, this „intervention 
method‟ can solve the problems such as delay and difficulties in getting in touch with 
a government officials, which constitute 80 per cent of the complaints received by 
the Netherlands National Ombudsman.33 Asian ombudsman offices emphasizing this 
alternative dispute resolution role include Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, and Thailand.34  
Reviewing improper administrative practice 
 As its mandate is rarely restricted to legality review, securing individual 
rights in the area where the court cannot provide sufficient redress is generally 
considered to be one of the main advantages an ombudsman has over other existing 
review mechanisms.35 While performing reviews beyond a study of strict matters of 
legality is part of the task of parliament, auditor-generals, and internal administrative 
supervisory authorities, the ombudsman can play a role alongside such mechanisms 
by emphasizing matters that go beyond the political, financial or efficiency aspects of 
the complaint.  In other words ombudsmen are well placed to pronounce on good 
administration. 
The following description of the Ombudsman of the European Union 
illustrates the important aspect of an ombudsman.    
[T]he EU Ombudsman‟s task is to supplement the legal rights available 
to the individual against the [European] Community with legitimate 
political pressure where the individual suffers an instance of unjust 
treatment from a Community authority but is left without a legal 
remedy.36 
 In this respect, the ombudsman normally looks at standards of proper 
administrative practice that do not - or do not yet - lie within the competence of the 
courts, but support expectations which any public member of contemporary modern 
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society can rightly expect their government to observe, articulate and support.37 To 
illustrate the form of expectation being covered here, there are many examples of the 
role the ombudsman can play in resolving injustice, where there is a loss but no legal 
remedy.  
 In France, case No. 670 is cited as an example of how the French 
Mediateur found that the government had acted according to the law but in an unjust 
manner.38 This case concerned the acceptance by the complainant of a refund in full 
and final settlement. Under the terms of the agreement, the acceptance meant that the 
complainant was forced to give up the right to contest any further the matter under 
dispute. The French Mediateur found this to be an example of how the government 
had acted according to the law but in an unjust manner.39   
 Similarly, in the UK, in the A Debt of Honor report,40 the Ombudsman 
found that there had been a real loss suffered by a number of complainants due to 
problems caused by the inconsistent eligibility criteria developed by the government 
to manage the compensation scheme concerned. But there was no legal error that the 
complainants could rely upon, as found in a court case which ran parallel to the 
Ombudsman investigation.41 Nevertheless, the Ombudsman recommended that the 
government apologise to those affected, review the operation of the scheme, and, if 
appropriate, reconsider the position of the complainant and those in the same 
position. The reason being once again is that there had been a failure in 
administrative practice, notwithstanding the lack of clear breach of a legal standard. 
For the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Ministry of Defence were expected apply a 
degree of care and attention, transparency and foresight of the consequences for 
affected parties that went beyond mere observation of basic legal standards.  
 Likewise, in Canada, in Haymour Holding Ltd. v R. In Right of British 
Columbia,42 the British Columbia Ombudsman recommended the government to 
make ex gratia compensation and legal expenses totalling over 160,000 dollars, with 
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an apology to an individual who suffered from government actions which the court 
had previously found to be „discriminatory, misleading, highly improper, unfair and 
bad faith‟. The court may have found in favour of the individual, but did not award 
personal damages or punitive damages against the crown because there was no 
remedy at law for such loss. 
 The previous examples make it clear that the ombudsman‟s work goes 
beyond the enforcement of law – and goes beyond legal questions, which allows 
investigation of injustice and fairness. The remedy recommended by an ombudsman 
also frequently extends beyond the sort of redress that a complainant could normally 
expect to obtain from the court and tribunal process. Therefore, it is often argued that 
one important reason for establishing ombudsmen is to deal with grievances for 
which no remedy is available in court, because as no legal right has been infringed, 
the matter is not actionable.43 As it has come to realise that the criteria exclusively 
focused on the question of „legal‟ rights does not always provide an adequate 
remedy. It is now widely accepted that an ombudsman has a role to play alongside 
courts, tribunals and other bodies in providing remedial help to people who have 
suffered injustice from defective administration.44 
 
3.1.2. Promote good administration 
Increasingly, concentrating only on complaint-handling is not seen as a 
sufficient objective for the ombudsman.45 Ombudsmen have been urged to make 
more use of their capacity by using their complaint role to identify areas of public 
administration that are a common source of complaints from the community.  With 
such knowledge it is argued ombudsmen can analyse the underlying causes of 
administrative problems and assist agencies in remedying the flaws in their processes 
in order to prevent mistakes from occurring in the future.46  In this move, many 
ombudsmen have introduced a systemic approach by taking a proactive role of being 
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concerned that administrative failures are rectified to prevent mistakes from 
occurring in the future, in addition to its primary individual complaints handling 
role.47 
One strong feature of the ombudsman is the depth and quality of its 
investigatory power which aids the expansion of this new role.  During 
investigations, the ombudsman can gather all the facts and all of the necessary and 
useful considerations in order to identify evidence of systemic faults within an 
administrative process that leads to unlawful, unfair or wrong actions/decisions. Such 
evidence can then be compiled into a report that includes his findings, together with 
constructive advice and recommendations that direct the body concerned as to how 
to correct such procedure, regulation or legislation on the basis that it is the 
procedure/regulation/legislation that is the underlying cause of administrative faults 
and leading to injustice.  Uncovering systemic weakness, therefore, can result in the 
government changing how it operates and a collective effect for all citizens. As an 
ombudsman has put it: „[A]...single and well-written report can be more effective in 
triggering political and departmental change than a decade of oversight by courts, 
tribunals and investigating agencies.‟48 
While there are other means by which system deficiency in government 
agencies can be checked, such as internal/external audit and an array of specialised 
bodies, review by an ombudsman is deemed necessary for a number of reasons. 
Unlike the review conducted by other constitutional watchdogs, the ombudsman has 
a broad investigatory power that can cover wide areas. Further, although mechanisms 
such as public enquiries or commissions can be set up to conduct comprehensive 
studies and make conclusions on a particular issue, the ombudsman is a permanently 
established body with long-standing body of residual knowledge and possesses an 
arguably high standing in the constitution. It is a body capable of making findings 
and recommendations based on thorough investigation and understanding of 
administrative process resulting from constructive engagement with the agencies 
being investigated.  
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This ability to identify systemic problems is what makes the ombudsman 
considered as an important mechanism in the quality control of administration which 
calls for a more detailed scrutiny of an administrative decision-making process than a 
simple examination of the final decision or action undertaken. This role also brings 
the ombudsman closer to the centre of public policy making as an analyst, as well as 
a critic and counsellor.  It is now accepted among ombudsmen that their core role is 
primarily concerned with complaints about specific decisions, but that they are also 
obliged to fulfil the wider role of improving procedures and bringing about desirable 
changes to legislations and policy.49   In fact, there is now widespread evidence that 
ombudsman systemic investigations have resulted in changes in administrative 
procedures or practices, or even policies, in many countries.50  
 Because of its wider impact, systemic investigations have been strategically 
used to raise the profile of several ombudsman schemes.51 For example, the 
Ombudsman of Korea from 2004 began publicising statistics recording its systemic 
impact.52 However, caution has been expressed that systemic investigation is 
intended more to identify and correct substantive problems within public bodies and 
administration and can, arguably, lead to a reduction in efforts to redress the 
grievances of individual complainants.53 In this respect, if the balance between these 
two roles can be struck, the ombudsman office can be a mechanism for resolving 
individual complaints and at the same time serve as a resource for government 
institutions in identifying and preventing administrative unfairness. Care needs to be 
taken, however, to ensure that a focus on systemic work does not reduce the capacity 
of individual complainants to pursue their grievances.  
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3.2 The essential features of an ombudsman 
The previous section demonstrated that the ombudsman differs significantly 
from other traditional methods of handling grievances and has several important 
advantages over these methods.  Taking these claims as a starting point, in Part II of 
this thesis, the work of the Thai Ombudsman will be analysed to explore the degree 
to which it is (a) designed to perform the traditional roles of the ombudsman and (b) 
the extent to which it has been successful in delivering those roles.  
Before moving on, however, it is necessary to introduce another common 
feature of ombudsman analysis.  For much as it is accepted that no two ombudsman 
schemes are the same, it is not just their core role that tends to be similar. In addition 
the institutional design of the office ordinarily follows some very predictable 
patterns. Building on this observation, several studies on the ombudsman institution, 
past and present, have identified a list of fundamental features and characteristics that 
are not just common to ombudsman schemes, but are deemed essential to the 
institution‟s unique role.  Rowat, for instance, has identified the characteristics of an 
ombudsman as:  
'(1) He is an independent and nonpartisan officer of the legislature, 
provided for in the constitution or by law, who supervises the 
administration; (2) he deals with specific complaints from the public 
against administrative injustice and maladministration; and (3) he has 
the power to investigate, criticize and publicize, but not to reverse, 
administrative action'. 54 
Seneviratne considered that the effectiveness of an ombudsman based on: (1) 
The ombudsman must be independent of executive and any partisan aspect of the 
constitution; (2) The ombudsman must have adequate powers of investigation and a 
jurisdictional coverage which is as wide as possible; (3) The ombudsman must 
ensure that there is effective remedy where administrative short comings are found; 
and (4) the ombudsman must be easily accessible; and (5) the ombudsman must be 
widely known.55 Gregory stated similar criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of an 
ombudsman, including: impartiality and independence, visibility and access, wide 
jurisdictions and competence, extent of non-statutory practices and procedures speed, 
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adequacy of remedial action secured, and effectiveness in obtaining compliance with 
recommendations.56  
Perhaps the most famous of all studies in this area is that by Gottehrer, who 
compiled the Ombudsman Legislative Reference Document, which was based on a 
study of more than 130 laws creating ombudsman offices. In this work, Gottehrer 
identified what he referred to as the essential features of an ombudsman institution. 
Partly influenced by his work, various Ombudsman associations – e.g. the 
Ombudsman Association, the Australian and New Zealand Ombudsman 
Association,57 the International Ombudsman Institute and the Asian Ombudsman 
Association - have developed membership documents along the lines outlined by 
Gottehrer.  In particular, in 1969 the American Bar Association identified twelve 
essential characteristics which every statute or ordinance establishing an ombudsman 
in the Unites States should contain. 
Although these various attempts to standardize the ombudsman model are not 
exactly the same, there is sufficient commonality to derive essential features of an 
ombudsman for the purposes of this study. This section, attempts to identify some of 
the best arrangements and practices that are universally recognized by academics and 
professionals as essential features of the ombudsman, for the purpose of establishing 
a framework for the review of the Thai Ombudsman scheme. What follows is drawn 
from the consensus that seems to be emerging, such as standards that refer to 
independence, impartiality, strong investigatory power, no enforcement power and 
access and public awareness and accountability. 
These basic characteristics are in themselves not a determinative factor for 
success, as effectiveness of the ombudsman also depends on external factors which 
relate to the political and social context in which the ombudsman operates.58 
Nevertheless, they are usually considered as prerequisites to the existence of the 
ombudsman and therefore could serve as an important base set of criteria that an 
ombudsman institution should meet. At the end of each feature criteria boxes are 
developed to serve as a theoretical framework of the study. 
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3.2.1 Independence   
Recognition of the importance attached to the issue of independence within 
the ombudsman community can be seen in the membership rules of ombudsman 
association.  For instance, the Forum for Canadian Ombudsman states: „An 
ombudsman is an independent, objective investigator of people‟s complaints against 
government agencies and other organisations, both public and private sectors...‟59 
This independence is also a prerequisite for the confidence that citizens must 
have in the ombudsman in his complaint handling role. 60  From the standpoint of the 
complainant, ombudsman schemes are different from many other complaint schemes 
(conciliation, compensation schemes) because ombudsmen are independent from the 
bodies they have power to investigate.61 In this respect, Oosting explained that 
citizens must feel that they can trust the ombudsman to safeguard their interest, as 
they do in the court of law, in order to reduce fears of a backlash reprisal at the hand 
of public official they are complaining about.62  
The IOA Code of Ethics, the basis for the Standards of Practice, says, „The 
ombudsman is independent in structure, function, and appearance.‟63  Establishing 
suitable arrangements to secure the independence of ombudsmen usually involves: 
• constitutional protection 
• institutional and functional independence 
• funding and operational autonomy 
• remuneration, security of tenure and removal of office 
These will be explored in turn. 
Constitutional protection 
Among all the various constitutional watchdogs, the ombudsman is perhaps 
one of the most at risk of abolition or curtailment upon grounds of political 
expediency. This prospect of abolition has long been a fear in the ombudsman 
world.64  One effective way to mitigate such risk is to enhance its legal status by 
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incorporating the institution in a constitution.  Because the process for amending a 
constitution is often designed to prevent frequent amendments, any potential for 
abolition or revision by a disgruntled government could therefore be reduced.  The 
ombudsman should be free to criticize without fear that the office will be abolished 
or unnecessarily restricted.  Providing for the office in the constitution rather than 
solely in legislation, to some degree, removes the office from the political sphere and 
also elevate the profile of the ombudsman office.  Constitutional underpinning has 
been encouraged by the Council of Europe. The Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe resolved that establishment at constitutional level is essential for 
any institution of ombudsman to operate effectively.65  
Valdes reported that structurally the great majority of the ombudsman in 
Europe and the commonwealth countries are based on constitutional or statutory 
foundation. The same claim can also be made in relation to the ombudsmen in the 
developing countries which are often formally instituted by the constitution.66 
Nevertheless, while increasingly ombudsman offices are being created through a 
constitutional instrument, there are well-established, high-quality ombudsman offices 
created solely by legislation in several countries.67   
Institutional and functional independence 
An independent test for the ombudsman is that it must not be subordinated to 
the body that they have power to investigate, especially the government or the 
executive branch.68 Uggla cautioned that  „if the ombudsman is powerful but lacks 
independence, there is a risk that in practice it becomes an instrument for achieving 
the political goals of other actors, while probably be of little service to the individual 
citizen or to the defence of human rights in general.69 
Institutional independence is achieved by arranging the ombudsman office in 
an external position in relation to the executive bodies that are subject to its scrutiny 
and also placing it in the machinery of state at a sufficiently high level.70 Therefore 
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traditionally an ombudsman is typically a creature of the legislature.  This helps 
provide the ombudsman with considerable independence and should facilitate 
investigation and reporting free from the interference of the executive branch of 
government. This point is confirmed by one leading piece of research which 
disclosed that all ombudsmen in the Scandinavian countries and the majority in the 
Commonwealth, European countries and the US are appointed by parliament.71 A 
further step, taken in Papua New Guinea, is to separate the Office from Parliament– a 
structure relevant to the role the Commission has in relation to members of 
Parliament. 
In Asia, however, in many countries ombudsmen are appointed by executive 
order appointments following a nomination process that does not involve 
parliamentary oversight. This difference in process from the norm in ombudsmandry 
poses a challenge to Asian ombudsmen. The risk is that an executive appointment 
ombudsman office, lacking effective parliamentary endorsement, will find it more 
difficult to earn credibility with all parties that will be affected by the office.72   
 Institutional independence also includes functional independence.73 This 
means, for instance, that his modus operandi should not be subject to any 
hierarchical instructions. Parliament can and does make general rules or directives as 
guidelines but cannot otherwise interfere with his procedure. The functional 
independence of an ombudsman can also be measured by the extent of his discretion 
in an investigation process. Enabling legislation normally allows the ombudsman to 
determine the nature and extent of any inquiry or investigation. The ombudsman has 
discretion whether to initiate, continue or discontinue an investigation or to decide 
not to investigate a complaint lodged if he thinks the problem mentioned would have 
affected the individual only slightly. He must also be free to determine whether, 
when and how to employ publicity. This point is crucial, partly because by 
publicising the results of his work- in particular in annual and other reports-the 
ombudsman help promote the transparency in the government.  
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Funding and administrative autonomy  
 It is also important that the ombudsman has sufficient resources available to 
fulfil its functions properly.  Budget arrangements can help ensure an ombudsman‟s 
independence. Experiences in many countries show that the funding for oversight 
bodies should not be left at the mercy of the government. Decisions on resource-
allocation should be based on objective and expert analysis. The simplest approach is 
for the ombudsman to propose an annual budget directly to parliament, in a manner 
similar to that for courts and other vital institutions (such as the supreme audit 
institution).74 It has been suggested that for transparency what constitutes sufficient 
resourcing should be determined by an appropriation committee of parliament in 
order to avoid excessive restrictions on funding which would affect the institution‟s 
ability to deliver what is expected of it.75  Legislation covering the ombudsman 
ordinarily ensures autonomy in managing the resources provided by the budget.  
Remuneration, security of tenure and removal of office 
  Legislation that creates the office commonly provides guarantees for 
personal independence such as security of fixed tenure specified by law and may 
only be removed from the office on grounds and procedures expressly specified by 
law. The majority hold the office for at least five or six years,76 with longer terms 
lasting from seven to a maximum of ten years with or without the possibility of 
reappointment77.   
 Commonly, among the specified grounds for early removal of the office-
holder are incapacity, incompetence, and criminal conviction, ineligibility to hold 
public office misconduct or becoming bankrupt.  To legitimate the process and 
provide a safeguard against the danger of removing a good ombudsman, a common 
requirement is to require that premature removal be determined by the same form of 
majority vote as adopted for appointment of the ombudsman.  Such a process reduces 
the possibility of an ombudsman being dismissed or suspended prematurely due to 
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the arbitrary will of those who designated the ombudsman, as the investigating result 
may offend those who have political power or control the legislative body.  
 Legislation also confirms the salary and the status office-holder either by 
way of connecting the office to Parliament or, as is often the case, by linking the 
ombudsman‟s salary to that of a judge of the Supreme Court.78  This arrangement is 
said to strengthen the ombudsman‟s personal stability and protect him against the 
danger of executive pressure by way of a reduction or increase of his income. Finally 
the ombudsman enjoys immunity from liability and criminal prosecution for acts 
performed under the law.79   
These various issues of concern taken from international guidance suggest 
that the following areas need to be examined in relation to the independence and 
autonomy of the Thai Ombudsman scheme. 
Independence 
• Is the Ombudsman created by the Constitution? 
• Is the Ombudsman subject to control by the executive/governmental organs 
or state authorities? 
• Does the constitution or the enabling legislation define the method of 
appointment and state clearly the term of appointment for the Ombudsman? 
• Does the Ombudsman report to the legislature directly on the result of its 
operation or any specific matters resulting from an investigation? 
• Is the Ombudsman free to select which complaints to pursue and methods for 
pursuing them? 
• Is the Ombudsman free to make recommendation? 
• Does the Office have its funds allocated directly from the legislature and is its 
budget funded at a level sufficient to carry out the functions of the Office? 
• Does the Ombudsman have the sole power to run the office, appoint and 
remove staff? 
• Does the Ombudsman have a fixed and long term of office? 
• Does the Ombudsman have a high and fixed salary? 
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• Is the Ombudsman provided with immunity from liability and criminal 
prosecution for acts performed under the law? 
3.2.2 Impartiality 
 It is said that independence is the bedrock on which the other fundamental 
characteristics rest while impartiality helps the ombudsman earn respect and 
credibility from the people and the government.80  Giddings noted that „Independence 
is not an end in itself. Its purpose is to secure impartiality in such a way as to re-
assure those who might wish to use the services of the ombudsman office that they 
will receive a genuinely fair assessment of their case.‟81 
While independence connotes status and relationship, impartiality relates to 
an attitude or a state of mind that is unbiased and without prejudice towards a 
particular case or party.82 It is therefore essential that an ombudsman must 
demonstrate that he is an impartial investigator by providing fair and objective 
treatment of people and the issues involved.83  Caiden pointed out that „ombudsmen 
must be careful not to create popularity by being a citizen advocate or biased towards 
government.84  
Bakewell emphasised the impartiality of the office as a crucial factor. 
Ombudsmen must be „free of political consideration to speak freely and assess 
independently‟, with its influence based on objectivity and prestige not political 
favour.85 Because of the lack of enforcement power, it is the perception of being seen 
to be impartial which is key to the ombudsman‟s findings and recommendations 
being implemented or administrative reform secured. The agency being reviewed is 
more likely to cooperate with an investigation when it can be encouraged that a 
process of third party objective review can provide reassurance that unfounded or 
unmeritorious complaints will be fairly treated.  On the other hand criticism made by 
an ombudsman office perceived to be biased is likely to be rejected.  An individual 
affected by administrative actions is more likely to turn to an ombudsman because he 
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believes that his case will be investigated by an objective third party.86 Impartiality is 
an essential feature in both the ombudsman‟s roles as an administrative dispute 
settler and as an accountability mechanism, as is argued by the Council of Europe in 
2003: 
His/her duties are best discharged as an independent, impartial 
intermediary…An ombudsman ought to give the public in general the 
confidence that there is  an impartial „watchdog‟ holding government 
and public administration to account.87 
Thus independence does not guarantee that an ombudsman will be impartial.  
In this context, impartiality is viewed as wider than independence; an ombudsman 
can be independent and yet be biased against one of the parties to the dispute. 
Legislation normally provides for measures to ensure that an ombudsman is 
perceived as impartial.  
The preservation of impartiality  
The impartiality of the ombudsman is primarily secured at the appointment 
and removal process. Personal qualifications are generally designed to select an 
ombudsman that can be widely respected.  More importantly still, a selection process 
is required that ensures the appointment of an ombudsman that is a widely respected 
person and can be accepted by diverse political groups as unaligned and fair. Options 
may include processes such as appointment by a super majority in parliament, or a 
requirement that all the political parties within the legislature reach consensus on the 
person being appointed, or provision for a nominating committee to lead the process, 
together with an extensive consultation process. The removal process is designed to 
guarantee that the ombudsman will not be removed for political reasons or because 
the results of investigations have offended those in political power in the legislative 
body.  Ombudsmen are subject to removal for specified causes or with the same 
super majority as appointment so as to ensure that the causes for removal are as 
widely appreciated and valid as those for appointment. 
Once appointed, it is important that the ombudsman sustains his credibility 
and authority by ensuring that he continues to be seen to be impartial in his conduct 
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and in the way he performs his duties. General standards of practice of the 
ombudsman observed as indicators of impartiality include restrictions on activities 
that would compromise his neutrality or perceived as potential conflicts of interest.  
Ombudsmen are normally restricted from being involved in any political 
activities. Ombudsman legislation tends to prohibit simultaneously holding public or 
elective office or from actively being involved in political parties‟ activities. The 
enabling law will also usually states how conflicts of interest will be handled, such as 
the adoption of a provision on whether an ombudsman is allowed to hold any other 
position concurrently, as well as procedures for handling possible conflicts of 
interest.  For example, the Indian Ombudsman is barred from being a member of 
parliament, an office of trust or profit and a political party.88  Likewise the 
Ombudsman Act of Alaska provides that the ombudsman cannot be a candidate for 
national, state or local until one year after leaving the office.89  
 In addition, to ensure impartiality the ombudsman should not hold additional 
positions in the office or enter into business or employment relationship that might 
lead to his ability to be impartial and fair to be called into question. 
These various issues of concern suggest that the following areas need to be 
examined in relation to the impartiality of the Thai Ombudsman scheme. 
Impartiality 
 Are personal qualifications imposed to select an Ombudsman who is widely 
respected? 
 Does the appointment process help to ensure that the person selected is 
widely viewed as fair and impartial? 
 Are reasons for dismissal of the Ombudsman specified by law? 
 Does the removal of the Ombudsman require a super majority? 
 Is the ombudsman prohibited from simultaneously holding public office or 
being actively involved in political activities? 
3.2.3 Power 
Traditionally most ombudsmen cannot compel action or remedy to be 
provided nor can he impose sanctions on non-compliance of his recommendation. 
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Most ombudsmen can investigate, recommend, report to parliament and publicise 
reports of matters of public interest to secure results.90   
Power to investigate 
Ombudsmen are investigators. Most ombudsman legislation requires that the 
ombudsman conduct an investigation before making a recommendation.  For 
example the Ombudsmen Act 1975 of New Zealand provides that „[h]aving 
completed an investigation, an Ombudsman may form an opinion that the decision, 
recommendation, act or omission: appears to have been contrary to law; or was based 
on a mistake of fact or law‟. Ombudsmen‟s inquisitorial inquiries are aimed at 
establishing the fact of the cases he investigates and not just to focus on issues 
presented by the parties, in order to be able to decide authoritatively on the quality of 
the administrative action. Therefore extensive investigatory power is a prerequisite 
for the ombudsman in order to obtain information necessary for making a 
comprehensive evaluation on the exercise of public authority.91   
An enhanced ability to access all relevant government documents together 
with a wide jurisdiction over all area of government administration is one of the most 
significant powers of the ombudsman and has been considered as one of the 
ombudsman‟s advantages over courts and parliamentarians.92  Most ombudsmen can 
request from government officials all public or confidential information, records and 
documents necessary in the discharge of his duties, although the office is also 
ordinarily required not to disclose confidential information. Often an ombudsman is 
empowered to interview witnesses and apply for and conduct searches of premises 
where relevant information is believed to be located. In some jurisdictions the 
ombudsman can conduct on-the-spot inspections and investigations. Many 
ombudsmen, such as the ombudsman in Denmark, Norway and New Zealand, as well 
as AOA members, are specifically given the right to summon and enforce subpoena 
witnesses and documents and interrogate witnesses under oath.93 Government bodies 
and government officials are under an obligation to reply to his queries and supply 
him with access to pertinent records with a narrow exception in the case where 
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disclosure of such information would be injurious to public interest and prejudicial to 
the safety of the state.   
The power to investigate does not always mean an obligation to investigate.  
There is often a discretion granted to an ombudsman to screen unworthy complaints. 
On the other hand, the power to undertake independent investigation on own 
initiative (ex officio) is considered important in identifying effective systemic 
shortcomings.  
A few common sources of matters that can invoke an ombudsman to use his 
own initiative investigation include media reports, reports on government functions, 
political commentary, as well as broader issues that arise out of a set of complaints.94  
This power  is cited as beneficial in the countries where the citizens do not know 
their rights and are susceptible to abuse of power by government and the ombudsman 
can intervene to investigate corruption and maladministration whether there is a 
complaint or not.95 The chief danger here is that inappropriate use of the own 
initiative investigatory power could expose the ombudsman to investigating issues 
purely because they were in the media spotlight. However the counter argument 
against this concern is that possessing such power is important if the ombudsman 
wants to be well-positioned to play a part in scrutinising the executive.96    
These are all issues which need to be examined in relation to the Thai 
Ombudsman scheme and suggest the following as important areas of inquiry.  
Power to investigate 
 Does the legislation provide the Ombudsman with the right to require all 
relevant information, documents and other materials from those subject to 
investigation? 
 Can the Ombudsman access all the public records necessary for an 
investigation? 
 Is the Ombudsman able to investigate regardless of complaints where 
required in the public interest? 
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 Does the agency subject to the investigation have a corresponding duty to 
cooperate with or respond affirmatively to the Ombudsman’s reasonable 
request of evidence related to the case?  
 Have there ever been any problems in using these powers? 
Power to report  
The ombudsman is provided with power to recommend but not the power to 
enforce his recommendations.  The ombudsman must persuade the government 
agencies to accept his finding and implement his recommendation. The persuasive 
power of the ombudsman‟s recommendation is believed to come from the 
comprehensive investigation of a case carried out in a neutral and impartial manner, 
supported by the quality of the ﬁndings, the practicality and reasonableness of his 
report and also the credibility and respect inherent in the office.  Without official 
collaboration, the ombudsman effort may have little influence. In order to maximise 
their impact, ombudsmen in general are found to put in a considerable amount of 
work in raising their public profile and cultivating strong complementary working 
relationships with the public sector.97 
In principle, government is expected to act on ombudsman recommendations 
because it is what people expect. In rejecting an ombudsman recommendation 
government needs to give justification for their rejection, otherwise governments will 
be seen to be acting as a judge in its own case and as rejecting the need for checks 
and balances within the constitution. In Ainsworth v Ombudsman, Justice Enderby of 
the New South Wales Supreme Court said: 
It has always been considered that the efficacy of the [the Ombudsman] 
Office and function comes largely from the light [he] is able to throw on 
areas where there is alleged to be administrative injustice and where 
other remedies of the Courts and the good offices of Members of 
Parliament have proved inadequate. Goodwill is essential. When 
intervention by an Ombudsman is successful, remedial steps are taken, 
not because orders are made that they may be taken, but because the 
weight of its findings and the prestige of the office demand that they be 
taken.98 
Report to parliament 
Public bodies do not always agree with the ombudsman‟s findings and may 
refuse to adopt their recommendations.  When this occurs, to resolve the dispute, 
ombudsmen need to be able to rely upon the political pressure they can create on the 
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government by submitting a formal report to parliament and making their findings 
publicly available, or a method of equivalent effectiveness. This is an addition to the 
mandatory annual report submission to parliament, in which ombudsmen may draw 
attention to cases in which public agencies have failed to implement their 
recommendation. The ombudsman‟s strength arguably rests with its close 
relationship with the legislature.99 The parliamentary route is often advocated as a 
strong tool because of its powerful place in the constitution. Given the opportunity, 
Parliament can invest time in exploring the matter and providing its opinion on the 
affair. Parliamentary support and scrutiny is often considered essential to the 
ombudsman‟s legitimacy and effectiveness.100  As one former Ombudsman 
observed: 
There is little doubt that the right of an Ombudsman to submit special 
reports to his legislature constitutes a powerful instrument. Even if it is 
never used by the Ombudsman, the potential of its user may be 
employed as a successful strategy to win compliance with 
recommendation.101 
The UK‟s PCA‟s Sachenhausen has been cited as a good example of how 
parliamentary support is valuable in bringing pressure on the government when 
departments raised difficulties in implementing its recommendation.102  It has been 
stated that government departments are reluctant to ignore the PCA‟s 
recommendation because of the fact that the PCA can command parliamentary 
support.103  
It is, therefore, widely suggested that the success of the office of the 
ombudsman heavily depends on strong parliamentary support. Parliament is 
supposed to on a regular basis carefully and thoroughly examine and debate the 
findings and recommendations presented in the ombudsman‟s annual and other 
reports, and then to take appropriate actions or measures. Such support or ideally 
corporation between the ombudsman and the legislature is crucial and key to its 
effectiveness.104  On the contrary, experiences of ombudsmen around the world 
                                                 
99
   Buck et al., n. 50, pp. 155-156. 
100
 The World Bank, n. 69. 
101
 K Friedmann, „Realisation of Ombudsman‟s Recommendations‟,  papers presented at the 4th 
International Conference, Commonwealth Ombudsman, Canberra, 1989, at 123-124. 
102
 Richard Kirkham, Brian Thompson, Trevor Buck, „When putting things right goes wrong: 
enforcing the recommendations of the ombudsman‟, Public Law, 2008, at 513. 
103
  ibid. 
104
  Discussion see Robert Runciman, „Ombudsmen and Legislatures: Allies or Adversaries?‟, 
Canadian Parliamentary Review, Vol.7(3), 1984, p.16.  
77 
 
suggest that problems with the effectiveness of ombudsmen in many developing 
countries can be attributed largely to failure of parliament to debate and take action 
on any of their annual or special reports.105 Today the best parliamentary practice for 
the ombudsman report to the democratic assembly is through a standing committee 
or in some jurisdictions a special committee is designated to engage with the 
ombudsman. For example, in the UK and Ireland, there are select committees which 
are responsible for receiving and debating the ombudsman‟s annual and special 
reports and for ensuring that its criticisms and recommendations are acted upon.   
Report to the pubic 
In case of lack of political support, the possibility of making known on a 
large scale his findings is another main weapon the ombudsman possesses.106  
Around the world, in such cases, recommendations are often (not always) adopted by 
government, albeit sometimes following wide and intense public discussion on unfair 
and inappropriate actions or policies cited in the ombudsman report.107 Therefore, it 
has been cited by several ombudsman that it is crucial that ombudsman institutions 
are able to issue public reports at the time and manner they see fit, which means the 
reports are not censored, „sanitized‟ or delayed by the executive or the bodies which 
they oversee.108 
The press can play a very significant role in strengthening the office of the 
Ombudsman. It could help the ombudsman increase visibility and can arouse 
considerable public attention by regularly publishing and commenting on the 
ombudsman‟s findings and recommendations, on the response of Parliament to the 
ombudsman‟s reports, on the response of the government and of the public bodies 
concerned, and on subsequent developments and changes.109  In general, the media is 
interested in the works of the ombudsman in order to monitor its works while the 
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general public pay attention because the emphatic public feel that what happened in 
the cases can happen to them too.110  
 The Irish, German, Estonian, UK, and Slovenian ombudsman institutions all 
cited that they have power to publicise their reports in the event of non-compliance 
or non-implementation, while the Serbian ombudsman may even publicly 
recommend the removal of the relevant official.111 It is broadly agreed in the 
literature that publicity may force an agency to action. In Latin America, ombudsmen 
are found to employ publicity more often to secure change, as they can be faced with 
hostile responses from government.112  This has proven to be an effective tool. As 
pointed out by Uggla, one source from the Peru‟s ombudsman office remarked that 
the government did not want to defy the ombudsmen as this would result in a 
political cost.113  
The ombudsman‟s ability to secure compliance and influence therefore 
depends significantly on the good will and cooperation from the 
executive/administrative branch, and on the second place support from parliament 
and eventually the public and favourable media coverage.  
A number of ombudsmen have claimed that the prestige and the publicity 
surrounding the office is more than enough to secure the desired effect without 
further sanctions.114 However, the extent to which persuasion is an effective means 
of inducing compliance varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Individual grievances 
do not always attract public interest. In such cases, it may not be practical to address 
the issue for political pressure through the legislative or appeal for public opinion. 
And this raises questions as to the usefulness of the institution. In certain 
circumstances, therefore, there may be strong arguments for considering additional 
coercive measures, where non-compliance is an offence, to ensure that 
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recommendations are adhered to, or at least considered. In addition, it has been 
argued that ignorance of the ombudsman‟s recommendations could adversely affect 
his performance and cause the ombudsman to become demoralized.115  
Despite the dangers, however, scholars and experienced ombudsmen have 
frequently argued against specific legal enforcement powers.116 The contrary position 
has often been claimed that the lack of enforcement power is strength of the 
ombudsman not weakness because it means that the office does not usurp or compete 
with the legislature and the executive, or become another court. When combined 
with other factors than merely the power to make legal binding decision, what seems 
to be a weakness enables the ombudsman to exert its influence to supplement and 
broaden the traditional means of control.117  To give the ombudsman direct 
enforcement power would result in the institution becoming more like other 
traditional mechanisms that are already in place, while in practice the traditional 
ombudsman model can be an effective means of redress where other means have 
failed.  
 It may be that the inability to force change is the central strength of the 
office and not the weakness.  It requires that a recommendation must be 
based on a thorough investigation of all facts, scrupulous consideration 
of all perspectives and vigorous analysis of all issues.  Through this 
application of reason the results is definitely more powerful represent 
…..it changes the way of thinking.118 
Monitoring implementation 
Adequate follow up on implementation of recommendations forms a critical 
part of an ombudsman‟s functions as it impacts the ombudsman‟s institutional 
effectiveness. It is suggested that ombudsman offices have a process in place to 
proactively follow up on the implementation of recommendations, instead of 
passively relying largely on feedback from the complainant and working on the 
assumption that if a complainant does not approach the ombudsman, the grievance 
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would have been redressed.119  It is argued that while this may be a reasonable 
assumption, it may still leave out a number of complainants who do not get the 
required relief and are hesitant to approach the ombudsman again.120 Besides it is 
worth pointing out that it is not just the non - implementation of recommendation, 
but the timeliness of the implementation which is the issue. Effectiveness in 
monitoring the implementation of recommendations is one of the criteria that 
ombudsman offices have developed or adopted as measures of performance.  121    
A study reported that the effectiveness of the monitoring techniques is likely 
to affect the number of recommendations that are successfully implemented by 
public bodies concerned.122 Monitoring techniques employed included site visits; 
follow-up discussions with public officials and complainants; arrange follow-up 
meetings with ministers to pose questions on the implementation of their 
recommendations departments,123  legislative arrangement that require agencies to 
report to the office at specific intervals on their progress in implementing 
recommendations;124 or a requirement that the ombudsman reports on non-
compliance on an annual basis. 
To explore these points, in examining the effectiveness of the Thai 
Ombudsman‟s powers, in this work the following questions will be tested.  
Power to report 
 Is there an expectation that the Ombudsman’s recommendation be 
implemented? 
 Can the Ombudsman report non-compliance to a hierarchically superior 
individual or body? 
 Can the Ombudsman report non-implementation to parliament? 
 Can the Ombudsman publicise non-compliance?  
 Does the Ombudsman have effective monitoring techniques to follow up the 
implementation of its recommendation? 
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3.2.4 Fairness 
Fairness is one of the criteria to be met by all ombudsman offices.125 In fact, it 
is the essence of the ombudsman process which aims to ensure that the complainants 
as well as the government agencies concerned are treated fairly.  In order that the 
ombudsman arrives at decisions that are fair and seen to be fair,126 the ombudsman is 
normally required to observe the principles of procedural fairness. Fairness can be 
explained as the requirement to make decisions on the information before it and by 
having specific criteria upon which its decisions are based.127  
Most ombudsman statues require the ombudsman to be procedurally fair to 
those whom her report may affect adversely.  For example, the ombudsman is 
required to advise the complainants of the reasons why a complaint will not be 
investigated or not supported or is outside jurisdiction, or is otherwise excluded. 
Such exercises may be done in writing or verbally and may have time periods 
imposed in order that there is no unnecessary delay in the process.   
Various design features set by ombudsman association such as USOA, IOA, 
and IOI are often embedded fairness in the internal operational arrangements of an 
ombudsman scheme. By way of example, ANZOA requirements for fairness reflect 
fundamentals such as the ombudsman‟s investigatory process normally requires that 
before announcing a conclusion or recommendation, the agency criticized should be 
consulted first and also given an opportunity to respond to the findings and 
recommendations. The importance of the concept of fairness is that reports are more 
accurate and criticism made is more easily accepted if the agency concerned or 
people being criticized have an opportunity to know what the criticism will be before 
it is made public.  
Good practice in ombudsmanry often provides both parties the opportunity to 
rebut the arguments of, and information provided by, the other party and allow for a 
review of any decision or conclusion the ombudsman has reached about the 
complaint.  Sometimes bodies investigated against are given the opportunity to 
include their reply in the final report.128 The rationale behind this practice is that 
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government bodies which are subjected to the ombudsman‟s investigation should be 
entitled to administrative fairness from the ombudsman, as is the case for the citizen 
from the government. 
Established ombudsman offices‟ websites e.g. ombudsmen in Canada, 
Australia, Hong Kong, England, and the USA delineate clear commitments that 
focus on fairness and show common attributes when it comes to sound principles and 
best practices concerning fairness. Based on the review of the literature and the 
ombudsman offices‟ website, a handful of checklists about the ombudsman‟s fairness 
were extracted as follows.  
Fairness 
 Are the complainants advised of the reasons why the Ombudsman decide not 
to investigate, cease to investigate the complaint or consider the complaint 
outside jurisdiction?  
 Are respective parties provided with an opportunity to present their 
arguments and evidence? 
3.2.5 Accessibility and public awareness 
Accessibility is another requirement for an ombudsman‟s effectiveness.129 As 
a complaint handling body, an ombudsman generally serves as an office of last resort 
for those who have tried unsuccessfully resolving their grievance with the agency 
complained against. On the other hand, an ombudsman's task is to assist the policy 
makers in supervising the administration of public policies, comment upon how they 
are being administered and recommend changes where appropriate. In this regard, for 
an ombudsman to be useful for complainants and to be effective in passing on 
bottom-up administrative lessons to policy makers, it is important that the 
ombudsman office is accessible for any person making a complaint.130 Arguably, it is 
its accessibility to the common citizen that differentiates the ombudsman from the 
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court system. Accessibility is made up of at least two components: awareness and 
availability. 
Promoting public awareness of the ombudsman‟s existence and a wide 
understanding of the activities of the office is important because prospective users 
need to know that there is an ombudsman first and then how it can help.  This can be 
dealt with through strategies such as public education, speaking engagements, 
advertising campaigns, press conferences, partnerships with civil society, media 
coverage and the circulation of informational materials (i.e. pamphlets, guides, 
brochures , annual reports, bulletins, etc.) to raise awareness about the institution. A 
problem in developing countries is that the institution is frequently not well known in 
rural areas.  
Ideally, the ombudsman‟s activities should be covered by media television 
and radio, newspapers, press conferences, leaflets, annual reports, and bulletins.  
Ombudsmen are increasingly making use of the various new media tools available 
e.g. the Federal Tax Ombudsman in Pakistan has a very active Facebook page, while 
the Ontario Ombudsman has been assiduous in developing its Twitter profile. The 
Ontario Ombudsman has launched a mobile version of the office's website which 
will allow mobile users to browse the Office's website more quickly and efficiently 
and file an online complaint from their mobile devices. 
The ombudsman must make himself readily available to people with 
complaints. McMillan states that a key reason for the success of ombudsmen around 
the globe is that they have „made themselves available to the members of the 
community they serve‟.131 Most ombudsmen have facilitated convenient access e.g. 
complaints can be made through telephone calls or website. The ombudsman service 
is free. In countries with a large population or poor communication facilities, there is 
a need to find a means to establish clearly established and signposted provincial or 
district offices, or arranging for regular regional visits. The Gibraltar Public Services 
Ombudsman Office‟s employment of Skype facilities to users provides an example 
of how modern technology can be used to enhance accessibility to the ombudsman‟s 
service.  
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In accordance with this analysis various proposed tests of access and public 
awareness are set below, as they will be applied in this study of the Thai 
Ombudsman. 
Access and Public awareness 
 Can anyone bring a complaint directly to the Ombudsman without paying a 
fee or passing through an intermediary office? 
 Can a complaint be lodged verbally or via internet? 
 Is the institution accessible to all citizens? 
 Are there barriers to accessibility? 
 How does the citizen find out about the Office? 
 Does the Office provide for an easy procedure by which to complain? 
 What does the law say about accessibility?  
 To what extent does the Ombudsman use electronic technology to aid the 
process? 
 Has the Ombudsman employed all reasonable measures to make the general 
public aware of its existence and role? 
3.2.6 Accountability 
An organization that uses the power of the state must be checked. 
Ombudsmen possess extensive investigatory power and considerable discretionary 
power. The court can apply judicial review which focuses on the legality of the 
ombudsman‟s procedure, not the merit of its decision. Therefore there is a need to 
provide adequate processes of external oversight to ensure that these powers are 
exercise appropriately, as well as to assure the effectiveness of the office.132 In 
addition ombudsmen should be seen to be responsible and accountable for their 
decisions and actions, including the stewardship of public funds, in order to ensure 
public confidence in the scheme and secure its long-term legitimacy.133 
It is widely accepted that the legislature is the most appropriate institution to 
oversee the ombudsman for three main reasons:  firstly, in a democracy parliament is 
a pluralistic institution unlikely to be captured by a narrow point of view; and 
secondly, there is a natural link between the ombudsman and parliament as the work 
of the ombudsman, as a watchdog and grievance handling complements to the work 
of parliament; and thirdly, a widely adopted model designed for ensuring the 
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ombudsman‟s independence and legitimacy dictates that the ombudsman should be 
free from other control, except for responsible to the legislature as its appointing 
authority.134 It should be noted that some ombudsmen who are not parliamentary 
appointed also submit their annual report to parliament.135 
Parliament scrutiny 
While it is suggested that full accountability of an ombudsman requires the 
combined impact of a variety of processes, fundamental to the accountability of 
ombudsman schemes is the regular oversight of Parliament.136  Parliamentary 
scrutiny of the ombudsman normally involves issues relating to its performance, such 
as an evaluation of its effectiveness, whether it has achieved its objectives, plan and 
budget. Unlike the court, parliament can consider the appropriateness of the role of 
the ombudsman, criticize the drawback and advise on the improvement. 
Arrangements for interaction between the ombudsman and parliament vary across 
countries.137 Parliament exerts its will through budget cut, removal and 
reappointment.  
 At minimum, an ombudsman office normally has a legal obligation to submit 
an annual report to the legislature, which is then made available to the public.  The 
ombudsman is required to publish a detailed and informative annual report 
containing specific statistical and other data about the performance of the scheme, 
including:  information about how the scheme works; statistics on complaints 
handled and their outcome; explanation of the way complaints have been handled 
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(including the arrangements for quality-control i.e. the time taken to resolve 
complaints); examples of outstanding case; and description of any systemic and 
emerging issues.138   
 The legislative assembly reviews the report of the ombudsman, examines 
strategy and the operation of the office and may inquire into a matter which the 
ombudsman has brought to its attention. Reporting can be made through a standing 
committee or in some jurisdiction special committee designated to engage with the 
ombudsman is established.139  
In examining the accountability arrangement of the Thai ombudsman in this 
work the following questions will be tested. 
Accountability 
 Is the Ombudsman required to report to the legislature directly and regularly 
on the result of its operation or any specific matters resulting from an 
investigation? 
 Does parliament allocate budget for the Ombudsman? 
 Is the Ombudsman required to report regularly to parliament? 
 Is the Ombudsman required to publish an annual report? 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the traditional role of the ombudsman which is the 
provision of administrative justice. The traditional role primarily involves receiving 
and investigating complaints from members of the public against government 
agencies and systemic investigations to address issues which potentially affect many 
complainants rather than an individual complainant, with an aim to improve 
administrative practice.  In light of the reality that there will always be an element of 
administrative error in the carrying out state functions, the redress of grievances 
caused by administration would likely to be needed in all societies. Further, as the 
control of administrative conduct by existing institutions – the court, the legislature 
and the executives - is not sufficient, this description of the traditional role will 
almost certainly remain the core role of ombudsman schemes around the world. 
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This chapter also studied a number of features that are widely established that 
an ombudsman scheme should possess to function effectively. An ombudsman 
depends on the power of persuasion rather than enforcement which allows it to 
complement well as an accountability mechanism.  Further, the claim was made that 
in order for an ombudsman, using the power of persuasion, to be effective, it must 
possess a number of essential features which help the office earn the credibility, 
induce trust and respect from both individuals and the government. These features 
are related to its institutional design, as well as principles of function, namely broad 
power of investigation, independence, impartiality, accessibility and public 
awareness, fairness and accountability.  
However, many ombudsman offices are subject to increasingly differentiated 
functions. Ombudsmen are now discharging functions which relate to, or are 
essentially different from the traditional ombudsman function of oversight of public 
administrative acts through complaint handling. This development has resulted in an 
ongoing discussion among ombudsmen and scholars with regards to the evolving 
roles of the ombudsman and the compatibility of its new roles to its essential features 
and its traditional duties. 
The Thai Ombudsman is an example of an ombudsman with evolving roles. 
Originally established in line with the traditional role and features of the standard 
ombudsman model - an independent legislative agency with general jurisdiction over 
all administrative agencies - it was subsequently entrusted with a number of 
additional responsibilities and now operates beyond the traditional area of 
administrative malpractice. Ongoing discussion concerns the performance of the 
Office, and has been directed mainly towards whether the new functions undertaken 
by the Office are compatible with its essential institutional features designed for the 
effective operation of the traditional roles originally assigned to it.  
In order to answer this question, the second part of the thesis will study the 
establishment of the Thai Ombudsman, its legislative framework and institutional 
design and the constitutional roles assigned to it.   These issues will be discussed 
using the framework of the ombudsman role and essential features identified in this 
chapter. However before examining the Thai scheme, the study will need to look 
more at other ombudsman schemes and their additional roles. 
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 Chapter 4  
The expanded roles of the modern ombudsman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The traditional core functions of a classical ombudsman and the favoured 
institutional design and essential features that should accompany the performance of 
the ombudsman‟s core role have been discussed in Chapter 3. However the 
ombudsman institution is an evolving one.  Today, in addition to the investigation of 
poor government decision making, newly established ombudsman offices, as well as 
older offices, have assumed multiple mandates. These mandates often include roles 
that were not typically part of the traditional portfolios of the first generation of 
ombudsman schemes which were largely focused on monitoring legality and fairness 
in public administration. This chapter now focuses on the other roles which have 
been given to the ombudsman over the years. 
The traditional role seems to have gained wide acceptance within academic, 
practitioner, governance and political circles, and arguably amongst the general 
public as well, insofar as it is accepted as an appropriate concept or model with 
which to review and identify administrative wrongs in bureaucratic decision-
making. 1  By contrast, there is some debate on whether the Ombudsman can be 
effective with the new roles it has been given. As McMillan has stated: „[t]hough 
growth and expansion are important, it is equally important that Ombudsman offices 
do not take on inappropriate functions.‟2 The aim of this chapter is to outline recent 
developments of the classical ombudsman, in terms of the new mandates given to the 
office, as additional functions have been asked of it in many parts of the world.3  It 
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also examines the implications of the combined mandates of the traditional and the 
new model.  Section 4.1 examines various reasons for additional functions being 
given to ombudsman schemes. It contends that the development is largely a positive 
one. Section 4.2 examines the new powers that can accompany the new roles, powers 
that in themselves can alter the nature of the ombudsman office. Section 4.3 offers an 
evaluation of the expansion of role of the ombudsman. The chapter draws on existing 
literature on various experiences of ombudsman schemes around the world and upon 
the array of previous studies that have extensively dealt with issues surrounding the ir 
jurisdiction. Section 4.4 then explores what have been identified as the difficulties, 
dangers or challenges associated with performing the additional functions. Section 
4.5 concludes the chapter.  
As this chapter will argue, this exercise is relevant to the thesis as the Thai 
Ombudsman is one of the latest examples of an ombudsman scheme that has evolved 
well beyond the traditional model. As the thesis will go on to argue, this point is 
made in particular relation to Thailand where the Ombudsman office has struggled in 
performing its function to full success for the last twelve years, with the result that 
there has been an adverse effect on the Ombudsman‟s effectiveness in performing its 
core operations. As pointed out by Pearce, „[w]hat this role should be can be 
informed by looking at what has been done with the fledging institution up until now, 
noting success and failure and thereby pointing the way to the future‟.4 The findings 
of this chapter will form a basis for various conclusions, about the Thai Ombudsman 
and the ombudsman enterprise generally, that will be laid down in Chapter 9.   
In relation to the previous chapter, this chapter will contend that the 
expansion of the roles of the ombudsman beyond the traditional core can be justified 
and explained within the analytical framework developed in Chapter 3. That is, an 
ombudsman is used to fill in the accountability gaps of the constitution which are not 
sufficiently covered by other mechanisms. Further this chapter adds emphasis to the 
importance of favoured institutional design and essential features that should 
accompany the performance of the ombudsman‟s core role which was discussed in 
chapter 3, by arguing that the ombudsman should retain its essential features and 
core roles while adjusting to different functions as needed by context. 
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As stated by Keith, „[a] constant theme in the development of the role of the 
Ombudsman has been the acquisition of new roles, either in a personal or official 
capacity, a measure of the success of the Office and the status acquired by a number 
of its holders.‟ 5  The particular problems the fact the Thai Ombudsman will be 
identified in Chapters 7 and 8.  This chapter will place that study in its international 
context  by identifying the factors which affect the effectiveness of ombudsman 
schemes, such as in Thailand, in adopting a multifunction office to make informed 
decision in giving the ombudsman additional functions.  
 
4.1 Justifications for the expansion of the ombudsman’s roles  
Since the 1970s, it has been reported that governments around the world, at 
both national and sub-national levels, have established ombudsman schemes with 
additional responsibility beyond administrative justice. Further, out of approximately 
110 ombudsmen in operation studied  by Keith in 2005, sixty percent are 
ombudsmen schemes which have assumed multiple mandates or been given roles 
that were not typically included in the traditional portfolios of monitoring legality 
and fairness in public administration. 6   Since 2005 the expansion of multiple 
mandates of ombudsman schemes around the world has continued.7 
As argued in Chapter 2, the best constitutional explanation and justification 
for the ombudsman institution is that it helps to service a necessary need for a gap 
filler(s) in the constitution to make up for the shortcomings of the traditional 
tripartite separation of powers model. In particular, the Public Sector Ombudsman's 
role and the work of the office is crucial in filling a particular gap that is not 
addressed by other mechanisms in the justice system that provide for redress from 
perceived administrative grievances. For this reason the ombudsman has become and 
remains an office of administrative review, as it has been adopted in many countries. 
The historical background to the introduction of ombudsman schemes around the 
world supports such an analysis.  
This section contends that the expansion of the roles of the ombudsman 
beyond the traditional core can be justified and explained within the a nalytical 
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framework developed in Chapter 2. Applying the logic above, ombudsman schemes 
have been used for a range of subject matters beyond the traditional model. Recent 
trends in ombudsmanship have focused on protecting human rights, fighting 
corruption,8 ensuring ethical conduct by elected public officials, and protecting the 
environment.9  
In Asia, Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean region, large misappropriations 
of public funds are perceived as an endemic problem, notwithstanding the prior 
existence of laws to address the problem. There are several types of oversight bodies 
that could be established to combat corruption, such as the courts or anti-corruption 
commissions. However in some countries, rather than create bespoke institutions for 
the purpose of fighting corruption, the choice has been made to give the ombudsman 
an express anti-corruption mandate as an additional function. Ombudsmen in the 
Republic of Korea, Macao, China, the Philippines, Viet Nam; and Yemen10  have 
been entrusted with specific anti-corruption functions.  Similarly, the ombudsman in 
South Africa has been given a mandate to enforce a leadership code of conduct 
which covers elected and senior public officials regarding matters such as misuse of 
government funds, conflict of interest and nepotism.  
In regions emerging from military dictatorships, where the state and public 
officials had been, and sometimes continue to be, the major source of human rights 
abuses, a different dynamic exists. While the judicial mechanism is still entrenched 
as the main mechanism to protect human rights, there is an additional problem that 
often, at least initially; the judiciary are not trusted by the people as defenders of 
their rights as they are perceived to have been too closely associated with the 
authoritarianism of the previous regime.11 In such instances, in several countries, the 
institutional setup of the ombudsman has evolved and been designed primarily 
around addressing this core need to safeguard human rights. 12   Human rights 
protection is given priority, though ombudsmen have not relinquished their general 
                                                 
8
 Alice Tai, „Diversity of Ombudsmen in Asia‟, Conference Papers, Stockholm, 2009, ret rieved 23 
May 2013, 
http://www.theioi.org/downloads/74sji/Stockholm%20Conference_29.%20Back%20to%20the%20Ro
ots_Alice%20Tai.pdf.   
9
 Linda C Reif, The Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International Human Rights System, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2004. 
10
 AOA member Fact Sheets, retrieved 24 May 2013, at http://asianombudsman.com. 
11
 B Y T Tai, „Models of Ombudsman and Human Rights Protection,‟ International Journal of 
Politics and Good Governance‟, Volume 1, No. 1.3, Quarter III, 2010. 
12
 Thomas Pegram, „Diffusion Across Political Systems:  The Global Spread of Nat ional Human 
Rights Institutions‟, Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 32, No. 3, August 2010. 
92 
 
checking role on administrative power. After the end of dictatorship, the Portuguese 
and Spanish constitutions established, along with the constitutional court, the 
Provedor de Justica and the Defensor del Pueblo to supervise the protection of 
human rights in the new constitution and government administration. Ombudsmen in 
Azerbaijan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tatarstan, and Uzbekistan focus solely on human 
rights protection.  Many Latin America countries, after the military regimes 
collapsed in 1980s, established human rights ombudsmen with wide jurisdiction to 
improve human rights protection, a problem that still persists.13  In Sri Lanka, the 
Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, in addition to other 
functions, has the mandate to receive complaints filed by a person whose 
fundamental rights have been violated by a public officer or public corporation.   
Thus it can be seen that in many places the role of the ombudsman has 
expanded from its traditional function, expressed exclusively in terms of 
administrative justice, to a broader role that explicitly addresses the issues of human 
rights and anti-corruption. Even older ombudsman offices are being given secondary 
functions of differing scope with respect to freedom of information, protecting 
privacy, child protection, and health system oversight. 14  The establishment of these 
additional roles was a response to the reality of the contexts within which 
ombudsman schemes were introduced or were already operating.   There are 
numerous other instances relating to other „gap- filling‟ functions of the constitution 
where the same choice has been made, i.e. to expand the ombudsman‟s remit rather 
than create a fresh bespoke institution. For instance, Namibia and Lesotho15 have 
granted their ombudsman offices with a specific mandate on environmental 
protection.   
A linked argument in favour of the expanded ombudsman mandate is the 
perceived need for ombudsman schemes to respond to the changing environment in 
which it operates. The New South Wales experience provides a good example of 
how an ombudsman‟s functions and powers have gradually evolved and developed 
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over the last thirty years in a number of ways.  In its early days, the key functions of 
the office were narrowly focused on resolving grievances about public authorities 
and administration. But over several years from the 1990s onwards, the office moved 
from a narrow examination of „administrative‟ action to testing a much wider range 
of public service conduct, including: „Any action of police, whether on or off duty; 
the handling of allegations of child abuse; and the operation of particular 
legislation‟.16 The increased public awareness of the problems existing in these areas 
has led to a number of changes in public policy so as to keep public authorities 
accountable. Correspondingly this raised profile has led to  discussions on the 
„underpinning concept of the role of public ombudsmen which is primarily to keep 
public authorities accountable by dealing with or investigating complaints on 
administrative action.‟ 17   In New South Wales, the increase in powers and the 
additional jurisdictions and functions that the office has subsequently gained is 
therefore designed to ensure that the ombudsman is capable of successfully rising to 
current public sector challenges and that its work remains relevant and important in 
society.18   
On occasion, trust in the institution in terms of both its permanency in the 
legal and political landscape and its ability to deliver results has been a direct 
contributor to an institution which has increased in scale and scope, particularly 
where the mechanisms have proved to be efficient and effective. One might even 
argue that there is a tendency in the ombudsman community to consider ways of 
maximising the service.  The older ombudsman offices that were originally created 
with a focus on the traditional mandate of redress and control have arguably been 
successful in expanding their remit to take on board a whole range of new functions.  
In New Zealand, the experience of the Ombudsman over nearly twenty years in 
dealing with information matters was the main reason for considering that the 
Ombudsman should have the monitoring role under the Official Information Act, 
while in other jurisdictions the regular courts, special tribunals or information 
commissioners were given those tasks.19 In the Australian State of New South Wales, 
it is suggested that the ombudsman has been appointed the Commissioner 
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responsible for the Independent Commission against Corruption due to the unique 
position of the institution.  Australian ombudsmen are now entrenched as 
independent of government, possessing a high level of public trust and profile, 
equipped with investigative capacities and fair dispute resolution offices. 20  The 
advantage of using the office of the ombudsman here is that as a high profile national 
institution, it is potentially better able to resist improper pressure from the executive 
than other bodies and is thus better equipped to undertake meaningful 
investigations.21 
In states that cannot afford to fund several oversight institutions, an integrated 
oversight body with maladministration, anti-corruption as well as human rights 
violation mandates is a preferable solution as this can save cost. Though the 
ombudsman usually does not have the intrusive powers required for tackling the root 
causes of corruption, such as the power to conduct covert surveillance, intercept 
telephone calls, and arrest suspects for questioning, which may appear to relegate the 
ombudsman to a less significant role in contributing to the fight against corruption, 
the features associated with the ombudsman institution have several advantages.   
The absence of executive authority makes it relatively easy to accord the ombudsman 
real independence which is a preferred condition for effective corruption fighting as 
independence is a sign of the absence of political intrusion into the agency‟s 
operations.  Additionally, given that it possesses a broad mandate and strong 
investigatory power, the ombudsman process can facilitate a simple and quick access 
to official and confidential documentation held by the state and individuals. This 
power assists the ombudsman in gathering credible evidence, plus the power to 
refuse to disclose it to any other person gives the office the added advantage of 
providing a shield against possible intimidation of informants and complainants.  
These advantages, in turn, permit the ombudsman a significant freedom of movement 
and of action. Besides, the ombudsman has the perceived advantage of being 
considered to be less complicated to establish when compared with other specialised 
anti-corruption agencies.  And for these reasons many countries have adopted the 
ombudsman scheme as a part of their strategies for fighting corruption.   
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Apart from the fact that it is convenient for the government to give the 
ombudsman tasks that do not easily fit into other state agencies, there is a notion that 
the integration of non-traditional functions into a single ombudsman office has the 
advantage of reducing the potential for institutional overlap and duplication22 and 
allows for the concentration of expertise. 23  This solution arguably enables the 
ombudsman to achieve significantly higher quality work across all functions and 
eventually benefits the community it serves. 24  Constitutionally multi-purpose 
independent monitoring bodies, such as the ombudsman or a national human rights 
institution, might also be understood to carry greater public recognition and authority 
and hence be less vulnerable to executive attempts to weaken the institution or 
undermine its work.25  By focusing the attention and responsibility for a range of 
oversight functions on one single body there is the potential to raise the public profile 
of the office and strengthen its position in countering such pressure. 26 In addition, 
recent developments in Australia illustrate that there are advantages, as ombudsman 
offices can be given extra funding by government if they can demonstrate their 
ability and effectiveness in discharging new functions. Due to budget constraints, 
Australian government agencies face reduction of their core funding. However, this 
can be countered by acquiring a new function that attracts additional funding. 
According to McMillan, „[t]he adoption of new functions has been the key to the 
doubling in size of my own office in recent years‟27. 
 This section showed that one explanatory reason for an expansion to the 
jurisdiction of the ombudsman has to do with the „gap- filling‟ functions of the 
constitution the ombudsman is employed to undertake in various countries. As for 
the reason for a country to have chosen to assign an ombudsman with an additional 
function rather than create bespoke institutions for the purpose of dealing with that 
function, these vary in practice. These reasons include the efficiency of using an 
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existing office in relatively small jurisdictions; the opportunity of using an existing 
office with high esteem; and the similarity of the skill sets which makes the 
ombudsman appropriate.  The next section deals with the new powers of the 
ombudsman - another issue associated with the expansion of the roles of the 
ombudsman. 
 
4.2 Accompanying new roles with new powers 
To reinforce its expanding roles, some ombudsmen offices have been granted 
a range of complementary powers beyond the traditional model. Thus in addition to 
the usual investigative powers of the ombudsman, the office has been given such 
powers as the power to initiate prosecutions and enforce its findings. To reflect the 
adoption of additional powers that diverge from the classical Ombudsman model, 
these offices have often been referred to as „hybrid ombudsmen‟, an evolution of 
institutions that combines both the role of an ombudsman in the classical sense and 
the role of ombudsmen with functions and powers beyond the traditional model.28 
Approximately 60 percent of all ombudsmen are hybrid in nature.29 Some features of 
hybrid ombudsman schemes are similar to the existing ombudsman framework, such 
as independent funding and operation, particularly as regards investigating 
complaints, reporting findings and making remedial recommendations.  However, 
there are also a number of areas of significant departure, as explained below. 
Unlike the traditional ombudsman, various human-rights ombudsman 
institutions have been assigned with numerous human rights protection and 
promotion functions including the task of ensuring that national legislation as a 
whole complies with human rights and international law obligations or engage in 
human rights research and education 30   (e.g. Austria, Czech Republic, Albania, 
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Armenia, Estonia, Poland, Portugal, and Spain).31  They are also often given diverse 
powers beyond those typically given to classical ombudsmen – they may include the 
right to appeal to ordinary or administrative courts, the right to start disciplinary 
prosecutions of civil servants or even to institute criminal prosecution (e.g. Greece, 
Finland, Bosnia, Poland, Lithuania), the right to contest laws and regulations before 
the constitutional court to test the constitutionality of the law.32 It is considered that 
granting the human rights ombudsman with litigation powers can complement 
judicial protection.33 
Anti-corruption ombudsmen have also been regularly endowed with powers 
beyond the traditional norm for classical ombudsmen. Some anti-corruption 
ombudsmen are granted coercive power, including prosecutorial and adjudicative 
powers, in addition to existing traditional ombudsman investigatory powers. The 
power to prosecute has mainly been used in developing countries where corruption 
levels are relatively high.34 In the fight against corruption, the Uganda Inspectorate 
of Government can prosecute wrong doers.35 In the People‟s Republic of China, the 
Ministry of Supervision functions directly under the leadership of the premier and is 
empowered by law to inspect, investigate, recommend, and, most significantly, 
directly impose administrative penalties.36 The Philippines Ombudsman too has not 
just investigative powers but also preventive and punitive authority. 37  The 
ombudsman can prosecute persons in court 38  and suspend them from their jobs 
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pending and during investigation. In the Philippines, the ombudsman can order 
examinations of the bank accounts of persons under investigation. The State 
Inspector General of Viet Nam has extraordinary power to freeze bank accounts.39 In 
Sri Lanka, the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration can 
award compensation to complainants who have suffered due to delays or unfair 
decisions. 40  Likewise, the Republic of Korea‟s Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights 
Commission can impose fines for negligent acts.41 The ombudsmen of the federal 
and provincial governments of Pakistan have the power to award compensation to 
any federal agency if civil complaints made against them have no good grounds or 
are raised purposefully to harass federal officials.42 
This section showed that recent changes have widened the ombudsman's 
powers. They differ somewhat from the traditional model. Today ombudsman 
schemes have evolved significantly from their original versions in terms of their 
potential and claim to impact the manner in which government operate. Ombudsmen 
schemes share a core objective of protecting citizens from abuse of power by public 
officials. While it is still difficult to assess the effectiveness of the ombudsman, the 
next section will attempt to provide an explanation as to the potential successes in the 
expansion of role of the ombudsman. 
 
4.3 Evaluating the expansion of the ombudsman’s role 
In practice, therefore, around the world many ombudsman schemes have been 
required to operate a wider mandate than the traditional model, and granted 
significant extra powers to accompany that wider remit. Many academics have 
argued that the evolution in the ombudsman enterprise beyond the classical 
ombudsman model has been largely a positive development, as ombudsmen and 
policy-makers have pragmatically adjusted the roles of the ombudsman to meet the 
needs of the political, social and economic contexts within which they are situated. 
The growth of ombudsman functions in scale and scope reflects acceptance and trust 
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of the institution in providing efficient and free access to justice, as well as its 
permanency in the legal and political landscape and its ability to deliver results.43   
Proponents of the way that the evolution of ombudsman schemes has 
occurred argue that in practice the development of the ombudsman‟s role in both old 
and new offices is not really a radical departure from its traditional function at all. By 
contrast, although the ombudsman institution may have evolved and diversified its 
functions, this has largely been achieved without compromising its core principles or 
aims. Indeed, it might be argued that what is happening is a more complete and 
logical reflection of what is necessary to fulfill those core aims.  
For instance, it has been argued regularly that the pursuit of the human rights 
jurisdiction is very much interlinked with the core role of the Ombudsman. 44 The 
ombudsman in exercising its powers and interpreting whether a particular act of 
public officials is an act of maladministration may not explicitly or consciously refer 
to the generally accepted international standards of human rights, but it is 
nevertheless an act of upholding human rights. 45 Several ombudsman scholars have 
already observed that, although many ombudsmen have adopted human rights 
concerns as an explicit part of their mandate, the salient features and modus operandi 
of most human rights ombudsmen have not changed or deviated from the traditional 
model in any significant way.46  
 A similar analysis can be provided with regard to anti-corruption 
ombudsman. An ombudsman‟s traditional area is concerned with eliminating 
maladministration.  Corruption issues may be intertwined with maladministration as 
most corruption of government has its origin in maladministration which leads to 
corruption and then embeds further maladministration, forming a vicious cycle.  
Therefore, though traditionally the ombudsman does not have an explicit mandate 
with regard to the fight against corruption, in broad terms corruption falls within the 
scope of maladministration. In this respect, the ombudsman can encounter corruption 
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indirectly in the investigation of complaints about inappropriate o r unlawful 
treatment.47    
 In support of the above, experience in Australia provides a good example, in 
terms of development and diversities of roles. The reasons are first, the offices have 
been in operation for almost forty years, and secondly, through the Australian 
ombudsmen‟s shared history there is a diversity of functions and operation as every 
Australian state has calibrated ombudsmen to its own political environment.  Both 
Stuhmcke and Snell concur that, despite the plethora of roles, the changes to 
jurisdiction and an increased focus on the quality of public administration, within the 
ombudsman design in Australia the individual complainant has been retained as the 
Australian ombudsman‟s primary focus. Further, throughout its almost four decades 
of operation, the ombudsman institution has remained faithful to its core features, 
while proving to be both flexible and responsive to external changes.48   
This section has examined arguments in favor of the expansion of the roles of 
the ombudsman.  It shows that there is a strong claim that the expansion of the roles 
of the ombudsman is largely a very positive one. However the expansion of the 
office of the ombudsman is not without problems and it cannot be assumed that it is 
always appropriate to expand the roles of the ombudsman. Many challenges remain, 
and it cannot be assumed that there are no limits to the boundaries of what an 
ombudsman can and should be asked to do.  This will be discussed in the next 
section.  
 
4.4 Risks in the multi–function model 
The previous section has demonstrated that the ombudsman‟s flexibility, 
together with its capacity, enables it simultaneously to assume many roles. However, 
in some instances, the acquisition of these additional roles may not be appropriate. 
As Pearce has noted, ombudsmen have not had the same level of success in the 
performance of these functions as in their traditional complaint handling.49 Therefore 
the concerns that have been expressed about the ombudsman‟s expanding role cannot 
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be ignored. Ombudsmen and scholars have noted the benefit of the expansion but 
also put forward the risks associated with being asked to perform new roles. 
  From these critics, it would not be possible to specify a list of what an 
ombudsman ought to do or not to do, as many of the potential problems will directly 
relate to the context of the country and the specific scheme in question. However the 
critics have presented both theoretical and practical challenges and there are a few 
obvious guidelines that can be adopted by way of general observation.  For the 
purpose of this section, four general areas of difficulty will be explored. These issues 
are chosen for further study because they are most frequently discussed and also 
specifically relate to the situation of the Thai Ombudsman. First, the section looks at 
the potential that some roles are simply incompatible with the wider role of the 
ombudsman. Second, the section suggest that there are some roles which may look 
compatible with the general ombudsman model but are dangerous because they have 
potential to drag the ombudsman into politically controversial areas, which will have 
a detrimental impact on the ombudsman‟s reputation. Here much depends on the 
status of the office and the context within which it operates. Third, the section 
identifies a number of the general practical issues which may affect the 
ombudsman‟s effectiveness in terms of its new functions, and may lead to problems 
of institutional overload. Finally, the section looks at some dangers in the 
ombudsman design which are inherent to all unelected institutions.  
(a) Incompatibility of roles  
Underpinned by the theoretical perspective that an ombudsman is best 
modelled for supporting the delivery of administrative justice, many scholars and 
ombudsman have opined that designers of ombudsman schemes must first be sure 
that any new functions assigned to the office will not require the ombudsman to do 
something that is essentially different in purpose from its core functions. In 
particular, any addition of functions should not compromise its core function and 
thereby threaten the institution‟s very essence.50 In this context, two issues warrant 
further consideration as they are frequently identified as involving roles that could be 
incompatible with the ombudsman is traditional core functions. They are the issues 
of advocacy and enforcement.  
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Advocacy and the ombudsman  
  In dealing with individual complaints, though from time to time a complaint 
can reveal defective administration, illegality or misconduct which attracts a grand 
scale of publicity to the detriment of the government of the day, it is generally held 
that it is important that the ombudsman does not act as an advocate or agent of the 
complainant or the concerned agency. At most, the ombudsman is an advocate for 
good administration. However in carrying out activities associated with some of the 
specialist functions that have been assigned to Ombudsman offices, there is a danger 
that the ombudsman is required to assume the role as an advocate/defender/guardian. 
As has happened, it is not easy for the traditional ombudsman to undertake such a 
role because the ombudsman must be fearless in defending the rights and interests of 
the citizen, while trying to preserve its ability to work closely with the executive in 
addressing complaints and righting administrative wrongs. 51  The reason is that 
advocacy would endanger the ombudsman‟s credibility as an independent and 
objective critic.52        
The Australian experience may be taken as an example of some of the risks.  
The Commonwealth of Australia Ombudsman was given a role under Freedom of 
Information Act. The task required the ombudsman to represent, as a counsel before 
an appeal tribunal, citizens who had been refused access to official documents under 
this legislation.  According to Pearce, by appearing before the appeal tribunal on 
behalf of a disappointed citizen, the Commonwealth of Australia Ombudsman was 
obliged to abandon the traditional impartial position jealously guarded by the office. 
This impinged unsatisfactorily on established relationships with agencies of 
government and changed the perception of the ombudsman.53 
Similarly in New Zealand, the Ombudsman was assigned a membership of 
the Human Rights Commission due to his background. However it was considered 
that the work of the Commission departed significantly from the ombudsman 
concept.  The Commission was concerned with private sector discrimination as well 
as discrimination in public sector administration. The methodology of the 
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Commission also differed – in performing their functions, the Commissioners took a 
conciliation role. Further the Commission had a broad public policy advice role. 
Consequently, the Ombudsman withdrew from the Commission‟s work as it was felt 
that the Commission‟s work was incompatible with the function or office of the 
Ombudsman. Eventually the office was removed from the list of Commissioners 
when the Commission was reconstituted in 1993.54 
Enforcement powers and the ombudsman  
In Chapter 3 we have seen that the traditional ombudsman does not possess 
powers to control decision-making or interfere unduly with the administrative 
process but it does possess significant power to enhance transparency of, as well as 
influence and place public pressure upon, decision-making.  This is a great positive 
advantage because without such enforcement powers the ombudsman can arguably 
enter into challenging areas of administrative practice more confident that it can 
avoid confrontation with officialdom.  
The overall benefit of this „softer‟ approach is that officials are more likely to 
accept recommendations than if they were viewed with more hostility. And if 
persuasive techniques are not sufficient to secure change, ombudsman schemes can 
still seek political pressure through those who exercise power within the state, 
parliament and executive. It was further argued in chapter 3 that the absence of the 
enforcement power is a key part of the attributes or features of the office which not 
only continues to distinguish the institution from other oversight bodies but has also 
enabled it to naturally adapt into the existing constitutional framework. The strength 
of such qualities has been widely recognized throughout the democratic world, with 
one result that ombudsmen have been called upon to perform an inc reasing range of 
functions.  In the areas of human rights and anti-corruption, it has been suggested 
above that the ombudsman institution, though without enforcement powers to compel 
recommendations, can make a great contribution. 
However, different trends can be identified in countries with weaker 
democratic traditions, or even states with a recent history of authoritarianism. Here, 
the ombudsmen have been more frequently armed with a stronger supporting 
compliance mechanism, either directly to or via the courts, especially where the 
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ombudsman has an express jurisdiction in anti-corruption. 55  These powers are 
particularly found in several newly established ombudsman offices in America, 
Africa and Eastern Europe and Asia, 56  where the offices are charged with the 
additional function of the enforcement of a leadership code, anti-corruption or human 
rights protection.57  
As noted above, there are advantages in establishing a unified office rather 
than a separate anti-corruption body, particularly as this assists in countering possible 
intimidation of informants and complainants, in addition to the benefit of cost 
efficiency.  However there are arguments against the operation of the ombudsman in 
this field. It has been suggested that the combination of the ombudsman‟s traditional 
functions with anti-corruption would impede anti-corruption efforts because an 
ombudsman is not well-suited to fight corruption effectively as fighting corruption 
requires enforcement power of some form.58 These two functions are quite different. 
While an Ombudsman's Office is meant to improve the operation of the public 
administration through the treatment of complaints about specific actions by a public 
body, an anti-corruption agency has a mandate to investigate and forward to 
prosecutors any information they may have about corruption.59  
From the above arguments, an issue to consider in assigning new roles to an 
ombudsman office is that there are functions that are qualitatively different or which 
require a different level of enforcement powers.  According to Reif, a function of 
human rights protection performed by the ombudsman and anti-corruption function 
should not be assigned for the same office but should be located in separate 
institution.60  The argument is that each office should have appropriate powers to 
fulfil its mandate. This is because functions that are qualitatively different will 
require different structural establishment and different levels of enforcement. 
Notwithstanding the above argument, there are some jurisdictions which have 
ombudsman offices with more powers beyond those of recommendation and 
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reporting.  For example the ombudsmen in Sweden and Finland can prosecute or 
commence disciplinary proceeding against public officials. But such enforcement 
power is considered exceptional and generally rarely used. 61  It should be noted that 
the involvement in lawsuits during 1995-1998 by the Ombudsman in Papua New 
Guinea was criticized as not ideal with respect to the ombudsman‟s key bene fit of 
persuasion, consultation and compromise rather confrontational litigation.62  
(b) Politically controversial areas and the ombudsman 
The above section discussed some roles that the ombudsman should not 
undertake as they are considered incompatible with the ombudsman concept in 
general.  This section turns to some roles that the ombudsman can perform, but in 
carrying out such a role, there is a risk that the perceived impartiality of the 
ombudsman might be negatively affected.  The extent of the risk depends much on 
the status of the office and the context, especially the political context within which a 
particular ombudsman is operating. 
As argued in chapter 3, without coercive power, fostering a high level of 
perceived impartiality in order to generate trust in the office is essential for the 
acceptance of and compliance with the ombudsman‟s recommendations. To achieve 
this status the ombudsman is supposed to be „free from political consideration… to 
speak freely and assess independently‟.63 Overall the goal is for an ombudsman to be 
considered a non-political institution. As observed by Caiden and Valdes, however, 
the ombudsman could actively become involved more directly in political matters if 
he chose to interpret his jurisdiction liberally and assumed a trouble-shooting role 
which led to the office filling a perceived vacuum in decision-making (competing 
with the executive) or criticizing the overall performance of government (behaving 
like the opposition).64   
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With relation to the ombudsman the risk remains, however, that even with the 
best of intention, an ombudsman who actively becomes involved more directly or too 
actively in political matters which should be more properly undertaken by the 
political branches, exposes himself and his office to the risk of being seen as 
politically partisan in the eyes of some politicians. Such an act endangers the office‟s 
claim to impartiality. As a consequence the ombudsman could lose trust, followed by 
a reduction in the ability to influence. Given the ombudsman‟s lack of enforcement 
power and its reliance upon techniques of suasion, once its powers of influence are 
reduced the ombudsman begins to lose everything. Politicisation poses a threat to 
impartiality of the ombudsman.65 
In practice ombudsman institutions around the world have in general 
exercised restraint in their involvement in political or social controversy, particularly 
in matters that are more appropriately dealt with by parliamentary intervention.66  
According to Professor Pearce, he always took a few precautions when raising policy 
issues, in order not to intrude too far into the political arena and preserve the non-
political and non-controversial role. 67   For instance, his Office would not make 
suggestions that the law be altered where there had been recent consideration of a 
matter by the Parliament. A particular challenge for the office is where the issue 
under investigation involved general public attention, a circumstance where the 
ombudsman might not be able to decline involvement. In such a scenario a long 
drawn out investigation may not be appropriate, but likewise an ineffectual review 
could potentially diminish the credibility of the ombudsman in the public‟s eyes.  In 
such cases, the ombudsman is challenged to conduct a sufficiently serious 
investigation to decide whether a genuine problem does exist and then make 
recommendations for further independent inquiry to examine the issue fully.68 All the 
while, the purpose is to retain integrity in the investigation, while piloting an 
approach that steers the ombudsman away from direct confrontation with the 
Government over politically sensitive issues. 
An example of this approach can be seen in the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman‟s involvement in an investigation of a policy of the Australian Defence 
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Force which stipulated that, subject to very limited exceptions, homosexuals should 
be barred from the Defence Force and dismissed if necessary. In investigating a 
complaint, the Ombudsman raised the question of whether this policy was in 
accordance with present attitudes of society towards homosexuals and whether there 
was a justification for discriminating against such persons. Having raised the matter 
in his report, he indicated that he would not pursue the matter further as, if it were to 
be taken up, it was more appropriate that this be at the parliamentary/political level. 
This approach was suggested to have saved the Ombudsman from being seen to 
ignore the problems of society, while simultaneously, enabling the Ombudsman to 
steer away from political conflict.69    
In dealing with individual complaints, though from time to time a complaint 
can reveal defective administration, illegality or misconduct which attracts a grand 
scale of publicity to the detriment of the government of the day, in the ma in the 
general wisdom is that ombudsman schemes should avoid regular confrontation. 
Instead, it seems that the ombudsman in general should work behind the scenes in a 
manner congenial to all parties. Such an argument for caution does not imply that 
there should not be tension between the ombudsman and the executive. Such strain is 
unavoidable if the ombudsman is to do its work meaningfully.  
Thus when under pressure or even attack, especially when that attack comes 
in the form of criticism from an executive member, the ombudsman needs to be able 
to rely upon others to do its political fighting for it. This is because the ombudsman 
does not have its own political power base; and this is where strong links with the 
legislature, which is responsible for supporting and supervising the ombudsman 
institution, can provide a valuable bulwark. Again, however, such links become 
difficult to build and maintain, if the ombudsman is seen to be operating in an 
excessively controversial fashion or to have over-reached its remit. Moreover, the 
likelihood of the ombudsman office being vulnerable to political attack is increased.   
According to Robertson, bureaucracy is sensitive to the political executive‟s opinion, 
if it senses that the relationship between the government and the ombudsman has 
become adversarial or combative, the ombudsman‟s chances of receiving 
cooperation or approval findings are considerably diminished.70  
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The above occurrence is more likely to happen when ombudsmen schemes 
are given power to intervene in very sensitive areas and the ombudsman‟s act was 
perceived as posing too much of a threat to those whom the ombudsman most needs 
to support and whose support the ombudsman most needed.  With this risk in mind, it 
has been observed by both ombudsman scholars, as well as experienced ombudsmen, 
that the potential for politicisation has been compounded by the assumption by 
ombudsman offices of additional roles and functions, such as human rights 
protection, freedom-of- information advocates, privacy guardians and equality 
defenders precisely because such issues bring the ombudsman closer to sensitive 
areas of public policy.71  
A practical example in Russia and Latin America helps illustrate the point. In 
the Russian Federation the first Ombudsman bearing the title „H igh Commissioner 
for Human Rights‟ was appointed in 1994, only to be dismissed by the Duma a year 
later for his criticism of the Russian intervention in the Chechen Republic. In Latin 
America, the severe human rights and accountability situation there prompted the 
introduction of several ombudsman schemes to tackle mass violations of 
fundamental human rights. 72  In performing this role, Ombudsmen have taken a 
proactive stance in their roles as an advocate of people and occasionally received a 
hostile response from governments. El Salvador provides one example of political 
interference. Following a period of conflicts with the government, an ombudsman 
was removed for ignoring his duties, but the government then refused to elect a new 
ombudsman. During the three years without a functional ombudsman, important 
personnel had moved on to other jobs and the institution had lost the credibility it had 
established earlier.73  
The point discussed above has focused on how the expanded jurisdiction can 
potentially push the ombudsman toward political conflict and expose the institution 
to political pressure. However the case of Russia and El Salvador exemplify an 
argument that working in an unfavourable context where the ombudsman works can 
make the ombudsman‟s work more difficult.  It is suggested that an ombudsman 
cannot work well in a state where there is weak respect for the rule of law and the 
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democratic culture is not well established. 74  In the case of Russia above, the 
ombudsman might have been too bold and unwise to make the institution a target of 
attack by the government and the role might not be appropriate.  But it can be argued 
that in a democracy with a longer heritage, the government would not be so sensitive 
to negative criticism over its policy or the ombudsman would not be abolished just 
because of negative criticism against the government policy. 
 (c) Problems of institutional overload 
As Pearce has advised, the ombudsman should not be afraid to assume new 
functions but at the same time the office should not be too ambitious or create false 
expectations as to what it can do beyond its capacities. 75  Likewise Ayeni has 
commented that an expanded role presents potential problems, such as the capacity 
of the office to take on additional responsibilities effectively and the possibility that 
the office could become overloaded with the responsibilities of so many functions 
being undertaken simultaneously. One potential outcome is underperformance; 
another is that the check against maladministration, the ombudsman‟s core business, 
is lost.76  
Such problems of institutional overload are interlinked, but for here the risks 
are broken down into the discrete issues of lack of resources, lack of expertise and 
reduced clarity of purpose of the ombudsman office. 
Lack of resource  
As noted above, numerous ombudsman offices have been charged with 
multiple functions for a variety of reasons. While there may be many advantages to 
multipurpose ombudsman offices, as discussed in the forgoing section, the creation 
of such an office should be scrutinized carefully. It can be argued that giving two or 
more functions to an ombudsman institution may not yield the positive results 
expected if its capacity is constrained by insufficient resources. 77 According to Reif 
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multifunctional ombudsman offices in some Latin America states have been found to 
suffer from insufficient financial resources.78  Pegram noted that, given the breadth 
of the institution‟s mandate and its inadequate funding, there was a risk of over-
extension of institutional resources and a likely detrimental effect on the 
ombudsman‟s impact. 79  Similar experiences have been noted for ombudsmen in 
Africa, also provided with various mandates but insufficient resource to accomplish 
their tasks properly.80  
A particularly good example of unrealistic demands being made of an 
ombudsman comes from Papua New Guinea. Through legislative reform,81 the Papua 
New Guinea Ombudsman office has been made responsible for keeping a check on 
5,340 politicians which have become covered by the national Leadership Code, 
without a corresponding increase in resources to support the new role.82 As a result, 
enforcing the Leadership Code has become a constraint on the ability of the 
Ombudsman to carry out its functions effectively. According to Amankwah and 
Omar:  
It appears that in its dual function of ensuring admin ist rative 
justice and enforcing the Leadership Code, to  keep the polit ical 
system free of vices, the latter task has taken more t ime and 
resources. It is not suggested that enforcing the Code is any less 
important than ensuring administrative justice. What is  important 
to ponder over is the question whether the onerous responsibility 
of ensuring the integrity  of polit ical and other leaders is a task that 
the Ombudsman Commission can carry out realistically.83 
From the experience in Latin America, the Pacific and Africa above, it can be seen 
that there are examples of ombudsman schemes being given powers which it is 
unable to exercise adequately by reason of resource constraints. This is because 
there is a possibility that the additional functions are conferred to the office without 
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proper thought about the budgetary implications.84  Given the various demands on 
government there might be sound economic reasons for failures in funding an 
ombudsman scheme, but nor can it be ignored that restricting the budget of an 
ombudsman is a potential opaque tactic by which their impact can be neutered. In 
this light, asking the ombudsman to take on a wider range of duties without 
sufficiently resourcing the change could be interpreted as a strategy to reduce the 
ombudsman‟s influence. The granting of new functions to an ombudsman scheme 
therefore does not necessarily imply a positive promotion of accountability.   
Lack of expertise 
To perform a new role requires sufficient resources, but it might also need 
fresh expertise to enhance a knowledge-based insufficiently present within an 
ombudsman scheme. Without relevant and appropriate expertise, an ombudsman 
scheme is unlikely to deliver on its new function to the standards expected of it.  
An account from the Commonwealth of Australia scheme can provide a good 
example of a case where an ombudsman has not been prepared for its new tasks.  
According to Pearce, one of the new roles that his office took on was to audit the 
compliance of the police with the relevant legislation that outlined the conditions 
under which telephones might be tapped. 85 Such a role imposed different demands 
on the office than its ordinary complaint handling and investigation.  By contrast to 
primarily focusing on addressing personal grievances, the purpose of statutory audit 
is to ensure that law enforcement powers that are otherwise hidden from public gaze 
are being exercised in strict compliance with detailed legislative requirements. This 
requires appropriate auditing staff who can engage full-time in their activities in 
order that every audit is carefully and professionally conducted, and properly 
reported. Remarkably, when first granted this new role, the specific task of auditing 
was not performed by the ombudsman office because, apart from insufficient 
resources such as funding and staff, it lacked the required skills to perform such a 
function.86    
Out of this experience, Pearce noted a clear rationale for choosing the 
ombudsman to deliver the new role. The ombudsman is perceived by the public to be 
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independent from government and free from political pressure. In this regard, if a 
government wished to appoint a review body that would be able to verify the ethical 
integrity of government, one which was largely untarnished by corruption of any 
sort, the ombudsman‟s office would appear a good choice given its sound 
credentials. Further, there may be a temptation in such circumstances for the 
ombudsman to want to enhance their profile and status by accepting the task. 
However, the benefits that may accrue from the expansion to the office and the 
previous good will located in the ombudsman may be undermined if the new 
function is not performed well. In this respect, the new tasks might require different 
skills that the ombudsman does not possess or has not yet developed, and unless 
managed well this may result in the ombudsman‟s failure to perform its legislative 
duties.  
Subsequently in 2001, the Commonwealth Ombudsman was allocated the 
task of monitoring and reviewing compliance with controlled operations legislation 
(Part 1AB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)) by the Australian Federal Police and the 
National Crime Authority (NCA). Once more it was found that the ombudsman 
office was often unable to investigate complaints against police adequately, 
particularly complaints involving allegations of significant criminality. Thus, initially 
in many cases it resorted to relying upon police internal investigation and there was 
no external, independent review of complaints by the ombudsman.87  
Over the years the auditing task has gradually become a substantial function 
of many ombudsman offices and is now seen as an appropriate ombudsman role.88  
One question might arise as to how the ombudsman can carry on without expertise. 
In fact, in the initial stage criticisms were made about the role actually performed by 
the ombudsman in carrying out this function, but the enhanced expectation placed 
upon the office has forced it to develop new techniques required to fulfil the 
function.89 The pertinent issue that the ombudsman should consider here is whether 
and for how long the stakeholders are prepared to bear with the earlier failures before 
it can acquire adequate expertise and perform well. 
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Notwithstanding the subsequent successes in Australia in ombudsman 
schemes adopting new roles, Pearce‟s earlier experience as an ombudsman provides 
us with a lesson that legislation can create a degree of public expectation on what the 
ombudsman is supposed to do (despite the office not being well-equipped to perform 
the role). In turn, the relative failure of the office to perform its statutory duties in 
full reflected badly on the ombudsman. For Pearce, the fear was that the public might 
not accept that the ombudsman was not able to provide a good service because of a 
lack of resources or expertise, with the possible result that in the public view the 
credibility and standing of the ombudsman office would be significantly dented.  The 
potential for such an equivalent scenario occurring is of particular importance for an 
ombudsman during its formative years, when it needs to earn respect from the public 
and other constitutional players in order to thrive. 
Clarity of purpose and image 
A strong note of caution about the expansion of the ombudsman‟s role has 
been expressed by Robertson. His core concern is that the ombudsman institution 
was designed specifically to achieve success in reducing or eliminating the excesses 
of bureaucracy. In this aspiration, there is a danger that new roles might have an 
adverse impact on the robustness of the essential features of the ombudsman which 
might compromise the institution‟s core role of protecting the individual 
complainant. 90  Undertaking too many functions by an ombudsman can lead to 
problems in the clarity of purpose of the image and the focus of the institution. Such 
an adverse impact might occur as a result of the traditional role getting lost in the 
myriad of other roles performed by the ombudsman or the ombudsman‟s overall 
image in the public eye becoming clouded by the diverse roles performed by the 
office. Along similar lines, McMillan has also observed that expansion can lead to 
“public confusion”, public deception” and “ill-considered change”. 91  To avoid 
mission drift, therefore, the discharge of any new function should be adapted to 
ensure that it is aligned with the ombudsman‟s essential principles in order to secure 
the long-term stability of the office.  
Some of the roles that have been given to the ombudsmen, such as the audit 
of police powers described above, involve the investigation of matters that are 
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wholly unrelated to administration. A similar example is the investigation of the 
ethics of politicians, which are not always inspired by citizens but instead flow from 
of the pursuit of „political‟ complaints about the ethics of political opponents. 
 A danger in this expansion is that the institution becomes less a citizen 
focussed office and more an office wrapped up in issues which do not require the 
input of the citizen. This can be argued to represent a significant deviation from what 
the office of the ombudsman is supposed to be about and a shift of role from the 
traditional role of ombudsmen. There is even the risk that in a multifunction office, 
the traditional role will be overshadowed by other functions, especially where the 
additional roles have enforcement powers. 92  As a consequence, some of the 
distinctive role of an Ombudsman‟s office is lost, or at least confused, such as 
pursuing citizen based grievances and bringing outside values into the business of 
government.93 
 Further these changes in the role and function of the ombudsman can alter 
the nature of ombudsmen by putting the ombudsman in the position of becoming a 
tool of executive government, instead of accommodating the need of the citizen. This 
in turn raises the question as to its original purpose and whether the ombudsman can 
still retain its role as an institution that acts in the interest of citizens. An unclear 
image would result in public confusion and likely damage to the standing of the 
office may ensue.   
(e) Dangers of unelected institutions 
While constitutional watchdogs are said to be introduced to provide for more 
a effective check and balance in the constitution, there has been criticism 
surrounding the work and role of such institutions.  A prevailing critique lies in their 
lack of democratic legitimacy and their tendency to discourage political 
representatives from taking full responsibility for decision-making and 
administrative performance.94 Such a result partly occurs by restricting the scope for 
policy-makers to adapt to current demands on government, but also through a 
tendency for decision-makers to defer too easily to the direction of watchdogs. 
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Several scholars have identified additional problems associated with watchdogs, such 
as the layers of bureaucracy they create and the added costs to governance incurred. 
Watchdogs also provide public agents with competing and incompatible expectations 
that need to be met, leading to multiple accountability disorders as an organisation 
trying to meet conflicting expectations could become dysfunctional. 95  Perhaps a 
more serious criticism is the potential for watchdogs to engage in empire building.96 
There is a tendency that watchdogs could reinterpret the jurisdictional boundaries of 
their position to suit their own vision of how their office should operate. This in turn 
might lead to public mistrust and eventually a question as to whether they should 
continue in operation. 
All of these dangers pertain to the ombudsman as much as any other 
autonomous unelected institution and imply that robust arrangements need to be in 
place to call the ombudsman to account. As with the other risks outlined above, 
accountability processes must be in place to verify the continuing and appropriate 
effectiveness of the office. Such a conclusion applies to the ombudsman generally, 
but because of some of the difficulties that the ombudsman offices with multiple 
functions have faced in achieving their goals, is particularly important with regard to 
multi-function offices.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
It seems that it is difficult to limit the role of the ombudsman by creating 
theoretical exceptions to its jurisdiction, as a core rationale of the office of the 
ombudsman is to attempt to fill in the accountability functions that are not adequately 
covered by other existing institutions. Thus, in many contexts the traditional role of 
the ombudsman office has been expanded to encompass a range of new roles, 
including human rights protection, anti-corruption provision, and freedom of 
information, constitutional review, and many others. But the experience of 
ombudsman schemes around the world has supported the argument that there are 
risks associated with these new roles.  Therefore this chapter contends that we should 
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be realistic, and aware of the limitation and dangers attached, should an 
ombudsman‟s functions be expanded.  While there are several considerations that 
must be taken into account, in conclusion, the present study proposes that the 
ombudsman is specifically designed to protect the public from the government 
wherever necessary and therefore this should remain its primary and priority 
function. As a young institution, there is a tendency that it might try to do new things 
and be stretched too far. In particular, the ombudsman would not benefit from too 
diversified role which would detract the ombudsman from its original function and 
inhibit specialization and expertise that should be achieved. In this regard, Pearce has 
suggested that it is important that the ombudsman‟s resources must not be spread too 
thinly. Therefore the ombudsman must be prepared to decline jurisdiction that is 
incompatible with the performance of his obligation to deal with citizens‟ complaints 
or where the new role may be likely to detract from the core role of the office. By 
doing so, the ombudsman can best ensure its continuing public support, while 
preserving its overall credibility in the eyes of the executive.97 The research in this 
chapter has identified a number of challenges and opportunities facing ombudsman 
schemes and there is a clear need for individual schemes and the ombudsman 
community as a whole to develop their strategic thinking in response. These issues 
will be returned to throughout Part 2 of the thesis which covers the problems that 
have surrounded the operation of the Thai Ombudsman in its first fifteen years.  
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Introduction 
 
„An ombudsman cannot be bought off the peg; it must be made to measure.‟ 1 
Scholars occasionally point out that an ombudsman is an example of a public 
sector institution that has been successfully transplanted into many different legal 
systems around the world.2 However, scholars have also observed that there are no 
direct transplants.3 In the words of Gregory, „[e]very country needs to tailor-make its 
own version of the office to suit its own specific need and circumstances‟.4 One 
constant theme during the study of an ombudsman is the acquisition of new roles for 
the institution, a trend that is associated with the adaptation of the concept to suit a 
wide range of political and constitutional contexts.5  The Ombudsman in Thailand is 
a very good example of this phenomenon.  
Thailand established the Office of the Ombudsman in 1997 to provide justice 
for people who have been treated unfairly by all types of civil servants or state 
employees.6  This role falls within what is widely recognized as the traditional role of 
an Ombudsman.  The 2007 Constitution7, passed after the Ombudsman was 
originally introduced, assigns two additional roles to this position: (i) to oversee the 
ethical practice of politicians and government officials and (ii) to follow up, evaluate 
and provide recommendations regarding implementation of and compliance with 
constitutional provisions by government bodies. As a result, in the case of Thailand 
the scope of its mandate is significantly enlarged and differs from its counterparts. 
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The central roles of the Thai Ombudsman are the investigation of 
maladministration within the public service and government agencies and the 
provision of recommendations in relation to that maladministration.  This part of the 
thesis examines the Thai Ombudsman‟s functions with a view to assessing its roles, 
effectiveness and limitations. The argument of this thesis is that while Thailand can 
and should create an ombudsman scheme that best suits its particular needs and 
circumstances, the assignment of additional roles must be undertaken following a 
proper understanding of the ombudsman concept, including its optimal design 
features and limitations. Besides the practical risks of overloading the Office with 
roles it cannot realistically fulfill, there are theoretical questions about whether or not 
the roles allocated fit the core ombudsman model. Along these lines, a big issue in 
Thailand is whether it is appropriate for a traditionally non-political institution, such 
as the Ombudsman, to become involved in the supervision of the ethical standards of 
politicians. 
Part II is divided into four chapters. Chapter 5 looks at the contextual 
background and the constitutional and legislative framework of the institution. In 
doing so, the reasons for the establishment of the Thai Ombudsman Office and the 
mandate that has been allocated to it will be identified.  Chapter 6 and 7 examines 
how the Thai Ombudsman Office operates based on its real performance and 
activities. The study will include empirical enquiries exploring available evidence 
e.g. reports, literature, statistics etc., and is supplemented by elite interviews with the 
current incumbents and high ranking officers of the Ombudsman Office, members of 
the 2007 Constitution Committee, Inspectors General and leading academics in 
public law.  Chapter 8 focuses on the Thai Ombudsman‟s institutional features, in 
terms of its legal arrangements and how they are implemented in reality.    The 
findings will be considered with reference to the checklists of features of the 
traditional ombudsman developed previously in Chapter 3.  The purpose of this 
exercise is to determine whether the Thai Ombudsman Office possesses sufficiently 
robust institutional design features necessary for a successful office or for an 
ombudsman to perform effectively. 
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Chapter 5 
 The Thai Constitution and the Thai Ombudsman 
 
 This chapter seeks to provide an overview of the constitutional background 
and the establishment of the Ombudsman in Thailand. It is argued that on paper, at 
least, the1997 Constitution8 represented an interesting evolution of the separation of 
powers idea, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  The office of the Ombudsman 
was established following the adoption of the 1997 Constitution, which also 
introduced for the first time several other independent oversight organisations.  
Together with these overseeing bodies, the Ombudsman was designed to provide an 
effective „checks and balances‟ system. This system, in turn, was designed to 
strengthen government accountability and prevent the accumulation of excessive 
power or inappropriate exercise of power by the executive branch of governance.   
 This whole thesis focuses on one aspect of the constitutional innovation of 
1997, with this chapter in particular identifying the specifics of the constitutional role 
which was allocated to the Ombudsman. Chapter 5 is sub-divided into four sections. 
The first section begins with a brief account of the state of the governance in 
Thailand which is characterised by the concentration of power in the executive 
branch and the expansion of the administration. The second section gives a historical 
overview of how the Thai Ombudsman Office came into existence and its evolution. 
The third section mainly details the constitutional roles of the Ombudsman, and the 
purposes as well as expectations that were placed on the Ombudsman. The fourth 
and final section offers a brief conclusion to the chapter and summary of issues that 
need to be explored further.   
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 Hereafter the 1997 Constitution. 
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5.1 Political and social setting 
5.1.1 General background  
It is not the place here to discuss in detail the Thai political and social 
background which has already been thoroughly discussed elsewhere.9 For the 
purpose of this study, three important aspects of the Thai governance will be 
highlighted.  They are: the tendency towards military interventions; executive 
dominance and strong bureaucracy; and administrative reform.  These aspects are 
specifically chosen because they are the most relevant in the context of this thesis.   
Military rule and the struggle for democracy 
It has been 80 years since a military-led coup brought an end to absolute 
monarchy in 1932 and instituted in Thailand a constitutional state with a western 
liberal democratic form of government. However, even now the country‟s democracy 
is said to be still stuck in its infancy. 10  The civilian governments since then have 
been repeatedly overthrown by military force in the form of coup d‟état. Each 
successful military intervention has usually resulted in a dissolved parliament, 
suspended political activities and abrogation of the existing constitution and a 
promulgation of a new constitution, in which a self-amnesty provision is put in 
place,11 made by leaders of the military coups to preserve their power. At a later 
stage, mass uprising against the military rulers, even where initially suppressed 
violently, have usually forced the military rulers to step down and bring about the 
return of democratic government.12 Too often, though, the democracy that has 
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 For  example, Surin Maisrikrod, „The Making of Thai Democracy‟, in Anek Laothamatas (ed.), 
Democratization in Southeast and East Asia, Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore, 1997, 
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10
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Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., 2009, 99–102,  Khien Theeravit. 
Thailand in Crisis: A Study of the Political Turmoil of May 1992 , Chulalongkorn University Print, 
Bangkok, 1997.  
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followed an uprising has been fragile and brief.  The popular-initiated 1997 
Constitution, an outcome of the 1992 uprising against military government13, which 
raised great expectations for political reform was short-lived.  Approximately eight 
years after it took effect, the army staged the 2006 coup d'état against the then prime 
minister Thaksin Shinawatra, whose Thai Rak Thai Party won a general election of 
2001and 2005, and replaced it with the 2007 Constitution.14 This halted the process 
of constitutional reform in Thailand that had begun with the bringing into effect of 
the 1997 Constitution.15   
Most recently in May 2014, the Royal Thai Army Commander-in-Chief 
Prayuth Chan-ocha declared martial law nationwide and triggered a military coup – 
the twelfth since the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in 1932.16 In so 
doing, the military ordered the arrests, interrogation and detention of a number of 
politicians, anti-coup activists and academics.17  The coup banned political 
gatherings, imposed internet censorship and took control of the media. The coup also 
established a military dominated national legislature which later unanimously voted 
the army Chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the coup leader, as a new prime minister 
of the country.18 It partially repealed the 2007 Constitution  issued an interim 
constitution granting itself amnesty and sweeping power, as it ordered the judicial 
branch and the constitutional independent watchdogs, including the Ombudsman, to 
continue to operate.19 
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Imbalance of power  
The system of the National Assembly or the Thai legislative branch was 
modeled after the Westminster system, and in times of democratic rule the trend 
towards executive dominance (discussed in Chapter 2) is reflected well in the Thai 
situation.  
The legislative branch of government consists of the two legislative bodies: 
the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Prime Minister usually is the 
leader of the largest party or the largest coalition party in the lower house of 
Parliament, selected first by an election in the lower house then officially appointed 
by the King. The legislature can forcefully remove the Prime Minister and members 
of his cabinet by a vote of no-confidence against, if the legislature has sufficient 
votes. The legislature can remove the Prime Minister and members of his Cabinet by 
holding a vote of no-confidence. On the other hand, the Prime Minister has the 
power to dissolve the National Assembly. 
In reality however opposition parliamentarians are seen as having little 
chance of winning a no-confidence vote because they lack a majority in the lower 
house, and party discipline ensures that the executive will receive support from the 
controlling party. 20  In one of the most recent votes of no-confidence on 28 
November 2011 against the Justice Minister, Pracha Promnok, the Minister survived 
with a result that showed no sign of a free vote, demonstrating that party discipline is 
still enforced strongly. 
In fact, since the adoption of a democratic parliamentary system of 
government 81 years ago, many motions of no-confidence have been lodged, but no 
government or government minister has yet been removed as a result of such a vote. 
This does not mean that vote of no-confidence has no effect at all but due to the party 
discipline its direct effect as envisaged by the Constitution has been limited  
In addition, though separation of powers theory would have it that Parliament 
legislates and government executes, in practice bills can be brought for parliamentary 
deliberation in many ways.  As has happened in Thailand, the 2007 Constitution 
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 This can be seen during the tenure of Thaksin Shinawatra after the Thai Rak Thai Parties won 
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forestall any parliamentary no-confidence vote.  See Martin Painter, „Managerial Reform and Political 
Control: the Case of Thaksin and the Thai Bureaucracy‟, Department of Public and Social 
Administration, City University of Hong Kong, 2005, retrieved 3 February, 2014, http://www.sog-
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allows the Council of Ministers (collectively) to introduce a Bill (Section 142 (1)).  
In addition, a Money Bill requires endorsement by the Prime Minister before it can 
be submitted (Section 143). The Council of Ministers also has the power to issue an 
Emergency Decree, which has the force of an Act, when the Council is of the opinion 
that there is an emergency and the necessary urgency of the situation makes the 
passing of the decree unavoidable (Section 184). As a matter of fact, most enacted 
laws are initiated by the government.  A government-sponsored Bill has seldom 
failed as the opposition can rarely defeat a government Bill. 
This condition in which the party who won most seats has total control of 
both the legislature and the executive has prompted concern over the weakening 
scrutiny of the executive by the legislative branch.21 This led to an effort to create 
constitutional mechanisms to promote accountability and transparency, in addition to 
parliamentary scrutiny, which eventually resulted in the establishment of the 
oversight bodies free of political influence under the 1997 Constitution. 
 Strong bureaucracy 
Thailand has been described as a “bureaucratic polity,22 to emphasise the 
autonomy in which the state has traditionally functioned without much political 
interference and public scrutiny. The growth of bureaucracy in Thailand can be 
traced back to the reformation of the administrative system during the reign of King 
Rama V, when western-model ministries were set up to be responsible for various 
new governmental functions. The civil service administration continued to expand 
following the implementation of the welfare state policy initiated by the 
revolutionary coup in the 1930s and the nation‟s ambitious economic plan introduced 
in the 1950s. While other sectors such as political parties, a strong civil society, and 
public interest groups were less developed, the Thai bureaucracy, consisting of civil 
administrators, has steadily grown unchallenged in both size and power and is seen 
as the prominent institution of modern Thailand.23 The Thai government has been 
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said to traditionally be controlled by the army and the bureaucracy.24 One observer 
has even said that the Thai polity has been more bureaucratic than democratic.25 
Throughout the country‟s frequent changes in government and constitutions, 
the nation‟s public administration has been maintained by Thai bureaucrats.  Since 
the 1950s Thailand‟s rapid economic growth, including important accomplishments 
in areas such as macroeconomic management, infrastructure development and social 
development, could be attributed to the achievements of the bureaucracy in initiating 
and developing state policy. However, the sheer volume of decisions that these 
public officials have to make, and make without delay, raises significant challenges.  
Given the variety of complex and often technical decisions made by 
administrative decision, as in other countries around the world, there is a concern in 
Thailand that the legislative branch cannot by itself act as an effective mechanism of 
control over the overall operations of the executive, especially when the bureaucracy 
possesses superior information, expertise, and technological and other resources.26 
Besides, the parliamentary means of monitoring the executive branch are not 
designed for the scrutiny of day to day administrative operations. Bureaucratic 
accountability is thus limited to hierarchical responsibility, while the internal controls 
by rules and disciplinary measures for administrative misconducts are reported to 
have been applied leniently.27 The constitution was initially constructed to solve this 
problem with the setting up of the Administrative Court. However, the drafters of the 
Constitution took a view that the Administrative Court has its own limitations28 and 
many disputes that result from the exercise of the administrative discretion are 
outside its jurisdiction.29  
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While Thailand has moved towards rapid economic development30, the 
political system has lagged behind due to many political crises. Thus by the end of 
the last century the bureaucratic system had largely operated free from proper 
reform31 or effective modernisation32 which resulted in many problems in the public 
sector.33 In the 1980s, concerns were expressed over the performance of the 
administrative branch. The major problems identified by leading public law scholars 
were its overlapping expanded functions; the lack of responsiveness and 
accountability to the citizenry; a preoccupation with particular units of 
administration; an inability to consider the process of governance in a holistic 
manner; an indifference towards the feelings or the inconvenience of individual 
citizens.34 Another contributory factor towards the perceived under-performance in 
the public sector has been the fact that, civil officials have enjoyed prestigious status 
for several years, first as the King‟s representatives under the absolute monarchy 
regime and then during the succeeding democracy government, in return, civil 
officials have not been trained to be accountable or responsible for their actions to 
the people.  
Problems in administration have also led to outcomes perceived as 
problematic in the private sector. A number of regulations currently in operation are 
deemed by many as unnecessary and cause undue difficulties for the private sector.35 
It is found that rules and regulations were made primarily to facilitate the 
administrative operation of performance. Further, due to various regulatory agencies, 
administrative rules and regulations in some areas are overlapping and conflicting. It 
is alleged that the confusion caused by over-regulation has on several occasions led 
to demonstrable damage in the private sector, such as in the control of private 
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businesses or professions.36 It is in this context that the strengthening of transparency 
at all levels is imperative, not only to curb the arbitrary use of public powers but also 
to cater to public needs.37  
Administrative reform  
The movement for administrative reform in Thailand after democracy started 
in 1992, demanding more democratization, transparency, and people‟s participation. 
This move resulted in a number of statutory frameworks governing bureaucratic 
actions being worked out and successfully brought into force. The two main 
legislations aimed at enhancing the administrative transparent decision making 
process and right to information are: the Administrative Procedure Act B.E. 2539 
(1996) and the Official Information Act of B.E. 2540 (1997) respectively. 
The Administrative Procedure Act B.E. 2539 (1996) is the first general 
administrative procedures act which limits and regulates as well as rationalizes the 
discretionary powers of officials in issuing administrative orders affecting the rights 
and freedom of any individual. The purpose is to establish general and transparent 
rules and procedures in decision making processes for all government agencies, in 
order that administrative practices be transparent, effective, unbiased and fair. The 
Act is an important measure to prevent the arbitrary use of discretionary powers by 
public officials.   
The Official Information Act of B.E. 2540 (1997) was enacted on the 
principle that under the democratic system, the people‟s right to know official 
information is a basic right under the law. It is deemed necessary for people to have 
an opportunity to know about the information regarding the operation of state 
agencies so as to be able to express opinions and use political rights correctly. The 
Act establishes the method for people to have access to official information. It 
prescribes for the criteria, means, and details as to the disclosure of information, 
which is different from those circumstances which happened in the past. The Act 
promotes the transparency and accountability of public agencies and supports 
peoples participation in the formation of government on the one hand, while on the 
other hand, protects personal data and privacy.  
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This subsection has shown the specific problems facing Thailand and efforts 
to overcome such problems. Nevertheless, these problem have continued to persist 
and been identified as part of the causes of the turbulent social-economic landscape 
of Thailand which led to the constitutional reform and the promulgation of the 1997 
Constitution.  
 
5.1.2 Constitutional reform  
  Since the transformation of the political regime from absolute monarchy to 
democracy, the major problems facing governance in Thailand have been corruption 
and the inefficiency and instability of the government.38  The lack of transparency 
and accountability in government gave rise to the movement for comprehensive 
political reform to solve the problems.39  
 In the early 1990s, the demands for institutional reform within intellectual 
communities led to a wider public constitutional discourse which ultimately 
culminated in the drafting of an entirely new constitution.40  The demand for a new 
constitution was fuelled by the spectacular economic crisis in 1997 as businessmen, 
civil society, urban middle class as well as the rural population blamed the crisis on 
mismanagement by politicians.41  Eventually the constitution drafting and debate 
processes took place within the context of the financial crisis in 1997. The 
Constitution was drafted with an unprecedentedly high popular participation in the 
process, with many organisations consulted on a nationwide basis before formal 
codification was undertaken and when the Constitution was promulgated, it received 
nationwide support.42  
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The 1997 Constitution had been devised to overcome Thailand‟s chronic 
problems of political corruption, bureaucratic polity, and government instability.43 
The Constitution contained measures designed to strengthen civil society, to help 
scrutinise politicians, enhance the efficiency and stability of elected governments, 
and create a carefully crafted checks-and-balances system, to ensure transparency 
and accountability of the government at all levels.44 This section focuses on only two 
measure introduced by the 1997 Constitution: the setting up of an array of 
independent oversight institutions and the recognition of the principle of good 
governance. 
 Independent constitutional watchdogs  
The new, complex set of independent institutions were intended to 
supplement the gaps in the existing check and balance system, which were 
considered insufficient to control the exercise of state power.  In the words of 
Borwornsak Uwanno, a drafter of the 1997 Constitution:45 
The classical notion of separation of powers into the three 
branches of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary 
is necessary but not sufficient The Thai Constitution goes 
further in instituting a fourth branch – various 
constitutional controllers have been established in such a 
way as to give them constitutional controllers have been 
established in such a way as to give them legitimacy to 
control, and have been vested with substantial control 
powers with which to perform their duties. These bodies 
are the fourth power to be added to the Montesquieu 
Doctrine because they exercise substantial and effective 
checks and balances over the other three classical branches. 
 
Accordingly a new set of watchdog organisations were set up under the 1997 
Constitution. The Election Commission (Sections 136-48), the National Counter 
Corruption Commission (Sections 297-302), and the State Audit Commission 
(Section 312) were each designed to oppress particular aspects of malfeasance and 
corruption. The Human Rights Commission (Sections 199-200) was intended to 
protect human rights and inspect human rights violations. A system of administrative 
courts (Sections 276-80) and the Ombudsman (Sections 196-98) were introduced to 
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further protect citizen‟s rights by extending the range of remedies available. Finally, 
the whole constitutional scheme was guarded by the Constitutional Court (Sections 
255-70) which controls the constitutionality of laws, decides disputes regarding the 
powers and duties of constitutional organs, as well as the removal of public officials. 
These independent bodies were designed to have different mandates and 
powers so as to complement each other. The purpose of such an arrangement is to 
constrain the use of power by building a spectrum of control mechanisms to achieve 
an all-over adequacy of scrutiny.46 The essence of achieving these offices is that, in 
their role as constitutional „watchdogs‟, they function freely from pressure and 
control of the government.47 Therefore they are all subject to the constitutional 
requirement, expressed in various terms, that they are functionally independent of 
both the executive and Parliament. The end result is that the Ombudsman stands as 
one amongst an array of institutional means for supplementing the traditional ways 
of parliamentary and judicial control over the executive. 
Despite the dissolution of the 1997 Constitution, these watchdog bodies, 
created as part of the Constitution, continue to function under the interim 
Constitution, mainly in an investigatory capacity; some of them – including the 
Ombudsman – have more powers under the following constitution, the 2007 
Constitution. A former president of the Administrative Court recently stressed the 
necessity of the independent organisations to examine the use of state power as 
below:48 
The separation of powers between the legislative and executive existed in 
the past. But at present, the executive and the legislature are coming from 
the same majority; some went to the executive and some to the 
legislature. Consequently the check and balance of power between each 
other is gone. It is therefore necessary to establish a mechanism of 
control by the Constitution. 
As mentioned above, though the coup, which took over the state power in 
May 2014, suspended the 2007 Constitution (except for the chapter on the monarchy) 
by, the judicial branch and independent constitutional organisations, including the 
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Ombudsman, have been maintained and continue to operate under the directives of 
the Army chief Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha. 
Administrative reform to good governance  
While the administration has been credited with national development, as 
discussed above, it was deemed necessary for the Constitution to create a 
comprehensive system of control bodies that could oversee all aspects of state 
administration due to its expansion in both size and activities.49  According to 
Borwornsak Uwanno, a drafting member of the 1997 Constitution, Thailand has a 
huge bureaucracy which includes 15 ministries, 207 departments including public 
enterprises, and 2,668,000 public servants, as well as 585 Acts of Parliament that 
enable these entities and officials to act. The risk of abuses of power resulting in 
violation of people‟s rights and freedoms is therefore high.50 
A recent study found that the Thai parliamentary redress mechanism is not 
sufficiently well designed to effectively resolve an individual grievance, due to its 
focus on completing the required procedure laid down by law, rather than seeking a 
resolution for the complainants.51 Besides, there is a concern in Thailand that the 
legislative branch by itself cannot provide an adequate control over the overall 
operations of government, as the scope and complexity of government administration 
has expanded,52 especially when the bureaucracy possesses superior information, 
expertise and technological and other resources.53  As a result, the legislature has 
become forced to depend greatly upon controls within government and on the 
professionalism of the public service to ensure integrity and fairness in the exercise 
of public power.  
Bureaucratic accountability is thus limited to hierarchical responsibility, 
while the internal controls by rules and disciplinary measures for administrative 
misconduct is reported to have been applied leniently.54 The idea that an institution 
such as an Ombudsman could be beneficial first appeared in 1994, with the argument 
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made that the complaint mechanism under the executive branch should be transferred 
to the National Assembly in order that the legislature would be able to control the 
behaviour and performance of government officials. 55 
The new Constitution brought about many reforms in the Thai public sector. 
In addition to creating new institutions, such as an administrative court system and 
the Ombudsman in the field of administrative justice, the requirement for an efficient 
system of administration to meet people‟s needs was recognised.56 
The State shall ensure the compliance with the law, protect 
the rights and liberties of a person, provide efficient 
administration of justice and serve justice to the people 
expediently and equally and organise an efficient system of 
public administration and other State affairs to meet 
peoples demand. 
In the same year the Constitution was promulgated, the 1997 economic crisis 
of Thailand had bankrupted the Thai Government. It was necessary for the Thai 
Government to borrow money from the World Bank and the IMF. The World Bank 
has made it a condition that any Third World or developing country that wants to 
borrow money from the World Bank must reform its government in line with good 
governance principles of the World Bank. In this regard, the Thai Government, in 
consultation with the World Bank, came up with a plan to reform the Thai 
bureaucracy. The Office of the Prime Minister‟s Order on building good governance 
and society dated August 10, 1999 was issued.  It was replaced by Royal Decree on 
Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance, 2546 B.E. (2003) which was enacted 
in accordance with the revised Public Administration Act of 2534 B.E. (No.5, 2002) 
which stipulates that the government must lay out the principles and methods of good 
governance.  
According to the Royal Decree, good governance refers to the administration 
of government that meets the following objectives:  
1) government practices that are beneficial to the wellbeing and 
happiness of the people, peacefulness and safety of society, and 
provide maximum benefit to the country;  
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2) government practices must meet the objectives of the state, which 
meant that government agencies must devise operative plans ahead 
with stated goals, missions, performance indicators;  
3) government practices must be efficient, substantially contributing to 
the achievements of missions of the State;  
4) streamlining of government work so that government services to the 
public would become faster and more convenient to the public;  
5) the revision of government agency‟s functions in accordance with 
the public administration plan, cabinet policies, budget capacity, the 
worth of missions, and changing conditions; and  
6) the evaluation of government work by an independent team in terms 
of objective accomplishment, client satisfaction, and contribution to 
mission success.57 
International donors such as the World Bank encouraged the Thai 
government to emulate the experiences of countries with new public management 
(NPM) reforms. As a result, good governance was interpreted as an efficiency 
problem which suits the NPM reforms that occurred in several developed countries, 
such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand.58 In such countries, NPM refers to 
the introduction of management techniques from the private sector to the public 
sector. In this regard, practices such as strategic planning, balanced scorecard, 
performance measurement, managing by results, are all examples of governance. 
The 1997 Constitution was replaced by the 2007 Constitution, which 
reinstated the same principle in Section 74 which reads: 
A Government official, official or employee of a 
government agency, State agency, State enterprise or local 
government organisation and other State official shall have 
a duty to act in compliance with the law in order to protect 
public interests, and provide convenience and services to 
the public according to the good public governance 
principle. 
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 This subsection has shown that the Constitutional development in Thailand 
shares commonalities with standard western constitutionalism. The Constitutions of 
1997 and 2007 reflect the idea that state power ought to be constrained, embodying 
basically liberal constitutional structures namely separation of powers, checks and 
balances among government powers; and enshrining popular sovereignty, rule of law 
and individual rights.  
Despite framework similarities, the Thai constitutional developments have 
been undertaken to tackle larger political and social transformations.  The 
constitutions contain measures designed to eliminate corruption in public life, 
provide stable government, and guarantee democracy and human rights. The 
establishment of the independent institutions in order to check and limit electoral 
politics reflects the need to introduce far-reaching controls over the exercise of 
public power.  As noted by one authoritative source, it would be: „… hard to imagine 
a more comprehensive attempt to change social facts by law‟.59 
As this thesis was about to reach its final stage in May 2014, Thailand 
experienced a military coup which has removed the Prime Minister, abrogated the 
Constitution and placed the nation under military control, bringing a halt to the 
process of constitutional reform. Though the coup allowed the constitutional 
watchdogs to remain in operation, it remains to be seen if these bodies will be able to 
retain their independence. Nevertheless independent watchdogs alone are not enough 
for maintaining the rule of law and democracy.60 For democracy to be truly back on 
track, it is therefore imperative to restore respect of the law on both the State and the 
people. Hopefully even though the constitutional documents of 1997 and 2007 are 
currently dormant, the spirit of liberal-democratic development in the constitutions 
can exert its influence in the Thai politics and continue to be an integral component 
of the contemporary discussion of law, politics, and society. As this thesis is being 
finalized, a new constitutional convention has been established to once again rewrite 
the constitution.61  
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5.2 The Thai Ombudsman  
As we have seen, the Ombudsman Office came into existence with its 
adoption by the 1997 Constitution in order to function alongside other independent 
constitutional organisations to exercise a specialised oversight function. The 2007 
Constitution, which replaced the 1997 Constitution, not only retains the Ombudsman 
Office but entrusts it with a number of important powers and mandates. The 
following section starts by looking at the essence of the arguments initially being 
made at that time as to why this new institution should be adopted and what were the 
hopes and expectations held by the advocates of this institution, since the inherent 
logic of those arguments is still applicable. It then describes the legislative 
framework of the Ombudsman institution and its development.  
5.2.1 The establishment of the Thai Ombudsman 
  Similar to the situation in other countries, the introduction of the Ombudsman 
in Thailand was initiated by recognition that there has been an enormous expansion 
in the scope and dimensions of government activities, and the power and authority of 
officials in the administration. In the case of Thailand, despite its significant social 
and economic development in recent years,62 its political system has remained under-
developed even while people have become more assertive. Such a conclusion was 
supported by an increase in the number of complaints received from the public.63   
Several subsequent studies that supported the establishment of an 
ombudsman argued that an ombudsman could promote democracy and provide 
external control over a public administration which has become increasingly more 
complex.64 Concern was expressed that conflicts between public organisations and 
individuals, if not fixed and alleviated in time, could accumulate and lead to severe 
political problems. The Ombudsman institution, once successfully adopted, was 
expected to be an independent body capable of controlling the operation of the 
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executive branch, while complementing its role in solving the grievances of the 
people.65  
Nevertheless, attempts to establish an ombudsman office in 1974 and 1981 
were not successful. The main argument expressed against the setting up of an 
ombudsman office was that it would not be necessary as there was an intention to 
establish the Administrative Court.66 However, it was soon realized that the 
Administrative Court had its limitations67 and many disputes that result from the 
exercise of administrative discretion are outside the Courts jurisdiction.68 Thus 
perhaps the strongest argument made for the establishment of the office of the 
Ombudsman in Thailand was that it would be capable of controlling the fairness and 
appropriateness of the exercise of state powers and that such a role would not 
duplicate the work of other control mechanisms, such as the Administrative Court, 
the Constitutional Court and the National Counter Corruption Commission with roles 
which are strictly limited to legality review.69  
The strength of arguments in favour of an ombudsman eventually led to a 
provision pertaining to the Ombudsman being inserted in the 1995 Constitution; 
however, the institution was not immediately established.70 Two years later, the 
concept was entrenched in the 1997 Constitution, along with other supervising 
organisations.  The first Organic Law on the Ombudsman office, outlining in detail 
how it would be formed and what its powers would be was published in the Royal 
Gazette on the 14th of September 1999. According to a survey conducted prior to the 
establishment of the Thai Ombudsman71, most members of Parliament regarded the 
primary purpose behind establishing an ombudsman office in Thailand as being to 
find solutions to grievances arising from the operations of public administration. The 
second priority was to protect the rights of the people from the intrusion and 
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violation caused by the administrative process and to investigate complaints made by 
people against the government agencies, respectively.  
It can be seen that the foundations of the Ombudsman in Thailand look very 
similar to those elsewhere in the world, insofar as it was created as a complaint 
handling mechanism to provide a channel for resolving grievances caused by 
maladministration. Its main advantage was seen to be the institution‟s ability to 
promote justice by looking beyond the narrow limit of legality.  In both these 
respects, arguably the role of the Ombudsman is even more important in the Thai 
context where political control has not kept up with the growth of the public 
administration.  The next section continues by detailing the Thai Ombudsman‟s 
evolving mandate and powers. 
 
5.2.2 Evolution of the Thai Ombudsman 
Original Mandate 
In the 1997 Constitution, the Thai Ombudsman office was established in line 
with traditional ombudsman schemes, as detailed in Chapter 3.  It functioned as a 
parliamentary ombudsman under the umbrella of the National Assembly.  It started 
off as a constitutional body to safeguard people‟s rights against the perceived threat 
of encroaching administration.  The Ombudsman‟s mandate was to handle 
complaints lodged with it by aggrieved individuals or referred to it by members of 
the legislature responsible for the redress of grievances. A linked role, which 
arguably went beyond the traditional ombudsman mandate, was to refer cases to the 
Constitutional Court or the Administrative Court if he found that any provision of 
existing law contradicted the constitution.   
The original mandate under the 1997 Constitution (Section 197 and 198) 
which remains the primary mission of the Ombudsman is as follows. 
   1) Consider and inquire into the complaint for fact-findings in the following 
cases: 
a. a Government official, an official or employee of a 
Government agency, a State agency, a State enterprise or a 
local government organisation fails to perform in compliance 
with the law or perform beyond powers and duties as provided 
by the law; 
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b. an official or employee of a Government  agency, a State 
agency, a State enterprise or a local government organisation 
performs or does not perform duties, which unjustly causes 
injury to the complainant or the public, whether such 
performance of duties or omission of duties is lawful or not; 
2) Prepare reports with opinions and suggestions and submit to the National 
Assembly;   
3) The Ombudsman may submit the case and the opinion to the 
Constitutional Court or Administrative Court for a decision in the case 
where the Ombudsman is of the opinion that:  
a. provision of the law, begs the question of the constitutionality 
in which the Constitutional Court shall decide the case 
submitted by the Ombudsman in accordance with the 
procedure of the Constitutional Court without delay. 
b. rules, regulations or any act of any public official begs the 
question of the constitutionality or compliance with law in 
which Administrative Court shall decide the case submitted by 
the Ombudsman according to the procedure of the 
Administrative Court without delay.  
It can be seen, therefore, that the Thai Ombudsman‟s mandate is similar to 
those available in other ombudsman schemes that have as a primary function the 
resolution of administrative grievances. Nevertheless, the drafters of the 2007 
Constitution came to the view that the Ombudsman had underperformed during the 
first seven years of its operation. Further, it seems to have accredited this result 
largely to the fact that its mandate and power was too limited to enable it to make 
substantial impact.72 Instead of finding shortcomings that could have caused poor 
performance of the Ombudsman Office, the conclusion it came to was that the 
Ombudsman should have more powers.  
One limitation in the original mandate of the Thai Ombudsman when 
compared to the traditional ombudsman model was the lack of power to initiate 
investigation without complaints. The 1997 constitution granted the Thai 
Ombudsman the power to make reference to the Constitutional Court in relation to 
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the constitutionality of law. But this is a power aimed at protecting the citizens‟ 
rights from being adversely affected by unconstitutional law and the Ombudsman 
cannot rely on this channel to rectify systemic problems in administration. This is 
because while some legislations, administrative rules, procedures, and practices may 
cause systemic problems, such problems may not make them unconstitutional.  
Therefore this power could only result in the improvement of the administration in a 
few select areas where constitutionality was at issue.  
The own-motion investigation power is widely considered important for 
systemic investigation to tackle generic administrative problems beyond individual 
grievances and enable an ombudsman to play a crucial role in improving 
administrative action to the benefit of both public bodies and complainants73. Under 
the 2007 Constitution the power of own-motion investigation was provided for the 
Ombudsman.  
But while the original lack of an own motion power may have been a cause of 
the underperformance of the Ombudsman Office before 2007, it is contended here 
that there is evidence to suggest that other factors may have much more negatively 
affected the effectiveness of the Ombudsman Office. These issues will be discussed 
further in the following chapters. Having discussed the original mandate of the Thai 
Ombudsman, the next subsection addresses the additional mandate of the 
Ombudsman under the 2007 Constitution. 
Strengthening the Ombudsman 
A review of the Ombudsman Office took place during the drafting process of 
the 2007 Constitution in which there were lengthy debates between members about 
whether the office should be abolished, as it had not demonstrated sufficient concrete 
results that it could actually help alleviate the grievances of the people.74 In the 
words of Prof. Somkid Lertpaitoon, Secretary to the Constitution 
Drafting Committee: … performance records were unclear, if not quite up to the 
mark.75 Eventually the drafters of the 2007 Constitution took the view that 
unsatisfactory performance was due to the limited power accorded to the 
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Ombudsman by the 1997 Constitution.76 With the aim of strengthening the status as 
well as the impact of the Ombudsman and a desire to impose stricter control over the 
executive, the drafters of the 2007 Constitution intended that the Ombudsman should 
be employed not only as a reactive mechanism to safeguard the rights of the people 
but also to contribute more in inspecting the exercise of state power.77   
 Consequently, a number of significant changes to the Thai Ombudsman 
scheme were introduced. The 2007 Constitution gives major additional powers and 
duties to the Ombudsman78 as follows: 
Firstly, the Ombudsman‟s scope of jurisdiction was widened to cover an 
investigation on the unlawful performance of duties of various constitutional and 
judicial bodies (excluding the proceedings of the courts). This expansion of 
responsibility increased the coverage of the Ombudsman‟s office beyond its typical 
jurisdiction.  The intention was that administrative acts of all kinds of public officials 
could be examined by the Ombudsman. 
Secondly, the Ombudsman was assigned with the responsibility of 
monitoring and evaluating compliance with the Constitution‟s provisions, as well as 
providing recommendations on necessary constitutional amendments. This power 
allows the Ombudsman to scrutinize whether the execution of public administration 
by the executive and its administrative branch is carried out according to the state 
policy set forth in the constitution.  
Thirdly, and more importantly, the Ombudsman has been granted supervision 
tasks of monitoring ethical conducts of political office holders and government 
officials. The Ombudsman is empowered to determine alleged breaches of ethical 
conduct of both the holders of political positions and all kinds of public officials. 
Identification of an alleged breach leads to initiation of disciplinary action for public 
officials and the potential removal procedures for persons who hold political 
positions.  
The Constitution also empowers the Ombudsman to initiate investigations 
into any case without receiving a complaint (own-motion investigation), if the 
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Ombudsman considers that such a case may have an adverse impact on the public or 
where the safeguarding of the public interest is required.79  
           The expansion under the 2007 Constitution not only has made the 
Ombudsman a fully-fledged ombudsman in a traditional sense but also markedly 
extended its jurisdiction beyond the traditional matter of administration to many 
important aspects concerning the functioning of the political system of the country. 
The mandate to monitor the implementation of the Constitution is aimed at making 
sure that the Constitution is fully implemented which in effect is to oversee the 
development of legislation required to implement the Constitution.  However, the 
decision to legislate is not part of administrative functions but belongs to the 
government and the legislature.  With regards to ethics, complaints may be about the 
behaviour of a particular public officials or political office holder and not about the 
administrative services in general.   
 Because the new jurisdiction includes monitoring ethics of parliamentarians, 
the Ombudsman has been given a new status which expressly detaches it from 
parliament. This new status will be discussed next. 
New status 
 The changes under the 2007 constitution have had a further radical impact on 
the set-up of the Thai Ombudsman. Formerly, the Ombudsman was set-up as a 
Parliamentary Ombudsman, with all the associated benefits of being branded as an 
officer of parliament, the central institution of the Constitution. With the advent of 
the new powers under the 2007 Constitution, such a joint relationship was no longer 
possible because the Ombudsman is now empowered to examine the ethics of 
persons holding political positions, which include members of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. To reflect this change, the 2007 Constitution 
relocated the Office of the Ombudsman to Chapter XI, under the heading of 
Constitutional Independent Organisations, along with other independent 
accountability mechanisms.  This signifies that the Office of the Ombudsman is no 
longer attached to the National Assembly. Accordingly, the institution has been 
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renamed the Office of the Thai Ombudsman without the term Parliamentary to 
reflect its new role.80   
  Within a short period of 13 years since its establishment, the Thai 
Ombudsman, once with a limited agenda and restricted scope of functions, has 
evolved to become a fully-fledged Ombudsman, which, according to one of the 
current office holders, is considered to be one of the ombudsman schemes with „the 
most extensive powers anywhere in the world‟.81 It might be thought that proponents 
of an ombudsman would generally advocate expansion of the powers of the 
institution, particularly as it has been argued that in many countries the institution is 
an under-utilised one.82 Indeed, as noted in Chapter 4, there is evidence around the 
world of expansion in the use of the institution, a trend which has been viewed 
favourably in the academic community.83  
However, unlike ombudsmen in some jurisdictions (such Australia), where 
the Ombudsmen have built up their public credibility which in turn has provided the 
impetus for further growth and influence of the office, the Thai Ombudsman‟s 
expansion has arguably come about notwithstanding its previous under-performance. 
Thus the expansion of powers to the Thai Ombudsman could be viewed more as a 
combined result of pressures to increase the offices‟ credibility and the contingent 
political demand to strengthen scrutiny over the executive branch. The argument of 
this thesis is that this approach has led to difficulties in the operation of the office.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter has exhibited several key issues confronting the 
Thai system which are also common problems seen elsewhere in modern states, as 
identified in Chapter 2. Thus, effective parliamentary scrutiny of the executive is 
commonly hindered by such things as party politics, executive dominance in the 
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legislature, and by the growing size and complexity of administrative decision-
making and the actions of public officials undertaken on a daily basis. In such a 
context, the traditional concept of a separation of powers, whether based on a 
Westminster model or a presidential model, does not of itself provide adequate 
protection of citizens from abuses of power by members of the executive. In other 
words, the trend towards the construction of the Thai Ombudsman, including the 
motivations and theoretical claims made in favour of the office, reflects a common 
theme in constitutional evolution.   
In dealing with its constitutional problems, the Thai Constitution introduced 
additional constitutional watchdogs. The Ombudsman stands alongside offices 
exercising complementary functions, which include the office of the National 
Counter Corruption Commission, the State Audit Commission, the National Human 
Rights Commission, the Election Commission and the Auditor-General. The debates 
preceding the creation of the office of the Ombudsman showed that the new office 
was designed to act on behalf of Parliament with regard to the administrative 
agencies, strengthening the traditional legislative control exercised by the supreme 
elective body and its individual members over the executive branch‟s 
administrations.  
The Thai example exemplified a recent trend in constitutional drafting that at 
its best involves enhanced efforts to structure and channel democratic power and to 
limit the role of partisanship, encompassing a myriad of institutions that affect a 
highly refined separation of powers.  Among these oversight bodies, the Ombudsman 
is the only one that is empowered to deal with citizens‟ grievances against 
administrative injustice, especially in areas where there are few or no legal rights, 
and in which political sanctions fail to provide sufficient coverage in terms of 
redress. The arguments for the Ombudsman office that were made on its 
introduction, therefore, chime very closely to those that have been made elsewhere in 
the world and link with a general claim that all citizens deserve a right to 
administrative justice.   
The 2007 Constitution gives the Ombudsman important new powers:  to 
conduct own-motion investigations to oversee the ethical practice of politicians, 
government officials or state officials as well as to establish a Code of Ethics to be 
followed by all public agencies. A second role is to follow up and provide 
recommendations in compliance with the Constitution, as well as matters for 
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consideration in support of Constitutional amendment. The reason behind such 
incremental change is the desire to strengthen the role of the Ombudsman and to 
increase control over the executive.   
The discussion regarding the constitutional roles of the Ombudsman 
complements further the argument that the Thai Ombudsman is assigned roles that 
fulfill a function not discharged adequately by other processes in government.  The 
Ombudsman‟s original mandate in protecting citizen‟s rights, by resolving 
complaints against public administration and improving administrative practice 
should be considered primary roles of the Ombudsman‟s office, given the power that 
it has as the only complaint body that can deal with unfairness effectively. On the 
other hand, the new supervisory roles of the Ombudsman, such as the role regarding 
the implementation of the Constitution, could overload the Office. Moreover it 
overlaps with the role of other institutions. The power in relation to ethical codes 
may be inconsistent with the role and image of the Ombudsman operating in 
accordance with the primary roles in that it sets the Ombudsman as a potential 
adversary to leaders, both political and administrative, the very people from whom 
he is meant to seek support and with whom he is meant to cooperate with. The next 
chapter will address these issues in more - depth.   
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Chapter 6 
The Traditional role of the Thai Ombudsman  
 
 
 
This chapter considers the Thai Ombudsman‟s functions with reference to the 
traditional roles of the ombudsman. The chapter has two aims, firstly it identifies that 
while the 2007 Constitution has given it more powers and a larger mandate to inspect 
the exercise of state power, the core function of the Thai Ombudsman remains 
unchanged, that is to remedy administrative abuses and promote fair use of public 
power. Secondly, it is contended that the Ombudsman has fulfilled this role well, but 
it should be able to function more effectively in some areas.  
   Toward this end, this Chapter is divided into three sections.  Section 6.1 
establishes that resolving grievances and improving good administration have been 
identified as the primary functions of the Office. Section 6.2 provides a description 
of the manner in which the Thai Ombudsman‟s power to remedy grievances and 
improve administration is structured, followed by a detailed examination of the 
practical application of his power. Section 6.3 concludes the chapter by highlighting 
the achievements of and the challenges faced by the Thai office with respect to its 
traditional role.   
The data used to support the study in this chapter and the next two comes 
from several resources. The main source used is the Ombudsman‟s official 
documents, such as the Ombudsman‟s annual reports, the Ombudsman‟s files and 
working procedure papers, speeches, and publications. To support these sources, in 
this thesis I have interviewed Ombudsman Sriracha Charoenpanich, Chief 
Ombudsman Panit Nitithanprapas and officers of the Thai Ombudsman Offices to 
gain an insight into the perception of their work and to supplement the statistical data 
uncovered on the Ombudsman‟s office. Various additional sources have been used to 
gain alternative perspectives on the work of the Ombudsman. Hence, the minutes of 
Meetings of the House of Representatives, and secondary sources such as the reports 
of the media, opinions of scholars and administrators have been reviewed in this 
work. Finally, elite interviews were held with other relevant stakeholders in the 
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Ombudsman‟s work. These included interviews with the Vice President of the Senate, 
an eminent public law scholar/State Councillor and a deputy permanent secretary to 
the Prime Minister‟s Office/Inspector General, with the primary purpose o f 
ascertaining their reflections on the performance of the Ombudsman.1    
       
 6.1 The Primary functions 
As discussed in chapter 5, the 2007 Constitution aimed to strengthen the 
Ombudsman‟s profile by assigning various functions to the office, but the 
constitution does not dictate which of the office‟s functions should take priority. 
Therefore, before examining the various functions of the Ombudsman, it is 
interesting to see what the Ombudsman perceived as its primary function and also 
what is expected from the Ombudsman by key stakeholders.  It will be claimed here 
that what is apparent is that, while the functions and powers of the office have 
expanded, none of the relevant stakeholders intend that there should be a change to 
the role of the Ombudsman as an administrative complaint mechanism. 
While the Constitution does not expressly address the question of which 
function should take precedence, it can be deduced that there was no intention under 
the new constitution to alter the Ombudsman‟s original purpose of resolving 
maladministration complaints. Further, it was stated in the drafting of the 2007 
Constitution that the principle of the Ombudsman has not been changed.2 
 The evaluation of the Ombudsman from the perspective of the legislature is 
also important because the original intent in establishing the institution was to 
supplement and complement the work of the courts and the legislature in the 
administrative justice system, rather than to supervise the conduct of the executive 
and government officials.3  In addition, the legislature‟s members still play a role in 
determining the office‟s future. In this respect, the views of members of Parliament 
can be obtained in the annual reports of the Ombudsman which in turn throw light on 
their perspectives on what should be the primary role of the Ombudsman. 
Messages from each President of the National Assembly to the Ombudsman 
are contained in all of the Ombudsman‟s annual reports since the expansion of 
                                                                 
1
 See an annex for a list of interviewees. 
2
 Minutes of Extraordinary Committee Meeting on Intention, Records, Archive and Minutes Scrutiny, 
Constitutional Drafting Assembly B.E.2550 (2007). 
3
 ibid. 
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functions in 2007. These messages have continuously emphasised that the 
Ombudsman should focus on the alleviation of administrative grievance as its prime 
responsibility,4 a thereby the existence of the Ombudsman is to facilitate the 
promotion and protection of the citizens‟ right to good administration.5  Likewise, 
the messages from both the heads of the House of the Representatives and the Senate 
after 2007 continue to stress that the ultimate aim of the Ombudsman is to be an 
institution upon which those who suffer from maladministration can rely for 
support.6  
According to Panit Nitithanprapas, the current Chief Ombudsman, the 
primary duty of the Ombudsman is to protect citizens and improve public 
administration by addressing administrative problems that the courts, the legislature, 
and the executive cannot effectively resolve, while the other additional functions 
given subsequently by the 2007 Constitution are tools to achieve the institution‟s 
main duties. 7  The Ombudsman has also  set goals to be achieved through their 
accomplishment, which is to remedy people's‟ grievances in a proactive manner with 
an efficient, standardized and just operation. 8  In the Annual Report of 2013, the 
Ombudsman stated that the success of the O ffice is in being able to remedy the 
complaint suffered and to restore fairness to society, as well as make suggestions that 
lead to change and improvement of the administrative system.9 
Looking at how the Office is organised also gives us a sense of where the 
Ombudsman prioritises his resources. The largest share of staff, which is divided 
among 3 divisions, each comprised of 60 people, works on complaints against 
maladministration; while division of 32 people work on complaints about ethics 
including promoting ethics standards; and a division of 11 people deals with 
constitutional compliance and evaluation.10 
                                                                 
4
 Utai Pimchaichon, message from the President of the Nat ional Assembly, the Ombudsman Annual 
Report 2545 B.E. and 2546 B.E. (2002 and 2003). 
5
 Phokin  Palaku l, message from the President of the National Assembly, the Ombudsman Annual 
Report 2548 B.E. (2005). 
6
 Prasobsuk Boondej, message from the President of the Senate, the Ombudsman Annual Report, 2550 
B.E. (2008); Somsak Kiatsuranon, message from the President of the Nat ional Assembly, General 
Theeradej Meepien, message from the President of the Senate, the Ombudsman Annual Report, 2552 
B.E. (2011). 
7
 Ch ief Ombudsman Panit Nit ithanprapas, an interview with the author on 15 March 2013 at the Thai 
Ombudsman Office, Bangkok. 
8
 The Ombudsman Annual Report 2550 B.E. (2008). 
9
 Message from the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman Annual Report  2554 B.E. (2013). 
10
 Wasan Thepmanee, Public Relat ions Officer, The Thai Ombudsman Office , an interview with the 
author on 15 March 2013 at the Thai Ombudsman Office, Bangkok. 
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After identifying that the central purpose of the Thai Ombudsman is to 
investigate complaints from the public alleging injustice due to maladministration 
and to improve the administrative practices of local authorities, it can be seen that the 
Ombudsman in Thailand still shares a similar mission to other ombudsman schemes. 
As discussed in chapter 3, this might lead to a conclusion that, in examining the Thai 
Ombudsman‟s operation and institutional design (though this study does not intend 
to make direct comparison), some comparisons with other ombudsman schemes or 
taking reference from overseas practices are therefore very relevant if the core 
mission is much the same.    
Nevertheless, despite the similarities with other ombudsman schemes, there 
are three special functions of the Thai Ombudsman that set it apart from equivalent 
institutions in other countries. In most other countries, ombudsman institutions do 
not have this spread of responsibilities, and these additional functions will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter. As already noted, direct comparisons are not 
always appropriate, and each country‟s unique historical, cultural, social, economic 
and political environment should be considered carefully before drawing any 
conclusions about the best way forward. The study now turns to look at first the 
performance of the Thai Ombudsman when carrying out the primary function.       
  
6.2 Traditional role 
The traditional role of the ombudsman was analysed in Chapter 3 and is 
generally understood to comprise the resolution of individual complaints with a view 
to assisting citizens in pursuing their grievances against public bodies, and to 
promote good administrative practice by uncovering and eradicating administrative 
system failures that cause widespread or individual maladministration.  The delivery 
of these dual traditional roles by the Thai Ombudsman is examined in more detail 
below, but first the powers of the office under the constitution and supporting 
legislation are outlined.  
 
6.2.1 Powers available to the Thai Ombudsman 
For any ombudsman scheme to be effective in delivering its goals it requires 
adequate statutory support and appropriate working arrangements. In this section 
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these arrangements in Thailand are explored. The discussion first covers resolving 
complaints about government administration, and then turns to recommendations for 
improving administration. 
(i) Resolving complaints about government administration 
Section 244 (1) of the 2007 Constitution and Section 13 (1) of the Organic 
Act on the Ombudsman  2552 B.E. (2009)11 stipulate that the Ombudsman has the 
power and duties to consider and investigate the facts of complaints against all types 
of government officials in cases involving: 1) failure to perform in compliance with 
the law or performance beyond powers and duties as provided by the law; and 2) 
performance of, or omission to perform, duties which unjustly causes injury to the 
complainant or the public, whether such act is lawful or not. 
According to the above provisions, the Ombudsman must assess whether 
there is „failure to perform in compliance with the law, beyond power and duties as 
provided by the law‟ or if there are „unjustly caused injuries‟ and whether such is 
lawful or not. This statutory definition indicates that the Ombudsman performs both 
legality and non-legality reviews.  
The capacity to look into contraventions of the law and at bodies exceeding 
jurisdiction potentially overlaps with the territory policed by the Administrative 
Courts in performing their judicial review function. However, the ombudsman's role 
extends beyond considering narrow questions of legality as the other grounds for 
review are „injuries‟ which are unjustly caused by an administrative action „whether 
such act is lawful or not‟. 
 The Ombudsman therefore has the power to determine whether there is a 
case of maladministration, as occasionally even if an agency complies strictly with 
its legal powers, it is possible that the end result causes losses and unfairness. In such 
cases, action taken by public authorities or officials may be consistent with the law in 
a narrow sense and yet constitute bad administration.    
This non-legality review function adds to the surveillance capacity of 
Parliament, as well as provides additional supervision on the substance of 
discretionary decisions that cannot be achieved in a court. In such a case the person 
affected by the administrative decision often has no legal right to seek redress in the 
courts while, as mentioned above, Parliament on its own could not provide the 
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 Hereafter the 2009 Act.  
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necessary continuous surveillance of the vast range of administrative decision-
making and actions affecting individual citizens.12 The Ombudsman‟s task of non-
legality review expands the degree of control over an administrative action beyond 
legality and therefore provides citizens with a greater chance to obtain justice in their 
dealings with bureaucracies.   
(ii) Recommend amendment to improve administration 
The Ombudsman has the power to recommend changes to legislation and 
practices to terminate administrative problems. The 2009 Act stipulates that the 
Ombudsman has the power to recommend amendments to any act of the legislature 
or subordinated legislations that have produced objectionable results such as 
unfairness, discrimination, or inequality.13 
The provision makes it explicit that the Ombudsman can go beyond the 
merits of each individual complaint to a broader area of administrative fairness, by 
identifying defects in the law that are a common source of complaints from the 
community, and assisting agencies to rectify them in order to prevent any recurrence 
of similar situations.   
In fact it can be seen that the law encourages the Ombudsman to embark on a 
„systemic investigation‟ on his own initiative. The 2007 Constitution, Section 244, 
provides that „...in the case where Ombudsmen consider that such act threatens to 
cause injury to the public at large or there arises a need to safeguard public interests, 
Ombudsmen may consider the matter and conduct inquiries without prior complaint‟. 
Therefore the Ombudsman is an independent fact- finder who can recommend 
changes that would lead to a greater administrative fairness in the public sector. 
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 Siriya Promradyod, The problem of legal status and authority of the Ombudsman under the 
constitution of the kingdom of Thailand , Master‟s Degree Thesis, Thammasat University, 2010. 
13
 Section 32, paragraph two, „In the case where the Ombudsman is of the opinion that despite an act 
of a government official, o fficial or employee of a government agency, State agency, State enterprise 
or local government organization being compliant with the law, by-law, rule, regulation or resolution 
of the Council of Ministers, but such the law, by-law, rule, regulation or resolution of the Council of 
Ministers induces unfairness or inequality before the law or being the ground of d iscrimination or out 
of date, the Ombudsman shall recommend the related government agency, State agency, State 
enterprise or local government organisation to cause revision or amendment to such law, by-law, rule, 
regulation or resolution of the Council of Min isters. If the recommendation relates to the resolution of 
the Council of Ministers, the report shall also be submitted to the Council of Ministers for 
information.‟ 
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6.2.2 The Functioning of the Ombudsman 
In law, therefore, the Ombudsman‟s role is a very broad one, as befits the 
nature of administrative justice. In this section, the functioning of the traditional roles 
of the Thai Ombudsman is reviewed according to the framework adopted in Chapter 
3 which identifies two key aspects of the Ombudsman work in term of the 
institution‟s contribution to administrative justice.14  
(i)  Resolving individual complaints 
In examining the role of the Thai Ombudsman in dealing with individual 
complaints; this section breaks the process of dispute resolution down into its 
constituent parts, which are: (a) jurisdiction; (b) accessibility and public awareness; 
and (c) methods for resolving complaints. By doing so, the section focusses on the 
key issues that an ombudsman scheme must address if it is to be effective. 
In this first section, the capacity for complaints to be made to the office is 
considered through a discussion of its jurisdiction, its accessibility, and the public‟s 
awareness of the office. These three features directly affect an ombudsman‟s ability 
to receive complaints and its relationship with the public. They therefore relate 
closely with the ombudsman‟s function in resolving complaints. (Other essential 
features of ombudsman institutions will be explored in Chapter 8.) 
(a) Jurisdiction 
It has been shown above that, in common with many other ombudsmen, the 
Thai Ombudsman has a wide mandate. Grounds for the Ombudsman review are 
stated broadly to include illegality as well as injustice done to a person by all kinds 
of government officials, whether such act is lawful or not.15  Ombudsmen are often 
the only place in government where the fairness of an act can be assessed and 
recommendations made to remedy decisions or actions that, while strictly legal, may 
nevertheless be incompatible with broader standards of justice. However, the ability 
of an ombudsman to assist a complainant is also dependent on its jurisdiction. 
By statute, the Thai Ombudsman can investigate all types of public officials.  
The authorities subjected to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman include government 
departments, government bodies, state agencies, state enterprises and local 
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 Trevor Buck, Richard Kirkham and Brian Thompson, The Ombudsman Enterprise and 
Administrative Justice, Ashgate, Surrey, 2011. 
15
 The Organic Act on Ombudsmen, 2552 B.E. (2009), section 13(1) (a), (b), (c). 
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government organisations and constitutional organisations. 16  This range of bodies 
that can be investigated covers almost the full breadth of state activity, including 
police, prisons, health, housing and education, services which in some jurisdictions 
are excluded from the scope of a general ombudsman. The scale of the Thai 
Ombudsman‟s jurisdiction therefore is wider than ombudsman schemes in many 
jurisdictions.  
While it is regarded that the wide jurisdiction of the ombudsman is preferred 
over a limited jurisdiction, as this means a wider range of government activities can 
be reviewed, it should be noted that other places have specialised ombudsman bodies 
focussed at different parts of public sector.17 
 As opposed to the wide jurisdiction approach, the specialised ombudsman 
model has the benefit of focussed subject matter expertise.  A benefit of having a 
specialised ombudsman is that an office with specific jurisdiction might be better 
placed to highlight the opportunities for redress and to encourage people to complain. 
However with regard to Thailand, for the time being this current arrangement 
arguably seems to suit the purpose of the institution for at least two reasons. Firstly,  
the Thai Ombudsman is meant to be a body that looks at the general public 
administration system and fills in the gaps in the existing administrative justice 
system, which in turn promotes easy access as this wide jurisdiction approach 
enables the Ombudsman to provide a cost efficient „one-stop‟ service. Secondly, 
given the low level of complaints that the Ombudsman currently receives (see 
below), it would be uneconomical and inefficient to create new specialised 
ombudsman bodies.  But this also follows that if a particular problem area can be 
identified where complaints are concentrated in a particular area of government, it 
might be appropriate to consider introducing a separate specialised ombudsman.  
Limits on jurisdiction 
Even where the overall jurisdiction is wide, most ombudsman schemes will 
place some specific restrictions on the areas that the ombudsman can investigate. 
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 The Organic Act on Ombudsmen, 2552 B.E. (2009), section 13(1) (a), (b), (c). 
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 For example, specialised ombudsman model is dominant in England. However there is an ongoing 
debate whether to integrate or to harmonise multiple schemes in the ombudsman community in 
England. Discussion see Richard Kirkham and Jane Mart in, „The creation of an English Public 
Services Ombudsman: mapping a way forward ,‟ democraticaudituk, 20 June 2014,  retrieved 19 
September 2014,   
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/57677/1/democraticaudit.com-
The_creation_of_an_English_Public_Services_Ombudsman_mapping_a_way_forward.pdf. 
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Ideally, limitations on the Ombudsman‟s jurisdiction should be carefully defined, as 
the ability to help complainants is enhanced by the breadth of their jurisdiction.  
Limited jurisdiction means leaving large areas of public power free from scrutiny. As 
a general rule, limitations on the ombudsman‟s jurisdiction should exist only to 
prevent jurisdictional problems so that the ombudsman does not unduly disturb the 
power structure of the state. In common with most ombudsman schemes elsewhere, 
in Thailand, these jurisdictional limitations apply to all investigations into national 
security, defense or international relations. In addition, matters relating to 
government policies, the trial and adjudication of a court, personnel issues of the 
civil services and disciplinary actions are excluded from the Thai Ombudsman‟s 
jurisdiction.18 
Another common issue that needs to be considered in the design of public 
service ombudsman schemes is the use of private service delivery agents to deliver 
government functions. Although the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman of Thailand is 
limited to public authorities, and does not cover private individuals or companies, the 
Ombudsman does not feel that outsourcing of service delivery from government 
departments to private bodies restricts his mandate.19 Based on the Ombudsman‟s 
published documents, the Ombudsman has investigated and resolved complaints 
against individuals or firms engaged in the delivery of a public service. The 
Ombudsman considers that he has the authority to consider the actions of public 
authorities in outsourcing services, or the actions of government bodies that are 
supposed to enforce rules and regulations and monitor operations and safety 
standards.20 
In terms of jurisdiction, therefore, arguably the legislation under which the 
Ombudsman currently operates is relatively unrestrictive and has been supported by 
a liberal interpretation of the office‟s powers in the practice of the Ombudsman in 
exercising his power, as discussed above. This legal framework could possibly be the 
most important factor in explaining the low proportion of complaints received by the 
office that the Ombudsman cannot resolve. The Ombudsman‟s statistics during the 
past five years shows that complaints which were considered to be outside its 
jurisdiction represent 35% of total complaints in each year. This amount can be 
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 The Organic Act on Ombudsmen, 2552 B.E. (2009), section 28. 
19
 Ombudsman Sriracha Charoenpanich, an interview with the author on 3 March 2013, at the 
Ombudsman Office, Bangkok. 
20
 The Thai Ombudsman Office, Thai Ombudsman at a Glance, Bangkok, 2009. 
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considered low given that many other schemes have recorded much higher number 
of complaints that fall outside their jurisdiction.21 Indeed, by far the most common 
ground for the rejection of a complaint by the Thai Ombudsman office was that the 
complaint lacked the complainant‟s legally required details, such as names and 
signatures resulting in insufficient information to process further.22 Taking this into 
account, very few complaints to the ombudsman are genuinely outside its jurisdiction.  
The wide jurisdiction and the low number of rejected complaints help to 
enhance the Ombudsman‟s image as a channel for complaints of administrative 
grievances of almost all types. This might be considered strength of the office when 
compared to other schemes that regularly record rejections of a higher number of 
complaints on the basis that they are outside of jurisdiction. 23  What this might 
suggest of the Thai Ombudsman scheme is that, for those that do pursue a complaint, 
the Thai arrangements make it relatively easy for the complainant to identify the 
appropriate body to whom to submit a complaint.    
(b) Access and public awareness 
An ombudsman scheme should establish practical and usable routes for 
complainants in seeking redress. As discussed in Chapter 3, accessibility is one of the 
essential elements of an ombudsman. An Ombudsman is regarded as a redress 
mechanism that provides a fast, effective and user- friendly way of protecting the 
citizen against maladministration as opposed to juridical procedures that are often 
complicated and expensive. Therefore it must be easily accessed by the public.  It was 
suggested that the degree of accessibility and public awareness can be tested by the 
following questions.  
Access and public awareness 
 Can anyone bring a complaint directly to the Ombudsman without paying a 
fee or passing through an intermediary office? 
 Can a complaint be lodged informally e.g. verbally or via internet? 
 Is the institution accessible to all citizens? 
 Are there barriers to accessibility? 
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 Buck et al., n. 14; and for example about 75% of all complaints to the Danish Ombudsman are 
rejected by the ombudsman primarily due to the fact that citizens have not exhausted administrative 
redress see Michael Gøtze, „The Danish ombudsman A national watchdog with selected preferences ’, 
Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 6, Issue 1, January, 2010, retrieved 19 September 2013, 
http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/. 
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 The Ombudsman Annual Reports.  
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 Buck et al., n. 14.  
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 How does the citizen find out about the office? 
 Does the office provide for an easy procedure by which to complain? 
 What does the law say about accessibility?  
 To what extent does the Ombudsman use electronic technology to aid the 
process? 
 Has the Ombudsman employed all reasonable measures to make the general 
public aware of its existence and role? 
Access 
Section 23 of the Organic Act on the Ombudsman provides unrestricted 
access to the Ombudsman, as any person, group of persons or community are entitled 
to make complaints directly to the Ombudsman without paying a fee. In addition, the 
complainant need not have a direct legal interest in the subject matter of the 
complaint. This situation is considerably wider than in many other ombudsman 
schemes within which access is often restricted only to those individuals that can 
claim that they have suffered an injustice of some form, and collective complaints 
are not allowed.24   
The legislation attempts to eliminate barriers in making complaints. Section 
24 allows the Ombudsman to accept complaints that are made in writing, verbally or 
by other means. Here too, this practice accords with best practice in the ombudsman 
community. 25  There is no requirement concerning the form of the complaint, but 
complaints made in writing must have the name, address and signature of the 
complainant.26 Nor is it the case with the Thai Ombudsman scheme that only citizens 
can initiate a complaint. Section 26 of the Organic Act provides that a complaint can 
be referred from a committee of the House of Representatives. A complaint can also 
be referred where the Senate conducts an inquiry or consideration on any matter and 
it is of the opinion that such matter is subject to the powers and duties of the 
Ombudsmen under this Organic Act. Again, this is an access route to the ombudsman 
not available in many other schemes.  
The Ombudsman also stresses that it is the objective of the office to facilitate 
access.  There is evidence in the practice of the Ombudsman that it has made 
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 This is the case in the UK.  
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 Buck et al., n. 14.  
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 The Organic Act on Ombudsmen, 2552 B.E. (2009), Section 24. 
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significant efforts to provide for various routes of complaint that are easily and 
widely accessible, simple and free of charge.  These routes include:27 
 Complain via the internet at www.ombudsman.go.th; 
 The telephone hotline 1676 (toll free call nationwide) or 0 2141 9100 and a 
call centre and electronic  handling systems is in place to assist complainants.  
Toll free is a preferable choice for complainants to contact Ombudsman. 
Each month the Ombudsman receives approximately 7,000 contacts by 
telephone;28 
 Complain by post. In this case the signature of the complainant, address, 
phone (or home phone contact) is required; 
 Complain via mobile handling unit travelling around the country especially in 
geographical remote areas to receive people‟s complaints to provide a 
stronger presence;  
 Complain via members of Parliament and Senators in the area of the 
constituent.  At the request of members of parliament, the Ombudsman has its 
officials stationed at the National Assembly on the days members of the 
House are convened;29 
 Complain through the Ombudsman‟s network. The Ombudsman has been 
noted in the ombudsman community for its policy in maintaining a relatively 
small ombudsman office and emphasising the cultivation of a network of 
other government and nongovernment organizations to facilitate better public 
access and timely service.30  The Ombudsman has collaborated with active 
non-government organisations, such as the Lawyer Council and other 
organisations, such as the Department of Legal Aid and Civil Rights 
Protection, Office of the Attorney General. Often these agencies will have a 
base in every province throughout the country, and thereby operate de facto 
as extensions of the ombudsman office in matters of complaint referral. The 
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 The Thai Ombudsman Facebook, retrieved 15 July 2013, 
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goal is to save the expenses of the poor so that they can file their complaints 
at their own domiciles.31           
The accessibility to the Ombudsman, in terms of the legislation and the 
practical efforts of the Ombudsman, compares favourably with standard ombudsman 
schemes around the world.  Some evidence of problems in practice elsewhere in the 
world includes the requirement for complaints to be made in writing, which appears 
to discourage some complainants from complaining,32 or the Member of Parliament 
filter measure in the UK, which obstructs direct access to the ombudsman.33 In many 
respects, it can be said that the Thai Ombudsman‟s office facilitates accessibility in a 
more positive manner than elsewhere in the world.   
Public awareness  
In order that an ombudsman office is useful for those who need to use them, 
it must be well known amongst the public. The 2009 Act does not deal directly with 
the issue of public awareness. However the Ombudsman has continuously employed 
various strategies to raise public awareness since inception. Activities to increase 
awareness include: 
 regional visits which the Ombudsman usually conducts twice a year;     
 a regular programme on National Assembly radio and occasionally 
other various on television/radio programs;   
 periodic publications, such as the Ombudsman‟s journal;  
 promotional materials advertising the existence of a scheme, such as 
printing on public utility invoices and train tickets;  
 large public campaigns, such as disseminating information about the 
opportunities for complaints to the Ombudsman by 3,000 village 
health volunteers and 7,000 village radio broadcasting stations;34 
 exhibitions with universities, other independent agencies, including 
the Public Relation Department several times per year.  
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The Ombudsman also creates a network of volunteers of its own, as well as in 
coordination with other government agencies,35 to help disseminate information on 
the Ombudsman and to instruct the public on how to file a complaint to the 
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman‟s annual reports are available on the website also in 
the form of Digital Accessible Information System (DAISy)36.  
It can be seen that the Ombudsman‟s strategies and community outreach 
activities or publicity material are consistent with best practice employed in other 
ombudsman offices.37  
The improved public awareness of the Thai Ombudsman is partially reflected 
in the increased number of complaints that the Office has received since it was first 
introduced in 1999. The workload of the Office had increased from less than 1,000 
cases in 2000 and 2001 to 2,595 in 2003 and has remained steady in the area of 
2,000-2,700 complaints per year since then. This low turnover in the early years 
could largely be attributed to the public‟s unfamiliarity with the Office when it first 
opened. But there has been a substantial increase in the number of enquiries received 
after five years of operation.  
This finding correlates closely with the finding of two surveys that have been 
conducted in recent years. In 2002, in a survey conducted by an academic researcher,  
the public awareness of the Ombudsman scored at 64%.38 In 2005, a survey by a 
public agency indicated that the Ombudsman‟s public awareness has increased to 
71.7%. 39  In this latter survey, the public awareness of the Ombudsman was 
understandably lower than traditional redress mechanisms, like the Court of Justice 
(91.6 %), but higher than other comparable independent institutions such as the 
Auditor General (69.6%) and the Human Rights Commission (65.8%).  
The relative lack of awareness of the ombudsman office amongst the public 
has been a problem in other countries.40  Although no global study has ever been 
conducted on the awareness of ombudsman schemes, what data we do have suggests 
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that if the Thai Ombudsman has secured an awareness rating in excess of 70%, this is 
a very credible achievement.41   
Public awareness and volume of complaints 
The above assessment raises two points worthy of further explanation. First, 
there is a contradiction between the impressively high rate of public awareness of the 
office and its relatively low number of complaints received. Therefore the high 
public awareness rate should be viewed with caution.  Second, is there an ongoing 
strategy within the Ombudsman office to verify public awareness of the office? 
On first analysis, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the number of 
complaints submitted to the Ombudsman Office in Thailand is relatively low, given 
the size of population of 60 million and when compared to ombudsman schemes 
elsewhere. To take just two examples: in terms of equivalent size of population, the 
UK PHSO received 29,000 complaints (either the calendar year 2011 or 2011/12);42 
or in terms of similar mandates and powers (albeit a considerably smaller population 
size) the Portuguese Ombudsman received a total of 7,753 complaints in 2011.43  
There appears to be an implicit general consensus among ombudsmen that 
there is a direct relationship between complaint levels and the level of general social 
faith in and awareness of a given office.44 In other words, it is generally accepted that 
the more complaints the office receives, the more this shows that the public knows 
about it and has confidence in it. However, it is accepted that the number of 
complaints alone cannot be specifically identified as a measure of performance, as a 
significant range of external factors need to be accounted for to arrive at meaningful 
conclusions on complaint levels. This means that comparisons with other 
ombudsman schemes need to be treated with caution, as each ombudsman scheme 
has a very different jurisdiction and operates in a very different context and 
environment 
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Even at this level of analysis, the issue is complicated by the fact that there is 
little consensus on what amounts to a measurable assessment of ombudsman 
performance. For instance, in addition to the formal complaints receives, ombudsman 
schemes will also handle a considerable number of informal communications. In the 
case of the Thai Ombudsman, in addition to formal complaints, the Thai 
Ombudsman receives an average of approximately 7,000 telephone enquires per 
month, which makes the ombudsman‟s impact look more significant than if one 
focuses on complaints alone.  These inquiries can be an indicator that the public are 
aware of the Ombudsman‟s existence and its role, as at least they showed that people 
thought of the Ombudsman when they had difficulties in dealing with government.   
With regards to external factors, in the Thai context, an important factor that 
needs to be taken into consideration when judging whether the number of complaints 
is too low is the wider administrative justice system in Thailand. Thailand has a 
system of compulsory administrative appeal, which means administrative appeal is a 
required condition for an action in the Administrative Court. It is likely that 
complaints that come to the Ombudsman are complaints that are not entitled to 
appeal or have been rejected by the Administrative Court. In this regards, one 
possible explanation for the low number of complaints is that the complaints which 
eventually make their way to the ombudsman represent only a very small proportion 
of the grievances which courts and authorities have to deal with.  An ombudsman 
typically is not a primary mechanism for administrative remedies but instead an 
option to facilitate redress. This is also the case in Thailand. 
In Thailand, the main mechanism in administrative justice is internal appeal 
followed by an application to the Administrative Court.45 This can be seen from the 
fact that for every administrative order that can be appealed or disputed, the law 
requires that such an administrative order must contain notification on procedure and 
timeframe for appeal. 46  Further, in general a person must complete available 
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administrative procedures before filing an administrative case. 47    There are also 
complaint-handling units established in all ministries.48  
In addition, Thailand has multiple other channels for complaints, such as the 
Department of Legal Aid and Civil Rights Protection, an Office of the Attorney 
General in every province throughout the country. In order to facilitate an aggrieved 
citizen in lodging complaints, most recently an additional route for complaints has 
been established under the Office of the Prime Minister. It takes the form of an 
integrated government complaint centre operated with four channels, all under same 
codename 1111. Its role is to accept comments, suggestions and clues to bureaucratic 
red tape and corruption.49  
It is difficult to draw strong conclusions about the relative importance of 
different branches of the administrative justice system in Thailand, as there is 
currently a lack of centralised data on the numbers of grievances dealt by different 
departmental routes to redress. The prevailing assumption, however, is that despite 
their lack of independence, significant numbers of complaints are dealt with by these 
alternative routes.   
Besides, there are other specialized institutions, such as the National Human 
Right Commissioner and the National Counter Corruption Commission, to deal with 
complaints in specific areas. This network of grievance handling machinery provides 
a range of alternative, and possibly on many occasions, preferable options with which 
to pursue an administrative grievance. Complaints to the Ombudsman should  not, 
therefore, be viewed in isolation.  The point here is that to gauge the impact of the 
Ombudsman cannot depend on statistics alone but must take into consideration other 
factors. 50   More work would be needed to assess whether the Ombudsman is 
underutilised or not, but what can be concluded from this preliminary inquiry is that 
the administrative justice system in Thailand is a complex one.  All of this makes it 
difficult to assess the low level of complaints of the Thai Ombudsman. 
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However, assuming that there is a contradiction between the impressively 
high rate of public awareness of the office and its relatively low number of 
complaints received, as indicated above, a question arises as to the reliability of the 
survey which deserves further explanation. Ideally the reliability of the survey or the 
representativeness of the survey subjects could be tested through conducting an 
extended number of surveys, managed independently of the Ombudsman. In this 
respect, the two pieces of research mentioned earlier could be considered reliable, as 
both of them were conducted independently of the Ombudsman. Moreover, one of 
them was conducted by King Prajadhipok's Institute, a major credible institute for 
political study.  Further, both pieces of research reported similar findings despite 
being conducted separately at different points in time.  
After having discussed some aspects of the Ombudsman with relevance to the 
effectiveness of its processes for receiving complaints, the study now moves on to 
examine the methods which the Ombudsman employs in performing its complaint 
resolution function. 
(c) Methods for resolving complaints 
The ombudsman has been described in chapter 3 as an extension and 
supplementary office to the pre-existing mechanisms of remedial justice available for 
individuals to use against the administration in the resolution of their complaints. In 
performing this function the ombudsman has considerable discretion to decide how 
far and in what way each complaint should be investigated and resolved. It has also 
been identified that the ombudsman has developed further methods, apart from 
formal investigation, in order to enhance their capacity in providing complainants 
with easier access to justice.  
  Similarly in Thailand, it will be seen that the techniques the Ombudsman 
uses are in common with the ombudsman trends.  Apart from investigation, the range 
of primary methods used for resolving complaints includes referral back to the 
primary decision-maker, mediation and informal settlements via telephone calls. In 
short, the Ombudsman offers an alternative dispute resolution service. Each mode 
will be detailed in turn below in order to demonstrate the practice of the Ombudsman 
as a channel for redress of grievances. 
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Referral 
As is common with most ombudsman schemes, a complaint presented for the 
Ombudsman‟s investigation must first of all be examined to ensure that it is within 
the its jurisdiction. In conforming to the enabling Act of the Ombudsman with regard 
to the rejection of complaints,51 complaints that fall outside the jurisdiction or which 
are rejected because the Ombudsman uses his discretionary power not to accept, are 
referred back to the relevant concerned agencies to follow appropriate proceedings 
there. The complainant is notified in writing of the result, stating the ground for 
rejecting the complaint and where possible redirecting the complainant to the 
appropriate authority.52  
At this stage, the Ombudsman offers a service that goes slightly further than 
simply referring the complainant to another body. The Ombudsman‟s statistical 
records show that in many cases the agency being complained against or the superior 
has not been aware of the incident. In such cases, the official in charge of the 
complaint will call the complained agency to inquire of the relevant facts and explore 
possible solutions without investigation.  The principle underlying this approach is 
that, as a general practice, in terms of effectiveness the public body involved should 
be the first route to address the complainant.53 First, the concerned public body can 
consider appropriateness apart from the facts and the law and, secondly, if the 
disputed matter involves technical expertise, the concerned public body will be in a 
stronger position to resolve the problems according to the expertise required.54 This 
approach of pushing complaints back down the administrative justice system 
wherever possible chimes with that adopted by most ombudsman schemes around the 
world.55  The benefit claimed is that such local redress is capable of securing justice 
without lengthy procedure. 
Speed in handling complaints is an important issue for ombudsman schemes. 
In the Thai office, procedural arrangements prescribe that upon receipt of a 
complaint, the complainant must be notified of receipt within 15 days from the date 
the complaint is received. The Ombudsman therefore serves as an access point that 
can assist a complainant in identifying the appropriate means by which a complaint is 
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best pursued. Records show that for the past five years there were approximately 600 
complaints that the Ombudsman has resolved by way of referral each year, 56 
representing almost 25% of its turnover. 
 It can be seen from the above that sometimes citizens do not always know 
exactly where to pursue grievances against public administration and the ombudsman 
is providing a conduit service for the redirection of complaints.  A good 
administrative justice system therefore, should provide an independent body that can 
assist citizens in finding out the appropriate means available to them. 57 What the 
Thai Ombudsman is doing here is helping people access the administrative justice 
system – even if the matters cannot be resolved directly by the Ombudsman. 
This is not a role which is detailed as such in the Thai Ombudsman 
legislation, as with its investigative and reporting powers, but its value is not to be 
underrated. While there are benefits of having in place a range of mechanisms for 
redress in the administrative justice system, still grievances may go unresolved due 
to citizens not knowing where to turn to when things go wrong because complainants 
may find the system too complicated. It is argued here that the Ombudsman plays a 
distinctive role in enhancing the complainants‟ ability in entering into the 
administrative justice system and provides a route to appropriate resolution of their 
grievances. 
After a complaint is accepted, settlements of grievances can be secured by 
informal telephone settlement, in-depth investigation and analysis and mediation.58 
Each is now discussed in turn. 
 Settlement through telephone calls and explanation 
The Ombudsman takes the view that wherever possible people‟s problems 
should be resolved and relieved promptly. Thus the office emphasises that where a 
resolution can be reached that is acceptable to the complainant and the alleged 
authority, an informal settlement should be the chosen method of resolution rather 
than a formal inquiry which would only prolong the redress process and which may 
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be entirely unnecessary.59  This approach mirrors the standard approach adopted by 
many contemporary ombudsman schemes now.60  
Within the organisation of the Thai Ombudsman office, Call Centre staffs 
assist inquirers in terms of availability of data, primary advice, investigating process, 
internal follow up etc. Informal coordination of a resolution is often organised 
through direct telephone conversation, instead of relying on traditional bureaucratic 
analysis of documentation and processes.  Fact-finding by telephone is also in line 
with the Council of Minister-endorsed coordination scheme that requires public 
agencies to extend their cooperation for internal coordination by telephone to redress 
a complainant‟s trouble.61  
Based on the Ombudsman‟s experience, on many occasions it is the 
complainants‟ own misunderstanding of the reasons for the decision that is the core 
of the grievance. Therefore, a common role for the ombudsman is to communicate to 
the complainant the explanation from the complained agency and the matters is 
settled.  In fact a large portion (at the average of about 44%) of complaints received 
each year during the past five years (2006-2012) have been categorized as containing 
no breach of law, or no illegal act or unfairness is found. 62   In such cases the 
Ombudsman normally orders ceasing consideration of a complaint and provides the 
detailed reasons for the complainant as to why such an act is lawful and fair.  
Arguably, in neither circumstance would it be appropriate to require a full 
investigation and formal report to be produced.  The complainant can argue with the 
Ombudsman‟s conclusion if he is not satisfied with the outcome and according to the 
Office‟s internal procedure, the Ombudsman will reconsider if there are new material 
evidence or facts.63 
In doing so, the Ombudsman aspires to create a better understanding between 
the complainant and the concerned government agency. This is a practice common to 
most ombudsmen. 
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Alternative dispute resolution      
The incumbents of the Thai Ombudsman office have continuously placed 
great emphasis on its role as a facilitator, negotiator and coordinator between those 
people lodging complaints and the agencies or officials that the complaints are 
lodged against. The Thai Ombudsman can perform well in redressing administrative 
grievances, especially where a grievance may not be capable of resolution in the 
court using methods of negotiation.  It is also evident that the Ombudsman‟s 
intervention by mediation has helped alleviate power imbalances between authorities 
and aggrieved citizens. Mediation can secure redress that complainants agree to 
which is likely to bring a satisfactory outcome to their grievance.  
Pramote Chotemongkol, a former Ombudsman, shaped the profile of the 
institution as a mediator with his approach to collaboration with concerned public 
agencies for resolution. He was of the opinion that the major function of the 
Ombudsman is to provide redress for individual grievances and it was important to 
give local authorities every possible chance to remedy or answer a complaint. In this 
respect alternative dispute resolution (ADR) was a highly effective tool. In addition, 
through ADR, the complainant can obtain a remedy more quickly, the authority is 
spared from the publicity that an investigation creates, and the Ombudsman's office 
is saved the necessity of conducting a time consuming investigation which might 
take upwards of six months to one year. He indicated that, for settlements resolved 
by techniques other than a formal investigation, the average time taken from the 
receipt of a complaint to the achievement of a settlement has been in the range of one 
month for an easy case to six months for a difficult case, which compares very 
favourably with the time taken for an investigation to be completed from the lodging 
of a complaint. 64   General Theeradej Meepien, another former Ombudsman, has 
stated that he thought that mediation works well in Thai society because Thai people 
in general do not like conflict and are easy to forget and forgive by nature.65   
ADR is implemented through a process of meetings and site visits, with in 
many cases disputes successfully settled peacefully through official agreement. The 
Thai Ombudsman usually employs a variety of ADR techniques to secure redress for 
injustice in those cases where the complainants have suffered, but do not have the 
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legal rights to obtain redress that can be enforceable by the Court of Justice or the 
Administrative Court. Unfortunately, the reports of the Ombudsman do not show the 
full statistical classification of the cases resolved by the different techniques 
employed by the ombudsman. However, examples have been provided of this 
technique in action. They include a case where a complainant was barred by 
prescription from bringing an action to the Administrative Court,66 or a case where 
the discretion is lawful but might result in unfairness, such as discretion that results 
in unnecessarily overburdening the complainant.  In such cases the Ombudsman 
normally recommends a review of the decision.  
A good example of the Ombudsman‟s use of ADR techniques to review 
administrative decisions when there is no other means of remedies available involved 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. With this complaint, Ombudsman 
suggested to the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives that it liaise with relevant 
agencies to consider granting more compensation to the complainant, and this 
initiative eventually resulted in the Council of Minister‟s resolution of 30 January 
and 20 February 2007. 67   Another example involves a complaint involving the 
Metropolitan Electricity Authority of Thailand (MEA) which installed a transformer 
pole opposite the residence of the complainant.  The Ombudsman successfully 
coordinated with the MEA to reconsider moving the pole to a safer position.68      
The above discussion demonstrates that the Ombudsman can be effective in 
facilitating dispute resolution between complainants and state authorities. The Thai 
Ombudsman‟s current practice is consistent with an early settlement technique 
increasingly adopted by many ombudsmen to resolve complaints informally without 
resorting to full investigations.69  The justification for this approach is universally 
claimed to be that early settlement is likely to be appropriate for dispute resolution, 
primarily because it is less costly and time-consuming. Early redress is also arguably 
more conducive to maintaining a good relationship between complainants and public 
bodies and delivers a more comfortable experience for the complainant.  
Nevertheless, settlement without investigation has a negative side. Critics 
have alleged that the process is unfair and there is often a fear that it might involve a 
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negotiated conclusion between the ombudsman and the agency.70  Questions which 
follow may include, for example, is the concerned department trying to hide 
something which it does not want investigated? Or should settlements be encouraged 
if the evidence suggests that there could be some serious administrative defects? One 
solution practiced by other ombudsman schemes is that the ombudsman issues a 
statement of reasons for such decisions, so at least makes public aware of the 
underlying nature of the complaint.71 The Thai Ombudsman does not employ this 
practice. 
Another important issue needs to be pointed out is that the aim of an 
ombudsman is not simply to ensure that an individual gets a remedy for a grievance; 
he must also try to discover the administrative irregularities and ensure that they will 
not recur. In this respect, all ombudsman schemes are required to strike a balance in 
their approach to their works.  This is reflected in the response of observers of the 
institution towards the Thai Ombudsman‟s work, which has not been entirely 
positive.  The Ombudsman‟s focus during the initial stage on the role as a mediator 
has been criticised by scholars and legislators as severely affecting the Ombudsman‟s 
constitutional mandate of monitoring the exercise of power by public officials. The 
argument has been made that the strategy of encouraging negotiated redress has 
resulted in insignificant achievements in preventing grievances to the people, despite 
the numerous laws passed to support the Ombudsman‟s powers. 72    A senior 
administrator has even stated that the Ombudsman‟s role as a mediator was not 
commensurate with its constitutional status, and that the Ombudsman should monitor 
more vigorously on administrative malpractice.73  
The data of the Thai Ombudsman does not show the proportion of cases 
resolved through mediation or indicate the nature of subject matters that were 
resolved by this approach. In the absence of information, it is therefore difficult to 
tell whether settlements without investigation have become more frequent or the 
number of investigations has been falling, or in other words whether the investigator 
role has been lost or compromised.  
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In response to the criticism above, Chief Ombudsman Panit has explicitly 
stated in her public statements many times that she would still be doing early redress 
the Office, but that more emphasis is now being placed on systemic investigation 
(see ‘(ii) recommendation to improve administration’ below).   
Inevitably though, not all complaints can be handled through the informal 
process. Complaints may be more complicated for a number of reasons. They may 
concern a lot of documents, several parties may be involved and many related pieces 
of legislation may require consideration and have to be complied with by the 
complained against agency. In such circumstances, the complainant will be advised 
to proceed with a written complaint. In such cases the Ombudsman requires the 
agency‟s written statement for reference in making investigation.  Again, all of this is 
in line with standard practice elsewhere in the ombudsman world.74 
Investigation 
The Ombudsman strives for speedy and thorough fact finding. A target has 
been set for internal working procedures that all complaints coming into the office 
must be finished from start to end within 6 months.  To achieve this goal the 
Ombudsman has developed admirably specific targets for expediting and 
investigation and resolution of complaints as follows.75  
Complaints are screened to determine jurisdiction. 1 day 
The Secretariat or Deputy Secretariat then assigns the case to relevant 
director of investigations or specialist. 
1 day 
Director of investigations or specialist assigns case to responsible officer. 1 day 
The responsible officer undertakes a secondary screening process. 1 day 
The responsible officer completes the investigation plan (if required). 14 days 
The responsible officer request the government agency involved for its 
account which is to be provided within 
30 days 
Upon receipt of the government agency‟s account, the responsible officer 
completes a summary report within  
15 days 
According to the Ombudsman Office‟s working procedure, in the event that 
the government agency does not respond within 30 days, the measures taken are (i) 
the issue of a warning; and (ii) to report such delay levels of the bureaucracy to the 
relevant Permanent Secretary and to the Minister in charge respectively. 76 Each of 
these levels of the bureaucracy is given 15 days to respond before the Ombudsman 
                                                                 
74
 Rajani Ranjan Jha, „Concept and Role of the Ombudsman Institution in Asia in Improving and 
Maintaining Public Service Delivery‟, Asian Ombudsman Association, 2010, p. 41. 
75
 The Thai Ombudsman Procedure Manual. 
76
 ibid. 
170 
 
notifies the next level.  The six-month target for completing investigations is line 
with the standard practice of ombudsmen, though increasingly more ombudsmen 
have set a target time for disposing of complaints within less than six months. 77 
To support the Ombudsman‟s operation, the Council of Ministers passed a 
resolution78 that all government bodies shall accelerate their own explanation when 
receiving the request from the Ombudsman Office.  In addition, in 2005 the 
Ombudsman made an agreement with the Office of the Civil Service Commission 
that cooperation with the Ombudsman should be acknowledged in a concrete manner:  
by giving credit to the concerned agencies, especially in terms of bonuses allocated 
for such agencies.79 
The Ombudsman has mentioned in several of its annual reports that in 
general the Office receives good collaboration from the affected agency in 
submitting documents or evidence as requested, despite clarification and explanation 
from the concerned government agencies being cited as one of the main reasons for 
delays in closing an investigation.  However, to date the Ombudsman has not had to 
apply legal enforcement measures against the agencies to obtain necessary 
evidence.80  
According to Chief Ombudsman Panit Nitithanprapas, the Ombudsman 
Office has set a target in the internal working procedure that all complaints must be 
finished within six months. 81  She proudly reported that the Office has a small 
backlog, stating that since the Office was first opened it has been able to finish 
23,807 cases, which represent 94.6% of total 25,171 complaints received, while only 
1,366 cases or 5.4% of total complaints are still under investigation.82   
This can be an elusive conclusion if the Chief Ombudsman perceived this as a 
small backlog. In fact, this amount of pending complaints accounted for about half of 
the total amount received each year.  The numbers of unresolved complaints in 2010, 
2011, 2012 and 2013 were reported to be 1,895; 1,123; 1,365 and 1,317 
respectively. 83  As reported in 2013, the cases which were completed within six 
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months accounted for only 53.12% of total processing cases in that year. 84   This 
appears to suggest that the Ombudsman Office has not effectively met its own target.   
Nevertheless the Ombudsman has received a relatively high level of 
satisfaction rating on its services. According to a satisfaction survey on its services 
conducted by the Ombudsman Office in November 2012, the Ombudsman received a 
high score on overall services, complaint procedures and investigation (74.80 %, 
77.40 % and 72 % respectively) and medium level of satisfaction on actions after 
consideration of complaints (59%). This could be perceived as a good outcome, but 
this satisfaction survey would be more credible if undertaken independently. 
Tripartite meetings 
 During an investigation, the Ombudsman gives both affected officials and 
complainants the opportunity to provide additional information and explanation, as 
well as to request more evidence. However, the inquisitorial method employed by the 
ombudsman can sometimes produce one-way communication or unilateral 
explanations. This in turn can lead sometimes to complainants expressing scepticism 
about the Ombudsman‟s decision, with former complainants even comparing the 
Ombudsman with a postman in terms of his duty.85  It is argued here that this point of 
view of the complainant experienced by the Thai Ombudsman reflects a common 
form of frustration that complainants can experience with ombudsman schemes. This 
frustration derives from the fact that complainants usually have no active part in the 
investigatory process of the ombudsman which normally does not require continued 
input from the complainant.86  
To tackle such situations, the Ombudsman has the option of forming a 
tripartite meeting in which the complainant, the Ombudsman and the particular 
government agency concerned can participate to settle the issue through a mediated 
settlement. This approach gives the complainant a sense of participation in solving 
their problems. Tripartite meetings can be held in Bangkok or other provinces that 
suits parties‟ needs. This arrangement is facilitated by the Ombudsman‟s regular  
seminars (at least quarterly) and visits to special areas (such as areas of high density 
of complaints). Such visits are arranged in an attempt to meet people in several 
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provinces, wherein the Ombudsman and officials are available to give advice and 
find ways to relieve troubles of people throughout the countries.87 
 The Ombudsman has stated many times in the Office‟s publication and 
website that a number of complaints are settled peacefully through tripartite 
meetings. 88  Nevertheless the Ombudsman‟s statistical records do not show the 
number of cases resolved by this method, and the extent of its use is difficult to 
ascertain.  
Investigations outside the office 
Some complaints require the ombudsman to conduct investigations outside 
the office, particularly those that deal with construction, land or environment. With 
such investigations, site visits are conducted by the Ombudsman or the investigators 
whenever deemed necessary in order to observe, investigate facts in the actual area 
and listen to both the complainants and the agencies  involved.  Such physical 
investigations aim for fast fact finding and also to promote better understanding, so 
that disputes are solved fairly and the complainants do not feel neglected by the 
Ombudsman or the government agencies. 89   Besides, employing an investigation 
outside the office can be a good way to raise social awareness of the Ombudsman‟s 
existence through public exposure. 
The above subsection shows that the Thai Ombudsman can help resolve 
grievances in a number of different ways, such as providing access to justice for 
members of public who have difficulties with public administration through a simple 
and non-onerous channel for grievances and complaints and resolving complaints 
which may not be justified in court. The Ombudsman‟s technique and capabilities in 
extending administrative justice are in line with standard ombudsman schemes as 
discussed in chapter 3. The next section will examine the function of the 
Ombudsman in systemic investigations to see if changes are made in administrative 
procedures or legislation as the result of such investigations. 
(ii) Recommendations to improve administration 
In the past, the main duties of the Ombudsman focussed only on fact finding 
concerning the complaints on maladministration, which indicated investigation of 
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173 
 
unlawful activity. But the new Organic Act on Ombudsman has provisions that go 
clearly and significantly beyond individual grievance redress, by making explicit 
reference to the notion that the Ombudsman may recommend systemic changes. The 
Ombudsman, therefore, is expected to address the root causes of maladministration, 
as well as resolve grievances.  
Firstly, section 32 empowers the Ombudsman to check the appropriateness of 
existing legislation by recommending amendments to legislation in cases where the 
Ombudsman is of the opinion that, despite an act of a government official being 
compliant with the law, by- law, rule, regulation or resolution of the Council of 
Ministers, that that provision induces „unfairness or inequality before the law or 
being the ground of discrimination or out of date‟. This expanded power allows the 
Ombudsman to deal with cases where there is no maladministration on the part of the 
administration but there is injustice as a result of the authority‟s action. This is a 
power which is quite common to ombudsman schemes around the world and is 
designed to increase the potential impact of the office. 90 
Secondly, Section 13 empowers the Ombudsman to protect the public interest 
by conducting own-motion investigations which permit the Ombudsman to start an 
investigation without being bound by the requirement to resolve particular 
complaints. Such own-motion investigations can be launched if the Ombudsman is of 
the opinion that the exercise of public powers causes injuries to the public or it is 
necessary to protect public interests.    
In order to place an emphasis on the systemic solution, the Thai Ombudsman 
has set up a Research and Strategy Division to examine the causes underlying 
complaints and to undertake research of similar cases from other ombudsman‟s 
experiences around the world.91 Results and knowledge gained during investigations 
are taken into consideration in analysing case information on the issues, alongside 
the relevant applicable law. This information is then used by investigators in 
determining the probable causes of complaints and to propose suggestions for 
administrative changes to reduce or prevent similar complaints occurring.  
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 A major exception to this is British public services ombudsman schemes. 
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 A train ing seminar fo r ombudsman investigators was organized by AOA in co llaboration with the 
Ombudsman of Ontario  to promote effect ive performance of their systemic investigations functions, 
Sharpening Your Teeth: Advanced Investigative Training for Administrative Watchdogs, 8–11 
February 2010, Bangkok.  
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This development in Thailand has benefited from the growing attention being 
given to this by ombudsmen in other countries, especially in AOA members. In 
response to this, AOA in collaboration with the Ombudsman of Ontario organised  
regular training seminars for ombudsman investigators to promote effective 
performance of their systemic investigations functions. For example, a seminar on 
Sharpening Your Teeth: Advanced Investigative Training for Administrative 
Watchdogs was held in Bangkok, in 2010 and the next one is scheduled to be held in 
2014. Participation in such initiatives demonstrates that the Thai Ombudsman takes 
the duties to promote good administration very seriously. 
 In practice, to date activities of the Ombudsman which aim for systemic 
changes can be categorised into three main areas: producing special reports, 
improving administrative procedures and proposing law reform. These will be looked 
at in turn. 
Special reports  
In many ombudsman schemes the special report refers to a report that the 
ombudsman submitted to parliament in the event of non-compliance with the 
recommendations that the ombudsman makes, but in Thailand the Thai Ombudsman 
uses the term to refer to the reports resulting from own-motion investigations on 
matters that he deems „urgent or beneficial to the administration of State's affairs‟.92  
The Ombudsman of Thailand claimed its special report in 2007 on polluted 
water in Nakhon Pathom Province as its first systemic investigation. This first case 
involved grievances which arose from environmental problems in Nakhon Pathom 
Province. 93  Complaints were made against Tambon (a sub-district administrative 
organization) which had allegedly failed to ensure compliance with regards to the 
discharge of wastewater from pig farms and industrial plants. As a result, natural 
water resources were contaminated and could not be used for agriculture. The 
Ombudsman‟s investigation found that the input of various government agencies was 
required to solve the problems.94 The Ombudsman instructed the concerned agencies 
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175 
 
to perform their duties and strictly enforce the rules and regulations for industry 
expansion and pollution control and established cooperation between such agencies.  
This case is considered by the Ombudsman as its first systemic investigation 
report, as the investigation involved a large number of complaints and several phases. 
In terms of the agencies that were covered by the report, there were ministries, 
departments, relevant governmental agencies, NGOs, and civil society. In terms of 
the geographical area covered, there were several provinces which were required to 
apply the Ombudsman‟s suggestions. The report also encompassed a significant 
investigation of waste water treatment techniques. The Ombudsman identified that 
the lack of inter-departmental coordination and related problems of compartmental 
mentality were the cause of complaints.  
By comparison with the early work of the Ombudsman, recently the office 
has been more active in its efforts to produce special reports and has increasingly 
been prepared to consider matters of policy, as well as administration. In 2012 alone, 
the Ombudsman published four special reports which the present Chief Ombudsman 
Panit referred to as „grand themes‟, due to the fact that they encompass a range of 
public policies at a national level.  These reports involved the following issues:  
„Illegal Foreign Ownership of Land‟, „Traffic Jam Management in Bangkok‟, 
„National Spatial Development Plan‟ and „Free Education Policy‟. The Ombudsman 
considered these issues critical to current national problems and believes they require 
urgent rectification. The reports are published in the form of monographs which the 
Ombudsman has submitted to parliament and disseminated to the public. In „Free 
Education Policy‟ the Ombudsman took a view that the nation‟s educational services 
have been diminishing in terms of quality over the past ten years because the 
Education Ministry has focused on free education for all, warning that the Education 
Ministry must review the 15 years of free education policy before it fails children 
and brings the national education into crisis.  
These most recent reports suggest a bold initiative on the part of the 
Ombudsman, but at the time of writing there is no evidence that these four special 
reports have been either partially or wholly implemented. 95  While they attracted 
media attention, there is no evidence to show that Parliament has responded nor even 
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made comments on the reports, or that the Ombudsman has been summoned to 
present the reports.96   
Further, one of the 2012 reports, „Illegal Foreign Ownership of Land‟, is 
illustrative of some of the challenges that an ombudsman can be faced with, in terms 
of exercising influence over Government and the legislature. The report has been 
controversial, as the responsible agency has outright denied the accuracy of the 
Ombudsman‟s statistical findings and stated that it was prepared to cooperate if the 
government, Parliament or the Ombudsman needs further information. 97 In defence, 
Ombudsman Pravit Ratanapian has admitted that it is difficult to provide evidence of 
illegal ownership. Currently the Ombudsman is seeking support for a legislative 
proposal to prevent foreigners illegally owning land via nominees and provide harsh 
sanctions, such as five to 20 years in prison and/or a fine of 500,000 to 2 million baht.  
  To issue a report which is not likely to be implemented hardly has a positive 
effect on the public perception of the office. Therefore, it is worth looking at the 
various observations that have been made about the Ombudsman‟s efforts to achieve 
systemic impact by special report. Both scholars and administrators have opined that 
the special reports of the Ombudsman that have so far been produced are not easy to 
implement.98  First, they are too broad and have not proposed ready measures for 
rectifying the defect in the existing system. For example, it is difficult to implement 
the „Illegal Foreign Ownership of Land‟  report as proposed, as there is an unsettled 
issue of statistical evidence due to difficulties in proving illegal ownership. This has 
as yet not been resolved and should be resolved first otherwise the punishment, as 
proposed by the Ombudsman, would be of no use.  Secondly, and more importantly, 
the issue of how to subsidise education and land use zoning are matters of policy 
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which would require political debate and decision as the implementation will be 
dependent on political support. Therefore, this raises a question of whether special 
reports of the Ombudsman could be considered as having systemic impact, as they 
are more in the sphere of making policy-based recommendations than practical 
administrative proposals and guidance.    
So a generic difficulty the Ombudsman is faced with is that, in choosing to 
target policy weaknesses of the government, it risks reducing the office‟s potential 
for concrete short-term impact. An additional risk is that by producing a series of 
special reports that appear to focus on the formulation of new policy might be 
perceived as an inappropriate role for an ombudsman. Further, such reports tend to 
be followed by press conferences and frequent media interviews by the Ombudsman, 
in which he has regularly criticised government policies. Such an approach can make 
the Ombudsman appear, in the eyes of the government, to be a major critic against 
the government, or in the worst case an opponent of the government. As the 
Ombudsman would have to depend on the government to implement his reports, this 
situation is not in his favour and also contradicts standard perceptions of the role of 
the Ombudsman. Traditionally, an ombudsman is understood as needing to cultivate 
a strong working relationship with government departments, so that they will be less 
resistant to working with the office toward possible solutions and will be more 
receptive to their recommendations.    
Recommendations to improve administrative procedure  
The current Chief Ombudsman‟s strategy can be found in the paper 
„Identifying People‟s Concern from the Daily Flow of Complaints and Contribute to  
Systemic Improvements‟. 99  The Ombudsman has tried to make the most of its 
interventions in resolving individual grievances so as to bring about what it calls 
„wider administrative improvement.‟100 While the power to make recommendations 
has been used largely in connection with his inquiries into actual cases, it can also 
contribute to the tendency of the Ombudsman to emphasise the general problems 
raised by a case and the future consequences of his decision, rather than on the 
specific fault which was the subject matter of the complaint.   
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The first case claimed by the Ombudsman as successful in improving 
administrative procedure is the resolution of the encroaching of a national park in 
Nakornratchasima province. In this case, the Ombudsman found out that the alleged 
illegal intrusion of the national park by nearby villagers resulted from a confusion 
caused by different maps being used by different concerned government agencies. 
The Ombudsman‟s report (known as the Wangnamkheo Model) makes 
administrative recommendations for the long term resolution of the issue, a proposal 
which can be applied to similar problems facing other national parks throughout the 
country.101 
Another investigation by the Ombudsman that not only resulted in the 
provision of relief to the complainant, but also improved the system concerning the 
correction officer‟s exercise of power, can be illustrated by the following case. In the 
case, a motorcyclist filed a complaint to the Ombudsman in which the police had 
fined and confiscated his driving license due to the loss of a license plate. This police 
response occurred, despite the motorcyclist explaining that he had already filed for a 
new license plate and had gone through the proper process and that he possessed the 
appropriate documents to prove his actions to the police.102 In the case, the outcome 
occurred because the police force had not looked at the documents and had made 
their decisions without following the proper procedure. Because of Ombudsman‟s 
intervention, the Thai Police put in place improved procedures for dealing with lost 
license plates, so that fairness and fair handling of the matter have become embedded 
in the police‟s decision-making. Further, following the Ombudsman‟s 
recommendation, the Department of Land Transport responsible for the issuing of 
license plates considered measures to provide for faster services.   
The most recent example of the Ombudsman‟s work which resulted in wider 
impact on administrative procedure is its recommendation that a citizen should only 
provide a copy of the front of the ID card when a copy of the ID card is required in 
contacting the government offices, instead of a copy of identification card on both 
sides as before. This measure reduces the administrative burden, as well as the cost 
to the public, which is in accordance with the principles of good governance. 
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Following the recommendation, the Ministry of Interior issued a notification dated 
22 March 2556 B.E. (2013) implementing the recommendation of the Ombudsman. 
The above cases give typical examples of how the Thai ombudsman has 
operated to encourage better, effective functioning of the administration by 
identifying defective procedures and regulations that need improvement corrections. 
This type of work is in line with the ombudsman reports elsewhere in the world and 
represents good practice. 
Law reform 
Like in the case of some other Ombudsmen schemes, the Ombudsman in 
Thailand has an important role as a law reformer also (see Chapter 4). Sometimes, in 
the course of the investigation of a case, the Ombudsman may find that the 
government official concerned acted lawfully but because the law itself is outdated 
or defective the result has been inequality or discrimination for the complainant. In 
such a case, the Ombudsman shall forward his recommendation for amendment of 
the law in question to the concerned agency for suitable amendment.  
The Ombudsman‟s recommendations in this regard have led to a number of 
positive changes in existing legislation. By way of example, the Person Name Act 
2505 B.E. (1965) was amended to allow women the right to choose a family name 
after the Ombudsman‟s recommendation which stated that a provision which 
required a married woman to take her husband's surname is discriminatory and unfair.  
Another example is the amendment of the Revenue Code clauses103 that disallowed 
married women from including their non-earned income when filing a separate tax 
return.  These clauses were viewed as unfair to married women, who have to pay 
more taxes than unmarried women because some of their income is combined with 
their husbands, which is usually taxed at a higher rate.  Another example is the 
amendment of the Act on Establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative 
Court Procedure 2542  B.E. (1999). The amendment resulted in court fees being 
exempted by filing a declaration of lack of funds for cases relating to administrative 
contracts.104   
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The three examples above illustrate aspects of the reforms in law which have 
been the cause of grievances to a complainant (s), and which the Thai Ombudsman 
has used to help achieving justice for the weak and the poor.  
Impact on administration 
The extent to which the Ombudsman can have an impact on public 
administration as a whole is difficult to quantify, 105  but the available evidence 
detailed above suggests that the Ombudsman can discover the root causes of 
maladministration in cases involving a large number of complaints and encourage the 
public body concerned to change its practices accordingly in order to improve the 
quality public services. Further, in a number of cases the Ombudsman has proved to 
be an effective mechanism in solving problems involving responsibilities of more 
than one department, which in general cannot be solved by one of them alone, as 
crossover jurisdictions are not accepted easily.  This is because unfortunately 
organizational interests and inter-bureaucratic competition created barriers among 
officials.  
It is evident from the Thai Ombudsmen‟s reports that there have been 
considerable initiatives taken recently to address systemic issues at the national 
policy level. It is also evident that it is more difficult to succeed with 
recommendations which represent proposals for the formulation or alteration of 
specific policies than with those which merely relate to the addressing of a specific  
administrative problem.  This is understandable, since in such cases the realisation of 
the recommendation depends on numerous actors. It can be seen in this chapter that 
the Thai Ombudsmen‟s success rate in proposing changes in policy is not good. 
On the other hand, the Ombudsman‟s investigations have successfully 
revealed on more than one occasion a lack of inter-departmental coordination and 
related problems of compartmental mentality, as well as problems of unclear 
delineation of responsibility between different departments which have directly 
caused many complaints. It also evident that, in such cases, the Ombudsman‟s status 
as a neutral body makes it a suitable organisation to propose improvement for all 
concerned departments.  In this respect, the Thai Ombudsman has enjoyed 
considerable success.  
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6.3 Conclusion 
 
The legal provisions and arrangements for the Thai Ombudsman in terms of 
its „good administration‟ mandate seem adequate for Thailand and also consonant 
with the ombudsman‟s traditional roles. As a legal institution, it is intended to 
provide protection to the peoples‟ rights against all forms of bureaucratic 
maladministration and to deal with injustice in public service. The Ombudsman has 
jurisdiction over all public servants, public authorities and ministerial departments. 
The various arrangement in place provide for easy access to the Office by a wide 
range of people, including those geographically remote from the capital and who lack 
financial or other resources. The Ombudsman‟s practice and strategies to raise public 
awareness have been noted to be as good as any practice in the ombudsman 
community. In short, the foundations of the Thai Ombudsman scheme appear strong. 
A review of the stakeholders‟, as well as the incumbents‟, intentions reveals 
that the Ombudsman remains focused on traditional concerns, such as 
maladministration and injustice against citizens, while there is an increasing demand 
that the Ombudsman expand his scope to deal with a broader range of issues.  A 
continued focus on the „case business‟ for an ombudsman is appropriate. 
A review of the Ombudsman‟s actions taken upon the complaints before him 
has showed that he has been able to serve a need in the area of administrative justice. 
The initial fear that he would duplicate the Administrative Court has proven 
unfounded by the fact that the Ombudsman has a distinctive contribution to make 
compared to the courts in terms of norms and procedures adopted. As a result, the 
Ombudsman has emerged as an important avenue for individual complaints against 
the actions of public authorities, even though its operations are not based on powers 
of enforcement. This finding shows that the Ombudsman office is doing its work 
effectively and in line with its mandate.  
However, there are issues worthy of further consideration. To begin with, 
there is evidence that the Ombudsman Office has not effectively met its own targets 
in terms of throughput time in resolving complaints, and that the institution may have 
not been widely used by complainants despite findings that suggest that it has a 
suitably wide jurisdiction, high level of social awareness and easy access.  This may 
perhaps best be illustrated by the high amount of backlog cases each year and the 
relative small number of complaints received by the Office. 
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Increasingly, the Ombudsman has also sought to improve the administrative 
process by making recommendation regarding the changes of administrative 
procedure and the legislative amendments.  The former is another area in which the 
Ombudsman has been shown to be effective in raising the standard of performance of 
administrative agencies. In particular, the Thai Ombudsman has identified the lack of 
inter-departmental coordination and related problems of compartmental mentality. 
Recently, the incumbents of the office have been anxious to tackle problems in 
existing public policies through the office‟s systemic powers.  However, the findings 
in this study suggest that most of the Ombudsman‟s recommendations made 
regarding public policies have not been implemented by the organisations concerned.  
Overall it can be said that the Thai Office has yielded some of the results that 
were envisaged when it was originally established in Thailand, as well as in other 
countries: in particular in terms of protecting the rights of the people. However the 
policies of each nation vary, which have caused the offices to be shaped to its 
individual needs and requirements.  To this issue I will return in Chapter 9 to analyse 
the extent to which the ombudsman office might be able to enhance its performance, 
but in the next chapter I will study the additional functions of the Thai ombudsman to 
identify the degree to which the office has made an impact in practice. 
 
 
 
 
. 
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Chapter 7 
 The Additional Roles of the Thai ombudsman  
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapters (Chapters 5-6) it has been identified that the Thai 
Ombudsman was established to perform the traditional role of the ombudsman, and 
how the Thai Ombudsman has performed such a role has been explored. This chapter 
focuses on the non-traditional functions of the Thai Ombudsman, namely reviewing 
complaints about the constitutionality of public sector activity, which was originally 
assigned to the Ombudsman when it was established by the 1997 Constitution; and 
two other functions which were added to the institution’s remit by the 2007 
Constitution, namely monitoring and evaluating implementation of the provisions of 
the Constitution by government agencies, and monitoring the enforcement of codes 
of ethics for political office holders and state officials. These latter two functions 
were added by the 2007 Constitution because the drafters of the Constitution wanted 
to raise the profile of the Ombudsman, which was perceived as under-performing; 
and to respond to the need to strengthen controls over the executive branch.  
However, the additional roles have often caused the Ombudsman to face 
negative criticism, especially those new powers created under the 2007 Constitution. 
Further, there is little evidence that the additional roles have resulted in raising the 
profile of the Ombudsman Office as intended.  Instead there has been a growing 
intensity of comment on these roles, and debate as to whether they are appropriate 
for the institution. Some academics have come to the view that the additional powers 
are not suitable for the institution. A prevalent perception has also developed that the 
Ombudsman has not demonstrated its full capacity or failed to effectively perform its 
new constitutional role as a proactive watchdog in overseeing the executive.   
On the other hand, arguably it may not be fair nor appropriate, at this point in 
time, to judge the experiment as a failure, as one might argue that the Ombudsman 
has established for 14 years and it has been only eight years since the adoption of its 
new mandates. In this regards, it is worthy to note that these increases of power 
under the 2007 Constitution were unplanned and instantaneous, as the drafters of the 
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Constitution granted such without prior consideration on the roles and the ir impact 
on the Ombudsman Office 1  and at present a number of perspectives still remain 
relatively under-explored.  However given that a new process of constitutional 
drafting has been set in motion by the 2014 coup with an aim to have a new 
democratic constitution drawn up within a year, it is a very good time to reflect the 
position, mandate and power of the Ombudsman in the Thai Constitution. 
It is against the background of this perception of poor effectivity that this 
chapter examines the powers of the Thai Ombudsman that are considered non-
traditional and the ways in which the Ombudsman has practically utilised them to 
accomplish his mission. The chapter aims to understand the intention behind the 
relevant Constitutional provisions and examines whether the Thai Ombudsman has 
been able to achieve the results intended by the Constitution. In order to achieve 
these aims, this chapter is divided into three sections. Section 7.1 provides an 
overview of the legislative framework of the Ombudsman’s additional powers and 
mandates. It contains an examination of the basis and purpose of the additional 
functions in the 2007 Constitution. The discussion in the drafting process of the 2007 
Constitution will be examined to appreciate the grounds underpinning the adoption 
of such functions. In section 7.2 the implementation of the legislation is explored.  In 
this section issues relating to the difficulties in the implementation will be analysed, 
so as to understand the current debate on the advantages and disadvantages of the 
functions and what has been achieved. Further, an assessment is made of whether the 
Ombudsman can fulfil its additional constitutional mandates. Section 7.3 concludes 
the chapter.  
 In relation to the previous chapter, as has already been explored, the Thai 
Ombudsman has anchored itself in the traditional role of redressing grievance and 
improving administrative practice. This chapter provides empirical evidence of the 
accomplishment and the difficulties the Ombudsman faces in performing additional 
functions. This finding will be analysed in Chapter 9 using the analytical framework 
developed in Chapter 4.  
Having identified issues relating to the difficulties in the implementation of 
additional functions of the Ombudsman in Thailand, this chapter places the debate 
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into the international context of the ombudsman with regards to the acquisition of its 
new roles. As this chapter will argue, notwithstanding the willingness of the 
constitutional drafters to entrust important functions to the Ombudsman, there have 
been various difficulties that obstruct its performance of the additional roles that it 
has been granted.  Some of the new mandates could burden the Ombudsman, as it 
lacks the expertise and capacity to perform these functions well. More 
problematically still, since the ombudsman institution’s ability to be successful 
normally depends upon it being perceived by all stakeholders as a politically neutral 
institution, in Thailand the attempts to fulfil these additional roles have led the 
institution into unhelpful political conflicts and this would likely affect its ability to 
perform effectively its core roles in administrative justice.   
 
7.1 Powers available to the Thai Ombudsman 
In this first section, a legislative overview is provided in order to provide an 
understanding of the power available to the Thai Ombudsman to perform the 
additional roles, as well as the intended meaning and purpose behind such powers. 
Reliance will be mainly placed upon the official papers of the Constitutional Drafting 
Assembly and the views of its members. The discussion focuses on three core 
powers:  reviewing complaints about the constitutionality of public sector activity; 
monitoring and evaluating implementation of the provisions of the Const itution by 
government agencies; and monitoring the enforcement of the code of ethics for 
political office holders and state officials. 
 
7.1.1 Constitutional litigation  
A power to commence constitutional litigation is an additional ombudsman 
power which is often found in human rights ombudsman schemes in civil law 
countries, such as in Spain and Latin America.2  These ombudsmen have a mandate 
of human rights protection and promotion, in addition to investigating complaints 
concerning irregularities in the public sector. Such ombudsman schemes often use 
international human rights law and constitutional and other domestic human rights 
                                                                 
2
 Linda C Reif, ‘Enhancing the role of ombudsman institutions in the protection and promot ion of the 
rights of persons with disabilities’, Conference Papers, Wellington, 2012, retrieved 27 October 2013,  
file:///C:/Users/Home/Downloads/Wellington%20Conference_14.%20Working%20Session%20B_Li
nda%20Reif%20Paper%20&%20Slides%20(1).pdfAugust 10, 2012. 
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norms in support of their work. 3  In doing so, they can bring matters to the 
constitutional court and the administrative court to determine the constitutionality of 
laws, treaties and/or other government action.  This type of power is considered 
desirable because it can enhance the role of the ombudsman institution in protecting 
and promoting the rights of persons, as well as operating as a complementing power 
to the ombudsman’s core investigating mandate.4 
In Thailand, the Thai Ombudsman is conferred with the power of 
constitutional litigation by the 2007 Constitution and the Organic Act on 
Ombudsman 2552 B.E. (2009) - in this work it is referred to as the 2009 Act. But the 
Thailand has separately established the Office of the National Human Rights 
Commission as the principal human rights institution. Therefore, the Ombudsman’s 
powers to request the Constitutional Court and Administrative Court to determine on 
matters of constitutionality are linked to an aim to establish a robust legal system 
which prevents the violation of constitutionally entrenched rights, rather than human 
rights in particular. This can be seen in the wordings of Section 245 of the 2007 
Constitution and section 14 of the 2009 Act which empower the Ombudsman to refer 
a matter, together with the opinion of the Ombudsman, to the Constitutional Court or 
the Administrative Court in a case where the Ombudsman considers that any 
provisions of law, by-law, order or any other act of any public officials raises 
question-marks about the constitutionality of the measure, or its compliance with 
superior laws. 
The main tool to achieve this is contained in the Constitution itself, which 
creates a special institution outside the traditional judicial, legislative and executive 
structure-the Constitutional Court/ the Administrative Court- to determine the 
constitutionality of legal activity. These courts are vested with the power to strike 
down primary legislation, by laws and general administrative action where it is 
incompatible with the constitution.5 The Constitutional Court and the Administrative 
Courts, together with the Ombudsman, provide a system for the judicial review of 
legislation and administrative action. Such an approach is considered necessary not 
                                                                 
3
 ibid.   
4
 Linda C. Reif, ‘Transplantation and Adaptation: The Evolution of the Human Rights Ombudsman’, 
Third World L.J. 31B.C. 269, 2011, retrieved 26 August 2013. 
5
 The Constitution of Thailand 2550 B.E. (2007), Sections 4, 141, 154, 211, 212 and 216. 
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only to foster the supremacy of the constitution but also to safeguard the citizens’ 
rights against unconstitutional governmental actions.6  
Previously, a problem of unconstitutionality of enacted legislation which may 
affect a citizen’s constitutional right could only be raised during the course of court 
proceedings in which the challenged provisions of any law applied to a case before 
the court. In such circumstances, the presiding court, on its own initiative, or by 
petition from one of the parties (concrete review), could look into the 
constitutionality of the law and refer matters to the Constitutional Court for judicial 
review if the law affects the  constitutional right and whether they are contrary to the 
constitution. 
 As a result, both the 1997 Constitution and the subsequent 2007 revision 
provided an additional channel for review process in which the review proceeds in 
the absence of a concrete judicial case. Such reviews are triggered by the input of 
designated independent organisations, such as the National Human Rights 
Commission7 and the Ombudsman himself.   
This process means that a person is entitled to lodge a petition through the 
Ombudsman to refer a matter to the Constitutional Court and to request a declaration 
of unconstitutionality of the enacted law, without the need to prove that his or her 
right is affected by the provision. Further, this process is considered a preventive 
measure since it allows the system to filter out unconstitutional laws before they can 
harm people.   
 
7.1.2 Monitor and evaluate the implementation of the Constitution 
The 2007 Constitution contains the directive principles for the 
implementation of fundamental State policies, as well as spells out the time frame for 
enacting law.8 The directive principles of fundamental State policies are intended to 
provide constitutional directions which the government is required to follow in 
making legislation and determining policies for the administration of State affairs.9  
At the time of the making of the 2007 Constitution, the constitutional drafters 
were of the view that despite these provisions being in place in the past, actual 
                                                                 
6
 Borwornsak Uwanno, ‘The Constitutional Court in the 1997 Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Thailand’, King Prajadhipok’s Institute Journal, Vol. 1, 2003. 
7
 The Constitution of Thailand 2550 B.E. (2007), Section 257. 
8
 The Constitution of Thailand 2550 B.E. (2007), Chapter 5. 
9
 The Constitution of Thailand 2550 B.E. (2007), Section 75. 
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implementation of the provisions of the Constitution was not effective because there 
was so much delay in the enactment  of the legislation, administrative rules and 
regulations required to put the constitutional provisions into effect.  Because of such 
shortfalls, the goals of the Constitution had not been fully achieved.   
The Constitutional Drafting Assembly viewed that one reason that this 
outcome occurred was because there was no formal mechanism responsible for 
monitoring and examining the results of the implementation of the Constitution by 
state agencies. Therefore, in order to ensure that relevant processes in the preparation 
of Bills and other legal instruments are undertaken in a timely fashion, it was deemed 
that there should be a body charged with the function of monitoring, facilitating, 
coordinating and overseeing the development of the legislation and administrative 
procedures.10 Since it was not considered economically and politically viable to set 
up a new agency, the task was assigned to the Ombudsman. 11 As a result, Section 
244 (3) of the 2007 Constitution stipulates that the Ombudsman has the powers and 
duties to monitor, evaluate and prepare recommendations on compliance with the 
Constitution, including considerations as to amendment of the Constitution, where it 
is deemed necessary.  
The Ombudsman's role regarding follow up, evaluation and making 
recommendations on constitutional compliance functions is another important 
development in Thailand because previously there had been no such organisation 
performing this function. However it should be noted that the Ombudsman is not the 
only institution that is tasked with this function, as the 2007 Constitution also set up 
the Law Reform Commission to improve and develop the law in the country, 
including recommending amendments to the law so that it is in conformity with the 
constitution with regard to the public opinions and hearing by the people affected by 
those laws.12 
In performing this role, there are at least two issues which would likely pose 
challenges for the Thai Ombudsman. First, although the new Constitution put in 
place an institutional process to enforce the implementation of constitutional 
provisions, it does not prescribe methods and criteria for evaluation of whether a 
                                                                 
10
 Minutes of the Meeting of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly 34/2550 (extraord inary), Tuesday 
26 June 2007. 
11
 The then First Vice President of the Senate Surachai Liengboon lertchai (now the President of the 
Senate), an interview with the author on1 March 2013 at the Government House, Bangkok. 
12
 The Constitution of Thailand 2550 B.E. (2007) Section 81 (3).  
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provision has been sufficiently implemented or not. Instead, it leaves it to the 
Ombudsman to decide and determine the sufficiency of efforts to implement the 
constitution. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it will be seen that this unclear provision has 
created a difficult challenge for the Ombudsman to overcome. Secondly, the fact that 
the Constitution is designed to radically reconfigure the political, legislative, judicial 
and administrative machinery of government means that this undertaking itself is a 
massive challenge. Part of the task would require the review of significant numbers 
of active legislation and sub-ordinate legislation in order to ensure that all 
implementers in all government institutions integrate constitutional rights in their 
legal and policy frameworks. In short the task entails a massive workload. For this 
reason alone, it is questionable whether the Ombudsman can carry out this task 
effectively.  The Asian Development Bank has estimated that working out all of the 
implications and ensuring that the new practices and procedures will function 
effectively will take at least a generation.13  In other jurisdictions this function is 
undertaken by a specialised body, such as a Commission for the Implementation of 
the Constitution.14  
 
7.1.3 Ethical Codes enforcement 
A concern with public service ethics has emerged internationally during 
recent years and has been an ongoing theme in Thai politics. 15   While the 1997 
Constitution requires government agencies to conform to ethical standards in order to 
prevent corruption, misconduct and enhance operational effectiveness, it did not 
provide a mechanism to enforce effectively or impose penalties in the case of 
violation of ethical standards. 16   Ethics therefore became an issue that each 
organisation addressed individually.  
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 Asian Development Bank ‘Governance in Thailand: Challenges, Issues and Prospects’, ADB, 
Manila, April, 1999. 
14
 Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution, Nairobi, Kenya. 
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 The move could  be in part attributed to the U.N. Convention Against Corruption who in  2003  
included a public service code as an essential element in corruption prevention, retrieved 19 
September 2014, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/soccp270.doc.htm, see S C Gilman, Ethics 
Codes and Codes of Conduct as Tools for Promoting and Ethical and Professional Public Service: 
Comparative Success and Lessons’, Comparative Successes and Lessons, paper prepared fo r the 
PREM, the World  Bank, Washington DC, winter 2005, retrieved 10 August 2013,  
http://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/35521418.pdf.  
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 The Constitution of Thailand 2540 B.E. (1997), Section 77. 
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The drafters of the 2007 Constitution concluded that this was an 
unsatisfactory solution because ‘in reality the moral standards and code of ethics 
have had no bearing, and certainly were hardly binding on anyone.’ 17  The most 
serious problem of all, it found, was the conflicts of interests that existed in the 
public sector, a grey sort of corruption that Thai law has yet to catch up with.18  
The 2007 Constitution therefore aimed at invoking improved compliance to a 
Code of Ethics and introduced a new ethical framework by (i) stipulating that as of 
September 2008 all holders of political office and State agencies shall have its own 
Code of Ethics 19 ; (ii) setting up mechanisms and working systems to ensure the 
effective enforcement of the ethical standard; (iii) and imposing penalties on 
violation of the ethical standard based on the severity of the case e.g. serious 
violation of, or non-compliance by holders of political office with ethical standards is 
liable to be cited as a cause leading to removal from office or disciplinary penalty in 
the case of public officials.20  
According to the 2007 Constitution the Codes of Ethics refers to standards to 
which public officials are expected to conform.  As this has developed in the Thai 
government, it provides guidance for officials as to how to behave in their 
professional and personal conducts or practice so as to maintain the dignity of the 
profession and to be worthy of public trust. The subsequent codes are more subtle 
and delicate than law and are aimed at greater transparency and accountability.21 
Breach of a code is not the same as corruption or criminal offense. However, the 
failure to follow certain aspects of the guidance offered in the code of ethics may 
leave an individual open to accusations of corruption or attempts at corruption. 
The Constitution emphasizes the importance of ethics by stating that in state 
administration policy and development, the working systems of the public sector 
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 Somkid  Lertpaithoon, ‘The Origins and Sp irit of the 2007 Constitution’, in  Wutthisarn Tanchai (ed.) 
Exploring the 2007 Constitution, KPI Yearbooks 4, King Prajadhipok’s Institute, 2007. 
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 ibid.  
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 The Constitution of Thailand 2550 B.E. (2007), Section 279.  
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 Section270. A  person holding a position of Prime Minister, Minister, member of the House of 
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shall give regard to the development of quality, merit and ethics of State officials.22 
The monitoring of the exercise of state powers therefore not only follows the 
provisions under the Constitution and the laws, but also enforces observance of the 
code of ethics with the goal of ensuring that the exercise of state powers is honest 
and just, and violators shall be punished accordingly.  
According to the 2007 Constitution Section 280, 244, 279, 280 and the 2009 
Act, Section 36, the Ombudsman has a consulting role in making the code of ethics 
of each type of political office holders and public officials, with the purpose to 
ensure that codes meet standards and raise the ethical consciousness among political 
office holders and public officials.  Additionally, with a view that complaints about 
breaches are made to the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman plays an important part as a 
mechanism that instigates the enforcement proceedings. After investigating the 
alleged breach of the Code of Ethics, if the Ombudsman is of the opinion that there is 
an incident of violation of the code of ethics, the Ombudsman will need to decide 
whether the violation is a serious offence, in which case the Ombudsman will need to 
submit the matter to the National Counter Corruption Commission for consideration 
for removal from office; or if it is not a serious offence the Ombudsman will need to 
report to the authority concerned: in the case of violation or non-observance by a 
person holding a political position, the Ombudsmen will report it to the National 
Assembly, the Council of Ministers or the local assembly concerned.  
Despite the fact that the Ombudsman does not have the power to impose 
penalties, he can conduct an inquiry and disclose the results of the inquiry to the 
public if the Ombudsman is of opinion that the violation of the ethical standard 
concerned is serious or there is a reasonable cause to believe that action taken by the 
person in charge will not be in a fair manner. 
The Constitutional revisions to include an ethical code, and establish the 
Ombudsman’s engagement as an external scrutiny process, have introduced an 
additional control to an existing self-regulatory based system for defining the 
standards of conduct expected of persons exercising public powers. The approach is 
designed to promote high standards of personal ethical conduct, thus creating an 
environment in which misconduct, corruption and fraud are less likely to occur.23  
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However, there are two issues that can be identified from the present 
legislation which may cause difficulties for the Ombudsman in carrying out this 
function. First, there is an issue of interpretation and application of the Code of 
Ethics. The legislation does not define what could be a ‘serious offence’; meanwhile 
the Codes of Ethics are more aspirations of broad principles than hard law. Another 
issue with the current legislation is its impact on the Ombudsman’s relationship with 
the executive branch and the administrative system more generally upon which the 
Ombudsman relies for its corporation in order to be effective. It is probable that this 
additional investigatory function will result in potential conflict between the 
Ombudsman and the main branch of government, the executive and its 
administration. This is especially the case now that the Ombudsman has been given a 
mandate that involves making arguably moral judgements of political action, as well 
as of personal conduct of public officials and political office holders. Given this, the 
instigation of enforcement proceedings by the Ombudsman could result in serious 
consequences, such as disciplinary action in case of public officials or removal from 
office in the case of political office holders.   
From the analysis of the potential difficulties of the Thai Ombudsman, it 
might be useful to note that in other countries equivalent codes of ethics for 
parliamentarians are separately administered by a bespoke body. Examples include 
the Commissioner for Ethical Standards in France, the Canadian Conflict of Interests 
and Ethics Commissioner or the Irish Standards in Public Offices Commission.  
There are ombudsmen for which part of the office’s role is to investigate complaints 
regarding ethical standards and codes of conduct of members of local government 
bodies, such as the Public Services Ombudsman for Wales, but it is noticeable in 
Wales that the role interlinks with a separate judicial process and relates to local 
government only, not the National Assembly of Wales itself. In this respect, 
therefore, the Thai Ombudsman’s power to monitor the code of ethics of the national 
politicians appears strong when compared to the ombudsman community as a whole. 
Implication of the additional functions  
This section has outlined the body of legal provisions regulating the additions 
to the role of the Thai Ombudsman and each of them was individually assessed. It is 
now time to step back and take a look at the entirety of the emerging picture. Stanley 
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de Smith’s comment quoted earlier in the thesis becomes relevant here.24 Different 
jurisdictions will approach the widening and narrowing of the Ombudsman’s 
jurisdiction differently depending upon local context. In Thailand the legislature has 
crafted a law that clearly enhances the roles of the Thai ombudsman, in which 
contrasts with the strategy adopted in other jurisdictions of establishing other bespoke 
supervisory agencies, such as the Commission of Constitution Implementation, or the 
Ethics Commissioner, to perform such tasks.  There it was identified that a series of 
potential risks face ombudsman schemes with an expanded mandate included  
incompatibility of roles, subjecting the Ombudsman to politically controversial areas 
and the problems of institutional overload due to insufficient of resource and 
expertise.  
The Thai Ombudsman, with its constitutional importance and prestigious 
constitutional status as an impartial independent watchdog, seems to look suitable to 
undertake such an expanded monitoring function despite its limited experience as a 
young institution with a humble success record.  But this section has identified some 
reasons for expressing concern as to the conferral of these additional roles, reasons 
which pick up on the issues raised in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
Overall, the section concludes that the legal mandate of the Thai Ombudsman 
is relatively diversified and extensive.   There are a couple of findings that stand out 
and merit particular attention though. On one hand this increased power and mandate 
may enable the Ombudsman to raise its profile. On the other hand, more power may 
result in a higher level of public expectation and the Ombudsman risks negative 
criticism if the office cannot fulfil its mandate. In addition to issues of resources and 
expertise that the Office may require to perform its new mandate, in terms of 
political controversy, there are also good reasons to question whether the 
combination of ombudsman and the code of ethics is good one, given that it could 
embroil the Ombudsman into political conflicts. These issues will be examined 
further in the next section.  
7.2 The functioning of the Thai Ombudsman 
The legal basis of the power of the Thai Ombudsman has been outlined.  It 
may be seem that the Thai Ombudsman enjoys a broad limit.  In many jurisdictions, 
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some of these functions are performed by other bodies. This section discusses the 
manner in which the Thai Ombudsman has implemented these various additional 
powers and assesses their impact. Since there is not much written on these topics in 
the ombudsman literature, common indicators of the key aspects of the ombudsman’s 
work that need to be explored in order to establish a suitable overview of their 
effectiveness are hard to find (see Chapter 4). Central to the discussion is, therefore, 
an examination of the effectiveness of the Ombudsman in achieving the result as 
intended by the Constitution. In view of the fact that these powers are a relatively 
recent developments (the powers were conferred to the Ombudsman in 2007 by the 
2007 Constitution but it took two to three years for the Office to be able to start 
discharging these new functions), apart from the views of the public, the discussion 
here will primarily draw on the suggestions and experience of various stakeholders, 
plus available documentary evidence. For this reason any analysis and conclusions 
drawn will, of necessity, be of a preliminary nature. However, the section does 
provide some significant details on the unfolding difficulties that the ombudsman 
faces in performing these roles, as well as the achievements secured so far, and as 
such it is hoped that this research will be useful for future studies and debates. 
 
7.2.1 Constitutional litigation  
The Thai Ombudsman primarily has a traditional mandate, it is also designed 
to provide a potential access point for citizens when faced with an act of public 
power that violates their fundamental rights or where there is a constitutional issue.  
Since this power was introduced, there is evidence to suggest that the Ombudsman 
has played an important role in providing access to the Constitutional Court for  
resolution under the powers described above. 
The best evidence of the impact of the Ombudsman in this area is the 
casework that has resulted from the office’s role. Examples of cases that the 
Ombudsman has brought to the Constitutional Court include the following: 
  In 2000, the Ombudsman brought an action arguing that a provision in 
judicial personnel law25  which prohibited disabled persons from becoming judges 
was inconsistent with the Constitution26 (which prohibited discrimination on various 
grounds such as health or physical condition). The Court ruled that the provision was 
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constitutionally valid citing that the Judicial Commission had every right to recruit 
individuals ‘with optimum potential’ into its workforce. 27  There has been 
controversy and criticism on the Court ruling for failing to base its decision on 
inclusiveness and equal opportunity, as well as to protect the rights of the 
handicapped as mandated by the Constitution. 28   Following this case, the 
Ombudsman also made a separate recommendation to amend other legislations, 
administrative rules and regulations that he considered to have substance which 
prejudice the rights of disabled persons to engage in various occupations. The 
recommendation was submitted to Prime Minister, the President of the House of 
Representatives and the President of the Senate for further action but no action has 
been taken as yet.29 Even though the Ombudsman’s submission was not successful, it 
is apparent that this submission raised a very relevant issue which has, at the very, 
least enhanced legal clarity and legal debate in this area.   
In 2001, the Ombudsman applied to the Constitutional Court for a ruling on 
whether a provision of the Organisation of the Military Courts Act, 2498 B.E. (1955) 
that permitted military courts to pass judgement or a decision in cases without a 
hearing was unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court held that the provision was 
unconstitutional for being contrary to or inconsistent with Section 236 of the 1997 
Constitution and therefore was unenforceable according to Section 6 of the 1997 
Constitution. 30    Consequently, this ruling has changed the long practices of the 
military.  
In 2002, a petition was made to the Constitutional Court asking it to determine 
whether a clause in the Bankruptcy Act 2483 B.E. (1940) was contrary to Sections 
29, 48 and 50 of the 1997. The clause limited the right of debtors to participate in a 
debt-rehabilitation plan for their business and thereby affected a person’s right in 
property and the liberty to engage in an enterprise or to undertake in a fair and free 
competition. The court held that the clause was not unconstitutional because even if 
the provision would restrict the rights and liberates of the debtor, such restriction was 
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imposed to the extent that was necessary and did not affect the essential substance of 
such rights and liberties.31 
 Such examples of practice by the Ombudsman institution in the formulation 
of the objections of unconstitutionality demonstrates the institution’s contribution in 
term of identify and submitting to the Constitutional Court for remedy those poor 
regulations which may introduce cumbersome mechanisms or generate violations of 
fundamental rights and freedoms.  
In all these of cases that fall under the power the Ombudsman to pursue 
constitutional justice on behalf of the citizen by providing the people with a link and 
an alternative means of gaining access to the Constitutional Court. Nonetheless in the 
event of a problem on the constitutionality of provisions of laws, this does not mean 
that the Ombudsman is bound to refer every case received to the Courts. The 
procedure begins with the usual preliminary screening to see if the complaints are 
within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction before determining if the objects of complaint, 
i.e. the law, by- law or an act pose a question of constitutionality. The Ombudsman 
then submits the case to the court, together with a preliminary opinion as to the 
constitutionality of the act, or law under scrutiny. The Ombudsman practice reveals 
that the office has never referred a case to the Courts if he opines that there is no 
question of constitutionality or legality issues.32   
To date the Ombudsman has received 261 complaints on unconstitutionality, 
of which in 189 the Ombudsman found the complaint did not include an 
unconstitutional item of law, yet in 36 the Ombudsman did find the relevant law to 
be unconstitutional and referred the complaint to the courts which was then accepted 
for a hearing. 33  In the majority of these cases, the Ombudsman’s opinions were 
upheld.34 But even though not all of these complaints have been successfully upheld, 
the Ombudsman has achieved an important impact in terms of harmonising of law 
with the constitution on some occasions, and providing a route by which reassurance 
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can be provided that the constitution is being upheld. Given the need to uphold the 
strength of the Constitution, arguably there is a benefit in conferring an independent 
body, such as the Ombudsman, the special responsibility for pursuing matters 
allegedly in conflict with the Constitution.  
 Another important aspect of the Ombudsman’s power in lodging petitions 
which request an ex post review of the law is that, in doing so, the Ombudsman 
serves as a neutral means to induce control of the law, as against the constitution. 
Importantly, this is a process that operates outside the more directly political attitudes 
of other legitimate individuals, such as MPs, or other designated institutions such as 
the Council of Ministers. Important as the political process of control is, as argued in 
Chapter 2, strong liberal democratic constitutions require such separation of powers 
to be embedded within their constitution.  A good example of the powerful impact of 
such a role is the Ombudsman’s of complaint it received which cited irregularities in 
the way the Thai Election Commission had set up the election. Further the complaint 
argued that the short timeframe provided for the staging of the election, 35 days, was 
unfair because it benefited the ruling party and put the opposition parties at a 
disadvantage. These complaints were duly referred by the Ombudsman to the 
Constitutional Court for resolution. The Constitutional Court ruled on 8 May 2006 
that the General Election was void and would have to be held again.35 
While petitioning for unconstitutionality to the Constitutional Court regarding 
laws approved by Parliament is apparently not part of the Ombudsman’s everyday 
work, considering the thousands of complaints received from citizens annually, it is 
one of the most important aspects of the Thai’s Ombudsman’s mandate. This 
reference to the Constitutional Court to produce judgement on unconstitutionality of 
law not only provides a binding decision on the complainant but also will benefit 
public at large.36 Constitutionally, this is an interesting role for the ombudsman, but 
one which does not directly challenge understandings of its basic institutional design. 
This is because, in practice, the Ombudsman operates as a procedural access route to 
the court, rather than as a proactive force or an adjudicator of constitutional questions. 
Under the constitution it is clear that the ability to oversee the constitution effectively 
largely depends on the Constitutional Court or the Administrative Court which have 
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power to adjudicate, not the Ombudsman.  Regardless of whether the Constitutional 
Court upheld the Ombudsman’s findings or not, it is worthy to point out that the 
Ombudsman has served its function as a mechanism to protect citizens’ 
constitutional rights.    
7.2.2 Monitor and evaluate implementation of the Constitution 
In practice, the Ombudsman’s monitoring duties under the constitution are 
conducted through three broad activities: monitoring implementation, evaluating 
compliance and proposing constitutional amendments.  
Monitoring constitutional implementation 
The Ombudsman’s task in this area is to follow up the work of those agencies 
responsible for taking action to implement constitutional provisions within the 
timeframe prescribed by the Constitution, and to report the progress. The 
Ombudsman has the power to request a government agency to give statements and 
report on their performance for consideration.  If the agency has not reported on its 
implementation of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may submit such incorporation 
to the Council of Ministers, the Parliament and the Senate.  
As noted above, effective implementation entails numerous laws and 
administrative measures to be enacted and put in place. The Ombudsman has 
estimated that to implement the fundamental State policies, as  intended by the 
Constitution, involves the enactment of 326 new laws and as many as 3,451 
administrative measures to be put in place.37    
To deal with the scale of the task, the Ombudsman initially collaborated with 
the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers to collect data on this matter.38 This was a 
more realistic approach because the Council of Ministers (the Cabinet) has a 
constitutional obligation to prepare annually the planning of legislation deemed 
necessary for the execution of the administration policies. It also has a national 
administration plan that details the measures and directions of official operations for 
each year of the administration of the Government, in accordance with the directive 
principles of fundamental State policies. However, according to Ombudsman 
Professor Sriracha Charoenpanich, after the new government took up office, 
collaboration from the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers ceased to be made 
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available. The Ombudsman therefore requested the cooperation of the individual 
agencies on progress by sending updated reports to the Ombudsman every quarter.39  
   
After monitoring and evaluating an implementation of the Constitution, the 
Ombudsman prepared and submitted a report, which includes recommendations for 
the implementation of the Constitution, to the person who controls or supervises the 
relevant agencies that appeared to fail to comply with the Constitution in any matter. 
The Ombudsman’s staff are also assigned to monitor the constitutional operation 
outcome reports of these agencies in the mass media, and to maintain continuous 
telephone contacts to obtain the most up-to-date information.40 
The Ombudsman prepared summary reports on the constitutional compliance 
of the different agencies, showing the number of legislation and administrative 
measures implemented which are included in the Ombudsman’s annual report each 
year. Since July 2012 the Ombudsman has provided an online database on the 
implementation of the Constitution by public agencies; this can be accessed via the 
Office of the Ombudsman’s website in order to allow the general public and the 
media to follow the progress and express their opinions on any matters. 
The Ombudsman reported that by 2013 it appeared that 64% of legislation 
and administrative measures required by the Constitution have been put in place 
within the given time frame.  There were 138 legislations and 851 administrative 
measures pending which were being follow upon by the Ombudsman to identify the 
cause of delay.   
Despite the progress that appears to have been made towards implementing 
the Constitution, it is doubted whether this aspect of the Ombudsman’s role has been 
as significant as the Constitution suggests it ought to have been. First, there is no 
evidence to suggest that (at least the Ombudsman has never claimed) that the 
implementation of the constitution so far could be directly linked to the 
Ombudsman’s efforts, or legislation being enacted that would otherwise not have 
been. Therefore, it is difficult to measure the impact of the Ombudsman in this area  
due to the fact that, even where new legislation is passed, it may be argued that the 
improvement of the government performance in this regard be attributed to numerous 
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alternative factors, as opposed to being directly attributable to the Ombudsman’s 
intervention.   
 Secondly, the new arrangement has led to a duplication of work between the 
Ombudsman and the Council of Ministers (the cabinet). The Council of Ministers is 
required by the Constitution to submit to the National Legislative Assembly an 
annual report on the result of its implementation of the directive principles of 
fundamental State policies, including problems and obstacles encountered. As 
pointed out above the Ombudsman statistics used in his report have been taken from 
the statistics prepared by the Council of Minister in order to report to the National 
Legislative Assembly.  A question that follows from this practice is what benefit is 
there in submitting the same information to Parliament. In this regard, one might call 
into question the usefulness of entrusting this power by the Constitution to the 
Ombudsman.   
Despite such difficulties,  one could possibly argue that the Ombudsman has 
an important role to play concerning the enactment of the legislation and measures 
required by the Constitution. Such a claim would derive from the argument that it is 
necessary to have an external body to monitor the government. It is plausible that 
there is a psychological effect of being aware that someone is watching and will 
report if the work is not done properly, and that this effect will make the government 
perform better. This is precisely the challenge that constitutional systems are always 
trying to deal with because without adequate pressures governments do not always 
do the job properly.  
Evaluating the implementation of the Constitution  
In order that legislation and measures meet the objectives of the Constitution, 
i.e. to ensure that the intentions of the Constitution are realized in practice, the 
Ombudsman is tasked with evaluations on the implementation of the Constitution.  
Unlike the monitoring task, through which the Ombudsman gathers the numbers of 
relevant pieces of legislation and reports, evaluation is a more comprehensive 
undertaking and requires qualitative analysis.  This study reveals that in practice the 
Ombudsman has encountered a number of difficulties in performing this task. 
This function has proven to be difficult to undertake without proper expertise. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, the Ombudsman’s Annual Reports from 2007 to 
2013 did not show any details on the Ombudsman’s performance on evaluation or 
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details of where the office had made recommendations with regard to the 
improvement of constitutional compliance. Evaluating whether legislation and 
measures meet the objectives of the Constitution is a complicated issue and must be 
treated with thoroughness. The Ombudsman has now appointed a committee 
consisting of constitutional experts to work on assessment criteria and working 
methods so as to create a standard assessment process that is acceptable to all parties.   
But academics remain sceptical about the Ombudsman’s expertise in this area. 
Prevalent comments made by academics so far are that to evaluate constitutional 
compliance would require constitutional analysis, a task that the Ombudsman was 
probably not well-equipped to perform with the human resources it has. 41  Even 
supporters of the Ombudsman have expressed disappointment towards the 
Ombudsman’s performance and urged the Ombudsman to show concrete results of 
its performance in this area.42 
In fact, in 2013 the Ombudsman for the first time stated in the Annual Report 
the results of the office’s evaluations of constitutional compliance. However instead 
of coming up with assessment criteria and working methods to be used by the Office 
in evaluation constitutional compliance, as previously stated, the Ombudsman 
commissioned two research projects.  They are ‘The problem of education policy on 
free education for 15 years’; and ‘the Evaluation of the Performance of the Political 
Development Council’.  Based on these two research findings, the Ombudsman 
reported that the Office had found that the practice of government in implementing 
the Constitution is not consistent with the spirit of the Constitution.  
There has been no evidence to suggest that Parliament and the public 
authorities concerned have responded to the Ombudsman’s reports. Meanwhile, the 
approach of the Ombudsman has not been well accepted by all parties. Academic 
commentators have remarked that while the Constitution does not dictate the manner 
in which the Ombudsman evaluates the implementation of the Constitution, the 
Ombudsman’s approach did not seem to be an appropriate way to evaluate whether 
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implementation of the constitution by public agencies is consistent with the will of 
the Constitution.43   According to one commentator: 
In my view, the fact that the Constitution entrusts the 
Ombudsman with such powers should be interpreted that the 
Constitution virtually requires the Ombudsman’s expertise 
to carry out the task by himself rather than just having the 
Ombudsman finds somebody to do it.  Research is 
acceptable if the findings can serve to feed into data capture 
and inform the work of Ombudsman. But at the end the 
Ombudsman must produce his own analysis and conclusion. 
What the Ombudsman is doing now is just acting as a 
messenger. 44 
Another commentator argued that to maintain this level of research into 
constitutional implementation would require the Ombudsman to carry out a massive 
quantity of work, most of which would probably end up  like other research, 
gathering dust on the shelves.45  
The above arguments illustrate the conflicting views on the ombudsman’s 
role in this area and the challenges that it faces. But nor does it seem that the strategy 
of commissioning research, without the Ombudsman’s direct input, is likely to yield 
a good result either. From the point of view of the constitutional drafters and some 
academics, this strategy would not meet their expectations, as it is the Ombudsman’s 
input that is in theory valued. Unfortunately, the Ombudsman does not have or has 
not yet acquired the required knowledge and expertise for the task. Using such 
externally commissioned research simply serves to highlight the point that it lacks 
relevant expertise. So far the appointed committee has not finished working on the 
criteria and method that it will deploy for evaluation. This could further suggest the 
difficulties of the task. 
Two more things are worth noting with respect to this role.  One is that this 
additional role is not directly related to the Ombudsman’s core role of providing 
protection for aggrieved citizens from the use of public power but it does make the 
Ombudsman an inspector of the government.  The other is that prescribing a 
jurisdiction that is to some extent different from those that relate to its existing 
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jurisdiction poses considerable challenges to the Ombudsman, as well as tending 
towards converting the institution into a more generalist and less focussed outfit. 
Preparing proposals for constitutional amendments 
 After monitoring and evaluating, the Ombudsman is empowered to prepare 
proposals in support of Constitutional amendments if he considers it necessary.46   
Since the promulgation of the 2007 Constitution, there was an attempt to 
amend this military- instilled Constitution. Several lawmakers from the then ruling 
party saw the constitution as undemocratic because it put in mechanisms to restrict 
democracy while, opponents see the 2007 constitution as a vital check against the 
government. 47  Eventually the parliamentarians who were members of the 
government proposed a controversial draft amendment to remove a number of its 
allegedly anti-democratic provisions. In response, the opposition party claimed that 
the government's plan to amend could be viewed as an attempt to overthrow the 
democratic regime and should be stopped.48  Amid the then ongoing political conflict 
over the constitutional amendment,49 the Ombudsman saw the opportunity to propose 
a draft for the constitutional amendment based on the power granted to it by the 
above constitutional provision.50 The Ombudsman, therefore, appointed an advisory 
committee comprised of ten legal and political science experts 51  to advise on a 
constitutional amendment on which the Ombudsman then submitted a proposal to the 
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President of the National Assembly for consideration. The Ombudsman’s version 
contained an opinion clearly different from that of the government, in particular with 
regards to the power of the major political organisations (such as the jurisdiction of 
the Constitutional Court and the power of the House Speaker). 52  Worse still the 
Ombudsman’s version was interpreted by the government as acting in the interest of 
an opposition party whose manifestos addressed similar problems and promoted 
similar solutions.53 
In this instance, it would seem that the Ombudsman took a view that it could 
work in parallel with other political institutions by an attempt to engage in the 
political debate on the constitutional amendments.  However, this approach has not 
been welcomed by all. More than one commentator has expressed the opinion that 
this is an inappropriate activity for the Ombudsman to be engaged in as it has 
brought the Ombudsman under criticism for competing with the legislature.  
According to Bunjerd Singkaneti, a more appropriate  approach for the Ombudsman 
would be for the office to operate as a supporting mechanism in identifying the 
obstacles preventing full implementation,  and facilitating solutions that might solve 
the problems that impede implementation of the Constitution.54 Similarly, Soonton 
Maneesawat viewed that by monitoring and evaluating government organisations in 
implementing the Constitution, the Ombudsman is in a good position to see where 
the problems lie, which sections have difficulties in execution, or what are/could be 
impediments to constitutional implementation. 55  As such the rationale behind the 
intention of the 2007 Constitution is that if any provision results in difficulties in 
practice or if there are any errors in the provision, then an amendment to the 
Constitutional provision may be necessary. Subsequently to the criticism, Chief 
Ombudsman Panit Nitithanprapas indicated that the Ombudsmen did not want a 
constitutional amendment or have an intention to compete with parliament but the 
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subject needed to be discussed in the interest of the public.56 To date there is little 
evidence that the Ombudsman’s efforts have c reated any effect on the ongoing 
constitutional amendment debate.57  
From the discussion above, one important argument to be considered is that 
the roles regarding monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the Constitution 
and the preparing of proposals for constitutional amendments  requires the 
Ombudsman to enter high political territory. Albeit the Constitution is a legal source 
of supposedly politically neutral aspirations – inevitably some of those aspirations 
will be value laden and even if they are not, there will always be residuary issues of 
how to implement them which are political. Plus of course, there are questions 
surrounding the costs and the appropriate speed of implementation through the 
Ombudsman’s input. Arguably, these tasks are at a high policy level and involve 
highly politically debates – and should therefore be resolved in the political arena (as 
alluded to above), not in the courts or through the Ombudsman. In Thailand, both the 
difficulties the Ombudsman faces in performing such role and the struggles involved 
to deliver results could suggest that the political tasks are beyond the Ombudsman’ 
territory. The proposed constitutional amendment is also a political action which 
affects the political organization of which normally is carried out by political 
institutions such as the government of the day or parliament. Getting involved in 
high political issues, in particular the constitutional amendments, may risk affecting 
the public’s as well as politicians’ perception of the political impartiality of the 
Ombudsman. 
7.2.3 Ethical Codes enforcement 
The Ombudsman’s exercise of its powers and activities in carrying out its 
duties with regard to Ethical Codes are examined in turn below.  
Formulation of the Code of Ethics 
While ethics is an issue that each organisation has to address individually, the 
Constitution requires that, apart from major values and professional ethics applicable 
to the professional characteristics of each organization, all codes of ethics shall 
consist of mechanisms and systems that ensure their effective enforcement, as well as 
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punishment procedures for imposing punitive sanctions in accordance with the 
degree of violation.  The Ombudsman has duties to make  recommendations or give 
advice in connection with the preparation or revision of the ethical standards, as 
prescribed by the Constitution.58   The Constitution also requires that all agencies 
shall have their own Code of Ethics in place by 23 August 2008.59 
In order to accelerate the preparation of codes of ethics, the Office of the 
Ombudsman compiled a list of agencies that must prepare them.  It then issued a 
most urgent memorandum on 27 November 2007 to the Secretariat of the Cabinet to 
inform all government agencies to formulate their own Code of Ethics by 23 August 
2008, requesting all agencies to deliver their Code of Ethics to the Office of the 
Ombudsman by the end of July 2008.60  In order that each agency had sufficiently 
similar standards and measurements, the Ombudsman prescribed and published nine 
core values61 which all ethics codes must incorporate, apart from major values and 
professional ethics applicable to the professional characteristics of each organisation. 
The Ombudsman then collected the codes of ethics prepared by each 
organization and made sure that they had all the mandatory elements required by the 
Constitution.  If the Codes of Ethics did not fully comply with the Constitution’s 
requirement, the Ombudsman advised the agency concerned to make amendments in 
order to adhere to the Constitution. Workshops were held to provide guidance in 
preparing codes of ethics. 
The Ombudsman reported that, as of December 2011, the Ethical Codes for 
politicians at the national level and for civil servants were 100% complete; for local 
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politicians 80%; local government officials 99%; and other public employees 96%.62  
The Ombudsman’s Office is developing a web link which provides the general 
public with access from the Ombudsman’s website to the electronic database of the 
government agencies displaying their respective ethical codes.  The task of the 
development of ethical standards by putting ethical codes in place is considered 
nearly accomplished and the Ombudsman’s Office is now a central information 
centre for all Codes of Ethics.63 In terms of producing an integrated set of ethical 
standards the Ombudsman has been effective. 
Building ethical consciousness 
The drafters of the Constitution took the view that attempts to impose ethical 
standards are less likely to be successful unless a culture of ethical consciousness can 
be developed.64  According to the 2009 Act, section 36 (2) the Ombudsman is also 
responsible for raising ethical consciousness. In this regard, the Ombudsman has set 
up a central ethical information centre, with the aim for it to operate as a knowledge-
based unit for both Thai and international agencies in promoting the ethical 
behaviour of politicians and state officials.  As the Ombudsman’s Office has limited 
resources compared to other existing mechanisms, such as the Ministries of 
Education and Culture which are the main responsible agencies for moral 
promotion,65 the Ombudsman’s efforts have been focused on collaboration with other 
existing prominent organisations, activists and NGOs that are responsible for 
monitoring and promoting morals and ethics both in the public and private sectors. 
But given the shared nature of this endeavour, it is hard to ascertain to what extent 
the Ombudsman’s contribution in raising awareness has had an impact.  
Report on violation of the Code of Ethics                                                                                                                         
As discussed above, the Ombudsman is designed to provide an external 
oversight of the standard of ethics of the political office holders and public officials 
to ensure that the various codes of ethics are enforced properly by the government 
agencies.  
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The Ombudsman is entrusted with power to investigate complaints about 
conduct which may constitute a breach of the Code of Ethics.  However, the 
Ombudsman has taken the view that his role is to intervene when the enforcement 
measures and penalties are not carried out according to the respective Codes of 
Ethics.  With regards to the codes of ethics, complaints are the sole source of work 
conducted by the ombudsman, as the law does not allow the Ombudsman to start 
investigation on his own when he thinks necessary. 66  Upon receiving a complaint, 
the Ombudsman’s Office does not start an investigation right away but forwards it to 
the agency responsible for oversight of the ethics of the government officials, in 
order that they can investigate the matter and to give the respondent in the complaint 
the opportunity to explain matters to the Ombudsman. This practice was introduced 
in order that the Ombudsman would not be adversely affected by the increased 
workload and it was also considered appropriate given the view that ethical issues 
should primarily be dealt with internally by the responsible agency for each 
department, as they know best the subject of the complaints and where the real 
problems are. 67  It was also hoped that this practice could reduce the degree of 
conflict and prevent strained relationships with public agencies that could have 
potentially been brought about if the Ombudsman investigated all complaints 
received. 
During the past five years, out of 216 petitions on ethics processed by the 
Ombudsman, only six have been acted on. Therefore, it can be seen that the 
workload of the office has not dramatically increased through this additional function 
been given to the office. The statistics also show that a large proportion of petitions 
are in the area of corruption, which is outside the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction and 
these were therefore referred to the National Anti-Corruption Commission. 
Nevertheless, this additional function has caused difficulties for the Ombudsman in 
many aspects, in particular with regards to monitoring the alleged breach of the code 
of ethics of the parliamentarians.  Recently, there has been an increased concern that 
the Ombudsman has become a means whereby political opponents can make 
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vexatious or mischievous allegations about each other. 68  In this regard, the decision 
making of the Ombudsman, although technically only a recommendation, is treated 
as setting in motion an execution process leading to punishment. 69 In view of the fact 
that the most extreme result is dismissal from office, commentators have pointed out 
that there are already some signs that political opponents have been tempted to use 
the code to discredit one another.70  Research has been conducted to support such 
claims by finding that political tensions have directly led to the number of ethical 
investigated complaints towards holders of political positions jumping from only two 
in 2011 to 29 in 2012, and 16 in the first half of 2013.71  
Since Prime Minister Yingluck took office in May 2011, the Ombudsman has 
conducted a series of ethical examinations against members of the government. At 
least three inquiries have been carried out against the Prime Minister herself and four 
against Ministers.72  Even where the investigations do not find against government 
officials, this high-profile probing role has arguably changed the image of the 
Ombudsman from ‘the least talked about’ office which, at one point was even seen as 
‘so insignificant as to be at risk of disbandment’, to an agency that people have come 
to regard as an institution which ‘stands up with claws and teeth’73.  However, the 
question of whether the Ombudsman can do as much as some people hope and 
expect remains highly controversial.  It should be noted that despite several 
investigations into the alleged misconduct of the Prime Minister and ministers, to 
date the Ombudsman has found no breach of the ethical code by these political actors. 
Instead, in a number of cases the Ombudsman stated after investigation that the 
alleged behaviour was not appropriate but did not amount to being unethical. He 
therefore recommended that the relevant procedure should be revised.    
The unclear and indecisive approach of the Ombudsman has led to criticism 
concerning the Ombudsman’s effectiveness in overseeing ethics. For example, those 
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who viewed that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Affairs Minister had failed to 
comply with the ethical standards have publically expressed disappointment, 
claiming that the Ombudsman had not acted according to the power conferred on the 
office by the constitution. Further, they have urged the Ombudsman to take 
appropriate action in order to commence proceedings to remove the Prime Minister 
and the Foreign Affairs Minister from office.74 
A member of the Constitution Drafting Committee and a proponent of the 
Ombudsman have expressed disappointment with his performance as follows: 
The work of the Ombudsman today reflected that it did not 
fully exercise its powers. The performance did not meet the 
intent and the role that the Constitution prescribed which is to 
direct and monitor behavior and ethics of both state officials 
and political office holders. The role of the Ombudsman was 
diminished for example Pramote Chotimongkol former Chief 
Ombudsman laid down an internal regulation that resulted in 
a public agency to monitor the ethics on their own before the 
Ombudsman’s intervention. Consequently, to date no 
agencies in particular the National Assembly has been able to 
inspect and prosecute its members on issues of ethics. In my 
view, the performance of the Ombudsman scored 5.5 out of 
10. 75 
It should be stressed that the effectiveness of the Ombudsman in policing the 
enforcement of ethical codes could not be measured alone by the number of 
substantiated allegations that the Ombudsman brought to the National Assembly.  
This is because the allegations may be unfounded. In addition, other than the 
possibility that the investigated politicians did not behave unethically, there are at 
least two possible explanations for the fact that the Ombudsman did not substantiate 
the alleged unethical misconduct of the Prime Minister and Ministers: the first is 
attributed to the fact that ethics are abstract and consist of broad principles which 
make it difficult for the Ombudsman to apply to a particular case. 76 The other is that 
the Ombudsman remained reluctant to become involved in controversial 
investigations, so as to preserve its ability to work closely with the executive in 
addressing complaints and righting administrative wrongs. 
  Nevertheless, the Ombudsman’s relationship with the Government has come 
under some strain arising from the above ethical investigations which are seen by a 
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 ‘Yingluck faces Ombudsman's Probe’, The Manager, 12 November 2012.  
75
 ‘The Ombudsman’s Mandate’, Konchadluek, 19 July 2013. 
76
 Kanin Boonsuwan, Spokesman and Member of the Drafting Committee for the 1997 Constitution, 
Komchadluek , 12 February 2012,  
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number of government members as being politicised and biased.77 It has been argued 
that there were several cases where the unethical behaviour of the members of 
opposition party was apparent but the Ombudsman failed to examine and take 
action. 78   As a result, the Ombudsman has been seen as an adversary by many 
leading members of government.  Such discontent with the Ombudsman has even 
directly led to a proposal by a leading member of the government party in the House 
of Representatives to disband the Office of the Ombudsman.79  
The point to be made here is that ethical code monitoring function has drawn the 
Office into controversial issues and as such resulted in problems for the Ombudsman 
in terms of decisions not being accepted by parties to a dispute, a danger which 
becomes especially evident in the area of ethics given its abstract nature which 
makes the Ombudsman’s decisions more likely to be contested. 
   In the meantime, Ombudsman Sriracha Charoenpanich earlier stated that he 
considered that the Ombudsman’s role in reporting ethical violations is in conflict 
with the interests of good working relationships with the government, saying that he 
accepted this task with much reluctance because it requires him to clash with 
bureaucrats and politicians.80 He recently revealed the difficulties the Ombudsman 
was facing in coordinating his office’s work with public organisations and political 
parties. According to him, the Ombudsman has organised a number of ethical 
training sessions for holders of political positions and public officials, but in the end 
the Ombudsman could train only one party (the Democrat Party), which was the 
opposition party. This is because the other political parties did not accept the 
invitation. In addition, while there were 20 public institutions which sent 
representatives to participate in the training, only two of these institutions proceed in 
accordance with the training.  This tiny fraction of possible trainees suggests that the 
Ombudsman has not been successful in this ethics tra ining. This provides further 
evidence that the Ombudsman’s ability to function effectively in raising public 
conscious of the ethical standards is adversely effected from the strained relationship 
the role creates with the parliamentarians. 
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 ibid. 
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 Former Senator Ruangkrai Leekitwattana, Post Today, 11 March 2012.   
79
 Sophon Petchsawan, Chairman of the House of Representative Sub-committee on the Constitutional 
Amendment, Dailynews, 7 January 2013.   
80
 Ombudsman Sriracha Charoenpanich, an interview with the author on 3 March 2013, at the 
Ombudsman Office, Bangkok. 
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It is difficult to make any real assessment of the effectiveness of the 
Ombudsman’s performance in the area of ethical standard enforcement, as this 
requires further study.  It is also probably too early to determine the impact of the 
Ombudsman on the ethical climate. However, from the discussion above, at this 
stage what can be said is that the Ombudsman has faced difficulties in discharging 
this function and the prevailing view has not been positive regarding the 
Ombudsman’s performance. Some scholars’ works have even suggested that ethical 
issues are more appropriately and effectively resolved through other kinds of 
institution.81  
 
7.3 Conclusion 
The chapter demonstrates that the Office of Ombudsman in Thailand can 
protect the rights of the citizen by providing a link and an alternative means of 
gaining access to the Constitutional Court in the event of a problem on the 
constitutionality of provisions of laws. This role is an extension to the Ombudsman’s 
core role of protecting citizens’ rights that may be adversely affected by the exercise 
of public power. 
However, the achievement of the other two additional functions: monitoring 
and evaluating government agencies implementation of the provisions of the 
Constitution; and monitoring the enforcement of codes of ethics for political office 
holders and state officials are not well manifested by the evidence currently available. 
The Office has not been seen as making a significant concrete contribution towards 
the implementation of the Constitution by public agencies. The Ombudsman's few 
investigations into ethical complaints against political office holders have not 
revealed any serious cases of ethical violation and no misconduct has been reported.  
It should not, therefore, come as a surprise that the institution is regarded by some as 
not being able to meet the expectations made of it by the Constitution in this respect. 
While it may be too early to assess the achievement of the Ombudsman in 
performing the two new roles assigned by the 2007 Constitution, it is obvious that 
the Thai Ombudsman Office is facing difficulties arising in performing such roles. 
First, there is an issue of lack of,   or perceived lack of, the expertise required to 
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 Professor Bunjerd Singkaneti, an interview with the author on 10 March 2013 at the National 
Institute of Development Administration (NIDA), Bangkok; State Councillor Professor Soonton 
Maneesawat, an interview with the author on 12 March 2013, Bangkok. 
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perform constitutional review and analysis. Monitoring and evaluating the 
implementation of the Constitution is labour intensive and requires specific expertise 
for which the Ombudsman is not sufficiently equipped. Without proper resources and 
expertise such challenges makes it considerably more difficult for a young institution, 
such as the Thai Ombudsman, to succeed. Evaluating the implementation of the 
Constitution also requires the Ombudsman to deal with the questions that are more 
appropriately answered by the political branches. The other issue is that the 
investigation and reporting of ethical violations has led the Ombudsman into conflict 
with the executive. In the Thai context, the Ombudsman was inevitably drawn into 
political disputes. A lack of cooperation from public officials and political parties has 
also been evident. Because the Ombudsman effectively operates through 
persuasiveness, these difficulties could affect the overall effectiveness of the Office. 
Overall, it would also seem that the perception that the Ombudsman's role as 
the protector of citizens’ rights from administrative abuses, thus far, has not been 
satisfactorily performed, is a perception that cannot be reversed by transforming the 
Ombudsman’s institution into a multifunctional office.  The mandate is broad and 
probably too diversified, adding for the potential for the office to be burdened by a  
lack of specific expertise and clarity in its image. On the other hand, these additional 
roles are of a highly political nature which are beyond the Ombudsman’s territory 
and may be incompatible with the Ombudsman’s principle.  In addition, the fact that 
the roles with regard to the mandates of both ethics and the Constitutional 
implementation relate only indirectly to citizens would likely affect the perception of 
the Ombudsman as an office for the people. Worse still, in these two mandates the 
Ombudsman only serves as an extra layer to the existing mechanism, making it 
difficult for the Ombudsman to make a significant and distinctive contribution or add 
much by way of meaningful value. The problem of performance together with lack 
of effective accountability (will be discussed in the next chapter) in place could have 
attributed to the diminished credibility of the Ombudsman, which ultimately led to 
the question of the legitimacy of the Ombudsman. Attempts to abolish the 
Ombudsman have also been evident. 
The chapter adds emphasis to the fact that, even with regard to its primary 
function, an ombudsman needs to build up its public credibility and confidence 
gradually over a period of time, which in turn might provide the impetus for further 
growth and influence of the Office. The forthright imposition of roles, as adopted in 
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Thailand, rather than an evolution on its own terms, may have led to difficulties in 
the operation of the office and undermined its ability to operate optimally. In this 
regard, the study now turns to the working arrangements and statutory support which 
is considered essential for any ombudsman scheme to be effective in delivering its 
goals. Therefore in the next chapter the appropriateness of the institutional design 
and the practical output of the Thai Ombudsman are explored. In Chapter 9, the 
question as to whether collectively the operational weakness of the Thai Ombudsman 
suggests that it is experiencing the difficulties identified in Chapter 4 will be further 
explored. 
 
 
 
215 
 
Chapter 8 
Analysis of the institutional design of the Thai 
Ombudsman 
  
 
 
As already discussed in Chapter 3, there are essential features of standard 
ombudsman schemes that it is widely accepted should be adopted in the design of an 
ombudsman scheme, notwithstanding the variations in the actual implementation of 
the concept in the countries that have adopted it. In Chapter 3, it was claimed that for 
an institution to function effectively as an ombudsman, it should ideally possess the 
following essential or constitutive characteristics: (l) independence; (2) impartiality; 
(3) effective powers; (4) fairness; (5) access and public awareness (see Chapter 6); 
and (6) accountability. The argument there was presented, and pursued further in 
Chapter 4, that ombudsman schemes that are inappropriately constructed are more 
likely to experience difficulties in the implementation of their roles than those built 
according to the classical design of the ombudsman.   
 In this part of the thesis, Chapters 5 and 6 identified that the Thai 
Ombudsman has been created to perform the ombudsman’s traditional function of 
resolving complaints about maladministration, and the additional functions that have 
been subsequently assigned to it are not meant to change this primary function. The 
question raised earlier regarding its ability in Thailand to deliver on all of the various 
roles conferred on it should now be addressed by considering the relevant provisions 
of the 2007 Constitution and the 2009 Act in light of these characteristics.  This 
Chapter also examines the implementation of these provisions in practice and aims to 
examine if there are any defects in the design that may hamper or limit the capacity 
of the Thai Ombudsman in the performance of its functions.  Therefore, included in 
the discussion in this section are facts and views of leading critics.  
For this purpose, this chapter therefore is divided into six sections, section 
one to five address five essential features in turn (‘Accessibility and Public 
awareness’ has already been discussed in chapter 6) using criteria developed in 
chapter 3.  Section six concludes the chapter.  
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8.1 Independence  
The conclusion of Chapter 3 was that best practice in ombudsman design 
necessitated that an ombudsman is constructed in a manner that guarantees its 
independence. The underlying rationale for independence in this context is that an 
ombudsman has to be capable of conducting fair and impartial investigations, 
credible to both complainants and the authorities that may be under the 
ombudsman’s review. For an examination of the Thai Ombudsman the following key 
issues were identified in Chapter 3 as important aspects of establishing independence.  
• Constitutional protection 
• Institutional and functional independence 
• Funding and operational autonomy  
• Remuneration, security of tenure and removal of office 
In order to verify the safeguarding of these factors various tests of 
independence could be envisaged. 
Constitutional protection 
Probably the best form of constitutional protection comes in the form of 
explicit recognition of the ombudsman’s status in the constitution itself. Such 
protection is further strengthened where there is some detail provided in the 
constitution as to the ombudsman’s organisation and powers. The veracity of such 
protection can be tested by the following question: 
 Is the Ombudsman’s Office created by the Constitution? 
  The 2007 Constitution recognises the Thai Ombudsman as an independent 
constitutional organisation by entrenching it under CHAPTER XI entitled 
‘Constitutional Organisation Part 1 Independent Organisations’. This is a bespoke 
section of the constitution dedicated to establishing and protecting the status of 
accountability institutions, including the Ombudsman.  Section 242 sets up the 
appointment procedure as well as its selection process and tenure, 1 while Section 
244 of the Constitution then sets out the Ombudsman’s powers and mandate. 2   
                                                                 
1
 Section  242 The ombudsmen shall not be more than three in number and shall be appointed by the 
King with the advice of the Senate from persons recognized and respected by the public, with 
knowledge and experience in the admin istration of State affairs, enterprises, or activit ies of common 
interest for the public and with apparent integrity. Appointed ombudsmen shall hold  a meet ing to elect 
among from themselves a president and shall disclose the result of the election to the president of the 
Senate. The president of the Senate shall countersign the Royal Command appointing the ombudsmen. 
217 
 
By integrating the institution into the written constitution – the supreme law 
of the land - the effect of these provisions is significant in terms of the permanence 
of the institution. As with many written constitutions, constitutional amendment in 
Thailand is subject to a special procedure that is more stringent than that required of 
ordinary legislation to prevent frequent amendment. The core features of the 
Ombudsman contained within the Constitution are, therefore, safeguarded against 
change imposed by governments that only retain partial support of the legislature.  
The amendment of the Constitution requires an approval by votes of greater 
than one-half of the total number of the existing members of both Houses.3  This 
process is more stringent compared to the ordinary legislative procedure, for which 
only a simple majority of present MPs4 is required and which does not need a joint 
meeting of both Houses, as is the case for constitutional amendment. By stipulating 
that constitutional amendments must be supported by a majority of the entire 
membership rather than the present or voting members, the result is that amendments 
require the support of at least 316 votes out of total 630 (480 in the House of 
Representatives and 150 in the Senate). Given that the opposition represents nearly 
half of the votes in the House of the Representative, and that a positive vote of at 
least 76 members of the Senate is required in favor of the proposition for amendment, 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
The qualifications, prohibitions, selection, and election regarding the ombudsmen shall be in 
accordance with the organic law on ombudsmen. The ombudsmen shall hold office for a term of six 
years from the date of their appointment by the King and shall serve for only one term. 
2
 Section  244 The ombudsmen have the powers and duties as follows: 1. to consider and inquire into 
a complaint for fact-finding in the fo llowing cases: a. failure to perform in compliance with the law or 
performance beyond the powers and duties as provided by the law for a government official, an 
official, or an employee of a State agency, State enterprise, or local government organization; b. the 
performance of, or negligence in  the performance of, the duties of a government o fficial or an  official 
or employee of a State agency, State enterprise, o r local government organization, which unjustly 
causes injury to the complainant or the public, regard less of whether such an act is lawfu l or not; c. 
examination of negligence in the performance of duties or the unlawful performance of duties by 
organizations under the Constitution and judicial bodies; d. other cases as provided by the la w; 2. to 
take action in connection with the moral conduct of persons holding political positions and State 
officials in accordance with the provisions of Section  279 para three and Section  280; 3. to prepare 
reports for and submit opinions and suggestions to the National Assembly. Such reports shall be 
published in the Government Gazette and made availab le to the general public; 4. to report results of 
investigation and performance as well as observations to the Cabinet, House of Representatives, and 
Senate annually and the said reports shall be published in the Government Gazette. Actions under (1) 
a (b) and (c) shall be taken by the ombudsmen after having received complaints from in jured persons. 
The ombudsmen may decide to launch an investigation into any matter that is deemed to be 
detrimental to the general public or the public interest. 
3
 The Constitution of Thailand 2550 B.E. (2007), Section 291. 
4
 Rule and Procedure of the Meeting of the House of Representatives, Sections  71-78 and 131. 
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this provision does mean that it is not easy for a majority government to make 
changes to the constitution without first securing wider political support.5  
Further, the Constitution also authorised the legislative body to enact an 
organic law to amplify the Ombudsman’s powers and responsibilities. 6 This remains 
a robust arrangement because the legislature cannot enact a law that deviates from 
that which has been provided for in the Constitution. Moreover, an organic act has a 
higher legal status than ordinary legislation, though lower than the constitution and 
its legislative process is designed to be more difficult. 7 Such processes are therefore 
designed to serve as a deterrent against arbitrary amendments, and should offer a 
better guarantee than ordinary acts  (provided that the constitution itself remains 
protected against politically or militarily instigated overhaul). 8  For the Thai 
Ombudsman, the constitution has duly been implemented in the form of the Organic 
Act on Ombudsmen B.E 2552 (2009).9 
The relatively secure constitutional position of the Ombudsman is illustrated 
by the Ombudsman’s ability so far to resist political moves to get rid of the 
institution. During 2012, the Ombudsman conducted several investigations against 
the Prime-Minister, Ministers and members of parliament in cases involving alleged 
violations of ethics codes (as discussed in chapter 7). Following such investigations, 
the Ombudsman office was exposed to political attacks as never before. Of most 
concern were the attempts to abolish the Ombudsman in January 2013 by Deputy 
Prime Minister Chalerm Ubamrung and the proposal by the House of Representative 
ad-hoc committee 10  for studying constitutional amendments, which resolved to 
                                                                 
5
 This is not to argue that the Thai Constitution provides stronger protections than those in other 
countries when it comes to amendment, especially where stronger majority is required while in the 
case of Thailand the only added strength is that many more members mus t turn up to vote to reach the 
required threshold. But this is only a real barrier if ordinarily a sizeable chunk of members do not turn 
up. 
6
 The Constitution of Thailand 2550 B.E. (2007), Section 139. 
7
 The Constitution of Thailand 2550 B.E. (2007), Section 240 stipulates that the legislative process for 
an Organic Act requires more than half of the existing MPs of both houses, while an ordinary act only 
requires simple majority of the attended MPs.  
8
 Another reason for introducing an Organic Act is to prevent the Thai Constitution from becoming 
too long, see Somkit Lertphaitoon, Organic Act (พระราชบัญญัติป ระกอบ รัฐธรรมนูญ ), Thai Research Fund, 
Bangkok, 1993.  
9
 In this work, it is referred to as the 2009 Act 
10
 This ad-hoc committee chaired by Sophon Petchsawang, former Vice President of the House of 
Representative, is appointed by the House of Representative under the Constitution Section 135 in 
order to perform any act, inquire into or study any matter within the powers and duties of the House 
and report its findings to the House. 
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dissolve the Ombudsman.11  Both cited the reasoning that the parallel existence of the 
Administrative Court and the Ombudsman made the Ombudsman institution 
unnecessary. The proposal is under deliberation, but because of the difficulty of 
making Constitutional amendments there was not any conclusion on the issue, which 
has probably been closed now following the 2014 military coup. The Ombudsman’s 
place in the constitution cannot be guaranteed in perpetuity, but the added protection 
provided by the constitution at least makes the danger a more long term one. 
As well as protecting the Ombudsman, its constitutional basis also helps to 
create a degree of prestige for the office, and lends it credibility in terms of the 
public’s perception. In Thailand the Ombudsman is appointed by the King with the 
advice of the Senate. 12  The ombudsman’s powers are derived directly from the 
Constitution and its status is parallel with and separate from the powers of the 
executive and legislative branch, the office is presented as a body of some 
importance.  The status of the Thai Ombudsman, therefore, strongly conforms to 
standard expectations as to the permanence of an ombudsman scheme. Indeed, it 
could be argued that embedding the Thai Ombudsman in the constitution makes the 
office more secure than many other equivalent schemes around the world which do 
not necessarily have constitutional protection.    
Institutional independence and functional independence 
The arrangement for independence must allow the Ombudsman to be visibly 
separate from the public bodies which are subject to the Ombudsman’s investigation. 
Furthermore, the ombudsman should be able to carry out their functions 
independently without external interference or imposed objectives and influence 
from the government and parliament. In Chapter 3 the following questions were 
identified as indicative of the lines of inquiry necessary to establish the functional 
independence of the ombudsman. 
• Is the Ombudsman subject to control by the executive/governmental organs 
or state authorities? 
• Does the constitution or the enabling legislation define the method of 
appointment and state clearly the term of appointment for the Ombudsman? 
                                                                 
11
 ‘Dissolve independent organisations’, Naewna, 12 January 2013, retrieved 28 September 2013, 
http://www.naewna.com/politic/columnist/4888; ‘Dissolve Ombudsman’, Dailynews, 7 January 2013, 
retrieved 28 September 2013, http://www.dailynews.co.th/politics/176678.  
12
 The Constitution of Thailand 2550 B.E. (2007), Section 242. 
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• Does the Ombudsman report to the legislature directly on the result of its 
operation or any specific matters resulting from an investigation? 
• Is the Ombudsman free to select which complaints to pursue and methods for 
pursuing them? 
• Is the Ombudsman free to make recommendation? 
The 2007 Constitution has clearly separated the Ombudsman from both the 
executive and legislative branch by specifically positioning the Ombudsman Office 
under CHAPTER XI entitled ‘Constitutional Organisation Part 1 Independent 
Organisations’.   
This arrangement has catered for the Ombudsman to operate as an 
independent body and also was a presentational significance which reinforces the 
perception of its independence. Under this structure the Ombudsman is no longer a 
parliamentary ombudsman, as it was in the previous constitution. Accordingly, the 
title of the Ombudsman has been changed from the ‘Parliamentary Ombudsman’ to 
‘the Ombudsman’ to reflect the new status. 
As for functional independence, the 2009 Act Section 28 and Section 29 
equip it with full discretion in determining the nature and extent of any inquiry or 
investigation; whether the matter complained of falls within his or her jurisdiction 
and, if answered in the positive, whether to accept complaints, continue or 
discontinue investigation. 13  Further, Section 15 of the 2009 Act gives the 
Ombudsman mandate to issue its own regulation on submission, admission and 
investigation of complaint.14 These powers are additional essential tools to secure the 
                                                                 
13
 Section 29 The Ombudsmen may reject or cease the complaint related to: 
(1) corruption in official service; 
(2) the matter in  which the complainant is not an interested person and the consideration thereon 
is not beneficial to the public;   
(3) the matter submitted after the lapse of two years as from the date the complainant knows or 
ought to know the cause of the complaint and the consideration thereon is not beneficial to 
the public; 
(4) the matter in which the appropriate remedy or compensation for grief or unfairness of the 
complainant has been given and the consideration thereon is not beneficial to the public;  
(5) the matter in which the complainant fails to give oral statement or present evidence or fails to 
do any act as requested writing by the Ombudsmen with in specified period and without 
reasonable grounds; 
(6) the matter in which the complainant has deceased without heir to continue the complaint and 
the consideration thereon is not beneficial to the public;  
(7) the matter in which the Ombudsmen has had conclusion, except where the new ev idence or 
fact has been found and the consideration result may be changed on account thereof. 
14
 Regulat ion on Submission, Admission and Investigation of Complaints, 2012, Royal Gazette 31 
January 2012. 
Section 28 The complaint decided by the Ombudsmen of having the 
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Ombudsman’s functional independence, as they warrant a self-determined method of 
investigation and any other duty.15 
The above discussion shows that the legislative arrangements for the Thai 
Ombudsman meets the ombudsman’s accepted norms of independence. But the real 
test is whether the ombudsman has been able to use its position freely. In practice, 
there is no evidence that members of parliament or government have tried to 
influence the decision-making of the Ombudsman or even direct his activities to 
certain matters. There is no report that the work of the Ombudsman is under pressure.  
This analysis is supported by an interview staged with the Ombudsmen by the author, 
in which the Ombudsmen indicated that they enjoyed full independence and had 
experienced no unwarranted pressure in the carrying out of their duties or 
operations.16 The findings and recommendations issued in public reports have not 
been subjected to censor or delay by the executive or the bodies which it oversees. 
The Ombudsman has the final say on the contents of the report. 
Funding and operational autonomy 
It is essential for the independence of the Ombudsman that the office is 
equipped with a budget that is sufficient to carry out the functions prescribed to it, as 
set out by the law. If this were not the case, the ombudsman would be incapable of 
carrying out the necessary investigations – a situation that may result in a lack of 
independence. In particular, financial and administrative reliance on the executive 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
following characteristics shall be rejected or ceased: 
(1) being policy of the Council of Ministers as stated to the National Assembly, except where the 
implementation in accordance with such policy being the matter under Section 13 (1) or (2); 
(2) being the matter that having been filed to the Court or the matter that the Court has final 
judgment or order thereon; 
(3) not being the matters under Section 13 (1) and (2); 
(1) (4)being the matter relat ing to personnel administration or disciplinary action of government 
official, official or employee of a government agency, State agency, State enterprise or local 
government organisation, except the matter under Section 13 (2); 
(4) the complainant fails to comply with Section 24.  
15
 Section 15 (5) to issue regulations determining rules and procedures on receiving of complaints for 
consideration and the regulations on inquiry; 
(5) to issue regulations determining ru les and procedures for the conduct of proceedings in 
relation to ethics of a person holding political position and State officials under Section 37 
and Section 39; 
(6) to issue regulation determining ru le on expenditure, allowances and travel expenses of oral 
evidence and the performance of duty of the officer; 
(7) to issue any regulation or carry out any other duty which is prescribed by this Organic Act or 
other laws to be a duty of the Ombudsmen. 
16
 Ch ief Ombudsman Panit Nitithanprapas, an interview with the author on 15 March 2013 at the Thai 
Ombudsman Office, Bangkok; Ombudsman Sriracha Charoenpanich, an interview with the author on 
3 March 2013, at the Ombudsman Office, Bangkok. 
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branch can make the ombudsman vulnerable to budget cuts, which would weaken its 
independence. Key questions to consider in this regard include: 
 Does the office have its funds allocated directly from the legislature and is its 
budget funded at a level sufficient to carry out the functions of the office? 
 Does the Ombudsman have the sole power to run the office, appoint and 
remove staff? 
On this issue, the 2007 Constitution resolves that constitutionally independent 
organisations, including the Ombudsman, should receive adequate funding in 
keeping with good governance and easy accessibility, and that the matter of funding 
should not militate against the institution’s independence.  Therefore, Section 168 of 
the 2007 Constitution provides specific protection for constitutionally independent 
organisations, including the Ombudsman, by allowing direct submission of a motion 
to the committee responsible for considering annual Appropriation Bill instead of 
having to go through the Budget Bureau like other public offices. The special 
procedure applies if the Ombudsman is of the opinion that the budget appropriated is 
not sufficient.17 
This arrangement means that the Ombudsman’s budget is approved by 
parliament, not the executive, and that the Ombudsman does not have to undergo 
annual budget negotiations with the government. As a result, the Ombudsman’s 
budget is largely protected from the direct control of the executive. The Ombudsman 
is not under the direct risk of being placed under budget restrictions by the executive 
to an extent that undermines its efficient operation.  Therefore, the constitutional 
arrangement for securing independence in terms of the budgetary process for the 
Thai Ombudsman exceeds the standard ombudsman practice. 
In terms of operational autonomy, Section 242 of the 2007 Constitution 
ensures the Ombudsman has full operational autonomy by stipulating that the Office 
of the Ombudsman is an independent agency with autonomy in personnel 
administration, budgeting and other activities.18 
                                                                 
17
 Section 168 The State shall provide adequate budgetary appropriations for the independent 
operation of the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court, Courts of Justice, the Administrative 
Courts and constitutional organs. In considering budgetary appropriations of the National Assembly, 
the Courts and agencies under paragraph eight, such agency may, if it is of the opinion that the 
budgetary appropriation for it is insufficient, directly submit a motion to the committee. 
18
 This constitutional provision is articulated by the Office of the Ombudsman Act 2552 B.E. (2009). 
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There is also no evidence that the Ombudsman has experienced operational 
difficulties or has had excessive budget constraints placed upon it by the executive in 
an attempt to weaken its capability.  From its establishment, the Ombudsman has 
received an annual budget in the range of 40-60 million baht. This level has changed 
since 2007, after the promulgation of the present Constitution, until now the Office 
has received an annual budget between 180-230 million baht.19 This represents at 
least a five times increase in budget allocation compared to the amount the Office 
received during the previous Constitution. Such a huge increase in budget allocation, 
therefore, is evidently a response to the expanded responsibilities that have been 
conferred on the ombudsman following the revision of the constitution.  
It should be noted that to date the Ombudsman’s funding has been on a par 
with other constitutional independent organisations of similar size and mandate, such 
as the National Human Rights Commission (i.e. in 2014 the Ombudsman received 
212.8 million baht while the National Human Rights Commission 198.5 baht 20). 
During the first two fiscal years of operation, the Office of the Ombudsman had a 
budget surplus by the end of the year. In 2006–2007, it was slightly over budget.   
This suggests that the budget is more or less sufficient. 
Remuneration, security of tenure, immunity and removal from office 
In order to protect the ombudsman’s independence, the enabling legislation of 
the Ombudsman should guarantee the personal security of the Ombudsman by 
prescribing for such things as salary, term of tenure, and provision for immunity. In 
relation to this goal the following key questions are pursued here. 
 Does the ombudsman have a fixed and long term of office? 
 Does the ombudsman have a high and fixed salary? 
 Is the Ombudsman provided with immunity from liability and criminal 
prosecution for acts performed under the law? 
The Thai Ombudsman is provided with several measures to protect its 
personal security. The 2009 Act prescribes that the salary, position allowance and 
other benefits of the Thai Ombudsman is prescribed by law.21 As such it cannot be 
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adjusted, raised or reduced by the government and therefore the Ombudsman is not 
controlled by the government. This measure protects the Ombudsman from being 
indirectly punished or discouraged or encouraged in the carrying out of his duties or 
from any repercussions if the Ombudsman publishes reports that cause political 
difficulties or makes inconvenient recommendations. As to the salary of an 
Ombudsman, since the Ombudsman is regarded as a high prestigious position, the 
remuneration is equated with judges of supreme courts.  
To date there has never been an attempt to reduce the Ombudsman’s salary. 
Indeed, recently a proposal has been put forward to increase the salary of the office 
holders of Independent Constitutional agencies, including the Ombudsman, to reflect 
the rise in living costs.22 
The Ombudsman also enjoys long office term of six years. 23 This long, fixed 
term gives the Ombudsman protection from removal by political reason or 
inappropriate pressure being placed upon him by the government. Unless dismissed 
by Parliament for incapacity or serious ethical misconduct, the Thai Ombudsman 
serves for six years.  The purpose for setting the term of six years is to make it 
overlap with the 4-year term of a member of the National Assembly. This fits the 
requirement that the term of the Ombudsman is longer than the term of the legislative 
body which is responsible, if necessary, for removing the Ombudsman.  
The provision for the Ombudsman to serve for only one term is intended to 
secure independence, so that the Ombudsman can act without having to speculate on 
the possibility of serving for another term. It also prevents the accumulation of power 
and monopoly of position. The tenure for six years is appropriate, as it is not too 
short for the Ombudsman to effectively implement his plan. And though it can be 
argued that many ombudsmen around the world are allowed to hold the position for 
longer than six years, the risk of holding the position for too long is that the 
Ombudsman can become complacent.  In this respect, the provisions are in line with 
standard ombudsman legislation and thinking, as argued in Chapter 3. 
 Apart from completion of his term of office, the Thai Ombudsman can be 
removed from office only on the grounds specified by law, e.g. incapacity, or gross 
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misconduct. 24  The criteria and process for dismissal on grounds of misconduct or an 
impeachment are set out in the Constitution sections 270-274. 25  The removal 
requires a resolution of not less than three-fifths of the total number of the existing 
members of the Senate, which is larger than an ordinary majority. 
While it is common practice to have a majority parliamentary confirmation 
for the removal of the Ombudsman, the arrangement in Thailand is to vest this power 
in the Senate for fear of political interference. Under the Thai Constitution, the 
Senate is designed to be politically neutral. 26   The same rationale applies to the 
appointment process (discussed below under ‘Impartiality’). This arrangement may 
deviate from common practice but it effectively provides strong protection for the 
Ombudsman from inappropriate pressure being placed upon him or her by the 
government. Taking into account the specifics of the Thai context, this legislative 
scheme therefore is in line with standard ombudsman legislation in protecting the 
ombudsman’s independence. (But there is an issue with accountability, this point will 
be returned to under ‘Accountability’ below.) 
Despite the legal guarantees for the independence discussed above, however, 
it is worth asking: if the government or other constitutional bodies were to attempt to 
interfere with the Ombudsman’s mandate and power, what defence or support would 
the Ombudsman have to protect himself? In the worst case scenario, the Ombudsman 
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could seek judicial protection. Section 214 of the Constitution provides resolution for 
the conflict of jurisdiction between the constitutional organs. Section 214 stipulates: 
In the case where there occurs a conflict as to the powers 
and duties between at least two organs, being the National 
Assembly, the Council of Ministers or constitutional organs 
that are not Courts, the President of the National Assembly, 
the Prime Minister or such organ shall submit a matter 
together with the opinion thereon to the Constitutional Court 
for a decision. 
This allows for strong constitutional protection for the Ombudsman, as the 
decision of the Constitutional Court shall be deemed final and binding on the 
National Assembly, Council of Ministers, Courts and other State organs.27 
The security of the post of Ombudsman is protected further by immunity 
granted for acts performed under the law. In this regard, the 2009 Act, Section 18 
provides that the Ombudsman shall not be liable to both civil and criminal liabilities 
if he exercises the powers and duties under this 2009 Act in good faith.  Since 
establishment, no Ombudsman in Thailand has been prosecuted in court with regard 
to the discharge of his power and duties. So long as judicial independence is 
constitutionally secured, the Thai Ombudsman is appropriately protected.  Where 
there are minor deviations from the standard institutional design, they are justified by 
the specific Thai context. 
Conclusion  
 In terms of independence the legislative framework and the practice of the 
Thai Ombudsman meet the standard expectations of institutional design in the 
ombudsman community for all the aspects tested here. The conclusion in this regard, 
therefore, is that the Thai Ombudsman enjoys a high degree of independence. Nor is 
there any available evidence of unwarranted pressure being placed on the 
Ombudsman’s independence. All the evidence would suggest that, in terms of 
securing independence, the solutions included in the 2007 Constitution were 
effective. So long as the Thai system of government remains stable, the 
Ombudsman’s position looks secure.   
The biggest danger to the Ombudsman’s independence, however, comes from 
the potential for the Thai constitution to be exposed to radical overhaul following any 
future military coup. This indeed is exactly what happened during 2014, although 
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interestingly the role of the Ombudsman has remained relatively untouched by the 
events of the coup. It is not the place of this thesis to discuss the temporary interim 
arrangements put in place by the military. Instead, it is submitted here, that upon the 
redrafting of the constitution, the 2007 represents a good model for the Ombudsman 
in terms of institutional design with regard to independence. However, it is also 
worth pointing out that the Thai Ombudsman is not a parliamentary ombudsman and 
of all the features of the Thai Ombudsman, none is more important nor represents 
such a radical departure from traditional ombudsman institutions as the 
Ombudsman’s relationship to the legislature. This point will be returned in Chapter 
9. 
 
8.2 Impartiality 
The need for demonstrable impartiality in the work of the individual 
ombudsman and for the office as a whole is imperative in order to safeguard public 
trust and reduce the danger that the work of the office is undermined by the presence 
of any political partisanship. The following questions are explored to evaluate if the 
Thai Ombudsman’s scheme fosters the Ombudsman’s impartiality. 
 Are personal qualifications imposed to select an Ombudsman who is widely 
respected? 
 Does the appointment process help to ensure that the person selected is 
widely viewed as fair and impartial? 
 Are reasons for dismissal of the Ombudsman specified by law? 
 Does the removal of the Ombudsman require a super majority? 
 Is the ombudsman prohibited from simultaneously holding public office or 
being actively involved in political activities? 
In Thailand, impartiality is emphasised as the essence of all constitutional 
watchdogs, including the Ombudsman.28  This is important as the enduring support 
for the Ombudsman and the willingness to accept his recommendation depends on a 
general perception of his impartiality. Arguably this is an issue in Thailand, due to its 
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selection process the Thai Ombudsman is not perceived by all as impartial, despite 
no one questioning his independence.29   
The best practice to secure impartiality is to appoint an ombudsman who is a 
widely respected individual and to have a selection process that is seen by diverse 
political groups as fair and impartial. This matter is covered in the 2007 Constitution 
by Section 242 which requires the Ombudsman to be:   
 ‘…the persons recognised and respected by the public, with 
knowledge and experience in the administration of the State 
affairs, enterprises or activities of common interest of the 
public and with apparent integrity.’ 
This constitutional provision seeks to find a well-respected person with 
knowledge,   experience, high social standing and ability to be qualified for the 
position but does not explicitly address the issue of impartiality. The 2009 Act 
Section 8 amplifies this constitutional principle by covering a broad range of matters 
which addresses the impartiality as well as other qualification. 30  The impartiality 
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point is particularly addressed in Section 8 (7) which aims to free the Ombudsman 
from fixed political affiliations, by prohibiting a member of a political party or 
person holding any other position of political party within three years prior to the 
application date from applying. The provisions of incompatibility of public office in 
Section8 (6) and (8) are another supportive provisions safeguarding the 
Ombudsman’s impartiality.  
In terms of conflict of interest, it should be noted here that the Ombudsman 
has a duty to submit to the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) an 
account. This account must show particulars of their assets and liabilities and those 
of their spouses and children who have not yet become sui juris upon taking office. 
(Every three years while being in office and upon vacation of office, in accordance 
with the form prescribed by the NCCC.) In practice since establishment, no 
Ombudsman has ever been reported to be in violation of these restrictions.  There is 
no evidence that the Ombudsman hold additional positions in the office or enter into 
business or employment relationship that might lead to his ability to be impartial and 
fair to be called into question. 
In terms of qualification, the provision covers various issues which have been 
identified to foster public confidence in the impartiality of his exercise of office.  
Prohibition of certain personal backgrounds, as prescribed in Section (5) and 
Sections (9)-(15), ensures the high social status and integrity of the ombudsman 
would not be affected. The minimum age requirement is imposed to get a candidate 
with considerable working experience.    
The post-holders appointed so far have been retired high-rank public officials 
who are considered established figures with a great deal of experience in 
administration of state affairs. Currently, the Chief Ombudsman, Panit 
Nitithanprapas, has a background as Inspector General of the Prime Minister’s Office 
before he became Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Social Development and 
Human Security. Prof. Sriracha Charoenpanich, was a law professor. The previous 
incumbents, Dr. Pravit Rattanapian was Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Science 
and Technology. Pramote Chotimongkol, held the positions of Deputy Permanent 
Secretary for University Affairs at the Office of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of 
University Affairs before his appointment as Ombudsman. General Teeradej 
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Meepien, had a career in the military, and then served as permanent secretary at the 
Ministry of Defence prior to his appointment.  Poonsub Piya-anant served as chief of 
the Budget Bureau before being appointed as Ombudsman. Pichet Soontornpipit, the 
first Ombudsman, was originally trained as a lawyer and served as Deputy 
Permanent Secretary for university affairs prior to working for the ombudsman office.  
While it has been argued that former 'insiders' might be more inclined to 
favor their own class when performing scrutiny,31  in the ombudsman community a 
background of senior experience in the civil service has often been considered 
advantageous for investigation due to the familiarity such experience brings with the 
practice of the bureaucracy. It is for this reason that former civil servants have been 
popular candidates for the office of parliamentary ombudsman in many countries. As 
is the case for Thailand, the 2007 Constitution specifically requires that the 
Ombudsman shall be appointed from the persons with knowledge and experience in 
the administration of State affairs. 32  Since establishment, seven ombudsmen have 
been recruited. All have been accepted as being well qualified for the position and no 
challenges made to the incumbent’s qualifications. There has been no evidence to 
suggest that the Ombudsmen are personally involved in public agencies under 
investigation, nor that any decisions of the Ombudsman have been biased toward 
public agencies.    On the basis of qualifications, the Ombudsman has been admitted 
to membership in the International Ombudsman Association, the Asian Ombudsman 
Association, and the International Ombudsman Institute.  
Selection process 
As discussed in chapter 3, the ombudsman appointment processes should 
ensure the appointment of an ombudsman who is a widely respected person and can 
be accepted by diverse political groups as unaligned and fair. Options may include 
processes such as appointment by a super majority in parliament, or a requirement 
that all the political parties within the legislature reach consensus on the person being 
appointed, or provision for a nominating committee to lead the process, together with 
an extensive consultation process. One of the best alternatives is one where the 
ombudsman is appointed, not by the government, but through a unanimous resolution 
of Parliament. However, in contrast with standard practice, the selection process of 
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the Thai Ombudsman is designed to exclude the involvement of the House of 
Representatives to prevent political domination of the process by the ruling party 
through the rule of majority.33 
The Ombudsmen are selected by the resolution of the House of Senate who 
will pass a secret ballot in voting on one name out of three candidates nominated by 
a Selection Committee.34 The Selection Committee consists of the President of the 
Supreme Court, the President of the Constitutional Court, the President of the 
Administrative Court, the President of the House of Representatives, the Opposition 
Leader in the House of Representatives and two persons selected by the Courts.  
Such a process of appointment by nomination, without parliamentary oversight can 
be counter-productive, and poses a challenge to the Thai Ombudsman. The fact that 
the Senate has a membership that is half selected is already seen as a conspicuous 
source of controversy. 35 
It is worth noting that, though the constitutional objective to ensure that the 
Ombudsman is free from political party influence has been realized, the exclusion of 
the involvement of the House of Representatives in the selection process has 
arguably resulted in undesirable repercussions on the perceived impartiality of the 
Ombudsman. Critics, including MPs, activists and commentators, who favoured 
appointment by a majority of a legislative body, have proffered the view that the 
Ombudsman’s selection process is undemocratic 36  and that therefore the 
Ombudsman lacks legitimacy to scrutinize public office holders. 37    In fact, one 
commentator even remarked that the elaborate appointment system failed to secure 
impartiality.38 The issues of impartiality that arise from the controversial selection 
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process became increasingly evident in the difficulties the Ombudsman faced in 
performing its function of monitoring ethical standards of political office holder. In 
this role it has been questioned and doubted the impartiality from both the 
government and the opposition as well as general public (see discussion on 
monitoring the code of ethics in chapter 7). 
 It is argued further that the Selection Committee should not be dominated by 
judicial figures as it is currently constituted, and should instead consist of members 
from various kinds of professions.  The importance of this point is the fact that 
support for the ombudsman depends on the manner he/she is selected and the 
importance of power of those who choose them. 
As noted above, all incumbents have been accepted as being well qualified 
for the position and no challenges made to their qualifications. Nonetheless, the 
challenge posed to the Ombudsman lies with the design of the selection process. One 
commentator pointed out that39 with the Thai design of the selection process, it is 
difficult for the incumbent to be able to achieve trust by all parties, regardless of that 
person's possible professional qualifications, excellent personal skills and best 
intentions. In turn, it has been claimed that the selection process has impacted upon 
the effectiveness of the Ombudsman (as well as other watchdogs).40 
Conclusion 
After considering several components with regards to impartiality, it can be 
seen that many components that contribute to the perceived impartiality of the 
ombudsman are well in placed in the Thai scheme.  There are legislative measures to 
protect the Ombudsman from conflicts of interest. The post-holders appointed so far 
have been retired high-rank public officials who are considered established figures 
with a great deal of experiences in administration of state affairs. The legislation also 
enables the Ombudsman to act impartially without fear of easy dismissal, as 
discussed earlier.  But the most important problem lies in the Thai design of the 
selection process which could not create confidence in the impartiality of the 
Ombudsman. This problem is important because as we have seen the process of 
selection has weakened the Ombudsman’s perceived impartiality and, consequently, 
the role of the Ombudsman has been subjected to skepticism.  
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8.3 Effective powers 
The extent of the powers of ombudsman institutions varies, but all have the 
basic power to investigate, recommend corrective actions, and issue reports. The 
questions identified in chapter 3 will be applied to test the Thai Ombudsman scheme 
in terms of its provision for investigatory powers and the ability to secure 
implementation of its recommendations through reporting to the legislature and 
public criticism. 
Power to investigate 
Without coercive power, the Ombudsman is compensated with strong 
investigatory powers. As identified in chapter 3, there are several factors which, 
taken as a whole, serve to secure the investigatory power of an ombudsman. In order 
to assess if the Thai Ombudsman is equipped with sufficient investigatory powers, 
these factors are examined by asking the following questions: 
 Does the legislation provide the Ombudsman with the right to require all 
relevant information, documents and other materials from those subject to 
investigation? 
 Can the Ombudsman access all the public records necessary for an 
investigation? 
 Is the Ombudsman able to investigate regardless of complaints where 
required in the public interest? 
 Does the agency subject to the investigation have a corresponding duty to 
cooperate with or respond affirmatively to the Ombudsman’s reasonable 
request of evidence related to the case?  
 Have there ever been any problems in using these powers? 
The Thai Ombudsman is equipped with strong investigatory powers in order 
to correspond with its extensive jurisdiction which has extended beyond the 
administrative officials to include those from the legislature and the judiciary (see 
chapters 5 and 6). The Thai Ombudsman is empowered to start investigations on his 
own motion, even though the existence of injustice may be obvious.  41  This is also in 
line with most ombudsman schemes around the world in providing the Ombudsman 
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with the freedom to commence investigations even before a complaint is submitted 
(see Chapter 3). The Ombudsman may, at his discretion, consider and conduct an 
investigation irrespective of a complaint, where he is of the opinion that the act under 
investigation has caused injury to the public or it is necessary to conduct an 
investigation to protect public interests. This power enables the Thai Ombudsman to 
address underlying systemic problems within an organisation and public 
administration beyond an individual complaint, and thus supports the fulfilment of 
the Ombudsman’s dual roles of reactive redress and proactive administrative 
improvement.  As was described in Chapter 6, in practice, using this power the 
Ombudsman has instigated several own motion investigations to address major and 
systemic issues and to improve public administration.  
The Ombudsman is provided with full powers to obtain evidence and 
examine witnesses, to require all relevant information, documents and other 
materials from those subject to investigation and to access all the public records 
necessary for an investigation. 42  In order to enhance cooperation with the 
Ombudsmen’s investigation, in the performance of duties, the Ombudsman and 
officer are deemed the competent officials under the Penal Code.43  This means there 
are penalties for failure to cooperate with the Ombudsman’s request in his capacity 
as an officer or obstruction to the carrying out of the Ombudsmen’s duties e.g.  
imprisonment for a term of not exceeding six months or to a fine of not exceeding 
ten thousand Baht or to both.44 Therefore, potentially these are strong powers that 
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can be enforced in the courts. As with most ombudsman schemes there are 
restrictions to such powers when applied to matters being investigated which have an 
impact on the security of the State, public safety or international relations.  These 
investigatory powers are in line with ombudsman legislation elsewhere. 
To date the Ombudsman has reported that the Office receives good 
cooperation from affected agencies in submitting documents or evidence, and there 
has been no report on legal enforcement measures against agencies to obtain 
documents or evidence.45 Nevertheless, it should be noted that that there is no data 
available to show how quickly public bodies are responding to requests and also 
slowness in responding to the Ombudsman’s request by government officials was 
stated in the Annual Reports as a cause of delayed investigations.46 
Power to report 
Like similar legislation in other countries, the Ombudsman’s 
recommendations and findings cannot be enforced in law.  Instead, the Office of the 
Ombudsman, through a process found in the Ombudsman legislative framework, can 
use moral suasion to cajole and persuade the government agency concerned to 
provide a remedy and/or implement administrative reforms based upon its 
recommendations.  Should the Ombudsman be dissatisfied with the steps taken by the 
concerned agency to redress issues, this process of moral suasion is facilitated 
through the power to report to higher level in the government (such as director of the 
department and the minister or Prime Minister) and to parliament, coupled with the 
power of publication. In examining the effectiveness of the Thai Ombudsman’s 
powers to report, the following questions are applied. 
 
 Is there an expectation that the ombudsman’s recommendation be 
implemented? 
 Is the Ombudsman required to report to the legislature directly and regularly 
on the result of its operation or any specific matters resulting from an 
investigation? 
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 Can the Ombudsman report non-compliance to a hierarchically superior 
individual or body? 
 Can the Ombudsman report non-implementation to parliament? 
 Can the Ombudsman publicise non-compliance?  
 Is the Ombudsman required to publish an annual report? 
 Does the Ombudsman have effective monitoring techniques to follow up the 
implementation of its recommendation? 
Report on non-compliance 
The Ombudsman’s legislation meets this expectation by requiring that if, 
within a reasonable time after making the recommendations, the recommendations of 
the Ombudsman are not complied with or acted upon in the first instance, he may 
write to the Minister of the department concerned requiring that suitable action is 
taken. If this further communication does not lead to the desired result, the 
Ombudsman can send the case to the Prime Minister or other senior figure to 
encourage action to be taken.47 
 After waiting for some reasonable period of time, if the government fails to 
take any action to comply with the Ombudsman’s recommendation without 
reasonable ground and that matter is important or has a strong public interest 
dimension, the Ombudsman can use the last resort available: to submit a report on 
such matter to the Council of Ministers, the House of Representatives and the Senate 
for immediate consideration and may disclose the contents of such a report to the 
public.48 
By the above provision, the condition for escalation to the legislature is that 
the matter must be important or relate to the public interest, and the Ombudsman has 
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 The Organic Act on Ombudsmen 2552 B.E. (2009), Section 33(paragraph one) In the case where a 
government official, official or employee of a government agency, State agency, State enterprise or 
local government organisation fails to comply with the opinion  or recommendation of the 
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discretion to determine whether or not the matter meets the condition.  At first glance 
this may seem to limit the power of the Ombudsman. But given the time constraints 
on parliament and the likelihood of an individual grievance attracting its attention 
without wider impact, this is arguably a reasonable approach and one which is 
replicated elsewhere. In the UK, for instance, in similar circumstances the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman ‘may, if he thinks fit, lay before each House of 
Parliament a special report’49. The Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 does not 
specify that a matter of public interest is involved, but the history of the use of the 
power by the Ombudsman is such that in practice special reports have not been 
submitted to Parliament unless the matter has been of some considerable significance.  
In addition, there are other channels available for the Ombudsman to secure 
implementation of his recommendations, such as referring to the Administrative 
Court or reporting non-compliance in his annual report. Besides if the Ombudsman is 
of an opinion that to preserve public interest, law or by law needs to be revised or 
amended, the Ombudsmen can inform the law reform organisation for further 
proceedings to make an urgent report to the Council of Ministers, the House of 
Representatives and the Senate for information, if such agency fails to proceed with 
that recommendation within a reasonable period.50 
                The Ombudsman’s unpublished record shows that since established the 
Ombudsman has furnished 77 non-compliance reports to the prime minister and 
concerned ministers, and 7  non-compliance reports to parliament out of the total 
process cases of 1,440 cases found against public bodies.51  This represents 5.3 % of 
non-compliance with the Ombudsman’s recommendation. A rate of 5.3 % of non-
compliance with the Ombudsman’s recommendation is relative ly high when 
compared with other successful ombudsmen i.e. in the UK the compliance rate is 
99 %.52  
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  Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, s.10 (3). 
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  The Organic Act on Ombudsmen 2552 B.E. (2009), Section  32 In  the case where the Ombudsmen 
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   From April 1999 to November 2012. 
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 Trevor Buck, Richard Kirkham and Brian Thompson, The Ombudsman Enterprise and 
Administrative Justice, Ashgate, Surrey, 2011. 
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                Of these cases there is no information available on what actions have been 
taken by the Prime Minister or parliament following the reports, therefore it is not 
possible to tell how many were eventually settled and how many left outstanding.  As 
such, there is not enough information to tell us what we need to know about the 
implementation of the Ombudsman’s recommendation. It is also worth to note here 
that the Ombudsman has never published its compliance rate or made estimations. 
The Ombudsman’s annual reports only stated that most of the recommendations have 
been complied with. This is because the Ombudsman currently does not 
systematically monitor the implementation of his recommendations  (though the 
Ombudsman is required by law to include in the annual report the implementation of 
his recommendation by government agencies, this will be discussed under ‘Annual 
report’),53 which means that information on rejection or compliance is not readily 
available.54 Therefore, at present it would appear impossible to verify whether this 
speculation of non-compliance rate is accurate.  
           In itself this is problematic and out of line with the operation of many 
ombudsman schemes. There are a number of risks here. First, failure to monitor 
compliance creates the danger that many grievances are left unresolved. It might be 
assumed that where a remedy is not made available then the aggrieved party should 
be in a position to submit a further complaint to rectify the matter, hence compliance 
can be measured by the lack of complaints made to the ombudsman about non-
compliance. But not only is this a dangerous assumption given the relative positions 
of power of the complainant and the public agency concerned, the lack of data on the 
issue stored by the ombudsman makes this argument impossible to substantiate.   
A further risk is that in redressing popular grievances and correcting the 
maladministration of individual government departments, if the ombudsman does not 
closely monitor the implementation of his recommendations and seeks feedback 
from the complainants about whether the maladministration has been properly dealt 
with, it is more difficult for the Office to demonstrate to the general public that it is 
making a difference. As such it might fail to meet the expectations of the people and 
end up being seen as a ‘toothless tiger’ in the public’s eye.   
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 Ombudsman Sriracha Charoenpanich and Dr. Issarabhath Teerabhathsiri, Director, the Ombudsman 
Office, interviews with the author on 3 March 2013, at the Ombudsman Office, Bangkok. 
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 Wasan Thepmanee, Public Relations Officer , the Ombudsman Office, an interview with the author 
on 3 March 2013, at the Ombudsman Office, Bangkok 
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Currently, the Ombudsman is considering putting in place a system to 
monitor implementation of its recommendations.55 
Annual report 
The Ombudsman has a duty to submit annually an annual report which shall 
include the recommendations that have not been implemented and indicate the 
relevant public agencies that did not co-operate during the investigation process or 
failed to follow the Ombudsman’s recommendation. 56   The Act requires that the 
annual report shall be published in the Government Gazette and shall be disclosed to 
the public.  
In practice, the Ombudsman has never denounced an administrative body for 
non-compliance in their annual reports, as the Ombudsman took the view that this 
would not be beneficial in their attempt to create a good relationship with public 
agencies.57 Another reason could be attributed to the fact that the Ombudsman does 
not have a system to monitor compliance as mentioned above (‘Power to report’). 
The means the fact that the Ombudsman has not made critical report denouncing any 
public bodies probably does not truly reflect that there are no problems for the 
Ombudsman in getting his decisions complied with.   
It is not uncommon among ombudsman schemes that the annual report does 
not attract much attention and the Thai Ombudsman may be right not to use the 
annual report in such a way that can result in undermine the image of the concerned 
public bodies unless it is a serious case which the Ombudsman can issue special 
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  Ombudsman Sriracha Charoenpanich, an interview with the author on 3 March 2013 at the 
Ombudsman Office, Bangkok. 
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 The Organic Act on Ombudsmen 2552 B.E. (2009), Section 43, the Ombudsman is required to 
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 Ombudsman Sriracha Charoenpanich, an interview with the author on 3 March 2013, at the 
Ombudsman Office, Bangkok. 
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reports. But it can also be argued that the ombudsman annual report is an important 
means to provide full information of its operation as intended by the Constitution. 
And for this reason, if there is any non-compliance without justifiable reasons or any 
repetitive failure to perform it, an annual report should reflect so. However, as noted 
above neither the information on the result of escalation to the Prime Minister and 
Parliament nor the information regarding implementation rate is readily available.  
Without enough information, it is difficult for the Parliament, or the public make any 
assessments about the Ombudsman’s work. 
In addition to the above, it should be noted here that while there is the 
requirement for the Ombudsman to submit an annual report to both Houses of 
Parliament, there is no formal process by which such a report could be reviewed.  To 
date there is little evidence that the parliament has reviewed the work of the 
ombudsman (this issue will be addressed later under ‘Accountability’).   
Special report 
In addition to an annual report, the Thai Ombudsman is endowed with power 
to report a matter that the Ombudsman considers ‘urgent or beneficial to the 
administration of the State's affairs’.58  
In practice, the Ombudsman has used this power in conjunction with the self-
initiated investigation power (as noted above) to take a proactive approach to tackle 
problems which the Ombudsman has considered to have affected the Thai society as 
a whole and which require urgent attention from the government.  Such 
investigations have resulted in several special reports which the Ombudsman has 
submitted to the House of Representatives, the Senate and the Council of Ministers 
for consideration and also made available to public (see Chapter 6 for more 
discussion of this power in practice).  
The significance of this Section is that it gives the Ombudsman the power to 
report directly to both Houses, without having to first submit the Ombudsman’s 
reports to public agencies. Hence, if the Ombudsman considers the matters 
concerned are urgent then he can submit such reports separately from the annual 
report.  In practice, this power has proved to be useful for the Ombudsman. So far the 
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 The Organic Act on Ombudsmen 2552 B.E. (2009), Section 43. The Ombudsmen may, if it deems 
appropriate, make a report on any specific matter to the Council o f Ministers, the House of 
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Ombudsman has published five special reports which the Ombudsman has submitted 
to Parliament and disseminated to the public. However, so far only one of these 
reports is known to have been implemented (for more analysis see Chapter 6).59 
There is no record that parliament has responded nor made comments on the reports 
or the Ombudsman has been summoned to inform Parliament of the reports.60   
From the above discussion, there are two issues worth further consideration 
in relation to the Ombudsman’s power to report. Firstly, normally the 
implementation of the ombudsman’s recommendation depends on primarily two 
factors: the solidity of evidence and the practicality  of the recommendation; and also 
and probably more importantly the support from parliament.  As for the case of 
Thailand these two factors seem to be problematic. It appeared that the special 
reports have issues of evidence and practicality (see chapter 7) and secondly, the 
weak link with parliament does not seem to encourage Parliament to take much 
interest in the matter.  (The Ombudsman is located outside Parliament’s umbrella and 
the selection process is designed to exclude the House of Representative’s 
involvement, see above discussion on independence.)     
Conclusion 
The Thai Ombudsman is endowed with equivalent or greater powers than 
most traditional ombudsmen in the support of its jurisdiction to undertake the task of 
resolving complaints as well as monitoring relevant systemic investigations powers.  
However, strong formal powers do not necessarily mean that the ombudsman’s 
power to influence is correspondingly strong. In the Thai case, it is difficult to 
ascertain the persuasive power of the Thai Ombudsman. In addition, the 
Ombudsman’s special reports do not seem to have had much effect. There is 
evidence to suggest that there are difficulties for the Thai Ombudsman in exercise the 
power to report. The Ombudsman’s annual reports have not been reviewed by 
Parliament.     As a result, the Ombudsman lacks sufficient political pressure 
meanwhile as a young institution its performance may not have built enough 
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 The Ombudsman’s Special Report on the Solution of Waste Water Crisis in Nakorn  Pathom 
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credibility to command strong public pressure. This is a matter which may be related 
to the constitutional position of the ombudsman.  These are issues that will be 
returned to in Chapter 9, as it goes to the heart of questions about the effectiveness of 
the Thai Ombudsman scheme. 
 
8.4 Fairness 
Fairness in the context referred to in this Section concerns the procedural 
manner in which an ombudsman conducts its work and not the fairness of individual 
decisions. In order to ensure that the decisions of the scheme are fair and are seen to 
be fair, here fairness will be tested using the following criteria. 
 Are the complainants advised of the reasons why the Ombudsman has 
decided not to investigate, cease to investigate the complaint or consider the 
complaint outside jurisdiction?  
 Are respective parties provided with an opportunity to present their 
arguments and evidence? 
These requirements are largely catered for in the Ombudsman’s legislations.61 
Detailed guidance outlining the procedure to be followed and the decision-making 
factors to apply for handling compliant and conduct investigation are provided and 
will be discussed below.  
Reject, cease to investigate and matters outside jurisdiction 
The Ombudsman has full discretion whether to accept a complaint for 
investigation, as in the 2009 Act Section 29, and to cease investigation if he finds no 
maladministration or injustice as in Section 28. In the event that the Ombudsman 
decides to cease an investigation because he is of the opinion that there is no 
administrative wrongdoing or unfairness, Section 31 expressly specifies that the 
citizen and the administration must be informed of the result of any investigation 
with ‘the detailed reason why such act is lawful and fair shall also be clarified to the 
complainant’.  This requirement to state reasons for decisions as laid down in the 
2009 Act is mirrored in the Ombudsman’s Regulation on Submission, Admission 
and Investigation of Complaints 2545 B.E. (2002), Sections 23, 24 and 25.  
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 The Organic Act of the Ombudsmen 2552 B.E. (2009), Section 31; and the Ombudsman’s 
Regulation on Submission, Admission and Investigation of Complaints 2545 B.E. (2002). 
243 
 
Right to present arguments and evidence 
The Ombudsman has discretion to resolve complaints without full 
investigation, as the Ombudsman does not need further evidence. However, in 
investigating the complaint, the law requires that the Ombudsman provides 
respective parties with an opportunity to present their arguments and evidence. The 
2009 Act, Section 31, ensures that both sides have the opportunity to input into the 
process: 
Section 31. The Ombudsmen … shall enable the 
complainant, government official, government organisation 
to give statement and present evidence in relation to their 
statement as appropriate. 
This provision is amplified by the Ombudsman’s Regulation on Submission, 
Admission and Investigation of Complaints 2545 B.E. (2002).  The Ombudsman’s 
Regulation on Submission, Admission and Investigation of Complaints 2545 B.E. 
(2002)  Section 16 requires the investigator to invite in writing to the authority and 
those affected by the complaints to clarify the points in the complaints and submit a 
counter-affidavit. Such a counter-affidavit must be submitted within 30 days from 
receipt of the complaints, a period which can be extended if necessary.  Under this 
Section, the complainants and the officials subject to investigation are allowed to 
make statements verbally, if the Ombudsman deems it appropriate.  In practice, the 
Ombudsman has always emphasised giving the complainant such an opportunity to 
make an oral statement, as it is deemed that the inquisitorial method should not base 
solely on documents.62 
Conclusion 
Both the enabling legislation and the Office’s procedural manual have 
measures to make sure that the decisions of the scheme are fair and are seen to be fair. 
The Ombudsman must provide reason for rejecting a complaint, ceasing to 
investigate and/or finding it outside jurisdiction, and the respective parties are 
provided with a right to present arguments and evidence. The Thai scheme therefore 
meets all the elements of this test.   To date there is no evidence of expressed concern 
about the fairness of the Ombudsman’s procedure. No complainant or local authority, 
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thus far, has sought judicial review in the Courts against the fairness of decisions of 
the Thai Ombudsman.   
 
8.5 Accountability  
The issue of the accountability is a key concern for an ombudsman, with its 
long term credibility partially dependent on the capacity of the office to demonstrate 
the efficacy of its operation. In analyzing this issue, in Chapter 3 a series of 
important tests were identified.  
 Is the Ombudsman required to report to the legislature directly and regularly 
on the result of its operation or any specific matters resulting from an 
investigation? 
 Does parliament allocate budget for the Ombudsman? 
 Is the Ombudsman required to report regularly to parliament? 
 Is the Ombudsman required to publish an annual report? 
The Thai Ombudsman can be held accountable though various ways, in 
particular: 1) parliament scrutiny; 2) removal by the Senate; 3) judicial review; and 4) 
external audit. 
Parliamentary scrutiny 
The primary accountability of the Thai Ombudsman is through its annual 
report. The 2009 Act, Section 43 requires the Ombudsman to report to the House of 
Representative and the Senate within March each year through the submission of an 
annual report.63 The annual report must show the outcome of the performance of its 
legislative function as well as the obstacles the Ombudsman encountered during the 
year. Section 43 also requires that the annual report shall be published in the 
Government Gazette and shall be disclosed to the public.  
In practice, the Ombudsman’s annual reports are submitted to the House of 
Representatives, the Senate and the Cabinet each year for information and discussion. 
They give details of its performance over the past 12 months, including financial 
reports and statistical information about the complaints received. Presenting the 
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Annual report is the only occasion when the Ombudsman is in contact with 
parliament.  To date, however, parliament neither acts nor proposes any actions in 
support of the Ombudsman (nor does the Ombudsman request this). 
  Thai legislation provides parliament as a mechanism of accountability to 
ensure that the office meets the expectation of standard ombudsman practice. 
However, the difficulty faced with many ombudsman schemes is that parliament 
does not pay sufficient attention to their annual reports, which reflects that the 
relationship between the Ombudsman and parliament is not that strong. This also is 
the case for the Thai Ombudsman. There have been occasions when the reports of the 
Ombudsman have been placed on the pending agenda; they have not been discussed 
by the House of Representatives (March 2010 and March 2011). 64  It means that no-
one is properly calling the Ombudsman to account – how can we be confident that 
they are doing a good job?  This issue will be returned to in chapter 9. 
Removal by the Senate 
As discussed under section 8.2.1, the Ombudsman, along with other holders 
of constitutional positions, are potentially subject to removal by a resolution of the 
Senate on grounds of misconduct, such as unusual wealthiness, or purports to 
commit corruption, malfeasance in office, malfeasance in judicial office or an 
intentional exercise of power contrary to the provisions of the Constitution or law, or 
gravely violates or fails to observe ethical standards. While parliamentary scrutiny 
tends to exercise control of the overall performance of the Ombudsman, 
impeachment proceedings are designed to tackle  an individual incumbent’s 
behaviour. 
In practice, it would be interesting to see how effective the impeachment 
proceedings of the Senate would be. The Senate is tasked with endorsing the 
nomination and selection of the most senior members of the independent 
constitutional agencies including the Ombudsman (see selection process discussed 
above). But one appointed, the Chief Ombudsmen is a component of the Selection 
Committee for the appointment of the Senate.65 Consequently, the Ombudsman will 
be removed by the Senators it is supposed to appoint.   This is seen to be ‘a clear 
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conflict of interest’. 66 Scholars and politicians have proffered the view that this 
patronage relationship has significantly damaged the effectiveness of the 
accountability of the Ombudsman, and in turn undermined the Ombudsman’s 
credibility. 67 For some this is an issue that will have to be rectified to secure the 
legitimacy of the Ombudsman 68  and is central to the ongoing constitutional 
amendment debate. I will return to this matter in Chapter 9. 
Judicial review 
Activities of the Ombudsman can be subject to judicial review.  Challenging 
the Ombudsman’s decisions in courts is rare, as recommendations of the Ombudsman 
are not binding, and public bodies dissatisfied with the recommendation can lawfully 
choose to ignore them.  To date only one action against the Ombudsman has been 
brought to the Constitutional Court requesting the Court’s ruling as to whether an 
Ombudsman is competent to bring before an administrative court a case against the 
Auditor General.69  However, the Constitutional Court rejected the application on the 
ground that the applicant was not permitted by the conditions and criteria of the 
Constitution70 to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court. Since the Court refused 
to address the case, the subject matter of the case whether the Ombudsman has 
jurisdiction over the Auditor General was not decided. 
External Audit 
 The Ombudsman Office is subjected to the scrutiny of the Auditor-General in 
so far as its management of its resources is concerned. So far there is no evidence 
that the Auditor has ever expressed any concerns. 
Conclusion 
While the Ombudsman is required to report to the legislature, in practice 
parliament has not paid sufficient attention to the work of the Ombudsman, in terms 
of both support and scrutiny. This outcome may be a result of the lack of a formal 
relationship with the legislature, and therefore a direct result of constitutional design. 
According to the 2007 Constitution the Ombudsman is not a parliamentary 
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ombudsman that investigates complaints on behalf of parliament, rather it is a 
constitutional independent organisation that scrutinises the ethical conduct of 
members of parliament. Therefore the legislature may not feel that it has to support 
the Ombudsman’s recommendations.  This lack of association with Parliament opens 
the door for questioning and attacks by political opponents regarding the efficacy of 
the Ombudsman’s operation.  This situation is further complicated by the removal 
process which is viewed by some as not being effective in calling the Ombudsman to 
account. How these provisions might be rectified or at least improved will be further 
explored in Chapter 9. 
8.6 Conclusion 
We have seen that, from a theoretical point of view, the 2007 Constitution 
and the 2009 Act satisfy most of the requirements of an effective ombudsman 
institution. The Constitution itself has created the independent Office of the 
Ombudsman. Each office holder is appointed by a special selection committee and 
by Parliament. There are measures to safeguard the independence from the executive 
branch, such as the process of appointment and removal from office,  provisions for 
autonomy in personnel administration, budgeting and other activities. The 
Ombudsman has discretion in every investigatory process.  The resources available 
to the Ombudsman are solely decided upon by the discretion of Parliament in its 
annual budgetary appropriations. The Ombudsman has strong investigatory power. 
The legislative provisions are also strong in terms of procedural fairness.  The 
Ombudsman does not have an enforcement power, but he has power to refer matters 
to ministerial or prime ministerial level to require action. If this fails, a report may be 
placed before parliament and the Ombudsman may publicise it as he sees fit.  
An examination of the practice of the Ombudsman also has suggested that the 
Office’s legislative framework has proved an effective basis for the functioning of 
the Ombudsman scheme. However, there are some aspects which are controversial 
and have proved to be crucial in the effectiveness of the Ombudsman, namely the 
method for appointing the Ombudsman which is not perceived by all to foster 
impartiality; the separation from parliament, which has resulted in difficulties in 
getting political support and attention for the office; and the process to remove the 
Ombudsman by the Senate which also potentially damages the Ombudsman’s 
accountability. Besides, the Ombudsman does not have an implementation follow up 
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system which undermines the Ombudsman’s practical effectiveness. The difficulties 
that these issues raise and how they could be ameliorated will be analysed further in 
Chapter 9. 
With the empirical study of the Thai Ombudsman completed, in the next Part 
of the thesis the findings of the empirical study will be collated and an assessment 
made of both the role and the institutional design of the Thai Office of the 
Ombudsman. This assessment will lead to some recommendations for the future of 
the Thai Ombudsman scheme.  Finally, observations for consideration of the wider 
study of the ombudsman enterprise will be mooted.  
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Chapter 9 
 Evaluating the Office of the Thai Ombudsman 
 
„If an ombudsman office does not add value to the process of improving                          
governance, and then show how it has done so, it may wither and die.‟1 
 
As has been pointed out at the beginning of the thesis, the Thai ombudsman 
has been faced with the risk of abolition twice since its establishment. The first 
occasion happened after ten years during the process of drafting the 2007 
Constitution; and the second time during a parliamentary debate on the amendment 
of the 2007 Constitution in 2013.  Both proposals were made on the grounds that the 
performance of the institution was not good enough in terms of fulfilling its mandate. 
Both these events raised questions about the objectives and the institutional design of 
the Thai Ombudsman scheme, and queries as to whether the office was fulfilling its 
objectives.  These questions are at the heart of this evaluating Chapter, in which I 
review and pull together the findings presented during the course of this thesis. The 
Chapter also reflects upon the implications of the findings and offers some 
alternatives for future reform of the Thai Ombudsman. 
Based on the empirical findings, arguments and conclusions as to the 
operation of the Thai ombudsman drawn from the previous Chapters (Chapter 6, 7 
and 8), this thesis contends that there is evidence to suggest that the ombudsman has 
done a good job in resolving grievances from administrative wrongs and that there 
remains a strong role for the ombudsman to perform. This general conclusion will be 
dealt with in Chapter 10, together with the evidence of the office‟s success. Further, 
the ombudsman has become one of the most important institutions in Thailand for 
the protection of constitutional rights.  
Notwithstanding these strengths, however, there are some shortcomings 
which need to be ironed out and the purpose of this Chapter is to highlight the 
Office‟s shortcomings in order to provide a critique of the ombudsman system in 
Thailand and to explore the options for reform and evolution of the office. In doing 
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so, the Chapter uses the findings in this thesis to reflect back upon standard 
theoretical thinking on the ombudsman and develop our understanding of the manner 
in which ombudsman schemes operate and the limits to this model of dispute 
resolution.  
Towards this end, this Chapter begins by analysing the various problems with 
the Office‟s performance and weaknesses in its institution design that compromise 
the ombudsman‟s essential features and undermine its ability to fulfil its potential. 
Then the difficulties and challenges faced in performing some of the Ombudsman‟s 
new roles are brought forward, which is followed by combined conclusions on the 
cumulative challenges that the office faces. This analysis leads to some suggested 
alternatives for the future of the Thai Ombudsman, including proposed solutions for 
reform. This Chapter ends by exploring the implications for the study of 
ombudsmandry as a whole.  
 
9.1 Issues of institutional design  
Much has been written on the ombudsman. As Chapter 3 outlined, a standard 
and dominant supposition in the work on the ombudsman is that institutional design 
is important for the success of an ombudsman scheme. As a starting point, therefore, 
this thesis has examined the robustness of the institutional arrangements that are set 
up around ombudsman schemes, as taken from best practice in the area. Chapter 3 
laid out a series of benchmarks by which the credibility of a scheme could be tested, 
ideas distilled from leading guidance on the topic. This checklist of ideas was applied 
in Chapter 6 and 8, with the findings presented in this study showing that overall the 
Office of the Thai Ombudsman conforms very much to the standard ombudsman 
model i.e. facilitating complaint services which are free of charges, easy to access, 
independent and impartial.  
However, what this thesis has identified is that under the current arrangement 
there are three aspects of the Thai Ombudsman‟s design that are not in line with 
recommended practice:  
1) the selection process for the Ombudsman suggests that the aura of 
impartiality around the Office may have been compromised;  
2) the removal process may undermine the credibility of the Ombudsman as it 
compromises effective accountability;  
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3) the separation of the office of the Ombudsman from Parliament can make it 
more difficult for the office to obtain sufficient political support and carry out 
effective parliamentary scrutiny. 
Individually and collectively, these shortcomings have the potential to negatively 
affect the credibility and effectiveness of the institution. 
9.1.1 Selection process for the Ombudsman 
The selection process for an institution such as the ombudsman is the starting 
point for establishing impartiality.  
According to the constitutional arrangements that have been put in place to 
establish independent constitutional organisations in Thailand, including the 
Ombudsman, it can be seen that one of the chief ambitions in designing these new 
institutions was a desire for them to be „impartial‟ (Chapter 8).  The findings of 
Chapter 8 show that the Thai Constitution has put in place almost all the standard 
recommended elements required to provide sufficient safeguard for an ombudsman 
scheme to retain the perception of impartiality. However, in doing so the drafters of 
the 2007 Constitution opted for an arrangement which made the Ombudsman 
independent, not just of the Executive, but of the leading political branch of the state, 
the House of Representatives. This is because under Chapter V of the 2007 
Constitution, alongside Parliament, the Independent Organisations are designed as 
mechanisms to oversee the Executive and the drafters chose a solution that 
minimised the potential for the Executive to exercise direct or indirect influence over 
the appointment process. Therefore, the selection processes for the heads of the listed 
Independent Organisations, including the Ombudsman, are designed to minimise the 
involvement of the House of Representatives to prevent the political domination of 
the process by the ruling party through partisan influence indulged in by 
parliamentarians.  
What this thesis has found is that this selection process may indeed shield the 
Ombudsman from direct political partisan control, but it has not necessarily 
reinforced the perceived impartiality of the Ombudsman. In this respect the Selection 
Committee, which is designated as an autonomous committee responsible for 
selection, does appear to conform to best practice insofar as it resolves the need to 
minimize the potential of the unfavourable impact of executive dominance in 
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selection of watchdogs.2  But as happens in Thailand, when we look at the make-up 
of the committee in more detail, its weakness lies in its composition and the small 
number of its committee members.   
The current process is organised through a seven-member Selection 
Committee, which is largely composed by judges and whose decisions are endorsed 
by a resolution of the House of Senate (Chapter 8). The small number of members on 
the Committee is viewed as potentially susceptible to external interference. This is 
because the Ombudsman is not selected by majority. Therefore, there is a fear that it 
would only require four of the members of the committee to be manipulated for the 
outcome of the selection process to be controllable externally.  Further, the 
Committee‟s judge-dominated composition has been criticised as not conforming to 
the need for inclusiveness.  As discussed in Chapter 8, being judge dominated and 
lacking in diversity, therefore, this selection process makes it harder to satisfy a 
wider range of stakeholders, especially political figures, that a suitable choice of 
persons has been considered and that the final appointment is non-aligned.  
Such perceived deficiencies in the selection process have provoked public 
criticism and discontent towards the independent organisations, and has in turn raised 
questions regarding their legitimacy.3  Politicians have used this lack of perceived 
impartiality against the Ombudsman, claiming that it was not legitimated, in 
particular, to scrutinise the ethical behaviour of Parliamentarians.  As mentioned in 
Chapter 8, in fact this lack of faith in the formation of independent organisations has 
made it difficult for the incumbents of all Constitutional watchdogs to be able to 
achieve trust by all parties since the appointment process has not helped to ensure 
that the person selected is widely viewed as impartial, which is considered to be the 
essence of the independent watchdogs.4  It is important to stress that apart from the 
problem that the process does not allow involvement of all parties, especially 
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politicians, there is no other allegation of impartiality. The issue, therefore, is 
predominantly one of perception but as pointed out previously (Chapter 3), 
perception that the stakeholders and general public hold of impartiality of an 
ombudsman is critical because an ombudsman must not only be impartial but also be 
perceived as impartial.  
 
9.1.2 Removal process 
The study finds that another institutional weakness of the Ombudsman lies in 
the removal process used to tackle the, hopefully rare, situation when an office-
holder no longer enjoys sufficient support for the performance of its work. According 
to best practice in ombudsman design, the removal process should be designed in 
such a way to safeguard the independence of the Ombudsman, while retaining the 
threat of removal as a significant means by which to make the Ombudsman 
accountable.5 This means reducing to a minimum the involvement of the executive, 
because the executive is most likely to have a vested interest in the choice of office-
holder. In order to secure independence, the removal authority is normally vested 
with the appointing body, or at least away from the executive. In the Thai 
framework, all incumbents of Independent Constitutional Organisations, including 
the Ombudsman, can be dismissed from office by the Senate. However, the removal 
powers of the Senate is arguably delegitimised by the chain of bonds between the 
Ombudsman and the Senate.6 This conclusion follows because, once in office, the 
Chief Ombudsman, as well as other incumbents of the Independent Constitutional 
Organisations, are endowed with the power to appoint the Senate.  Such a process 
creates a patronage relationship in which the Independent Organisations are 
responsible for selecting the members of the body which is primarily responsible for 
holding them to account. This circular relationship undermines the claims to the 
effectiveness of the accountability process, and in turn significantly damages the 
credibility and legitimacy of the Independent Organisations, including the 
Ombudsman. This claim is partially supported by the lack of any real evidence that 
the Senate has ever spent much, if any, time calling the Ombudsman to account. 
Indeed, the Senate Select Committee has no more formal responsibility with regard 
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to the Ombudsman, after the selection process has been completed. This issue of 
accountability is important, as it has been shown elsewhere that an important part of 
the ombudsman‟s armoury in securing its long-term legitimacy is its ability to be 
called to account.7  But the goal of accountability becomes all the more important 
when the Ombudsman is empowered to investigate allegations of ethical 
misconducts of the public office holders and bureaucrats, as it is in Thailand. On the 
one hand, the public and leading stakeholders need to be reassured that this important 
power is wielded appropriately; on the other, the allegation of unaccountability is an 
easy weapon with which to target the Ombudsman. The current arrangement leaves it 
open to those who wish to attack the integrity of the office.8   
Both the selection process and the removal process for the Ombudsman have 
been designed in theory to prevent the Ombudsman from the unfavourable impact of 
political influence in order to strengthen its independence and impartiality. However, 
in practice the methods used have had an unintended effect that undermines its 
perceived impartiality and accountability, two attributes which are essential for an 
ombudsman to perform effectively. 
 
9.1.3 Separation of the Ombudsman from Parliament 
The design for the Ombudsman scheme in Thailand, therefore, has attempted 
to embed independence but perversely has done so in a way that both risks the 
perception of the integrity of the office and has created cause for the elected branch 
of the state to be suspicious of the Ombudsman. This latter observation leads to two 
further matters relating to the relationship between the Ombudsman and Parliament 
which warrant consideration: the ability of the office to obtain political support and 
the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny of the Ombudsman‟s work.  
Under the 2007 Constitution, the Thai Ombudsman is located within Chapter 
XI, which is designated for Independent Constitutional Organisations. Such an 
arrangement creates a clear image of separation from Parliament and suggests that 
the Ombudsman is no longer an agent of Parliament. As argued above, this design 
structure has been chosen to distinguish very clearly the Ombudsman from the 
„political‟ branch of the state, a structure in particular relevant to the role of the 
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Ombudsman in relation to policing the enforcement of the ethics of members of 
Parliament.9  However, with reference to the common legal framework for 
ombudsman schemes, the 2007 Constitution tends to use Parliament as a key 
mechanism through which to enforce the Ombudsman‟s recommendations and to 
hold the Ombudsman to account. In particular, the Ombudsman is required to report 
to Parliament each year through the submission of an annual report. But the impact 
of this process in Thailand has been negligible, as there have been occasions when 
the annual reports of the Ombudsman have been placed on the pending agenda and 
they have not been discussed by the House of Representatives.10 Likewise, special 
reports of the Ombudsman have never been discussed in Parliament.  
While this lack of attention to the work of the office may not be too dissimilar 
to that for many ombudsmen in other jurisdictions, the outcome reflects a 
relationship between the Ombudsman and Parliament which is not necessarily 
strong.11 This outcome suggests that the Thai arrangement does not encourage 
Parliament‟s engagement in the Ombudsman‟s work. This lack of engagement is 
problematic in many aspects. The lack of engagement means that it is unclear that 
anyone is properly calling the Ombudsman to account and in turn does not help 
foster an environment of legitimacy around the office.  Further, the lack of 
parliamentary attention not only results in insufficient scrutiny but also means that 
the office lacks a crucial source of support. One of the findings of Chapter 8 was that 
the Ombudsman‟s special reports had not been reviewed by Parliament, despite in 
principle Parliament being able to make use of the reports and to support the 
Ombudsman‟s work in return. This is problematic, as one of the purposes of the 
ombudsman generally is to provide for a source of information and insight into the 
work of the executive that can be used to enhance the scrutiny of the executive by a 
range of constitutional players, including Parliament. This does not seem to be 
happening in Thailand, 
Another consequence that may follow if Parliament (in case the government 
is the majority in Parliament) does not pay attention to, or support the work of the 
Ombudsman, is that the public authorities that are under the control of the 
government may be encouraged to ignore or fail to comply or cooperate with the 
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work and recommendations of the Ombudsman. This tendency can be explained by 
the fact that the effective delivery of the soft power techniques operated by the 
Ombudsman, presumably involves a certain degree of appeal to reason and also a 
certain degree of expectation that a higher authority will ultimately support the 
Ombudsman's decision (anticipatory persuasion). Therefore the Ombudsman is 
dependent on political support both direct and indirectly, despite its need for 
independence and clear separation from government. In Thailand, while the Office of 
the Ombudsman is generally said to be respected, the Ombudsman‟s annual reports 
refer to the continuing failure by some government agencies to respond in a timely 
manner to requests by the Ombudsman for explanations or to resolve problems 
identified by the Office.12 (However it should be noted here that there is not enough 
information to identify the cause of such delay, this conclusion must therefore be 
treated as tentative). 
In the long term, it could be that the lack of an active relationship between the 
Ombudsman and Parliament may not be a major weakness of the Thai Ombudsman 
but rather a feature which is compensated for by other aspects of the scheme. Around 
the world, other ombudsman schemes do exist that operate successfully without the 
active support of a parliament.  For example, in Australia where the Ombudsman is 
strong and there is government goodwill and therefore the Ombudsman rarely faces 
difficulties in persuading the government to accept its findings and 
recommendation.13 In such a situation, it may seem that parliamentary support would 
not be particularly necessary for the Ombudsman‟s effectiveness, albeit it must not 
be forgotten that the status of an officer of parliament in many countries has helped 
strengthen the position and status of an ombudsman.14   At the least, it is widely 
accepted that the support of parliament is an advantage, if not a prerequisite of a 
successful Ombudsman. As in the case of Thailand, arguably as matters stand, a clear 
structural separation from Parliament is in fact only a matter of image but does not 
lead to much of a difference in substance (i.e. in term of endorsement and reporting). 
However, such separation may result in negative consequences, as it tends to give a 
psychological effect on the side of MPs.  Parliament may feel that it does not own the 
Ombudsman or the Ombudsman does not perform in its interest. Should we be 
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surprised, therefore, that elected representatives regularly ignore the Ombudsman‟s 
work?  The point of this discussion is it could be timely to reconsider whether this 
arrangement is a sensible starting position for a young office. Lack of political 
support may be detrimental to the future success of the institution when it has yet to 
build its credibility and gain strong public support and command respect. 
 
9.2 Issues related to performance of functions 
The previous section outlined some conclusions that can be drawn from 
comparing the institutional design of the Thai Ombudsman scheme with best practice 
in global ombudsmandry. But this study has also explored the operational 
effectiveness of the Thai Ombudsman through a review of the output of office since 
its introduction. 
This thesis has distinguished two strands of ombudsman work: the traditional 
function of the office that has been associated with it since the earliest years of the 
ombudsman institutions and which is almost universally expected of the institution; 
and the additional functions that ombudsman offices around the world have been 
required to perform. 
With regards to its traditional role, the Thai Ombudsman and his staff appear 
to have handled a large number of complaints from citizens and can claim to have 
improved many of the government's administrative procedures (for a summary see 
Chapter  10). However, the study has also disclosed areas in the operation of the 
Ombudsman office that need to be addressed in order for the Office to achieve the 
potential of an ombudsman as a mechanism of administrative justice. These 
shortfalls include high backlogs in the number of complaints received by the office, 
insufficient statistical reporting and unimplemented special reports. Combined, such 
shortfalls in performance indicate an ombudsman scheme that might struggle to 
demonstrate its claims to legitimacy and authority.  
The delivery of successful performance of these aspects of the ombudsman‟s 
work is not an issue covered in depth by the standard guides on the recommended 
institutional design of the ombudsman of the office. Instead, they are features of the 
ombudsman‟s work that demonstrate that it is necessary to look beyond the basic 
institutional design of an office, as promulgated in legislation and global ombudsman 
guidance, when considering its effectiveness.  Indeed, the shortfalls that have been 
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identified in this work relate to aspects of the office that are considered key to its 
effectiveness in terms of the strength of its performance and ability to demonstrate 
impact.15 Thus while the objective and role of the ombudsman can be justified, the 
ombudsman needs to be capable of demonstrating the effectiveness and 
accountability of its performance in order to retain its legitimacy.16  Without such a 
narrative, it can be argued that delays in resolving grievances, a shortage of 
indicators to substantiate the office‟s distinctive value, and an inability to sufficiently 
generate and demonstrate a wide impact; are all outcomes that could contribute to an 
office being perceived as underperforming as a mechanism for the redress of 
administrative grievance and injustice.  
 
9.2.1 Backlog  
The Thai Ombudsman‟s formal procedures and powers are strong (Chapter 
8). The arrangements in place are in line with good practice in many ombudsman 
schemes in terms of target times for each of its processes and systems for tracking 
the progress of complaints to measure their own performance.17  However, the 
Ombudsman‟s statistics show that for the past four years from 2010-2014, the 
amount of pending complaints accounted for about half of the total amount received 
each year (Chapter 6, under „Investigation‟). By contrast, the cases which were 
completed within six months accounted for only 53.12% of total processing cases in 
that year,18 even though its internal working procedures prescribes that all 
complaints coming into the office must be finished from start to end within six 
months.19  The failure to meet set targets is indicative of an underperforming office 
because prompt complaint-handling is such a fundamental expectation of the office. 
These extended delays are not in line what it might be argued are implicit in general 
understandings of the principles of procedural fairness. In other words, a right to be 
heard implies a right to be heard and/or have a complaint handled within a 
reasonable time. Extended delays can put the credibility of the Ombudsman at risk 
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and result in discouraging complainants. It should be noted that in his annual reports 
the Ombudsman has not picked up backlog as a significant problem and therefore the 
reasons for the current backlog have not been identified.20 
 
9.2.2 Insufficient statistics and reporting   
Performance statistics are regularly used to support claims that an 
ombudsman office is operating effectively and thereby used to garner public support. 
Yet the database and the statistical reports used by the Thai Ombudsman have not 
been constructed in a way that can be employed to demonstrate fully its distinctive 
value. The Ombudsman‟s records provide general information ranging from the 
number of enquiries/complaints received/ screened out/ withdrawn/discontinued; the 
mode of lodging complaints; outcome of inquiries/complaints; area of concentration 
of caseload; and direct investigations completed. However, it is not possible to 
discover other important information, such as the proportion of the case load 
concerns relating to grievance resulting from injustice, as opposed to issues to do 
with legality, or cases resolved through preliminary inquiries, early settlement, or full 
investigation.  Thus while the information available gives a useful description of its 
remit, action and outcome, the information does not show the whole picture of the 
Ombudsman‟s operation.21 The need to do better and provide more informative data 
is illustrated by the following points. 
First, the Ombudsman‟s strength lies in its ability to provide justice in the 
grey area beyond hard law and beyond the jurisdiction of Administrative Courts. 
While there is evidence to suggest that the Ombudsman has been successful in 
assisting persons who were affected by an unintended anomaly in a legislative rule 
that could not be effectively addressed by judicial review to obtain a suitable remedy, 
the Ombudsman does not provide a classification of the caseload concerning issues 
relating to grievances resulting from injustice, as opposed to issues to do with 
legality that it has nevertheless successfully resolved. We do not know, therefore, 
how many cases the ombudsman resolves in which the complainant does not have a 
strict legal entitlement or an alternative redress route. Therefore, its distinctive value 
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in providing an effective remedy is not easily demonstrated by the statistics and 
thereby not easily appreciated.  The Ombudsman is only one of many channels 
through which the administrative grievances are resolved. Without showing its 
distinctive value, there will be always scepticism of the Ombudsman‟s utility.22 
 Secondly, despite the Ombudsman claiming that most of its 
recommendations have been complied with, the Office does not have a process in 
place to follow up on the implementation of its recommendations. As a result, the 
Ombudsman does not have the statistical records to show how many of its 
recommendations have been implemented and whether or not implementation is 
actually producing the results it had hoped for.23 This in turn negatively impacts the 
Ombudsman‟s effectiveness as a grievance redress mechanism and poses serious 
risks for its institutional credibility and image. Most ombudsman schemes can 
quantify in percentage their implementation rate because it is often advanced as a 
useful measure of how an ombudsman is doing, and as an indicator of the credibility 
of the ombudsman office.24 In this respect, some of the Asian Ombudsman 
Association‟s members, for example the Hong Kong Ombudsman, has been noted 
for their sophisticated computerised complaints management system of which 
experience could be advantageous to the Thai Office.25      
      
9.2.3 Unimplemented special reports  
The importance of the Ombudsman institution lies not just in the reactive role 
played by the Ombudsman in finding a satisfactory solution to an individual 
grievance, but in the proactive role played by the Ombudsman in identifying defects 
in the administration and recommending remedial measures or even changes in 
policy or interpretation of law. 
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On the positive side, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
recommendations by the Ombudsman with regards to redress of individual 
grievances have largely been ignored. Thus it may be reasonable to trust the 
Ombudsman‟s claim that most of his recommendations in this respect have been 
complied with. The findings also reveal that the Ombudsman has made some 
progress in securing administrative improvements with his systemic 
recommendations. These achievements are proudly reported as highlighted cases in 
the Ombudsman‟s annual reports.26  But on the downside, all four high-profile 
special reports that have been produced and submitted by the Thai Ombudsman 
during the past five years have remained undebated by the House of Representatives 
and unimplemented by public authorities.27  
As charted in Chapter 8, the reason for the high level of unimplemented 
recommendations could have much to do with the impracticality of the 
recommendations being made. Often they appear to involve new policy initiatives, 
with one of the reports still being disputed by the concerned department which has 
denied the accuracy of its findings. Therefore, the Ombudsman‟s efforts to 
increasingly seek to demonstrate their value by conducting investigations with a 
systemic component has not created the impact intended by bringing about reforms 
that improve governance for all. Further, the credibility of the Ombudsman as an 
investigator could have been damaged insofar as some of its reports appear to have 
resulted in disputed findings. Given the high profile nature of systemic reports, if too 
often reports lead to disputes about the content of the findings, this compromises the 
core business of the ombudsman. Leading advocates of a systemic approach to 
ombudsmandry, Marin and Jones, have forewarned the challenges in this area if 
„[j]ust one investigation … does not follow the principles of excellent investigation.  
…… [I]t will prove very difficult to reclaim your credibility, if just one of your 
investigations is shown to be shoddy…..‟28   If this is true, it is therefore crucial for 
the Thai Ombudsman in the near future to focus on reestablishing its credibility 
through demonstrating the robustness of its findings. To achieve this goal it may 
have to reconsider the way it organises its investigation process.  
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9.3 An excess of roles 
  An expansion of the mandate of the ombudsman will ordinarily place 
additional burdens on an ombudsman scheme and will require corresponding 
sufficient resources to be provided if the scheme is to continue to perform effectively 
(Chapter 4).  The study in this thesis has found that although the Thai Ombudsman 
has not suffered from cutbacks, there is evidence to suggest that the office has 
experienced practical difficulties as a result of insufficient resource and expertise 
(Chapter 7). Further, the difficulties have had an adverse effect on the effective 
performance of its mandate.  The Ombudsman is a young and a small office, which 
contrasts with the fact that the Constitution gives the Ombudsman a powerful 
jurisdiction to follow up and report on the implementation of the Constitution by the 
government. The Ombudsman is also to review the implementation strategy of the 
government to ensure that the objectives of the Constitution are met.   
The requirement to track the implementation of the constitution by all 
departments creates a massive workload. To cope with a problem of insufficient 
manpower, the Ombudsman has in the past relied on the statistics collected by the 
Secretary to the Cabinet (Chapter 7). This solution resolved the Ombudsman‟s 
manpower problem by avoiding hiring more staff to deal with data collection, but by 
reporting the same data as the government the Ombudsman was criticised for not 
adding value to the information provided elsewhere.  
As for the evaluation of the constitutional implementation which requires 
extensive knowledge of public law, the Ombudsman has not been able to perform 
this function due to a lack of required expertise and this has led to negative critique 
against the Office‟s performance. Further, the Ombudsman‟s role and competence in 
this area has been critiqued by public law academics. The approach taken by the 
Ombudsman to resolve this problem has been to appoint a committee (in 2012) to 
work on a formula for evaluation, yet still no clear result of this work has been 
presented after three years. 29   
There is a very real danger that this mandate has created a false expectation 
about the capacity of the office which has not been met. A point to be considered is 
whether the Ombudsman should be allocated with more resources in order to meet 
with the demand of this specific mandate or whether it is better to remove this task of 
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the Ombudsman‟s jurisdiction. This point must be considered by taking into account 
another problem associated with this task which will be shown in section 9.4.   
 
9.4 Advocacy 
It has been argued in this thesis that advocacy contradicts the good practice of 
an ombudsman (Chapter 4) because objectivity and impartiality is the essence of an 
ombudsman (Chapter 3). Advocacy in so far as it entails taking sides is incompatible 
with the ombudsman‟s image of unaligned and impartial investigator and in turn 
would undermine its persuasive power. 
The findings in this study empirically supports the above assertion that 
advocacy is not compatible with an ombudsman. There is evidence that the Thai 
Ombudsman has engaged actively in policy advocacy by involving his office directly 
in public policy debates, albeit without success.30  This is particularly evident when 
the Ombudsman constantly criticised some major government policies while seeking 
to introduce different policy initiatives in its special reports. Another example of the 
advocacy role can be found in the constitutional mandate which gives the 
Ombudsman the power to make recommendations for the constitutional amendment. 
It has been suggested in this thesis that this function provides the Ombudsman with a 
platform to venture into policy advocacy. Under this mandate, the Ombudsman has 
sought to suggest amendments to the Constitution and proposed its own draft law for 
consideration to Parliament. However, it is noticeable that the Ombudsman‟s draft 
has by and large been ignored.    
The advocacy role of the Thai Ombudsman has an adverse effect on the non-
political nature of the institution and put the Ombudsman‟s ability to remain 
objective in question. Being a constant vocal critique of the government‟s major 
policies while proposing its own policy initiatives and draft constitutional 
amendment was generally perceived as competing with the legislature while the 
government interpreted such role as acting in the interest of the opposition party.31 
Consequently, this led to the perception that the Ombudsman‟s recommendation was 
based on political considerations which was problematic, as it is naturally more 
difficult for a government to accept recommendations which are perceived to be 
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prejudiced or biased. This factor would most probably partially explain why the 
Ombudsman‟s proposals on policy and constitutional amendments have not always 
been followed.  
 
9.5 Political controversy  
Comparatively, the ombudsman institutions worldwide have in general 
avoided getting involved in politically controversial matters, due to the importance of 
maintaining political neutrality (Chapter 4). However, based on the empirical 
evidence obtained for this study, this thesis found that the Ombudsman institution in 
Thailand has found itself having to fulfil a highly political and controversial role in 
its task of monitoring the ethical misconducts of political office holders. In 
performing such a task, the Ombudsman investigates allegations of ethical 
misconduct and then refers the issue to Parliament or the department concerned, if it 
is satisfied that there is a prima facie breach as a result of misconduct (Chapter 7).   
Investigation of the ethics of politicians can be considered under the branch 
of anti-corruption and is an additional role to their traditional function, albeit the role 
of the ombudsman in this sphere is limited. It is also a role which is found to be more 
common in developing countries than established democracies.32One reason that the 
role of investigating ethical issues is not a widespread feature of the ombudsman‟s 
work is that without an enforcement power, an ombudsman is not well-suited to fight 
corruption effectively and also the adversarial strategies are in conflict with the 
ombudsman‟s cooperative model.33  
As for the Thai Ombudsman, as shown in Chapter 8,34 performing this task 
has become even more difficult because of the political circumstances. There is 
evidence to suggest that the Ombudsman was perceived as a means for political 
opponents to make vexatious or mischievous allegations about each other. This is 
because political opponents have been tempted to use the code of ethics to discredit 
one another, because a breach of the ethical codes can lead to dismissal of office or at 
the very least damage their reputation. Therefore, apart from damaging the 
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Ombudsman‟s relationship with the government after the Ombudsman launched 
investigations against some leading politicians, it has placed the Ombudsman into 
political conflict and made it a target for political attack with some politicians 
appearing to regard the Ombudsman as a threat.   So far the Ombudsman has found 
no breach of the ethical code by these political actors (though it has found and 
reported a number of ethical misconduct with regards to public officers), which is 
probably due to fact that the allegations were groundless or it might be because by 
handling the process of investigation, the Ombudsman tended to avoid becoming a 
party to the conflict. Whatever the reasons be, the result is that the Ombudsman 
became subject to criticism for weakness and ineffectiveness.  
But for the Thai Ombudsman the difficulties lie with its status. The point 
stressed here is that it is hard for the Ombudsman to avoid being seen as politically 
biased when it is required to get involved in political conflict by its mandate. This 
means that its various tasks are made much more difficult for the Thai Ombudsman 
because it struggles to gain trust from all parties while its image as an effective 
organisation has been damaged. Therefore, it may be timely to reconsider whether 
the onerous responsibility of ensuring the integrity of political leaders is a task that 
the Ombudsman can realistically carry out. 
 
9.6 The danger of unelected institutions  
One of the potential problems with unelected institutions identified in 
Chapter 4 is that while these constitutional watchdogs are introduced to provide for a 
more effective constitutional check and balance, there is a risk that watchdogs might 
serve subtly different purposes to what they were established for. This could be 
because the watchdogs may reinterpret the jurisdictional boundaries of their position 
to suit their own vision of how their office should operate. 35  The result might be 
increased public mistrust if they are deemed to be inappropriately overstepping their 
mandate, and eventually questions will be raised as to whether they should continue 
in operation.  It is argued in this thesis that the Thai experience endorses the potential 
dangers implied by the theory. As it can be seen, the Thai Ombudsman has   
aggrandise its role beyond the monitoring of government administration which 
should be the core of its function, to evaluate some of the major government‟s 
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policies. In doing so the Ombudsman was seen as evaluating the performance of the 
whole government.  
The Ombudsman‟s legislation explicitly imposes restrictions on the 
Ombudsman‟s power to investigate the policy of the government.36  This provision 
preserves the basic principle of ministerial responsibility to Parliament and a 
separation of powers. In effect, this means that the justifiability of a policy of 
government is excluded from the Ombudsman‟s jurisdiction. However, we have seen 
that on many occasions the Ombudsman‟s special reports have sought to criticise the 
merits of some of the government‟s major policies. According to the Ombudsman,37 
the justification for such interventions is based on its statutory power to investigate 
the „performance of or commission to perform duties of a government official which 
unjustly causes injuries to the complainant or the public whether such act is lawful or 
not‟38. Based on this provision the Ombudsman took a view that all government 
policies that result in social injustice fall under his jurisdiction.39  
However, it must be emphasised that the effect of this provision is to enable 
the Ombudsman to inquire into administrative decisions in circumstances where 
injustice has occurred but such decisions may go unchallenged in courts and 
therefore is intended to provide the Ombudsman as a means available to aggrieved 
citizens to seek relief.  It is argued that if the Ombudsman takes a view that all 
government policies that result in social injustice fall under his jurisdiction, there is a 
chance that the Ombudsman could invoke the government policy to comply with his 
own criteria of injustice. In doing so, it could follow that the Ombudsman could be 
seen as having ignored the fact that such recommendation may be difficult if not 
impossible to be adopted. This is because governments necessarily are required to 
take heed of political criteria when making policy-based decisions, and they are 
obliged to be willing to be held accountable under the democratic norms of 
parliamentary government. By contrast, the approach adopted by the Ombudsman 
risks carrying it away from the original design of the institution which was 
constructed to avoid political entanglements and overt public assessment of public 
officials. As well observed by a scholar, „…many incidents pointed to the fact that 
independent agencies in Thailand focused more on sustaining their „super 
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independence‟ than to check and to hold the government to democratic 
accountability, and this will ultimately threaten democracy.‟40 
Another potential problem is multiple accountability, as in-built into the Thai 
constitution by the creation of a series of constitutional unelected watchdogs, is that 
there is a danger of public bodies being exposed to over-scrutiny. To mitigate such a 
danger, a constitution should be designed to provide an accountability system to the 
general public in a manner that avoids unnecessary duplication.41  This study reveals 
that with regards to making recommendations on constitutional implementation 
functions, there are serious duplications of functions between the Ombudsman and 
the Law Reform Commission.  Such duplication is found in section 81 (3) of the 
2007 Constitution42; and with regards to the supervision and monitoring of the ethics 
of persons holding political positions, there are serious duplication of functions 
between the Ombudsman and the Office of the National Anti-Corruption 
Commission. Such duplication is also found in section 250 of the 2007 Constitution 
of Thailand.43  The intention of the Constitutional Drafters for these duplications is to 
provide extra layers to guarantee accountability, but it also means that the 
Ombudsman does not provide a distinct contribution or additional benefits. 
Duplication of function is inconsistent with the underpinning theory that the 
Ombudsman is designed to fill gaps in existing coverage, as argued in Chapter 2. 
Duplication of functions also risks inconsistency of decisions. The question remains 
which institutions are more suitable to undertake such functions.  This point will be 
returned to in section 9.9 which will suggest reduction of the role of the Thai 
Ombudsman. 
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9.7 Difficulties of political context  
It has been argued by some that the ombudsman model cannot operate as it 
was intended to without the spirit of democratic responsibility from which the 
institution evolved.44  The experience of ombudsmen in different parts of the world 
has shown that regardless of their formal powers, the chances of success and the 
survival of this institution in its functioning to redress public grievances, protect 
individual rights and liberties, are much more favourable in a democratic 
environment with strong rule of law systems than in countries where democracy and 
the rule of law is weak.45  The empirical data gathered and analysed in this thesis 
would suggest that the overall democratic order has a considerable bearing on the 
performance and effectiveness of the Ombudsman institution.  
Following this claim, any study of the effectiveness of a specific ombudsman 
scheme must take into account the environment within which it operates. In this 
respect, it is important to take note of the fact that unlike their counterparts in many 
other developing countries, the Thai Ombudsman ofﬁce has operated, generally 
speaking, in a fairly favourable environment. Despite political instability due to 
frequent military interventions,46 freedom of expression and freedom of the press are 
constitutionally guaranteed as well as respected in practice.47 Free elections, an 
independent judiciary and a British type of public administration, including neutral 
career civil servants, have all been salient features of Thai political systems.48  
Thailand has a good human rights record.49 In fact, Thailand was considered to be 
one of the most democratic countries in Southeast Asia until the 2006 Military 
Coup.50  
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This relatively calm operating environment is reflected in the experience of 
the ombudsman. The Ombudsman has not, in the main, run into difﬁculties of 
apparent disregard for his requests for information or in the implementation of its 
recommendations. Albeit that it has been argued above that delay in resolving 
complaints has been an issue, no-one has suggested that this can be attributed to 
unwarranted delay on the part of public servants and authorities in responding to 
requests, or a seemingly unwillingness to conciliate matters. In this respect, as will 
be argued below, under current arrangements there are very real prospects of 
improved performance for the Ombudsman institution should its role be restricted to 
its classical role.  However, the polarisation of Thai politics and society which has 
developed since 2006 and has become a prominent aspect of Thailand has almost 
certainly posed very real challenges for the Thai Ombudsman in the delivery of its 
new mandates. As happened, politics of extreme – of „us against them‟ or „you are 
either with us or against us‟51 have resulted from a deep polarisation in Thai politics, 
a situation that has tended to place the Ombudsman at a greater disadvantage. Thus 
although the Ombudsman has sought to preserve its political neutrality, both the 
advocate role of constitutional check and the controversial roles of ethics have 
subjected the Ombudsman to much partisan pressure. Therefore, arguably the 
ombudsman office is faced with an almost impossible task given the context in which 
it is supposed to operate. 
 
9.8 Conclusions on the operation of the Thai Ombudsman’s scheme 
The point raised by Marin and Jones at the beginning of this Chapter 
resonates with much of what I have observed on the Ombudsman in Thailand. 
Ombudsman schemes need to be able to demonstrate their effectiveness and 
relevance if they are to secure the support of key stakeholders. From the foregoing 
discussion it can be seen that the working of the Ombudsman institution and the 
context or environment in which it operates indicates that it has a number of 
limitations or shortcomings, and its performance record is not so satisfactory. 
Collectively, the main problems that the study has identified are to do with excessive 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
University and Academia Sinica, Taipei, 2007, 1-38, retrieved 20 September, 2013, 
http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/publications/workingpapers/no.34.pdf.  
51
 Central problem is rural-urban divide which disagree on how to equalize the benefits of economic 
development and ensure equal political representation. The unending deadlock and polarization is at 
the roots of the current political crisis which eventually led to the 2014 coup. 
271 
 
and possibly inappropriate powers and functions. Overall, the design of the Thai 
Ombudsman pays insufficient attention to the different competencies required to 
perform the different roles that it has been given. As a result, it is arguable that the 
Ombudsman is required to serve very different needs, with some of those needs not 
compatible with the core functions for which the office has been established. The 
evolution of roles in Thailand may be broadly in line with an international trend 
towards a proactive watchdog model with multiple functions, and away from a 
traditional model where the ombudsman‟s powers and mandates have been rather 
restricted in line with traditional expectations of administrative justice.  But the 
Ombudsman institution has developed differently in Thailand to elsewhere and the 
context in which it operates is arguably more challenging than in many other 
countries.   
In particular, in the overwhelming majority of countries where the 
ombudsman has been introduced, it has developed on a different path to Thailand, 
with ombudsman schemes being given extensive periods of time in which to embed 
their service before being challenged to undertake new functions.  In Thailand, in the 
1990s the Ombudsman as a new scheme was unable to demonstrate its effectiveness 
and had yet to earn credibility and respect. But in its second decade, it has moved 
from instability to controversy as it has not been able to perform fully and has begun 
to lose the trust of Parliament and the executive. It has been argued in this thesis that 
this latter trend has come about as a direct result of the 2007 Constitution, through 
which Parliament was portrayed as giving the Ombudsman a „leap‟ by granting it 
new and  extensive powers. This amendment was a direct response to its earlier 
underwhelming performance, but the Ombudsman institution has not found it 
possible to forge ahead as rapidly as had been hoped. Moreover, as a direct 
consequence of the reforms to its mandate, its impartiality and political neutrality, 
among its most important assets, have appeared to be compromised.  
The risk that this thesis has uncovered is that its diminishing credibility in 
terms of impartiality and political neutrality has increased the difficulties that the 
Thai Ombudsman encounters in discharging his responsibility and gaining the 
confidence and respect of the political class and citizens. The relationship between 
the Ombudsman and the citizens also remains unclear, as new roles take the 
Ombudsman away from the citizen.  In the future, the Thai Ombudsman will not be 
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able to rely upon the weapon of public opinion to the same extent that ombudsmen 
elsewhere in the world are generally able to do.  
 
9.9 Implications for the future of the Thai Ombudsman 
This section considers a number of separate ways forward for the Thai 
Ombudsman.  
(a) Abolition of the office 
If it can be argued that the Thai Ombudsman is not delivering on the full 
range of its functions, then one available solution is to abolish the institution and 
transfer its functions elsewhere.  
An initial riposte to this solution, however, is that there remain very strong 
reasons for retaining its functions and it remains very unclear that there are any 
obvious alternatives for much of what the Ombudsman currently does. The Thai 
Ombudsman was introduced as part of an attempt, initiated by the Thai people, to 
reform the nation‟s politics and administration. Before its introduction, for around 
fifty years there had been demand for providing additional avenues for justice for 
aggrieved citizens from administrative actions and eventually the 1997 Constitution 
recognised this demand by providing for the Ombudsman as an additional avenue for 
redress.  Since then, despite the fact that Constitutions have been annulled by coup 
d‟états, the Ombudsman has survived and continued to function without any apparent 
impairment. This existence may be taken as a sign of its continuing relevance in the 
Thai society, notwithstanding the claims of this thesis that it could do better.  
Moreover, abolishing the office would do nothing to address the underlying 
reasons for the office which remain just as important today as when the Ombudsman 
was first established. The argument of this thesis is, therefore, that a more logical 
solution is to make the office more effective.  Despite the fact that the Ombudsman 
scheme cannot fulfil all of its current aspirations in full, there is evidence to suggest 
that the Ombudsman institution has made some positive contributions in dealing with 
individual complaints, and demonstrated its ability to elaborate on particular social 
problems (see Chapter 10 for a summary of this claim).  In fact with its robust legal 
framework, the Thai Office has considerable potential for growth and development.  
However, as observed by Abedin, democratic institutions and values are like delicate 
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plants, they need careful nurturing to grow and thrive.52 Therefore the Thai society 
should be patient. In hindsight, the 2007 Constitution was too ambitious in its 
expectations of the Ombudsman, which suggests that the model needs refining but 
not abolition.  
(b) Continue with the 2007 solution 
It is logical to first consider whether the ombudsman can be more effective in 
this existing model before having to make major changes to its formal functions and 
structure.  As such, before considering the ways in which the Ombudsman might be 
reformed, an alternative way forward is to retain the existing model but address its 
weaknesses. There are options to reform the current Ombudsman scheme‟s operation 
and resources. It might also be possible to introduce new processes to assist the 
Ombudsman in gaining real traction in the implementation of its recommendations in 
the areas of ethical review and reviewing the implementation of the Constitution.  But 
it is suggested here that the operating practice of the Ombudsman since 2007 reveals 
that the problems lie less in the processes and resources of the office, but more in the 
nature of the new functions and in the political context within which it operates. 
The difficulty is that, as has been argued throughout this thesis, the 2007 
model has conferred on the Ombudsman functions that the Ombudsman and the 
office are not able to adequately perform. As referred to previously (Chapter 8), this 
strong model was imposed to raise the Ombudsman‟s profile, without adequate 
consideration of the implications it would have on the Ombudsman. The result has 
been to overload the Ombudsman with tasks it is not designed or prepared to handle. 
The new mandates have carried the Ombudsman away from its original core role, as 
a provider of justice for aggrieved citizens as was initially intended.  
As it has turned out, the chances of the Ombudsman succeeding in the 
delivery of these tasks is very limited under the current political situation. Moreover, 
as argued above, even in a more stable political environment, these functions would 
be difficult for an ombudsman to perform effectively. Additional functions and the 
expectation that come with those functions always risk detracting the Ombudsman 
from the performance of its core role. This is not to suggest that the Thai 
Ombudsman be forever restricted only to its original aims and functions, but it is 
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argued here that to travel so far on its current path of portraying a mechanism of 
control responsible for holding executive branch accountable has caused 
disproportionately adverse effects on the Ombudsman. In particular, the Ombudsman 
is losing its status as an impartial referee and thereby losing its legitimacy as an 
independent accountability mechanism. Besides it is unrealistic to assume that 
resources could be stretched indefinitely. 
It is, therefore, likely that, even if the current processes of the Thai 
Ombudsman were improved and resources enhanced, the problems with the 
institution‟s standing would remain, while the underwhelming response of 
Parliament to its recommendations would continue. This very likely outcome means 
there is a continued danger that the Ombudsman‟s reputation will be damaged.  The 
Office‟s failure to meet expectations would undermine people‟s respect and 
eventually lead to public disillusionment with the concept which would make it more 
difficult to continue to perform its entire function.  My considered conclusion here 
therefore, taking all matters into account is that to resolve the problems needs more 
than a slight adjustment of the existing model. 
(c) Reform the existing model 
The foregoing discussion examined the potential for a slight adjustment of the 
existing model, which does not involve radical shifts in the model of the 2007 
Constitution.  There are more radical options, however, to address the present 
predicament of the Ombudsman.  One is to make changes to the current institutional 
design of the Ombudsman under the 2007 Constitution.   Another is to relieve the 
Ombudsman altogether of the responsibilities in relation to monitoring leadership 
codes and constitutional implementation, as conferred to it by the Constitution.  It is 
contended that these changes are necessary in strengthening the standing of the 
Ombudsman. This section develops the proposal that the office‟s institutional design 
should be altered. 
Underpinning the argument is the principle that the institutional design of the 
office is essential in supporting the effective functioning of the ombudsman.  The 
key problem with the current institutional design identified above is that its perceived 
impartiality and accountability are compromised.   Further reform should aim to 
bring the Thai model to meet with the standard ombudsman practice.  
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Above it was argued that the selection process for the Ombudsman was a 
major part of the problem. One option is to increase the numbers of the committee 
members and include MPs on the members of the selection committee. The thinking 
here is that greater diversity on the committee would result in a wider acceptance of 
the person recruited and help resolve the current perception of lack of impartiality. 
Moreover, increased parliamentary participation at the selection stage might assist in 
attracting the interest of parliamentarians in the Ombudsman‟s works and hence 
encourage a better utilisation of the Ombudsmen by Parliament and more 
parliamentary scrutiny.53 If such goals can be furthered, then this solution would also 
contribute towards addressing the problem of inefficient accountability process of the 
current arrangement. This would in turn strengthen the Ombudsman politically as 
well as enhance the Ombudsman‟s democratic legitimacy. 
 Perhaps it would be worthwhile to consider the setup of the selection 
committee in the 1997 Constitution, which was more widely accepted than the 
current set up because it promoted a greater diversity and inclusiveness of 
participation. The 1997 model prescribed the selection committee of 31 members 
comprising of representatives from political parties (19); rectors of state universities 
(4); Office of Public Prosecutor (4); and Supreme Court (4).54 If it was felt that this 
process excessively favoured politicians, the ratio could be adjusted to reduce the 
political portion to be less than half to prevent domination by political sector. While 
this process will bring the Ombudsman closer to the political branch than the current 
model, it is argued that it will not result in the Ombudsman losing its independence 
as there are measures as has been illustrated in Chapter 3 that  were already put in 
place to sufficiently preserve elements necessary for the ombudsman‟s 
independence.  
The above suggestion on parliamentary involvement at the selection stage 
might be expected encourage a better utilisation of the Ombudsmen by Parliament 
and more parliamentary scrutiny. In addition, it is contended that the Ombudsman 
should be brought back under Parliament domain and that a special standing 
committee that receives reports from the Ombudsman should be established. 
Realignment towards Parliament would theoretically create a closer link and more 
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direct relationship which will be beneficial in drawing more parliamentary support. 
A special standing committee would provide a designated institutional support and 
scrutiny for the Ombudsman that deals with the reports and the recommendations of 
the Ombudsman.  This arrangement is suggested as an effective solution in many 
jurisdictions to deal with the problem of Parliament‟s showing little interest in the 
work of the ombudsman, which is also considered suitable for Thailand, in particular, 
given the Ombudsman being a new institution and Parliament‟s lack of experience 
with this new system and means of controlling administration through the 
Ombudsman. 
 
(d) Reduce the roles of the office 
 This thesis has demonstrated that the core function of the Thai Ombudsman 
is to provide individual redress and to promote good administration. As confirmed by 
the Thai Ombudsman as well as its stakeholders, specifically the members of 
parliament (Chapter 6), the addition of new functions should not change its core 
functions or lead to the Ombudsman moving away from these dual core functions.  It 
has been argued that the broad and unfit mandates currently conferred on the 
Ombudsman have made it difficult for it to fulfil its functions effectively. It is 
therefore contended that, in the Thai context, the Ombudsman should focus on its 
core functions and be removed from the duty of performing those additional roles 
that are unfit for the office. 
In order to provide greater focus and to streamline the mandate of the 
Ombudsman, the functions of investigating ethical misconducts and conducting 
constitutional checks on the government ought to be removed. This refocussing, it is 
argued here, would allow the Ombudsman the space with which to address its 
performance issues, such as the backlog of complaints and the development of a 
formal follow-up system on the implementation of recommendations. As mentioned 
above, given that these mandates were also assigned to other Constitutional agencies, 
that is, the National Counter Corruption Commission, and the Law Commission, it is 
unlikely that the constitution would be significantly weakened by such a reform to 
the Ombudsman‟s jurisdiction.   
Another reason that supports the removal of these functions from the 
Ombudsman‟s jurisdiction is that, given the relevance of the objective of 
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establishment of such agencies and in terms of required expertise and the available 
resources they have, these agencies are more suitable to fulfil these particular tasks 
than the Ombudsman. This removal would also safeguard the Ombudsman from any 
perception of acting politically through intervening in policy issues or in a partisan 
nature through accepting controversial referrals of unethical allegations from 
politicians, and this would also remove the unnecessary duplication of functions.  
The Ombudsman hence would retain its original constitutional traditional role in 
administrative justice: investigating administrative complaints; taking own initiatives 
to address systemic problems; and the subsequent expanded mandate of sifting 
constitutional cases for the Constitutional Courts which helps further the 
constitutional goal of administrative justice. 
 
(e) Improve performance issues  
The empirical data analysed in this thesis reveals that there are a number of 
weaknesses in the operation of the Thai Ombudsman scheme that undermined its 
effective performance, such as the backlog of cases, the lack of formal follow up 
procedure after recommendations and insufficient statistical reports. As pointed out 
above, one of the problems facing the Thai Ombudsman is that it has not 
demonstrated its value and its distinctive contribution. It is argued that these 
weaknesses could have led to the perception that it has underperformed.  It is 
therefore contended that these operational weakness should be addressed without 
delay. Given the danger of abolition on grounds that the Ombudsman has 
underperformed, addressing weaknesses in the performance of the Ombudsman is as 
important as the reform of its mandate and institutional design. 
In summary, the thesis suggests that the way forward for the Thai 
Ombudsman is to reform its institutional design, refocus on its core roles and fix the 
operational weakness. 
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9.10 Implications for the study of ombudsmandry 
The study of the Thai Ombudsman conducted in this thesis not only provides 
an improved understanding of the Thai Ombudsman and identifies potential solutions 
for reform, it also generates some insights for the study of ombudsmandry more 
generally. This Chapter concludes by summarising what this thesis tells us about how 
the ombudsman institution should be understood in a liberal constitution.  
Further evidence for the need for an ombudsman institution 
An underlying feature of the ombudsman design is that it has a role to play in 
liberal constitution because it fills a gap in the justice arena which would otherwise 
occur. Around the world, ombudsman schemes have been introduced in many 
countries to deal with citizens' grievances against administrative abuses, especially in 
the grey areas for which there are no legal rights for compensation. Here the 
experience of many countries has been that the existing safeguards do not provide 
adequate protection for their citizens and political sanctions fail to redress 
grievances.  The office of the Ombudsman in Thailand, as we have seen, was 
instituted relatively recently precisely for this purpose. There had been a parallel 
discussion on the creation of an ombudsman office and an administrative court in 
Thailand in order to deal with complaints against public authority.  Despite concerns 
of opponents that the existence of both an ombudsman and an administrative court 
could constitute an unnecessary duplication of functions, after long debate, 
eventually the 1997 Constitution established both the Administrative Courts and an 
Ombudsman Office. The Ombudsman‟s function and powers are designed to expand 
the ability of citizens to pursue grievances beyond the traditional public law redress 
available in the Administrative Court and therefore the Ombudsman has a distinct 
constitutional role.  The parallel existence of the Ombudsman and the Administrative 
Courts in the Thai context provides another example that these institutions serve 
different purposes and confirms the accepted view that courts and tribunals alone are 
not capable of resolving all administrative disputes.   
Further evidence of the integrity branch in operation 
Based on the notion that traditional constitutional institutions provide 
insufficient control, various institutions, including the Ombudsman, were established 
in the Thai Constitution to complement the deficiencies in the tripartite model. These 
bodies were set up in a way as to give them legitimacy to control (i.e. clear 
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separation from the executive and the legislature, guaranteed independent scrutiny), 
and have been vested with substantial control powers with which to perform their 
duties. To indicate the constitutional importance of these watchdogs, their status have 
been recognised as Independence Organisations in Chapter XI of the 2007 
Constitution. The Ombudsman has a distinctive role as a separate mechanism for 
resolving administrative injustice, protecting constitutional rights and providing an 
additional check on the Executive. In this respect, the Thai Constitution, featuring a 
complex set of “guardian” institutional safeguards against legislative overreaching, 
constructed in nested institutions, exemplifies a recent trend in constitutional drafting 
towards embedding more complex mechanisms of constitutional accountability. A 
key aspect of this form of constitutional design is to employ different types of power 
to hold the government accountable or what has been collectively described as an 
“integrity” branch of the constitution.   
Better understanding of the limits of the office 
A particular area of ombudsmandry about which much remains to be 
understood is the effective limits of the ombudsman enterprise in terms of the 
functions that it can be deployed to deliver. There has been a tendency for 
ombudsman schemes around the world to being given an increasing variety of new 
roles, in addition to their traditional core function of combating maladministration. 
Experiences suggest that governments may find it convenient or economic to give 
ombudsmen new roles as the need for these roles become apparent, in circumstances 
where these roles do not fit easily elsewhere and where it is considered costly to set 
up new institutions. The question remains as to whether this distribution of 
constitutional responsibility is always appropriate.  
There is general agreement that the Ombudsman is an organization that is 
highly flexible and that it is not necessary to restrict the use of the model to basic 
complaint handling alone. However, it has been also suggested that an ombudsman is 
not a panacea and the experience of the Thai Ombudsman illustrates many of the 
potential risks involved in expecting too much of the ombudsman model.  As it 
happens with the Thai Ombudsman‟s model, it turns out that some of the new 
additional roles that have been granted to it have failed. Recent works of scholars as 
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well as practitioners55  have now cautioned about what an ombudsman should or 
should not do.  Building from these works, this thesis has constructed a set of 
explanatory criteria which may help us explain why some roles might be less suitable 
to an ombudsman scheme and the background contextual factors that might also lead 
to an ombudsman scheme failing in its delivery of certain functions (Chapter 4). This 
set of ideas has been used to analyse the problems in the Thai Ombudsman scheme 
which has been given mandates beyond the classical model.  
In Chapter 4 it was argued that, both from theory and practice, it is clear that 
significant thought has to be put into assessing whether certain roles are compatible 
with the ombudsman model. Some roles will be incompatible as a matter of 
principle, others because of the political and social context within which they 
operate. In this latter respect, it was also argued that the ombudsman is peculiarly 
sensitive to political resistance, a factor which should also be accounted for when 
decisions about roles for the ombudsman are decided upon, as should the potential 
for the new role to sow general confusion amongst politicians, administrators and the 
public as to what service the ombudsman is primarily in place to deliver. 
Additionally, it needs to be considered whether the ombudsman can be realistically 
resourced with the expertise and staff to implement a new role. Finally, Chapter 4 
argued that for an ombudsman scheme to be effective in the long-term, the inherent 
dangers of unelected institutions need to be properly managed.   
In all of these respects, this study found that, certainly in the case of Thailand, 
there are practical limits to the range of roles that an ombudsman can be required to 
fulfil.  The findings broaden the academic literature and also the academic debate 
about the evolving roles of ombudsmen and better understanding about the limits of 
the office. The Thai experience in expanding the ombudsman‟s jurisdiction helps 
illustrate that the risks such as, conflicting roles; politically controversial roles; 
problems of overloaded office; and duplication of functions are real.  The Thai case 
also shows that limits of an office could be attributed to different factors such as, 
delay in handling complaints; no formal follow up system on the implementation of 
recommendations; insufficient statistical report; and unimplemented special reports. 
These are shortcomings which could lead to underperformance despite the 
institutional design being robust. 
                                                                 
55
 See Chapter 4. 
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Further evidence of the strength of the institutional design model and its weak 
point 
 The experience of the Thai Ombudsman shows that the Ombudsman‟s 
effectiveness does not always follow automatically from having a stronger and wider 
power and provides further evidence that the non-coercive soft powers of an 
ombudsman is one source of its effectiveness and when combined with other feature 
such as independence, impartiality etc. can constitute a strength. This reflects in its 
achievement as a mechanism for redress of administrative grievance and improving 
administrative practice. But the Thai Ombudsman‟s case also illustrates that this 
strength must be connected with other factors, such as the implementation of its 
recommendations by the government and parliamentary positive support. The 
eventual outcome of its effort and its credibility as an institution is dependent on such 
perusal. Even though the Ombudsman makes a recommendation which is sensible 
and backed up by extensive data drawn from exhaustive investigations and research, 
without implementation no one will see the concrete result of such recommendation. 
This could mean that even the best effort by the institution, the ability to operate 
effectively may be stifled by the negative effect of its context. It is therefore difficult 
for an ombudsman to be seen as an effective institution on its own.   
Better understanding of the importance of context and overall constitutional 
support in a variety of forms 
From the above discussion, political and government support must be given 
to the ombudsman institution, its work and recommendations.  Political and 
government support depend on circumstances. With the Thai case it can be seen that 
the fact that Parliament is indifferent to the Ombudsman‟s work and 
recommendations together with the eroding relationship with the government, 
hinders the Ombudsman‟s effectiveness. Because of the political context, the Thai 
Ombudsman has a difficult task to maintain impartiality, which is not made any 
easier as many issues can become more and more politicised as the ongoing political 
conflict has made it more difficult for the Ombudsman to draw government and 
political support. The Ombudsman‟s ability to fulfil its additional role with regards to 
monitoring the politician‟s ethics was limited. The Thai experience exemplifies how 
the context can negatively affect the ombudsman‟s effectiveness and the importance 
of constitutional support to optimise the ombudsman‟s effectiveness. 
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9.11 Thailand as a special case? 
The argument has been made above that the study of Thailand in this thesis 
displays certain trends and events that add to our broader understanding of 
ombudsman institutions elsewhere in the world. But it might be objected that 
Thailand is a special case, being a newly democratizing nation, which experiences 
regular military coups. It might also be argued that the problems experienced by the 
Thailand Ombudsman are entirely explainable by the special political context within 
which it operates.  Such a claim would require further study, but a preliminary 
rejection will be offered here. This thesis has conceded all along that an ombudsman 
scheme needs to be devised to match the context within which it operates. Indeed, 
one of the strengths of the institution is that it is so capable of being adapted to meet 
different social, economic and political contexts. The theoretical model developed in 
Chapter 4 specifically makes allowance for such inherent local issues to be factored 
into ombudsman design, and part of the rationale for arguing in this thesis for a more 
limited model for the ombudsman is due to the challenging context within which the 
Thai Ombudsman operates. However, the claim of this thesis is also that Thailand is 
not so unusual (e.g. see Chapter 5). The country has a large, educated middle class, a 
relatively robust civil society and has in recent years been one of the best-performing 
economies in the world. Thailand has also experienced chronic political instability, 
but similar to other Asian countries, recently Thailand‟s Constitutions have been 
engineered for the purpose of constructing a more perfect democratic political system 
with strong constitutional guarantees of citizens‟ rights and high aspirations towards 
social justice.  The Constitution‟s elaborate mechanisms of separation of powers and 
mechanisms of checks and balances, such as the new watchdogs Constitutional 
Court, Administrative Court and independent commissions on elections and 
anticorruption, and the Ombudsman, represent one the codification of one of the 
world‟s most advanced constitutions. Above all, although new in many respects, the 
country‟s administrative justice system is complex and includes overlapping layers 
of dispute resolution processes. 
As this thesis is finalised, a new Constitution is being drafted. In the view of 
this author it is entirely right that the standard understandings of best practice in 
ombudsmandry (Chapter 2 and 3) should continue to apply to its design.  
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines the characteristics and the operation of the Ombudsman 
system in Thailand from its inception since 1997 until 2014. In this final chapter, the 
main findings of the thesis are summarised and some of the major issues and 
arguments emerging from the analysis above are presented. 
The Thai Ombudsman remains a young institution, but, as this thesis has 
shown ,it is an institution upon which many hopes were pinned by the Constitutions 
of 1997 and 2007. Yet there has been little research on the Ombudsman, 
notwithstanding its constitutional status. Due to this lack of empirical evaluation of 
the Thai Ombudsman system, this research is original and necessary, all the more 
since the office has been subject to significant political criticism. This study, 
therefore, is the first attempt to offer an external, independent review of its 
performance and to interrogate the extent to which it meets a set of expectation of 
ombudsman institutions accepted across the globe. In doing so, the thesis provides 
original empirical evidence of the work of the Thai Ombudsman in practice. 
In meeting this need for improved understanding and analysis, this research is 
based on a study of existing legislation, as well as the practical results achieved by 
the Thai Ombudsman. To gain an understanding of the latter a range of resources has 
been collated, including the annual speeches and reports of the Ombudsman, 
documentary material obtained from Parliament and the Thai Ombudsman office, 
and the research and methodological literature produced both by ombudsmen 
themselves and by academics. To triangulate and better understand the information 
gathered through literature reviews, this thesis has been supported by a series of elite 
interviews with the team of Ombudsmen in Thailand, a member of the Constitution 
Drafting Assembly, senior public officials and public law professors.  
In order to examine the characteristics and the working of the Ombudsman 
system in Thailand, in the introductory chapter three aims were set:  
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1) to examine the functions of the institution, in order to discover how it 
measures up to its objectives as well as to the ombudsman standard 
practice;  
2) to review its institutional design, with a focus on whether it is in line with 
the standard features of the ombudsman; and  
3) to test whether the Ombudsman operates with an excessive remit and to 
identify whether its existing collection of roles is appropriate.  
The results of the findings will be structured according to these aims. 
At the start of the thesis, a theoretical framework for analysis was developed 
as a means to understand how the ombudsman works, and how and why 
characterising it as a mechanism of administrative grievances aids our 
comprehension of it (Chapters 2 and 3). This framework outlined the standard claims 
made in favour of the institution in its traditional role of resolving complaints from 
members of the public against government agencies and undertak ing systemic 
investigations to address issues with an aim to improving administrative practice.   
By reviewing a wide range of studies on the ombudsman institution, past and present, 
a list of fundamental features and characteristics that are deemed essential to the 
institution’s unique role were identified as core to the effective design of an 
ombudsman. These standards were developed further into a set of criteria boxes.  
This analytical framework is useful in terms of unpicking the extent to which 
the Ombudsman’s contribution as a mechanism of administrative justice measures up 
to its objectives, as well as the standard practice. Applying this framework, the study 
reveals that the ombudsman has contributed significantly in resolving grievances 
from administrative wrongs and improving administrative practice. Indeed, it can be 
claimed that the office has become one of the most important institutions in Thailand 
for the protection of constitutional rights.  
  
10.2 The Thai Ombudsman and administrative justice 
The Thai Ombudsman was initially established by the 1997 Constitution to 
handle complaints of grievances from individuals in dealing with government bodies. 
Though it was given additional mandates by the 2007 Constitution, this complaint-
handling mandate remained its core function.  Indeed, the 2007 Constitution gives 
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the Ombudsman the power to initiate investigation without complaints to enhance the 
Ombudsman’s ability to improve administrative practice.      
A key focus of this thesis is to establish whether the Ombudsman has 
produced results in terms of its complaint-handling role. This analysis was 
undertaken in particular in Chapter 6, where it was concluded that o verall the 
Ombudsman has achieved some success so far in the redressing of grievances and the 
improvement of administrative practice. Many of the complaints that reach the 
Ombudsman's office could not be actioned in the courts with positive results. It can 
be said that the Thai Office has yielded some of the results that were envisaged when 
it was originally established in Thailand, just as the model of the other ombudsman 
has achieved in other countries - that is to ensure that individuals have effective 
access to administrative justice. 
   According to the Ombudsman’s statistics, the Ombudsman has already 
dealt with a considerable number of cases.  Of those where an investigation was 
concluded, positive outcomes have been reached in a significant number. The 
number of complaints turned down or rejected without even investigation complaints 
compares very favourably with that of several other ombudsman schemes. Also 
statistics reveal that there seems to be a stable flow of complaints against the 
government from the public since 2004. Logically it might be claimed that the 
Ombudsman has proved to be effective in the independent investigation of 
maladministration; otherwise it would not be able to sustain and attract a stable flow 
of complaints.   
The Ombudsman’s activities show that it is able to negotiate with public 
authorities on behalf of citizens to secure redress where a serious injustice seems to 
have occurred but the law does not provide any redress. In order to mediate 
effectively, the Ombudsman has adopted techniques such as tripartite meetings and 
onsite visits which enhance both the Office’s accessibility and public awareness of 
its existence and roles. Evidence suggests also that the Ombudsman Office has been 
successfully employing early settlement strategies, such as mediation and 
conciliation, to resolve complaints in a less costly and time consuming manner. 
The Ombudsman also has a claim to operate as the first port of call for many 
citizens when faced by maladministration in government.  The Ombudsman Office 
records high amounts of telephone enquiries, of which a large proportion has been 
redirected. This assistance and advice function though cannot replace a more formal 
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legal aid scheme but it does represent a practical solution for dealing with the 
problems of access to justice.  The office’s work fills to some extent the gap in 
administrative justice in Thailand by lowering the threshold to justice when 
compared to the courts and by resolving injustice that is not sufficiently addressed by 
judicial review. The output of the office, therefore, appears to fit appropriately into a 
wider system of constitutional coverage of citizens’ rights. 
In term of systemic reform, the Ombudsman has also conducted direct 
investigations of its own volition and produced several reports that reveal systemic 
weaknesses and deficiencies in administrative practice. Following this form of work, 
there is evidence that the Ombudsman has been responsible for a number of positive 
changes in administrative regulation and procedure.  In particular, the Thai 
Ombudsman has been able to identify a lack of inter-departmental coordination and 
related problems of compartmental mentality. 
The above findings suggest that the Ombudsman could measure up to its 
objectives and meet the ombudsman standard practice to a certain extent. However, 
there are shortcomings in the Ombudsman’s operation which should be addressed in 
order that the Ombudsman can contribute better,  both in the area of complaint 
handling and systemic investigation (Chapter 9). These shortcomings include a high 
backlog of cases which undermine the Ombudsman’s effectiveness. Another issue is 
the fact that the Ombudsman does not provide adequate classification of the caseload 
relating to grievances resulting from injustice, as opposed to issues to do with 
legality in cases where the complainant does not have a strict legal entitlement or 
because of the lack of availability of an alternative redress route. The problem that 
arises from this lack of statistical evidence is that the Ombudsman’s distinctive value 
when compared to other forms of redress, in particular judicial review, is not 
demonstrated and therefore not appreciated due to shortcomings in its operation.  
Further the Office does not have a process in place to follow up on the 
implementation of recommendations, which results in a lack of concrete indicators to 
advance as a useful measure of how an ombudsman is doing. This may explain why 
the Constitution Drafting Committee took a view that the Ombudsman’s 
performance has been unsatisfactory. Another important shortcoming is the fact that 
the Ombudsman’s special reports which aimed to have broader social implication 
have not been able to attract attention from parliament nor have they been 
implemented (Chapter 9) (a point to which will be returned below). All of these 
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issues mean that, although the Ombudsman has secured some successes, its impact 
has been more limited than perhaps it could have been. 
 
10.3 The Thai Ombudsman and additional roles 
By itself, the above analysis leads to a conclusion that the Thai Ombudsman 
has a strong role to play in the constitution, but its operation needs improvement in 
certain respects. But the major finding of the thesis suggests that a more radical 
reconstruction of the Thai Ombudsman is required. This finding comes out of 
Chapters 6-9, in particular Chapter 8, and is one that suggests that too much has been 
expected of the Thai Ombudsman and that this burden has led to significant 
difficulties for the office, both in terms of performance and reputation.   
The Thai Ombudsman was initially established only to handle complaints of 
grievances from individuals in dealing with government bodies, but has subsequently 
experienced a significant expansion in its mandates and powers. The end result is 
that the Thai Ombudsman has become a multi- function office with difficulties in 
performing its new functions. The unease around the office  that has resulted from 
this expansion has led to a proposal for the abolition of the office on ground of 
underperformance. The suspicion is that the young Ombudsman is failing partly 
because it undertakes some functions for which the office is unfit. 
The Thai Ombudsman was tasked with three additional functions by the 2007 
constitution: initiating constitutional litigation; monitoring and evaluating the 
implementation of the Constitution, including the preparation of proposals for 
constitutional amendments; and reporting on violations of the code of ethics.  
In performing constitutional litigation, there is evidence that the Ombudsman 
can protect the rights of the citizen by providing a link and an alternative means of 
gaining access to the Constitutional Court in the event of a problem with the 
constitutionality of provisions of laws. This role is an extension to, and 
complementary of, the Ombudsman’s core role of protecting citizens’ rights that may 
be adversely affected by the exercise of public power and the Ombudsman has not 
faced major difficulties in performing this function.     
However, with regards to the other two additional functions of the office, 
namely monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the Constitution and 
reporting on violations of the code of ethics, the empirical investigations of this 
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thesis reveal that these functions require more staff, as well as extensive knowledge 
and expertise which the Ombudsman and its staff do not sufficiently possess. 
Arguably the Ombudsman’s small office is not designed for such resource- intensive 
activities. Further, such additional functions cause more fundamental difficulties for 
the status of the office. For instance, the preparation of proposals for constitutional 
amendments is considered by some as requiring the Ombudsman to take an active 
role in promoting a particular policy position, a role akin to advocacy role which 
contradicts the Ombudsman’s widely understood standing as an impartial referee. 
Therefore, to the extent that this new function requires the Ombudsman to 
compromise its essence, which requires the preservation of its impartiality, it is a role 
which is unfit for the Office. 
With regards to reporting on violations of the code of ethics, this research 
(Chapter 7) has found that this function has proved to be very difficult for the 
Ombudsman to perform effectively in the Thai context. On top of confrontations 
with the executive, there is evidence to suggest that this function has subjected the 
Ombudsman to political partisan attacks which have grown as Thailand has had to 
deal with a deeply divided society since 2006.  As a result, political leaders have 
tended to view the Ombudsman as a potential threat which has provoked political 
resistance. The fact that the Ombudsman has found no breach of the ethical code by 
these political actors, even though perhaps due to fact that the allegations were 
groundless, has raised doubt over his effectiveness in this task.  
Another issue with these two additional functions is that they relate only 
indirectly to the rights of individual citizens. As a result, the Ombudsman has to 
serve subtly different purposes to those for which it was originally established. 
Certainly these functions have increased the Ombudsman’s powers significantly, but 
this in turn has led to public mistrust and rendered the Ombudsman vulnerable to the 
attack of inappropriately overstepping their mandate.   For instance, the 
Ombudsman’s proposal to amend the 2007 Constitution was deemed an 
inappropriate exercise of its power by interpreting its mandate beyond the 
constitutional intention and perceived as usurping the power of the legislature 
(Chapter 7).  For an unelected independent oversight mechanism, such as the Thai 
Ombudsman, to exceed its mandate is a serious issue. This situation is made more 
dangerous due to a perceived lack of sufficient accountability arrangements in place 
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for the office (Chapter 8).  Eventually, this state of affairs could bring its legitimacy 
of the Thai Ombudsman under question.   
Such problems are made more of a concern by the fact that this study has also 
found that these two functions to overlap with the jurisdiction of other independent 
constitutional organisations which are more suitable for this in terms of their 
resources and objectives.  Duplication of functions without added value from the 
Ombudsman suggests that there is no need for the Ombudsman to perform these 
roles. 
It is this analysis of the Thai Ombudsman’s roles that provides perhaps the 
most significant finding of this thesis in terms of its contribution to the study of 
ombudsmen more generally. In Chapter 4, this thesis explored the expansion of the 
ombudsman model away from its traditional functions towards additional functions 
being expected of the institution. Although an analysis was identified that supported 
this expansion of the ombudsman model, the Chapter also constructed a set of 
explanatory criteria from existing literature to help explain why some roles might be 
less suitable to an ombudsman scheme and which contextual factors might also lead 
to an ombudsman scheme failing in delivery of certain functions. Analysis 
underpinned by this framework provides an insight into the problems that the Thai 
Ombudsman has faced in delivering its mandates beyond the traditional core roles. In 
doing so, Chapter 9 offers answers to the question of whether the Thai Ombudsman 
operates with an excessive remit and identify whether its existing collection of roles 
is appropriate. 
In short, the empirical investigations of the Thai Ombudsman tend to confirm 
the explanatory criteria developed in Chapter 4 with regards to why an ombudsman 
might or might not be able to carry out its additional functions effectively. 
 
10.4 The Thai Ombudsman’s institutional design 
 The review of the Ombudsman’s institutional features conducted in this 
thesis (Chapter 8) reveals that the Ombudsman is largely well-equipped to deliver his 
primary constitutional role. The Thai Ombudsman has a prestigious constitutional 
position. In fact, problems facing ombudsman schemes around the world are that 
they are prone to abolition and that they are perceived as not able to work as 
effectively in less democratic environments.  Being enshrined in the Constitution 
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helps strengthen the existence of the Thai Ombudsman, as was apparent in the 
Ombudsman’s ability to survive several political attempts by leading political parties 
to get rid of the institution over the past thirteen years.  
However, structural deficiencies around the selection process for the 
Ombudsman, provisions which are intended to set him above party politics, have had 
an unintended effect of tarnishing the perception of stakeholders and the general 
public in terms of the Ombudsman’s impartiality.  Another structural shortcoming is 
the process to remove the Ombudsman by the Senate which also has damaged the 
Ombudsman’s accountability.  
 
10.5 Recommendations 
The following recommendations flow from the data analysis in this study. In 
order to increase its value and demonstrate its distinctive contribution, the following 
performance weakness should be addressed by the Ombudsman:  
 the backlog of cases; 
 the lack of formal follow up procedure after recommendations;  
 insufficient statistical reports; 
 unimplemented special reports. 
The earlier chapters raised various solutions and measures by which these 
issues could be tackled. The study also points to the need to reform the 
Ombudsman’s institutional design and to refocus on its core roles in order to increase 
the credibility of the institution and attract more support from parliament.  The 
legislative framework of the Ombudsman could be amended with the following 
considerations: 
 the relocation of the Ombudsman within the parliamentary sphere; 
 setting up a designated standing special committee for scrutiny and 
support for the Ombudsman; 
 increasing the numbers of the committee members responsible for the 
appointment of the Ombudsman, and including MPs on the members 
of the selection committee to improve the perception of impartiality 
and accountability; 
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 remove altogether functions with regards to investigation and report 
on ethical misconduct; and  constitutional checks on the constitutional 
implementation; 
 retaining the function of referring cases to the Constitutional Court for 
constitutionality review. 
 
10.6 Conclusion 
 Having examined critically the functions and the institutional design of the 
Thai Ombudsman, this study contends that the Thai Ombudsman is an institution 
under stress. The main reason is that significantly it has been given functions that it 
is unable to perform adequately and effectively. The Ombudsman’s institutional 
design also needs to be firmed up to ensure that it matches best practice in terms of 
impartiality and accountability.  Importantly, the study identifies some operational 
shortcomings in the performing of its dual core functions of redressing administrative 
grievances and improving administration, which need to be ironed out in order for 
the Thai Ombudsman to be more effective. However, this study contends that, 
despite these weakness and shortcomings, the Ombudsman has served its main 
constitutional objectives in redressing administrative grievances and improving 
administration well. Most of its institutional features meet the standard practice of 
the ombudsman, which means that the foundations are there for a strong traditional 
ombudsman scheme. This could be considered another achievement given the fact 
that that many ombudsman schemes have taken some years to settle down into a 
strong institution. In addition, around the world, several ombudsman offices have 
experienced a reduction of budget and threats of abolition. The Thai Ombudsman has 
not only survived abolition and never suffered budget cuts, but it has also 
experienced a period of strengthening and being entrusted with more mandate and 
powers. Therefore, it is contended here that the Thai Ombudsman has done a good 
job and can continue to do so, but its limitations and weakness as identified above 
must be resolved, its institutional design and roles must be reformed. 
While Thailand shares common features of newly democratizing nations in 
Asia such as regular military coups and chronic political instability, the country has 
basic component of democracy such as a large, educated middle class, a relatively 
robust civil society and has in recent years been one of the best-performing 
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economies in the world. The country devised an elaborated constitutional separation 
of powers and mechanisms of checks and balances, such as the new watchdogs 
Constitutional Court, Administrative Court and independent commissions on 
elections and anticorruption, and the Ombudsman, representing one the codification 
of one of the world’s most advanced constitutions. The country also provides 
complex administrative justice system which includes overlapping layers of dispute 
resolution processes. The thesis and the study therefore can benefit in particular 
Asian countries with similar context like Thailand and add to our understanding of 
the ombudsman in general.  
The Thai Ombudsman provides further evidence for the need for an 
ombudsman institution and of the integrity branch in operation. The Ombudsman’s 
expansion and constitutional status in Thailand is one that exemplifies the recent 
trend in constitutional arrangements which makes an explicit recognition of a 
separate branch of government - an integrity branch of the constitution with a distinct 
functional specialisation alongside the traditional branches. This is an interpretation 
of the constitution arguably required in all government structures, alongside 
arguments for good administration and a broader conception of the rule of law. 
Perhaps a broader lesson which may be drawn is that, while an ombudsman 
institution may be tasked with more functions other than its traditional core 
administrative justice role due to its flexibility, the expansion of functions for the 
office is not without limit. While this study could not explicitly answer what an 
ombudsman should do or should not do, as this depends on a number of factors, it 
has provided an account of the factors that need to be considered in deciding whether 
or not a new function is appropriate. This is an area of ombudsmandry about which 
much remains to be understood. The contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate that 
there are some functions that are difficult for an ombudsman to perform effectively, 
and there is a danger in asking an ombudsman to do too much. This study supports 
the main stream in ombudsman literature that, while an ombudsman is an office that 
has the potential to meet different demands to those of its original establishment and 
there is no one correct ombudsman model, an ombudsman that is trying to do too 
much or trying to perform functions that compromise its core principles or essential 
features is likely to fail.  This study adds to the current understanding of the 
institutional type and the conditions under which it could function best. 
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Currently, much of the standard guidance on the ombudsman seems to 
presume that adequate institutional design guarantees the effective operation of an 
ombudsman, but this thesis has highlighted that in fact there are other factors that 
affect the effectiveness of the ombudsman. A strong robust institutional design may 
not reflect the concrete performance.  This paper has a made a preliminary 
assessment of the Thai Ombudsman. On the basis of these findings, future research 
possibilities in this area could be the evaluation of the ‘public awareness’ of the 
Ombudsman. This is one essential feature of institutional design that could not have 
been fully measured through documentary analysis or the Ombudsman’s actions. 
Further work could also be undertaken to review the effectiveness of the 
relationships and coordination between the Ombudsman and other independent 
organisations.  Each of these questions demands further empirical research.      
10.7 Current developments 
This section is added to the thesis at the time the author just finished writing 
and the submission date is drawing near.  One of the current developments in relation 
to the Thai Ombudsman which deserves attention is the ongoing debates within the 
constitution drafting process regarding whether or not another of the Constitution’s 
independent watchdogs, the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand 
(NHRC), should be retained or merged with the Office of the Ombudsman.  
Bowornsak Uwanno, Head of the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC), 
announced in February 2015 that the constitutional drafters had agreed to merge the 
NHRC and the Office of the Ombudsman into one organisation. 1 The new name of 
the merged agencies will be the Office of the Ombudsman and Human Rights 
Protection.  According to Bowornsak, the NHRC and the Ombudsman have similar 
functions so they should be merged to enable people to file complaints, while 
reducing operational costs. This plan has received a mixed public response and 
spurred wide debates which are mainly concern with how the changes will affect 
human rights protection in Thailand. The author, however, would like to draw 
attention to the impact of the proposed changes on the Ombudsman institution. 
While there are a number of obvious benefits to a merger, which have been 
highlighted by the Head of the CDC, there are other issues that should be taken into 
                                                                 
1
 ‘NHRC to fight ombudsman plan  - No one consulted, civic groups say’, Bangkok Post, 5 February 
2015, retrieved 23 February 2015, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/466533/nhrc-to-fight-
ombudsman. 
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consideration. First, the nature of the new organisation remains unclear. The name of 
the merged agencies - the Office of the Ombudsman and Human Rights Protection 
implies that this new organisation will be a combination of the Ombudsman and 
NHRC, an understanding supported by Borwornsak’s statement. However, this 
combination suggests two possible interpretations of the nature of the Office. First, it 
could be that the merger changes the priority of the Ombudsman from administrative 
justice to human rights, which is typical for a human-rights ombudsman which has 
an express human-rights mandate. The other possibility is that this office has dual 
missions of human rights and administrative justice, with equal emphasis placed on 
both. According to Borwornsak, it seems that the latter is more likely. In such a case, 
the Thai Ombudsman will be a very different institution from the human rights 
ombudsman model operated elsewhere and may in fact be unique in institutional 
design.  
Another issue of concern is the resources. A multi- function ombudsman 
frequently faces the problem of inadequate resources. But in this case, if the Office 
has two equal priorities, in addition to inadequacy, there might arise the difficulty of 
how to allocate an adequate budget for two equally important tasks without causing 
undesirable feelings of competition within the organisation. Current proposals do not 
provide details on the process through which such internal decisions are to be made. 
It should be stressed that this proposal is not a certainty, as the proposal is at a 
preliminary stage and will be subjected to further consideration by several bodies, 
such as the National Reform Council, the National Council for Peace (NCPO) and 
the royal endorsement which will take another year. 2  There are therefore 
opportunities for the questions and recommendation in this thesis to be taken into 
account during this process. The proposal does highlight the relevancy of this thesis 
and the importance of factoring in the considerations raised in this thesis when 
embarking on institutional design and redesign.    
                                                                 
2
 The Government Public Relation Department, ‘Three-Phase Roadmap Emphasized by the NCPO 
Head’, retrieved 23 February 2015, http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_news.php?id=7312&a=2. 
295 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
Ackerman, Bruce, The Future of Liberal Evolution, Yale University Press, 
1992 
 
Ackerman, Bruce, „The New Separation of Powers‟, 113 Harvard Law 
Review, 2000 
 
Abedin, Najmul, „The Ombudsman in developing democracies: the 
Commonwealth Caribbean experience‟, International Journal of Public Sector 
Management, Vol. 23 No. 3, 2010 
 
Adler, M, „Understanding and Analysing Administrative Justice‟, in M Adler 
(ed.), Administrative Justice in Context, Hart Publishing, Cornwall, 2010  
 
African Ombudsman Research Centre, Comparative Analysis of Legal 
Systems Governing Ombudsman Offices in Africa, 31 January 2014, retrieved 24 
February 2014, 
http://aoma.ukzn.ac.za/Libraries/MISCEL_ENGLISH/AORC_Comp_AnalysisDrftR
epMar14__Final_2.sflb.ashx 
 
African Ombudsman Association „What an Ombudsman is and does‟, 
retrieved 24 February 2014, 
http://www.aoma.org.za/component/option,com_frontpage/Itemid,1/ 
 
African Research Centre, „Information, Coordination, Training, Advocacy 
and Research Needs of the African Ombudsmen and Mediators Association‟, Report, 
GIZ, June 2011 
 
Albritton,  R B and  Bureekul, T, Thailand Country Report: Public Opinion 
and Political Power in Thailand, A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance 
and Development, Working Paper Series No. 34, Asian Barometer Project Office, 
National Taiwan University and Academia Sinica, Taipei, 2007, 1-38, retrieved 20 
September, 2013, 
http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/publications/workingpapers/no.34.pdf  
 
Alexander, Larry, „Constitutionalism‟ in  Thomas Christiano, John Christman 
(eds.), Constitutionalism Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy, San Diego 
Legal Studies Paper No. 07-04, 2005 
 
Al-Wahab Ibrahim, The Swedish Institution of Ombudsman, Stockholm, 
Centraltryckeriet AB Boras, 1979 
 
Amankwah, H and Omar, K, „Buttressing Constitutional Protection of 
Fundamental Rights in Developing Nations: The Ombudsman Commission of Papua 
New Guinea - A New Hybrid‟, 18 Melanesian Law Journal, 74, 1990  
296 
 
 
American Bar Association, Standards for the Establishments and Operation 
of Ombuds Offices, February, 2004, retrieved 18 June 2014,  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2004/dj/115.authc
heckdam.pdf 
 
Amnesty International, Report 2002, New York, Amnesty International 
Publication, 2002 
 
Amornjitsuwan, Supavanee and Paisansakulchani, Srisudan, Legal Problems 
of Independent Organization of the Constitution of the Royal Kingdom of Thailand 
B.E. 2550: Sources of Selection Committees, Faculty of Law, Ubon Ratchathani 
University, 2011 
 
ANZOA, Rules and Criteria, December 2011 
 
AOA, Member Fact Sheets, retrieved 24 May 2013, at 
http://asianombudsman.com 
 
Asian Development Bank „Governance in Thailand: Challenges, Issues and 
Prospects‟, ADB, Manila, April, 1999 
 
Asper, Y Valdes D, „The Self-Perceptions of the Ombudsman: A 
Comparative and Longitudinal Survey‟, in Linda C Reif (ed.), The International 
Ombudsman Anthology: Selected Writings from the International Ombudsman 
Institute, Kluwer Law International, the Hague, 1999 
 
Aucoin, Peter, ‘Administrative Reform in Public Management: Paradigms, 
Principles, Paradox and Pendulums‟, Governance, 3, Issue 2, 1990 
 
Aufrecht, S E, „The Ombudsman Office‟, Public Administration and Public 
Policy, Vol. 2, 2009 
 
Ayeni, Victor O, „The Ombudsman in the Achievement of Administrative 
Justice and Human Rights in the New Millennium‟, The International Ombudsman 
Yearbook, Vol. 5, Kluwer Law International, Leiden, 2001 
 
Ayeni, Victor O, „The Changing Nature and Contemporary Role of National. 
Ombudsman Institutions in the Commonwealth and Elsewhere‟, in Linda C Reif 
(ed.), The International Ombudsman Yearbook , Vol. 4, Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague, 2001 
 
Ayeni, V O, „The Ombudsman in the Administrative Justice and Human 
Rights in the New Millennium‟, in Linda C Reif (ed.), The International Ombudsman 
Yearbook, Vol. 5, Kluwer Law International, Leiden, 2001 
 
Ayeni, Victor O, „The Role and Effectiveness of the Ombudsman Institution‟, 
National Democratic Institute, 2005 
 
297 
 
Ayeni, Victor O, „Ombudsmen as Human Rights Institutions: The New Face 
of a Global Expansion‟, Speech at the 9th IOI World Conference in Stockholm, 2009 
 
Bakewell, R D, „The Ombudsman and Politics‟, Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol. XLV, No. 1, 1986. 
 
Baldwin, John and Gwynn Davis, „Empirical Research in Law‟, Chapter 39 
in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet, The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies, Oxford 
University Press, 2003 
 
Bangkok Post, „NHRC to fight ombudsman plan - No one consulted, civic 
groups say‟, 5 February 2015, retrieved 23 February 2015, 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/466533/nhrc-to-fight-ombudsman 
 
Barker, Rodney, Political Ideas in Modern Britain: In and After the 
Twentieth Century, 2nd edn., Routledge, London 1997 
 
Bell, J S, „Comparative Administrative Law‟, in Mathias Reimann & 
Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, 2006 
 
Bell, J S, „Administrative Law in a Comparative Perspective‟, in Esin Örücü 
& David Nelkin (eds.) Comparative Law: A Handbook 287, Hart, Oxford, 2007  
 
Barbour, Bruce, „The Ombudsman and the Rule of Law‟, Paper presented at 
the Annual Public Law Weekend, 5-6 November, 2004, IOI Occasional Paper 
 
Barendt, Eric, „Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government‟, PL 
599, 1995 
 
Barendt, Eric, An Introduction to Constitutional Law, Oxford University 
Press, London, 1998 
 
Bitzjak, Ivan, „Special Features of the Role of the Ombudsman in Transition 
Condition,‟ in Linda C Reif (ed.) The International Ombudsman Yearbook ,  Vol. 5,  
Kluwer Law International, 2001 
 
Boonsuwan Kanin, „Independent Organisations‟, Komchadluek, 12 February 
2012 
 
Boontuan, Siripa, „Reform Constitutional Independent Organisations-Tie to 
people?‟, Matichon, 13 April 2014 
 
Boramanand, Nantawat, Privatization of the Thai State Enterprises, Institute 
of Public Policy Studies, Bangkok, 2000 
 
Born H, Wills A, and Buckland, B S, A Comparative Perspective of 
Ombudsman Institutions for the Armed Forces, Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Policy Paper, No. 34, 2013 
 
298 
 
Botelho, Greg, Hancocks, Paula and Olarn, Kocha, „Thai military takes over 
in coup – again‟, CNN, 22 May 2014, retrieved 7 October, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/22/world/asia/thailand-martial-
law/index.html?hpt=hp_t2 
 
Anna Boucher, Ahmar Mahboob & Lydia Dutcher, „Power and solidarity in 
elite interviews‟, A paper for the American Political Science Association General 
Meeting, Chicago, 28 August – 1 September, 2013 
 
Bowornwathana, Bidhya, „Administrative Reform and Regime Shifts: 
Reflection on the Thai Polity‟, Asian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 16, No. 
2, December, 1994 
 
Bowornwathana, Bidhya, „Thailand: Bureaucracy under Coalition 
Governments‟, in John P Burns and B Bowornwathana (eds.), Civil Service Systems 
in Asia, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2001 
 
Bowornwathana, Bidhya, Administrative Reform Abroad: The United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, New Zealand, Japan, and Sweden, Office of the 
Administrative Reform Commission, the Royal Thai Government (in Thai), 
Bangkok, 2001 
 
Bowornwathana, Bidhya, „Importing Governance into the Thai Polity: 
Competing Hybrids and Reform Consequences‟, in Bidhya Bowornwathana, Clay 
Wescott (ed.) Comparative Governance Reform in Asia: Democracy, Corruption, 
and Government Trust, Research in Public Policy Analysis and Management, 
Volume 17, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2008 
 
Brock, Arlene S, Repositioning the Ombudsman: Challenges and Prospects 
for African Ombudsman Institutions, retrieved 27 July 2014, 
http://aoma.ukzn.ac.za/Libraries/External_reports/Kenya_Draft_Report_of_the_Regi
onal_Colloquium_of_African_Ombudsmen.sflb.ashx 
 
Brookman, F, Noakes L and Wincup E, Qualitative Research in Criminology, 
Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999 
 
Buck, Trevor, Administrative Justice and Alternative Dispute Resolution: the 
Australian experience, Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA), DCA Research 
Series 9/05, London: DCA, 2005. 
 
Buck, Trevor, Kirkham, Richard and Thompson, Brian, The Ombudsman 
Enterprise and Administrative Justice, Ashgate, Surrey, 2011 
 
Bureekul, Thawilwadee, Survey on public confidence in government 
institutions and satisfaction with public services during 2003-2010, King 
Prajadhipok's Institute, Bangkok, 2010 
 
Carl, Sabine, „Toward a definition and taxonomy of public sector 
ombudsmen‟. Canadian Public Administration, 55, 2012 
 
299 
 
Carolan, Eoin, The New Separation of Powers: A Theory for the Modern 
State, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009 
 
Carlota, Salvador T, „The Ombudsman: its effectivity and visibility amidst 
bureaucratic abuse and irregularity‟, Phil. L. J., 12, 65, 1990 
 
Carr, Cecil T, Concerning English Administrative Law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1941, cited in Carol Harlow, Richard Rawlings, Law and 
Administration, 3rd edn., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009 
 
Casey, James P, Constitutional Law in Ireland, 3rd edn., Round Hall, Dublin, 
2000 
 
Caiden, Gerald E (ed.), International Handbook of the Ombudsman: Country 
Surveys, Vol. 2, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1983 
 
Caiden, Gerald E, (ed.) International Handbook of the Ombudsman: 
Evolution and Present Function, Greenwood Press, Westport 1983 
 
Caiden, Gerald E, „Public Administration and the Rise of the Ombudsman‟, 5 
Politeia 1, 1986 
 
Caiden, Gerald E, „The Challenge of Change‟, paper presented at the Fourth 
International Ombudsman Conference, Commonwealth Ombudsman, Canberra, 1989 
 
Caiden, Gerald E, and Valdes, Daisy A, „Maturation issues for the 
ombudsman‟, in Linda C Reif (ed.), The International Ombudsman Anthology: 
Selected Writings from the International Ombudsman Institute, Kluwer Law 
International, the Hague, 1999 
 
Capel, Emlyn, Wade, S and Phillips, G Godfrey, Constitutional and 
Administrative Law, 9th edn., Longman, London, 1977 
 
Carmona, George V, „Strengthening the Asian Ombudsman Association and 
the Ombudsman Institutions of Asia‟, Asian Development Bank, Strengthening the 
ombudsman institution in Asia: Improving accountability in public service delivery 
through the ombudsman, Asian Development Bank Economics Research Paper 
Series, Asian Development Bank, Mandaluyong City, 2011 
 
Chambers, Paul, „Superfluous, Mischievous or Emancipating? Thailand‟s 
Evolving Senate Today‟, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 28, 3/2009 
 
Chang, Wen-Chen „the Emergence of East Asia Constitutionalism: Features in 
Comparison‟, American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 59, 2011 
 
Chen, Albert H Y Chen, „Constitutions, Constitutional Practice and 
Constitutionalism in East Asia‟, December 24, 2014, Routledge Handbook of Asian Law, 
Forthcoming; University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2014/04, 
retrieved 21 May 2015, at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2542528 
 
300 
 
Cheng, H Y, „The Emergence and Spread of the Ombudsman‟, the Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 377, no. 1,  May, 1968 
 
Chotemongkol, Pramote, „The Ombudsman, the toothless tiger‟, The 
Manager, 7 July 2006, retrieved 3 October 2013, 
http://www.manager.co.th/iBizchannel/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9490000087016 
 
Chularat, Ackaratorn, Lecture on Concept and Principle of Public Law on 29 
November 2013, Bangkok, retrieved 8 January 2014, 
http://www.manager.co.th/Politics/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9560000148239&Html
=1&TabID=2& 
 
Connors, Michael K, „Political reform and the state in Thailand‟ Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, Volume 29, Issue 2, 1999 
 
Constitutional Court, Thailand, decision 64/2547, 8 May 2006 
 
Constitutional Court, Thailand, decision no. 57/2555, 10 October 2011 
 
Csernatoni, Raluca, „Policy Briefs: Radiography of a Conflict – Thailand‟s 
Penchants for Coups d‟état‟, retrieved 21 May 2015, at 
https://isiseurope.wordpress.com/2014/05/28/policy-brief-thailand/ 
 
Dailynews, „Dissolve Ombudsman‟, 7 January 2013 
 
Danet, B, „Towards a Method of Evaluation the Ombudsmen‟, 
Administration and Society, 10(3) 335, 1978  
 
Davis, Kenneth C, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, Louisiana 
State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1969 
 
De Jonge, Alice, „Ombudsmen and Leadership Codes in Papua New Guinea 
and Fiji: Keeping Government Accountable in a Rapidly Changing World‟, 1998, 
retrieved 24 October 2013, http://www.paclii.org/journals/MLJ/1998/6.rtf 
 
De Smith, S A, Mauritius Legislative Assembly Sessional Paper, No. 2, 1965 
 
Ditsawanon, Sasin, „Problems in the Consolidation of Democracy in 
Thailand: The Study of Trust in Political Institutions‟, Kasetsart J. (Soc. Sci), 2010, 
31 
 
L A Dexter, The Sociology and Politics of Congress, Rand McNally, 
Chicago, 1969 
 
Diamandouros, P Nikiforos, „Human rights and non-judicial remedies-The 
European Ombudsman‟s perspective‟, speech at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science, London 30 November 2005 
 
Diamandouros, P Nikiforos, „Legality and good administration: is there a 
difference?‟, speech at the sixth seminar of National Ombudsmen of EU Member 
301 
 
States and Candidate Countries on 'Rethinking Good Administration in the European 
Union', Strasbourg, France, 15 October 2007, retrieved 7 October 2013, 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/speeches/en/2007-10-15.htm 
 
Diamandouros, P Nikiforos, „The Role of the Ombudsman in strengthening 
accountability and the rule of law‟, Speech at the Constitution Unit, University 
College London,  29 November 2005, retrieved 23 October 2013, 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/speeches/en/2005-11-29.htm 
 
Dicey, Albert V, The Law of the Constitution, Macmillan, London, 1961 
 
Dobjani E, „The Establishment and Operation of the People‟s Advocate: the 
Ombudsman in Albania‟, in Linda C Reif  The International Ombudsman Yearbook , 
Vol. 6, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2002 
 
Dorney S, „Ombudsman‟s job „impossible‟ under proposed PNG reforms‟, 
Radio Australia, 18 June 1995, cited in Alice de Jonge, „Ombudsmen and Leadership 
Codes in Papua New Guinea and Fiji: Keeping Government Accountable in a 
Rapidly Changing World‟, 1998, retrieved 24 October 2013,  
http://www.paclii.org/journals/MLJ/1998/6.rtf. 
 
Dressel, Bjorn, „Thailand's Elusive Quest for a Workable Constitution 1997-
2007‟, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2009 
 
Drewry, Gavin, „Ombudsmen and Administrative Law - Bright Stars in a 
Parallel Universe?‟, 17, Asia Pac L Rev, 3, 2009 
 
Dunleavy, Patrick and, Helen Margetts, „New Public Management is Dead: 
Long Live Digital Era Governance‟, Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, July 2006 
 
Elliott, James, „Towards Parliamentary Democracy in the Third World: the 
Case of Thailand‟, Parliamentary Affairs, Mar 1984, Vol.37, 220 
 
Elwood, Brian, „How to harmonize general ombudsman activities with those 
related to specialized ombudsman‟, The International Ombudsman Yearbook , Vol. 2, 
1998, Kluwer Law International ; International Ombudsman Institute, The Hague, 
1999 
 
Engle, Karen, „Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context‟, 32 
N.Y.U. J. Imr'L L. & POL. 291 
 
Epstein, Richard A, The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest 
for Limited Government, Harvard University Press, 2013 
 
Esty, Daniel C, „Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing 
Administrative Law‟, 115 Yale Law Journal, 2006 
 
Farrell Anne-Maree, Sarah Devaney and Amber Dar, No-Fault Compensation 
Schemes for Medical Injury: A Review
302 
 
Review Group, Scotland, Scottish Government Social Research, 2010,  retrieved 7 
November 2011, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/924/0099427.pdf 
 
Fayemi, Kayode, „Constitutional Governance and Institutions of Horizontal 
Accountability‟, presentation at the Senate Public Hearing on the review of the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, Lagos, 6 March 2003, retrieved 3 March 
2014, http://www.slideshare.net/kayodefayemi/constitutional-governance-and-
institutions-of-horizontal-accountability 
 
Field, Chris, „Recent evolutions in Australian Ombudsmen,‟ presentation to 
the Australian Institute of Administrative Law National Forum, 2009, retrieved 24 
July 2013, 
http://www.ombudsman.wa.gov.au/Publications/Documents/speeches/060809_AIAL
_Forum_2009.pdf 
 
Field, Chris, „Independence – A key principle‟, Presentation to the Australian 
and New Zealand Ombudsman Association Biennial Conference, 2010, retrieved 27 
August 2013, 
http://www.ombudsman.wa.gov.au/Publications/Documents/speeches/060510_Prese
ntation_by_Chris_Field_to_ANZOA-2010.pdf 
 
Fleiner, Thomas, Fleiner Lidija B, Constitutional Democracy in a 
Multicultural and Globalised World, Springer Science & Business Media, Berlin, 
2009 
 
Fombad, Charles Manga, „The Enhancement of Good Governance in 
Botswana: A Critical Assessment of the Ombudsman Act, 1995‟, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, Mar. 2001 
 
Forum of Canadian Ombudsman, 2006, „What is an Ombudsman?,‟ retrieved 
23 January 2013, http://www.ombudsmanforum.ca/whatis_e.asp. 
 
Frahm, Michael, Australia and Pacific Ombudsman Institutions, Mandate, 
Competence and Good Practice, Springer, Vienna, 2013 
 
Frank, B, „The Ombudsman Revisited‟, the Journal of International Bar 
Association, May, 1975 
 
Friedmann, K, „Realization of Ombudsman‟s Recommendations‟, papers 
presented at the Fourth International Conference, Commonwealth Ombudsman, 
Canberra, 1989 
 
Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, „Reform Constitutional Independent Organisation?,‟ 
ThaiPBS, 19 March 2007, retrieved 20 October  2014, http://www.fes-
thailand.org/wb/media/Debate%20Show/Independent%20Agencies%20Reforms_fin
al.pdf 
 
Fukuyama, Francis, State-Building: State Governance and World Order in the 21st 
Century, Cornell University Press, New York, 2004 
 
303 
 
Garner, John Francis, Administrative Law, 4th edn., Butterworth, London, 
1974 
 
Gellhorn, Walter, „Annotated Model Ombudsman Statue‟ in S V Anderson, A 
J Callaghan (ed.), Ombudsman for American Government?, Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1968 
 
Giddings, Phillip, „The Parliamentary Ombudsman: A Classical Watchdog‟, 
in Oonagh Gay & Barry K Winetrobe (eds.), Parliament’s Watchdogs: At the 
Crossroads, The Constitution Unit, University College London, 2008 
 
Gilligan, Emma, „The Human Rights Ombudsman in Russia: the Evolution of 
Horizontal Accountability‟, 32 Hum. Rts. Q. 575, 2010 
 
Gill, Chris, „The evolving role of the ombudsman: a conceptual and 
constitutional analysis of the "Scottish solution" to administrative justice‟, Public 
law, No. 4, October, 2014 
 
Gilman, S C, Ethics Codes and Codes of Conduct as Tools for Promoting and 
Ethical and Professional Public Service: Comparative Success and Lessons’, 
Comparative Successes and Lessons, paper prepared for the PREM, the World Bank, 
Washington DC, winter 2005 
 
 
Ginsburg, Tom, Albert H Y Chen (ed.), Administrative Law and Governance 
in Asia, Routledge, London, 2009 
 
Ginsburg, Tom, „Constitutional afterlife: the continuing impact of Thailand‟s 
postpolitical constitution‟, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2009 
 
Goodroad, Scott L, „The Challenge of Free Speech: Asian Values v. Unfettered Free 
Speech, An Analysis of Singapore and Malaysia in the Global Order‟, 9, Ind. Intl & Comp L 
Rev, 1998 
 
Gottehrer, D M, „Fundamental Elements of An Effective Ombudsman 
Institution,‟ Article presented at plenary session II: developing the working methods 
and tools of the Ombudsman of the IOI Conference, Stockholm, 2010, retrieved 3 
March 2014, 
http://www.theioi.org/downloads/934ch/Stockholm%20Conference_15.%20Plenary
%20Session%20II_Dear%20Gottehrer.pdf 
 
Götze, Michael, „The Danish ombudsman A national watchdog with selected 
preferences’, Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 6, Issue 1, January, 2010, retrieved 19 
September 2013, http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/ 
 
Gregory, Roy, Building and Ombudsman Scheme Statutory Provisions and 
Operating Practices, in Linda C Reif (ed.), The International Ombudsman Anthology: 
Selected Writings from the International Ombudsman Institute, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1999 
 
304 
 
Gregory, Roy, „Building an Ombudsman Scheme: Statutory Provisions and 
Operating Practices‟, in Linda C Reif, (ed.), The International Ombudsman 
Anthology: Selected Writings from the International Ombudsman Institute, Kluwer 
Law International, the Hague, 1999 
 
Gregory, Roy & Giddings, Philip, Righting wrongs: The Ombudsman in Six 
Continents, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2000 
 
Gregory, Roy and Giddings, Philip, „The Ombudsman Institution: Growth 
and Development‟, in Roy Gregory and Philip Giddings (eds.), Righting wrongs: The 
Ombudsman in Six Continents, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2000 
 
Gregory, Roy, „The Ombudsman: An Excellent Form of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution‟, in Linda C Reif (ed.) International Ombudsman Yearbook, Vol. 5, 2001 
 
Groppi, T, Piergigli, V, and Rinella, A, Asian Constitutionalism in 
Transition: A Comparative Perspective, Giuffre, Milan, 2008 
 
Harding, Andrew, „May There be Virtue: New Asian Constitutionalism in 
Thailand‟, 3 Australian Journal of Asian Law, 2001 
 
Harding, Andrew, Peter Leyland, „The constitutional courts of Thailand and 
Indonesia: Two case studies from South East Asia‟, Journal of Comparative Law, 
2008 
 
Harding, Andrew, „A Turbulent Innovation: the Constitutional Court of 
Thailand 1998-2006‟, in Andrew Harding, Penelope Nicolson (ed.) New Court in 
Asia, Routledge, London, 2009 
 
Harding, Andrew and Leyland, Peter, „Constitutional Design in Thailand: the 
Management of Electoral Process in an Emergent Democracy‟, The Journal of 
Parliamentary and Political Law, 4 (2), 299, 2010 
 
Harding, Andrew and Leyland, Peter The Constitutional System of Thailand: 
A Contextual Analysis, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011 
 
Harlow, C and Rawlings, R, Law and Administration, Butterworth, London, 
1997 
 
Harlow, C, „Back to basics: reinventing administrative law‟, P.L. 1997, Sum, 
245-261 
 
Hassall, Graham & Sean Cooney, „Democracy and Constitutional Change in Asia‟, 
Asian Studies Review, 1993 
 
Hatchard, John, „The Ombudsman in Africa Revisited‟, The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 4, Oct., 1991 
 
Hatchard, John, „Developing Governmental Accountability: The Role of the 
Ombudsman,‟ Third World Legal Studies: Vol. 11, Article 9, 1992 
305 
 
 
Hatchard, John, Ndulo, M and Slinn, P, Comparative Constitutionalism and 
Good Governance in the Commonwealth: An Eastern and South African Perspective, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004 
 
Hood, C, „A Public Management for All Seasons‟, Public Administration, 
69:1, spring, 1991 
 
Hurwitz, L, The State as Defendant Governmental Accountability and the 
Redress of Individual Grievances, Aldwych Press, London, 1981 
 
Health Service Ombudsman, ‘Care and compassion?’, Report on ten 
investigations into NHS care of older people, retrieved 3 June 2013, 
http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/7216/Care-and-
Compassion-PHSO-0114web.pdf 
 
Hedemann, M, „The individual and the EC Ombudsman‟, New Law Journal, 
6 May, 1994 
 
Heede, Katja, European Ombudsman: redress and control at Union Level, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000 
 
Henderson, E G, Foundations of English Administrative Law, Harvard, 1963 
 
Henkin, Louis, „A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influence and 
Genetic Defects‟, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 533, 1992 – 1993 
 
Hicken, Allen, „The 2007 Thai Constitution: A Return to Politics Past‟, 
Crossroads 19:1, 2007 
 
Hill, L B, ‟Institutionalization, the Ombudsman, and Bureaucracy‟, Amer. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 68, 1974 
 
Hill, L B, „International transfer of the ombudsman‟, in R L Merritt (ed.), 
Communication in International Politics, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1972 
 
Hill,  Clauspeter Hill, Jörg Menzel, „Preface‟ in Clauspeter Hill, Jörg Menzel 
(eds.), Constitutionalism in Southeast Asia, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Singapore, 
2009 
 
Hofmeister, Wilhelm and Karsten Grabow, Political Parties Functions and 
Organisation in Democratic Societies, Konrad Adrenauer Stiftung, Singapore, 2011 
 
Holmgren, K, „The need for an ombudsman too‟, in Donald C Rowat, The 
Ombudsman: Citizen’s Defender, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1965 
 
Hong, Seong P, A Comparative Study on Ombudsman Institutions in Asian 
Region,  Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission, Korea, Republic, 2011, 
retrieved 3 June 2013, 
www.acrc.go.kr/eng/file/file.do?command=downFile&encodedKey 
306 
 
 
Huntington, Samuel, The third wave: democratization in the late twentieth 
century, University of Oklahoma Press, 1993 
 
International Ombudsman Institute, February 2015, IOI Regions, retrieved 4 
February 2015, http://www.theioi.org/ioi-regions 
 
International Ombudsman Association, 2007, IOA Code of Ethics, retrieved 
15 February 2014, http://www.ombudsassociation.org/standards/Stds_Practice_1-
07.pdf 
 
IOA, IOA Standard of Practice, retrieved 20 March 2012, 
http://www.ombudsmanassociation.org/docs/BIOA-Rules-New-May2011-Schedule-
1.pdf 
. 
Jacoby, Daniel, „The Future of the Ombudsman‟, in Reif (ed.), The 
International Ombudsman Anthology: Selected Writings from the International 
Ombudsman Institute, Kluwer Law International, the Hague, 1999 
 
Jäger, Kai, „Why did Thailand's middle class turn against a democratically 
elected government? The information-gap hypotheses‟, Democratization, December, 
2012, Vol. 19, No. 6 
 
Jägerskiöld, Stig, „The Swedish Ombudsman‟, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, Vol. 109, No. 8, Jun., 1961 
 
Jeffries, Ian, The Countries of the Former Soviet Union at the Turn of the 
Twenty-first Century, Routledge, New York, 2004 
 
Jiaying, P and Cheong, L I, Comparative Study of Ombudsman Systems of 
Asia, Comparative Studies of Ombudsman Systems in Asia jointly sponsored by the 
Commission against Corruption of Macao, China, and the Macao Foundation, 2008 
 
Jonchakphan, Kamchai in „Re: the power of the Ombudsman, (in Thai)‟, 
Komchadluek, 16 July 2013 
 
Jumbala, Prudisan, „Thailand: Constitutional Reform amidst Economic 
Crisis‟, Southeast Asian Affairs, Singapore, 1998 
 
Helmke, Gretchen, Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and 
Presidents in Argentina, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004 
 
Kaldor Mary & Ivan Vejvoda (eds.), Democratization in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Continuum, London, 2002 
 
Kanojia, Tripta, and Rachel Simeon, „Challenges to Executive Dominance in 
Intergovernmental Relations‟, in John Kincaid and Rupak Chattopadhyay (eds.), 
„Policy Issues in Federalism: International Perspectives’, Unity in Diversity 
Learning from Each Other, Vol. 5, Forum of Federations, 2008 
 
307 
 
Kantharia, H H, Ombudsman: Indian Scenario, paper presented at the 2nd 
Conference of the Asian Ombudsman Association, Seoul. 25–28 March, 1997 
 
Keith, K J, „Development of the role of the Ombudsman with  reference to 
the Pacific‟, 22nd Australasian and Pacific Ombudsman Regional (APOR) 
Conference, Wellington, New Zealand , 9th-11th February 2005 
 
King, G Keohane, R O and Verba, S, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research, New Jersey, Princeton University Press. 1994 
 
Kirchheiner, H H, „The Ideological Foundation of the Ombudsman 
Institution‟ in Linda C Reif, (ed.), The International Ombudsman Anthology: 
Selected Writings from the International Ombudsman Institute, Kluwer Law 
International, the Hague, 1999 
 
Kirkham, Richard, „The Parliamentary Ombudsman: Withstanding the test of 
time. Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman‟, House of Commons Paper: 
HC 421 of 2006-07, London, 2007 
 
Kirkham, Richard, „Explaining the lack of enforcement power possessed by 
the ombudsman‟, Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 30:3, 2008 
 
Kirkham, Richard; Thompson, Brian; Buck, Trevor, „When putting things 
right goes wrong: enforcing the recommendations of the ombudsman‟, Public Law, 
2008 
 
Kirkham, Richard, „The 21st Century Ombudsman Enterprise‟, paper 
presented to the IOI biennial conference, November 2012, Wellington, New Zealand, 
retrieved 23 May 2013, 
http://www.theioi.org/downloads/o32s/Wellington%20Conference_04.%20Plenary%
20II_Richard%20Kirkham%20Paper.pdf 
 
Kirkham, Richard, „The Gibraltar Public Services Ombudsman, A review for 
the office of the Gibraltar Public Services Ombudsman‟, December 2012 
 
Kirkham, Richard and Martin, Jane, „The creation of an English Public 
Services Ombudsman: mapping a way forward,‟ democraticaudituk, 20 June 2014, 
retrieved 19 September 2014, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/57677/1/democraticaudit.com-
The_creation_of_an_English_Public_Services_Ombudsman_mapping_a_way_forwa
rd.pdf 
 
Kirkham, Richard, „A Welsh Twist on the Constitutional Status of 
Watchdogs‟, Cambrian Law Review (forthcoming 2015) 
 
Kittayarak, Kittipong, „The Thai Constitution of 1997 and its Implication on 
Criminal Justice Reform‟, retrieved 7 September 2013, 
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no60/ch06.pdf 
 
Klampaiboon, Siroj „Independent Organisations and Democratic 
Accountability‟, 21 July 2014, Bangkok Biznews, 18 June 2013 
308 
 
 
Klein, James R, The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997:  A 
Blueprint for Participatory Democracy, Working Paper No. 8, The Asia Foundation 
Working Paper Series, March 1998, retrieved 3 September 2014 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/Paper_on_the_1997_constitution_2.pdf. 
Komchadluek, „The Ombudsman‟s Mandate‟, 19 July 2013 
 
Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Gabriele (ed.), European Ombudsman Institutions, 
Springer Wien, New York, 2008 
 
Madison, James, „Federalist, No. 51‟ (1787), in Ira C Lupu, „The Most-Cited 
Federalist Papers‟, Constitutional Commentary, Vol. 15, Issue 3, (Fall 1998), 
University of Minnesota Law School 
 
Malakul, Kriangsan, „As demands for popular participation rise, Thailand's 
infant democracy finds itself at a crossroads‟, Asianews.it, 01/20/2014, retrieved 3 
September 2014,  
 http://www.asianews.it/news-en/As-demands-for-popular-participation-rise,-
Thailand's- infant-democracy-finds-itself-at-a-crossroads-30084.html 
 
Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois (1748), in Anne M Cohler, Basia Carolyn 
Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone (eds.), Cambridge Texts in the History of Political 
Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989 
 
Lansford, Tom, Political Systems of the World, Marvell, Cavendish, 2007, 
Law Commission, Administrative redress: public bodies and the citizen, Consultation 
Paper No. 187, retrieved 23 October 2013 
 
Lawson, Gary, „The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, Harvard Law 
Review‟, Vol. 107, No. 6, April, 1994, retrieved 7 September 2014 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp187_Administrative_Redress_Consultati
on.pdf 
 
Law Commission, Thailand, „Administrative redress: public bodies and the 
citizen‟, Consultation Paper No. 187, retrieved 23 October 2013, 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp187_Administrative_Redress_Consultati
on.pdf 
 
Leech, B L, „Interview Methods in Political Science‟, PS: Political Science 
and Politics, 2002 
 
Leekitwattana, Ruangkrai, „Constitutional Independent Organisation‟, Post 
Today, 11 March 2012 
 
Leong, Laurence Wai-Teng, „From “Asian Values” to Singapore Exceptionalism‟, in 
L Avonius & D Kingsbury (eds.), Human Rights in Asia: A Reassessment of the Asian 
Values Debate, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2008 
 
Levinson, Daryl J and Richard H Pildes, „Separation of Parties not Powers‟, 
119 Harvard Law Review  2311, 2006 
309 
 
 
Lertpaithoon, Somkid, „The Origins and Spirit of the 2007 Constitution‟, in 
Wutthisarn Tanchai (ed.) Exploring the 2007 Constitution, KPI Yearbooks 4, King 
Prajadhipok‟s Institute, 2007 
 
Leyland, Peter, „The Quest for Good Governance in Thailand and the Thai 
Constitutional Watchdogs‟, retrieved 26 October 2013. 
http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/workshop11greece07/workshop16/Leyland.pdf 
Leyland, Peter, Terry Woods, Textbook on Administrative Law, 4th edn., 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004 
 
Leyland, Peter, „Droit Administratif Thai Style:  A Comparative Study of the 
Administrative Court in Thailand‟, Australian Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, 
2006 
 
Liangboonlertchai, Pornsan, „Dictatorship of the majority‟, The Nation, 7 
September 2013 
 
Locke, John, The Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690), Chapter 2,  
based on the paperback book, John Locke Second Treatise of Government, edited, 
with an Introduction, by C B McPherson, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis 
and Cambridge, 1980 
 
Lorch, R S, Democratic Process and Administrative Law, revised edition, 
Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1980 
 
Loughlin, Martin, Foundations of Public Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2010 
 
Madison, James Madison, „Federalist, No. 51.‟ (1787), in Ira C Lupu, „The 
Most-Cited Federalist Papers‟, Constitutional Commentary, Vol. 15, Issue 3, (Fall 
1998), University of Minnesota Law School 
 
Matthews, D R, US Senators and Their World, Vintage Books, New York, 
1960 
 
Maisrikrod, Surin, „The Making of Thai Democracy‟, in Anek Laothamatas 
(ed.), Democratization in Southeast and East Asia, Institute of South East Asian 
Studies, Singapore, 1997 
 
Marin, André and Jones, Gareth, „Measuring Ombudsman Performance: 
Setting Performance Standards and Indicators‟, in Asian Development Bank, 
Strengthening the  ombudsman institution in Asia: Improving accountability in 
public service delivery through the ombudsman, Asian Development Bank 
Economics Research Paper Series, Asian Development Bank, Mandaluyong City, 
2011 
  
Marshall, M A and Linda C Reif, „the Ombudsman: Maladministration and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution‟, 34, Alberta Law Review, 1995 
 
310 
 
Masterman, Roger, The Separation of Powers in the Contemporary 
Constitution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011 
 
McAleer, M, „Working out Initiative Investigation‟, The Ombudsman, May 
2013, Issue 49, retrieved 12 June 2014, 
http://www.ombudsmanassociation.org/theombudsman/49.pdf 
 
McCargo, Duncan, and Pathmanand, Ukrist, The Thaksinisation of Thailand, 
Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen, 2005 
 
McCargo, Duncan, (ed.), Reforming Thai Politics, Copenhagen, NIAS, 2002; 
M H Nelson, (ed.), „Thailand‟s New Politics‟, KPI Yearbook 2001, King 
Prajadhipok‟s Institute and White Lotus Press, Nonthaburi and Bangkok, 2001 
 
McLeod, Ron, „Twenty Five Years of the Commonwealth Ombudsman‟ in 
Dennis Pearce and Max Spry (eds.), AIAL FORUM, Number 36, Australian Institute 
of Administrative Law Inc., March 2003 
 
McMillan, John, „The Ombudsman‟s Role – Looking Backwards, Looking 
Forwards‟, the Australian Public Service Commission Leadership Lunchtime 
Seminar Sydney, 25 June 2003 
 
McMillan, John, „Future Direction 2009 – The Ombudsman‟, Paper to 
Australian Institute of Administrative Law National Administrative Law Forum, 
Canberra, 7 August 2009, 63 AIALForum, 2010 
 
McMillan, John, „Key features and strengths of the Ombudsman model – 
National Ombudsman Commission of Indonesia‟, Seminar and Training on Local 
Ombudsman, 22 - 25 June 2004, retrieved 2 February 2012, 
http://www.ombudsman.gov.au 
  
McMillan, John, „The expanding Ombudsman Role: What fits? What 
doesn‟t?‟, presentation to Australia Pacific Ombudsman Region meeting in 
Melbourne on 27 March 2008, retrieved 15 November 2013, 
http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/files/27_March_2008_The_expanding_Ombudsman
_role_What_fits_What_doesnt.pdf 
 
McMillan, John, „The Ombudsman, Immigration and Beyond‟, 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, IPAA Seminar, Canberra, 25 October 2005, retrieved 
24 July 2013,  
http://ombudsman.gov.au/docs/speeches/IPAA-Immigration-and-
beyond_25oct2005pdf 
 
McMillan, John, „Fighting Corruption While Safeguarding Human Rights‟, 
United Nations High Commission on Human Rights Conference on Anti-Corruption 
Measures, Good Governance and Human Rights‟, Poland, 8–9 November 2006, 
retrieved 1 June 2013,  
http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/files/8_November_2006_Fighting_corruption_while
_safeguarding_human_rights.pdf 
  
311 
 
Mendez, J E and Aguilar, I, „La relacion entre Ombudsman y el Derecho 
International de los Derechos Humanos‟ 1 Debate Defensorial: Revista de la 
Defensoria del Pueblo, 55, 1998, in Linda C Reif, The Ombudsman, Good 
Governance and the International Human Rights System, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2004 
 
Menzel, Jörg, „Constitutionalism in Southeast Asia: Some Comparative 
Perspectives‟, in  Clauspeter Hill and Jörg Menzel  (eds.), Constitutionalism in 
Southeast Asia, Vol. 3, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Singapore, 2009 
 
Mifsud, Ivan and Plaidy, Cecile, „The Roles of Administrative Courts and 
Ombudsmen in France and Malta: A review of  Two Contrasting Systems‟, in Linda 
C Reif (ed.),  The International Ombudsman Yearbook , Vol. 8, Martinus Nijhoff , 
Leiden, 2004 
Mikecz, Robert, Interviewing Elites: Addressing Methodological Issues, 
Qualitative Inquiry 18(6) 482 –493, 484 
 
Montesano, Michael J, „The Struggle to Amend Thailand‟s Constitution‟, 
ideas, no. 41, Singapore, 1 Jul 2013, retrieved 5 October 2014, 
http://www.iseas.edu.sg/documents/publication/iseas_perspective_2013_41_the_stru
ggle_to_amend_thailands_constitution.pdf 
 
Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois (1748), in Anne M Cohler, Basia Carolyn 
Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone (eds.), Cambridge Texts in the History of Political 
Thought. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989 
 
Moore, John E, „Ombudsman and the Ghetto‟, 1 Conn. L. Rev. 244 1968 
 
Morgenstern Albrecht, „Separation of Powers and Party Politics- On the 
Value of Divided Government‟, paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House 
Hilton, Chicago, IL, 02 September, 2004, retrieved 12 December 2011, 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59277_index.html 
 
Morrison, Gail H, „Decisions by the Ombudsman and Review by the 
Legislature: Rules, Principles and Policy‟, Ombudsman Journal, No. 8, 1989 
 
Munroe, T, „The Ombudsman and Parliament‟, paper presented at the Third 
Regional Conference of the Caribbean Ombudsman Association (CAROA), 
Runaway Bay, 2004 
 
Muntarbhorn, Vitit and Taylor, C, Roads to Democracy: Human Rights and 
Democratic Development in Thailand, International Centre for Human Rights and 
Democratic Development, Bangkok and Montreal, 1994 
 
Naewna, „Dissolve independent organisations‟, 12 January 2013 
 
Najmul Abedin, „The Ombudsman in developing democracies: the 
Commonwealth Caribbean experience‟, International Journal of Public Sector 
Management, Vol. 23 No. 3, 2010. 
312 
 
 
National Assembly, Thailand, Minutes of the Parliament, retrieved 4 
February 2013, http://librarymb.parliament.go.th/snacm/minute_advance_search.jsp 
 
National Assembly, Thailand, Minutes of the House of Representative 
Meetings, retrieved 28 October 2012, 
http://library2.parliament.go.th/giventake/hr24.html 
 
National Assembly, Thailand, Minutes of the Meeting of the Constitutional 
Drafting Assembly 34/2550 (extraordinary), Tuesday 26 June 2007 
 
National Assembly, Thailand, Minutes of Extraordinary Committee Meeting 
on Intention, Records, Archive and Minutes Scrutiny, Constitutional Drafting 
Assembly B.E.2550 (2007) 
 
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), The Role and 
Effectiveness of the Ombudsman Institution, 2005 
 
Neher, Clark, „Democratization in Thailand‟, Asian Affairs: An American 
Review, 1994 
 
 Nitithanprapas, „Daily Complaint Handling toward a Systemic Approach,‟ 
Thai Ombudsman Experience‟, speech delivered to the 12th Asian Ombudsman 
Association Conference, 7 December 2011, Japan 
 
Nitithanprapas, Panit, MCOT, interview on the 14th anniversary of the 
Ombudsman Office on 11 April 2014, retrieved 27 September 2014, http://mcot-
web.mcot.net/fm1005/site/view?id=53479b4bbe047037348b457f#.VCkzifldUm0 
 
O‟Callaghan, M L, „Provincial shake-up brings pay out for MPs and raises 
doubts‟, The Australian, 15 September 1995 
 
Ockey, James, Making Democracy: Leadership, Class, Gender, and Political 
Participation in Thailand, University of Hawaii Press, 2004 
 
Ockey, James, „Problems in the Consolidations of Democracy in Thailand‟, 
retrieved 21 May 2015, at 
http://www.thaiconference.tu.ac.th/1011abstracts/PROBLEMS%20IN%20THE%20
CONSOLIDATION%20OF%20DEMOCRACY%20IN%20THAILAND%20II.doc. 
 
O‟Donnell, Guillermo, „On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual 
Problems: A Latin American View with Some Postcommunist Countries‟, World 
Development 21, No. 8:1355–69, 1993 
 
 O‟Donnell, Guillermo, „Delegative Democracy‟, Journal of Democracy 5, 
1994, No. 1: 55-69; O‟Donnell, Guillermo, „Illusions about consolidation‟, Journal 
of Democracy 7(2), 1996:34–51 
 
O‟Donnell Guillermo, „Polyarchies and the (un)rule of law in Latin America: 
a partial Conclusion,‟ in J Mendez, G O‟Donnell, P S Pinheiro, The (Un)rule of Law 
313 
 
and the Underprivileged in Latin America, (ed.), Univ. Notre Dame Press, Notre 
Dame 1999, pp. 303–337 
 
O‟Donnell, Guillermo, Democracy, Agency, and the State: Theory with 
Comparative Intent, Oxford University, Press Oxford, 2010.  
 
 
O'Reilly, Emily, „Relations between Ombudsmen and Parliaments‟, speech at 
the 8th national seminar of the European Network of Ombudsmen, 21st October 
2011, Copenhagen, Denmark 
 
Ombudsman Association „Accountability‟, About Ombudsmen, retrieved 3 
July 2014,  
http://www.ombudsmanassociation.org/about-accountability.php 
 
Ombudsman Office, Thailand, Twelve Years, Bangkok, 2009 
 
Ombudsman Office, Thailand, Thai Ombudsman at a Glance, Bangkok, 2009 
 
Ombudsman Office, Thailand, „Introduction‟, A Collection of the 
Ombudsman’s Opinions, Rongpimduentula Press, Bangkok, 2010 
 
Ombudsman Office, Ombudsman Journal, 3rd year, Vol. 1, January-June 
2010, Bangkok 
 
Ombudsman Office, Ombudsman Annual Reports 2543-2556 B.E. (2000-
2013) 
 
Oosting, Marten, „The Ombudsman and His Environment: A Global View, in 
Reif (ed.) The International Ombudsman Anthology: Selected Writings from the 
International Ombudsman Institute, Kluwer Law International, the Hague, 1999 
 
Oosting, Marten, „Protecting the Integrity and Independence of the 
Ombudsman Institution: The Global Perspective‟, in Linda C Reif (ed.), The 
International Ombudsman Yearbook, Vol. 1, Kluwer. Law International, 2001 
 
Oosting, Marten, „The Ombudsman: A Profession‟, keynote speech presented 
at the work Strengthening the Ombudsman Office in Africa August 16, 1996, 
retrieved 12 February 2014, http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1996/1114335896.htm/ 
 
Owen, Stephen,„The Expanding Role of the Ombudsman in the 
Administrative State‟, University of Toronto Law Journal, 40, 1990 
 
Owen, Stephen, „The Ombudsman: Essential Elements and Common 
Challenges‟, in Reif (ed.), The International Ombudsman Anthology: Selected 
Writings from the International Ombudsman Institute, Kluwer Law International, the 
Hague, 1999 
 
314 
 
Pakeerat Vorajet, „Problems of Independent Organisation‟, Matichon, 23 May 
2011, retrieved 21 October 2012, 
http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1306140947 
 
Palakul, Phokin and Swangsak, Chanchai, Public Law and Bureaucratic 
Reform in the Age of Globalization (in Thai, กฎหมายมหาชนกับการปฏิรูประบบราชการในยุคโลกาภิ
วัตน์), Nitthitham, Bangkok, 1998 
 
Parliamentary Commissioner, Fourth Report of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Administration HC 324 (2004-05) 
 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 1615 of 
2003, retrieved 12 March 2014, 
http://assembly.coe.int/documents/adoptedtext/TA03/EREC1615.htm. 
 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, „Strengthening the 
Institution of Ombudsman in Europe‟, Resolution 1959 (2013), Council of Europe, 
Strasbourg 
 
Painter, Martin, „Managerial Reform and Political Control: the Case of 
Thaksin and the Thai Bureaucracy‟, Department of Public and Social Administration, 
City University of Hong Kong, 2005, retrieved 3 February, 2014, http://www.sog-
rc27.org/Paper/Scancor/Martin_Painter.doc 
 
PASC 2007, „Work of the Ombudsman‟, Oral Evidence given by Ann 
Abraham, Parliamentary an Health Service Ombudsman, HC 1086-1, session 2007-8, 
18 October 2007, The Stationery Office,  London 
 
Paterson A, The Law Lords, Macmillan, London, 1982. 
 
Pearce, Dennis, „The Commonwealth Ombudsman: Present Operation and 
Future Development‟, Papers on Parliament No. 7 - Unchaining the Watch-Dogs, 
March 1990,  retrieved 28 October 2013, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Research_and_Education/~/~/link.
aspx?_id=6D5134E956DA415B977A17D6D01FC658&_z=z 
 
Pearce, Dennis, „The Ombudsman: Review and Preview: The Importance of 
Being Different‟, The Ombudsman Journal, No. 11, 1993 
 
Pearce, Dennis, „The Commonwealth Ombudsman: The Right Office in the 
Wrong Place‟, in Robin Creyke and John McMillan (eds), The Kerr Vision of 
Australian Administrative Law at the Twenty-Five Year Mark, 54, Centre for 
International and Public Law, 1998 
 
Peabody, R, Webb Hammond, S, Torcom, J, Brown, LP, Thompson, C, 
Kolodny, R, „Interviewing Political Elites‟, PS: Political Science and Politics, 1990 
23(3), 451-55 
 
Pearce, Dennis, The Commonwealth Ombudsman Reports, 41 (24), Canberra 
Survey 1, 1998 
315 
 
 
Pegram, Thomas, „The Politics of Accountability: The Institution of the 
Ombudsman in Comparative Perspective‟, paper presented at the II REPLA Annual 
Workshop, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, 26–28 March, 2008 
 
Pegram, Thomas, „Diffusion Across Political Systems:  The Global Spread of 
National Human Rights Institutions‟, Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 32, No. 3, 
August 2010 
 
Pegram, Thomas „Weak Institutions, Rights Claims and Pathways to 
Compliance: The Transformative Role of the Peruvian Human Rights Ombudsman‟, 
Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2011 
 
Persson, Torsten, Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini, „Separation of Powers 
and Political Accountability‟, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (4), 1997 
 
Pemberton-Carrington, Charmaine A J, „The Ombudsman and development: 
Structural adjustment and its effect on the Ombudsman institution‟, The Ombudsman 
Journal, No. 13, 1995 
 
Petchsawang, Sophon, „Constitutional Amendments‟, Dailynews, 7 January 
2013 
 
Phongphaew, Pornsak, Research Report on Ombudsman: The Transferability 
of the Parliamentary Ombudsman to the Thai System, presented to National Research 
Council of Thailand, Bangkok, 1990 
 
Phongpaichit, Pasuk & Chris Baker, „Thailand: Fighting over Democracy‟, 
Economic and Political Weekly, 2008, Vol. 43, No. 50, Dec. 13 - 19, pp. 18-21 
 
Pitt, William, speech, Hansard (House of Lords), 9 January 1770, col. 665 
 
Plattner, Marc F, „the End of Transitional Era‟, Journal of Democracy, 
Volume 25, Number 3, July 2014 
 
Pocham, Narumon, The Ombudsman Complaint Investigation Process, 
Master of Law Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 2002 
  
Pollitt, C and Bouckaert, G, Public Management Reform: A Comparative 
Analysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004 
 
Pond, David, The Impact of Parliamentary Officers on Canadian 
Parliamentary Democracy: A Study of The Commissioner of the Environment and 
Sustainable Development & The Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Canadian 
Study of Parliament Group, 2010, retrieved 27 August 2013, 
http://www.studyparliament.ca/English/pdf/PondPaperFinal-2010-e.pdf 
 
Post Today, „NCPO suspends constitution, maintains the Senate, in Thai‟, 22 
May 2014 
 
316 
 
Poomhiran,Chanikarn and Thepajon, Kanitha, „Re: the power of the 
Ombudsman‟, Komchadluek, 16 July 2013 
 
Prokati, Kittisak, „Thailand‟: „The “October Movement” and  the 
Transformation of democracy‟, Memories and Legacies of a Global Revolt, Bulletin 
of the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., 2009 
 
Promradyod, Siriya, The problem of legal status and authority of the 
Ombudsman under the Constitution of the kingdom of Thailand, Master‟s Degree 
Thesis, Thammasat University, 2010 
 
Prosser, Tony, The Regulatory Enterprise, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2010 
 
Public Relation Department, „Three-Phase Roadmap Emphasized by the 
NCPO Head‟, retrieved 23 February 2015, 
http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_news.php?id=7312&a=2 
 
Quah, Jon S T, Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Office of the Ombudsman 
in the Philippines, the World Bank 2004, retrieved 18 June 2013, http://siteres 
ources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Images/285740-
1351266456008/8909406-
1394484377609/Quah_Evaluating_OMB_Effectiveness.pdf  
 
Questiaux, M N, „How administrative courts meet the need‟, in Rowat, (ed.), 
The Ombudsman: Citizen’s Defender, 2nd edn., George Allen and Unwin, London, 
1968 
Richards, D, „Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls‟, Politics, 1996,   
16(3), 199-204 
 
Rajani Ranjan Jha, „Concept and Role of the Ombudsman Institution in Asia 
in Improving and Maintaining Public Service Delivery‟, Asian Ombudsman 
Association, 2010 
 
Raja, Aftab, „Measures for Removal of Constraints in Implementation of 
Ombudsman‟s Decisions/ Recommendations‟, retrieved 18 June 2014, 
http://asianombudsman.com/ORC/MemberResearchStudies/short%20studies-
Director%20Implementationrev1.pdf 
 
Reif, Linda C, „Ombudsman and Human Rights Protestation and Promotion 
in the Caribbean: Issues and Strategies‟, in Ayeni, Victor O, Reif, Linda C, Thomas  
H (eds.), Strengthening Ombudsman and Human Rights and Institutions in 
Commonwealth Small and Island States, Chameleon House Limited, London, 2000 
 
Reif, Linda C, The Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International 
Human Rights System, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2004 
 
Reif, Linda C (ed.), The International Ombudsman Yearbook , Vol. 10, 
Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009 
 
317 
 
Reif, Linda C, „Transplantation and Adaptation: The Evolution of the Human 
Rights Ombudsman‟, Third World L.J., 31B.C. 269, 2011 
 
Reif, Linda C, „Enhancing the role of ombudsman institutions in the 
protection and promotion of the rights of persons with disabilities‟, Conference 
Papers, Wellington, 2012, retrieved 27 October 2013, 
file:///C:/Users/Home/Downloads/Wellington%20Conference_14.%20Working%20S
ession%20B_Linda%20Reif%20Paper%20&%20Slides%20(1).pdfAugust 10, 2012 
 
Richardson, Jack, „The Ombudsman‟s Place among the Institutions of 
Government – Past, Present and Future‟ Australian Journal of Administrative Law, 
183, 8(4), 2001 
 
Riggs, Fred W, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity, 
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1966 
 
Robertson, J, „Setting up an Ombudsman Office‟, The International 
Ombudsman Yearbook, Vol. 1, 1997 
 
Robertson, J, „The Ombudsman around the World‟, The International 
Ombudsman Journal, Vol. 2, 1998 
 
Rong, Jiunn & Wen-Chen Chang, „the Emergence of East Asian 
Constitutionalism: Features in Comparison‟, 59 Am. J. Comp. L. 2011 
 
Roosbroek, Steven Van, „The Ombudsman and the Citizen: and Challenge of 
Some Commonly held Assumptions‟,  report present at EFMD conference on Public 
Sector Management Development 14 - 16 June 2006, Aix-en-Provence,  retrieved 18 
June 2014,  
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/82748/1/Paper+EFMD+Steven+Van+
Roosbroek.pdf. 
 
Rowat, Donald C, „Ombudsman for North America‟, Public Administration 
Review, 1964 
 
Rowat, Donald C, The Ombudsman: Citizen’s Defender, 2nd edn., George 
Allen and Unwin, London, 1968 
 
Rowat Donald C, „The Spread of the Ombudsman Plan in Western Europe‟ 
Occasional paper no. 21, IOI, February 1983 
 
Rowat, Donald C, „The suitability of the ombudsman plan for developing 
countries‟, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 50, 1984 
 
Rowat Donald C, The Ombudsman Plan: The Worldwide Spread of an Idea, 
2nd edn., University Press of America, Lanham, 1985 
 
Runciman, Robert, „Ombudsmen and Legislatures: Allies or Adversaries?‟, 
Canadian Parliamentary Review, Vol.7(3), 1984 
 
318 
 
Sabot, E C, „Dr. Jekyl, Mr. H(i)de: The contrasting face of elites at 
interview‟, Geoforum, 1999, 30, 329-335. 
 
  Samudavanija, C, Legislative Reference Service and Ombudsman, Report on 
a Study Trip to the University of Hawaii, 9th-13th April 1973 
 
Sattaburuth, Aekarach, „New charter framework by Dec 29‟, Bangkok Post, 
20 November 2014 
 
Saunders, Cheryl, „Towards a Global Constitutional Gene Pool‟, 4 National Taiwan 
University Law Review, 2, 2009 
 
Sayuri Umeda „Thailand: Move by Parliament to Amend the Constitution 
Law Library of Congress‟, 
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205403594_text 
 
Schedler, Andreas, „Introduction‟,  in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and 
Marc F Plattner (eds.), The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New 
Democracies, Lynne Rienner Publisher, London, 1999 
  
Schillemans, T, „Redundant Accountability: The Joint Impact of Horizontal 
and Vertical Accountability on Autonomous Agencies‟, Public Administration 
Quarterly, 34, 3, 300–37, 2010 
 
Scott, I, „Functions of the Ombudsman in underdeveloped countries‟, 
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 1984, Vol. L No. 3, pp. 221-6. 
 
Seneviratne, Mary, Ombudsmen in the Public Sector, Open University Press, 
Buckingham, 1994 
 
Seneviratne, Mary, Ombudsman Public Service and Administrative Justice, 
Butterworth, London, 2002 
 
Serirangsan, Thirapat, An ombudsman as an Innovative Idea for Political 
Development in Parliament System, Master‟s Degree Thesis, Chulalongkorn 
University, 1991 
 
Serirangsan, Thirapat, Attitude of the Member of the Parliaments: Towards 
the Establishment of the Ombudsman, the Secretariat of the House of 
Representatives, Bangkok, 1997. 
 
Sheppard, Claude-Armand, „An Ombudsman for Canada‟, 10 McGill L J 291, 
1964 
 
Shelton, D J, „The Ombudsmen and Information‟ 12 VUWLR, 1982, 233 
 
Short, E F, „The Thai Bureaucracy‟, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 
5, No.1, June, 1960 
 
319 
 
Short, E F „The Ombudsman in Ghana‟, and Jorge Luis Maiorano, „The 
Defensor del Pueblo in Latin America, in Gregory, Roy and Giddings, Philip, 
Gregory, Roy & Giddings, Philip, Righting wrongs: The Ombudsman in Six 
Continents, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2000 
 
Short, E F, „The Development and Future of the Ombudsman in Africa‟, in 
Reif (ed.), The International Ombudsman Yearbook , Vol. 5. 2001 
 
Shumavon Douglas and Kenneth Hibbeln, (eds.), Administrative Discretion 
and Public Policy Implementation, Praeger, New York, 1986 
 
Skinner, S and Hyman, C, „The Ombudsman Offices in Denmark and British 
Columbia, Canada: A Comparative Study‟, in Linda C Reif (ed.), The International 
Ombudsman Yearbook, Vol. 5, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2001 
 
Snell Rick, „Australian Ombudsman: A Continual Work in Progress‟, in  
Matthew Groves and Hoong Phun Lee (ed.), Australian Administrative Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007 
 
Southeast Asia Post, „Coup leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha is Thailand's 
new PM‟, 21 August 2014 
 
Stacey, Frank, Ombudsman Compared, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978 
 
Stern, Aaron M Institutional Change in Legislatures: Thailand’s House of 
Representative 1979-2002, Thesis, the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Political 
Science), University of Michigan, 2006 
 
Stuhmcke, Anita, „Ombudsmen and Integrity Review‟, in L Pearson, Carol 
Harlow and M Taggart (eds) Administrative Law in a Changing State: Essays in 
Honour of Mark Aronson, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2008 
 
Stuhmcke, Anita, „Evaluating Ombudsman: A Case Study in Developing a 
Quantitative Methodology to Measure the Performance of the Ombudsman‟, The 
International Ombudsman Yearbook , Vol. 10, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
2009 
 
Stuhmcke, Anita, An Empirical Study on the Systemic investigations Function 
of the Commonwealth Ombudsman for 1977-2005, unpublished thesis submitted for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The Australian National University, 2009 
 
Stuhmcke, Anita, „Each for Themselves‟ or „One for All‟?: The Changing 
Emphasis of the Commonwealth Ombudsman‟, 38 Fed. L. Rev. 143, 2010. 
 
Stuhmcke Anita, „Discretion, Direction and the Ombudsman: To Steer the 
Ship or to Choose the Ship?‟, Conference Papers, Wellington, 2012, retrieved 15 
November 2013, http://www.theioi.org/publications/wellington-2012-conference-
papers 
 
320 
 
Stuhmcke, Anita, „The Evolution of Classical Ombudsman: a view from the 
antipodes‟, Int. J. of Public Law and Policy, Vol.2, No.1, 2012 
 
Stuhmcke, Anita, „Australian Ombudsmen and Human Rights‟, SSRN, 2009, 
retrieved 27 August 2013, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2310420 
 
Supreme Court, UK, „Supreme Court of the United Kingdom comes into 
existence‟, 1 October 2009, retrieved 11 December 2011, 
www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/pr_-0109_2_.pdf 
 
Tai, Alice, „The Impact of Social and Political Environment and Their 
Influence on the Work of the Ombudsman: Hong Kong‟, in L C Reif (ed.), The 
International Ombudsman Yearbook , Vol. 5, 2001 
 
Tai, Alice, „Diversity of Ombudsmen in Asia‟, Conference Papers, 
Stockholm, 2009, retrieved 23 May 2013, 
http://www.theioi.org/downloads/74sji/Stockholm%20Conference_29.%20Back%20
to%20the%20Roots_Alice%20Tai.pdf 
 
Tai, B Y T „Models of Ombudsman and Human Rights Protection,‟ 
International Journal of Politics and Good Governance‟, Volume 1, No. 1.3, Quarter 
III, 2010 
 
 
Tan, Kevin YL, „State and Institution Building through the Singapore Constitution‟, 
in Thio Li-ann & Kevin YL Tan (ed.), The Evolution of a Revolution: Forty Years of the 
Singapore Constitution, RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2009 
 
Tanzi, Vito „The Changing Role of the State in the Economy: A Historical 
Perspective‟, IMF Working Paper, 1997 
 
 
Taylor, R H, Elections and Democratization in Thailand, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996 
 
Tew,Yvonne, „Beyond “Asian Values”: Rethinking Rights‟, CGHR Working Paper 
5, Nov. 2012, University of Cambridge Centre of Governance and Human Rights, 
Cambridge 
 
Thairath, „Losing Territory – One Million Rai‟, 16 March 2012 
 
Thanapornpun, Rungson, Economic Policy Process in Thailand, Kobfai, 
Bangkok, 2003 
 
Thanicul, Sakda, „Regulatory Reform and Competitiveness in Thailand‟, 
presented at the APEC Competition Policy and Economic Development Conference, 
jointly organized by Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Japan Economic 
Law Association, retrieved 15 December 2011, 
http://www.thailawforum.com/articles/regulatory2.html 
 
321 
 
The Manager, „Yingluck faces Ombudsman's Probe‟, 12 November 2012  
 
The Nation, „Ombudsman and the ethical codes‟, 17 October, 2012 
 
The Nation, „Court Puts Charter Changes on Hold‟, Bangkok, 2 June 2012 
 
The Manager, „รวมประกาศ-ค าสั่งคณะรักษาความสงบแห่งชาติ‟ (A collection of NCPO 
announcements and orders), (in Thai), 22 May 2014. 
 
Theeravit, Khien, Thailand in Crisis: A Study of the Political Turmoil of May 
1992, Chulalongkorn University Print, Bangkok, 1997 
 
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, „Opinion/ The Draft Constitution‟, General news, 
Bangkok Post, 20 April, 2007 
 
Thomas, Richard CBE, Martin Jim, Kirkham, Richard, External Evaluation 
of the Local Government Ombudsman in England, April 2013 
 
Thomson, B, „Spatial Diffusion of the Ombudsman Institution: African 
Adaptations of a European Innovation-The Consolidation Problem‟, The 
Ombudsman Journal 10, 57 
 
Vijaikadka, Songkhla, „An Overview of Public Administration Reform in 
Thailand‟, 2004, retrieved 9 June 2012,  
http://www.lawreform.go.th/lawreform/index.php?option=com_content&task=view
&id=126&Itemid=12 
 
Vile, M J C, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, Liberty Fund, 
Indianapolis, 1998 
 
Volio, L G, „The Institution of the Ombudsman: The Latin American 
Experience‟, Revista IIDH (Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos), 37, 
2003 
 
Uggla Fredrik, „The Ombudsman in Latin America‟, Journal of Latin 
American Studies, Vol. 36(3) 2004 
 
Ji Ungpakorn, „The Political Economy of Class Struggle in Modern 
Thailand‟, Historical Materialism, Jul 2001, Issue 8, pp. 162-5 
 
USOA, Governmental Ombudsman Standards, for example: Act 204 of 1994, 
§ 722.930 
 
Uwanno, Borwornsak, Public Law, Vol. 2: The Separation between Private-
Public Law and the Evolution of Public Law in Thailand, Nitthitham, Bangkok, 1994 
 
Uwanno, Borwornsak, „Depoliticising key institutions for combating 
corruption: The new Thai Constitution‟, King Prajadhipok‟s Institute, 2000, retrieved 
4 December 2013, at http://press.anu.edu.au//wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ch11.pdf 
 
322 
 
Uwanno, Borwornsak, „The Constitutional Court in the 1997 Constitution of 
the Kingdom of Thailand‟, King Prajadhipok’s Institute Journal, Vol. 1, 2003 
 
Uwanno, Borwornsak, „Dynamics of Thai Politics‟, paper presented at 
Thailand Relationship and Southeast Asia Seminar, The Royal Thai Embassy, The 
United States, 9-10 May, 2007 
 
Uwanno, Borwornsak, Economic Crisis and Political Crisis in Thailand: Past 
and Present, King Prajadhipok's Institute, Nontaburi, 2009 
 
Uwanno, Borwornsak, the Spirit of the Constitution, 10 October 2011, 
retrieved 3 October 2013, http://library2.parliament.go.th/giventake/content_cons40-
50/cons2540/cons40-intention2.pdf. 
 
Vangansuren, Ulziibayar, The Institution of the Ombudsman in the Former 
Communist Countries Paper written under the Charles and Kathleen Manatt  
Democracy Studies Fellowship at IFES  July - August, 2002 International 
Foundation for Election Systems Washington, D.C. 2005 
 
Vasavada, Triparna, „Corruption and Democratic Governance in India‟, in 
Gedeon M Mudacumura,  Göktuğ Morçöl (eds.), Challenges to Democratic 
Governance in Developing Countries, Springer Science & Business Media, 2014 
 
Viraphol, S, „Law in Traditional Siam and China: A Comparative Study‟, 65 
Journal of the Siam Society 81, 1977 
 
Wade, Geoff, „The Thai coup amid broader concerns‟, Flagpost, 27 May 
2014, retrieved July 2014, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary
_Library/FlagPost/2014/May/Thai_Coup_2014 
 
Wade, H W R, Administrative Law, 3rd edn., Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1971 
 
Waiswa, B, Country Report on The Fight against Corruption: Inspectorate of 
Government, paper presented at the 3rd Annual General Meeting of EAAACA 
in Bujumbura, Burundi, October 2009, retrieved 28 August 2013, 
http://eaaaca.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/06/EAAACA_IG-Country-Report-on-the-
fight-against-corruption_3rd-AGM_Bujumbura.pdf 
 
Wakem, B, „Achieving Administrative Justice and Procedural Fairness in 
Ombudsman Investigations‟, speech given at the Australian and New Zealand 
Ombudsman Association (ANZOA) Inaugural Conference, Melbourne, 22 – 23 April 
2008,  retrieved 23 June 2013, 
http://www.ombudsman.parliament.nz/ckeditor_assets/attachments/118/bw_anzoa_2
008_speech_-
the_role_of_the_ombudsman_alongside_the_courts_in_achieving_administrative_ju
stice.docx?1345076080 
 
323 
 
Waseem, Mohammad, „Independence of Ombudsman‟, in Asian 
Development Bank, Strengthening the Ombudsman Institutions in Asia 
Strengthening the ombudsman institution in Asia: Improving accountability in public 
service delivery through the ombudsman, Asian Development Bank Economics 
Research Paper Series, Asian Development Bank, Mandaluyong City, 2011 
 
Webb, Adrian Review of Tribunals Operating in Wales, the Stationery Office 
Limited, 2010, retrieved 12 May 2013, 
http://ajtc.justice.gov.uk/docs/RTOW_English_t.pdf 
 
Weiss, Thomas G., „Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: 
Conceptual and Actual Challenges‟, Third World Quarterly 21, No. 5/2000: 795-814 
 
Welch, C, Marschan-Piekkari, R, Penttinen, H, Tahvanainen, N, „Corporate 
elites as informants in qualitative international business research‟, International 
Business Review, 2002, 11, 611-628. 
 
Wheeler, S and P A Thomas, „Socio-Legal Studies‟ in D J Hayton (ed.), 
Law’s Future(s), Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002 
 
Woolf, H, Jowell J and Le Sueur, A, (eds.), De Smith Judicial Review, 6th 
edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2007 
 
Wongwattansarn, Chaiwat, General Law on Administrative Procedure, 
Chiraraj Press, Bangkok, 2007 
 
World Bank, „Fostering Institutions to Contain Corruption‟, 24 
PREMNOTES, 1999 
 
World Bank, „Using an ombudsman to oversee public officials‟, PREMnotes,  
number 19, April 1999, retrieved 30 May 2014, 
http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/PREMnotes/premnote19.pdf 
 
Zacks, M, „Administrative Fairness in the Investigative Process‟, in Linda C 
Reif, (ed.), The International Ombudsman Anthology: Selected Writings from the 
International Ombudsman Institute, Kluwer Law International, the Hague, 1999 
 
Zakaria, Fareed, „Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew‟, 
73, Foreign Ave. 1994 
 
 
 
 
 325 
 
Appendix 1 
 
List of Interviewees and interview questions 
 
 
Research interviews were conducted with the individuals listed below. List of questions 
was sent in advance to the interviewees and served as a platform for discussion of related 
issues. 
 Chief Ombudsman Panit Nitithanprapas 
 Ombudsman Professor Sriracha Charoenpanich 
 Dr. Issarabhath Teerabhathsiri, Director, the Ombudsman Office 
 Wasan Thepmanee, Public Relations Officer, The Thai Ombudsman 
           Office 
 President of the Senate Surachai Liengboonlertchai, a member of the 2007 
Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA), former First Vice-President of the 
Senate (at the time the interview with the author was taken place) 
 Soonton Maneesawat, Professor of Public law and a State Councillor 
 Banjerd Singkaneti, Professor of Public Law and a member of the 
Law Reform Commission of Thailand 
 Kamol Suksomboon, Inspector-General/ Deputy Permanent Secretary 
to Office of the Prime Minister 
 
Questions for an interview with the Ombudsman 
 
           Questions are divided into three groups: concept, perception and policy which cannot be 
obtained from the documentary evidence; operations, procedures where the information found 
in the documents are not clear or where there are any gaps in the documentation and 
relationship with other public bodies and complainants and implementation of the 
ombudsman’s recommendation. 
 
A. Questions pertaining concept, perception and policy 
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1) What do you consider the most important aspect of the work of the 
Ombudsman/your office? 
2) The Ombudsman’s function has been expanded under the current Constitution.  
What do you consider the core function of the Ombudsman? 
3) How do you make your choice of priority among investigating complaints 
against public authorities, overseeing ethics of politician and public officials and 
monitoring constitutional compliance (section 244 and 245) and on what basis? 
(How do you prioritise the most important aspects of the work of your 
office/ombudsman?) 
4) Should the ombudsman be first and foremost a processor of complaints, or 
should it ideally be a promoter of good administration? 
5) Should the Ombudsman be an alternative to the court or the last resort to resolve 
grievances? 
6) Does the Ombudsman play a preventive function with regard to improper 
actions or abuses of powers by public officials? 
7) Should the jurisdiction of the Thai Ombudsman cover human right issues? 
8) Does section 244 (2) of the 2007 Constitution   render the Ombudsman to 
become a ‘morality policeman’ or an ‘ethics compliance officer’ rather than 
promoting best practice? 
9) What constraint do you encounter and to what extent do you think the 
Ombudsman can achieve when perform role described in 8)? 
10) Do you consider any aspect of the Ombudsman’s work could overlap with other 
agencies such as the recently established Law Reform Commission, the National 
Human Rights Commission? If there is any how does the Ombudsman deal with 
the overlap jurisdiction? 
11) How can the Ombudsman add value in relation to the constitutionality checking 
given several specialized bodies are already in place to specifically work on this 
issue? 
12) Do you consider the current mandate assigned by the Constitution too ambitious?  
13) Do you consider the present role of the Ombudsman sufficient in achieving the 
intention of the Constitution? 
14) What should the appropriate role of the Ombudsman in Thailand?  
15) Which of the Ombudsman’s roles or the function and power could/should be 
changed? 
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16) In which direction is the institution of Ombudsman moving in a longer term? 
17) What do you consider to be the biggest weakness in the design of your office?  
18) What is, in your opinion, the real challenge to Ombudsman’s role? 
 
B. Clarifying operations, procedures and relationship with other public bodies and 
complainants 
19) What are the internal procedures for sieving the case? 
20) How do you know whether or not pursuit of early settlements reduces the level 
of redress/justice obtained?  
21) Are settlement followed up or do you rely on a further complaints? 
22) Have you encountered an overlapped of jurisdiction with other constitutional 
independent agencies especially the Human Rights Commission and National 
Counter Corruption Commission? If yes how was the situation resolved? 
23) Is there any form of cooperation between the Ombudsman and other 
constitutional independent agencies and in what areas? 
24) In practice does the Ombudsman make use of his power to summon people? 
25) How cooperative are the public bodies when the Ombudsman request 
information? 
26) Has the Ombudsman participated in the parliamentary debate concerning his 
reports? 
27) In practice, when referring the case to the Administrative Court regarding 
administrative actions, does the Ombudsman act as the prosecutor or the joint 
plaintiff or on behalf of the injured person?  
28) Are you happy with the court’s approach to the work of the ombudsmen (also 
with reference to the recent Administrative Court’s ruling on 3G that the 
National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC), which 
held the auction for 3G licences, does not have civil servant status, and so does 
not fall within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction) 
29) In practice, what is your emphasis between alleviate individual injustice and 
scrutinize administrative process? 
30) In practice, are you more concerned with the problem of the quality of the 
administration than the legality? 
31) What triggers full and thorough investigation report? 
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32) Is the Ombudsman well-equipped to carry out its mandate? To what extent are 
you constrained by considerations of caseload volume and resources? 
33) Does the Office of the Ombudsman collect demographic data about the kind of 
consumers who bring complaints to the ombudsman? (age, gender, education 
occupational background, etc.) 
34) Do the Ombudsman produce the Ombudsman's guide to standards of best 
practice to promote good administrative practice for good public bodies, if not 
why and is  there any plan to ?  
35) Is budget a constraint to your independence and do you have adequate resources 
for your task? 
36) In your opinion how do the current practice and roles of the Ombudsman reflect 
the role meant by law? 
37) How do you consider the function and roles of the Thai Ombudsman correspond 
with the theoretical principles of ombudsman?  
 
C. Implement of recommendation  
38) What is the rate of implementation of your recommendation?   
39) What is the rate of rejection and agreeing to redress not as full as your initial 
recommendation? 
40) What evidence do you have that indicate that the Ombudsman can improve 
administrative practice in general? 
41) What is the process by which you would pursue a recommendation that had 
been rejected? Could this be more effective?  
42) In your opinion, has the Ombudsman’s function in policing  ethical codes 
affected  public perception of the Ombudsman’s neutrality, a good working 
relationship with executive agencies which ultimately  the adoption of the 
Ombudsman recommendations? 
43) Does the Ombudsman get enough support from parliament on the 
implementation of recommendation? 
44) How does parliament respond to the Ombudsman’s systemic report (Special 
report)? 
45) Has parliament debated on the Ombudsman’s reports? 
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Questions for an interview with the Vice President of the Senate , scholars and senior 
government officials 
 
A. Background and role of the Ombudsman  
1) What is the source and intention of the Constitution in determining the functions of 
the Ombudsman under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 2550 B.E? 
2) Would you agree or not that the main role of the Ombudsman is to ameliorate the 
suffering of the people from the exercise of power the officers of the state, if not, 
what should be the role of the Ombudsman? 
3) Why was the ombudsman given such a diverse range of roles in the 2007 
constitution? What was the problem that led to the new powers being introduced? 
Was any consideration given to creating a new body to perform the constitutional 
and ethical investigations? Were any concerns expressed as to the Ombudsman’s 
capacity to perform these roles – or was it always felt that the ombudsman was the 
best institution for the task?  
4) Which Ombudsman does the Thai Ombudsman modeled after? 
 
B. Detailed questions on the Ombudsman’s functions 
Ethics 
5) Why is the Ombudsman an appropriate body to monitor ethical enforcement? 
6) For the past five years have you seen any problem in the Ombudsman's role in 
monitoring how ethical enforcement?  How far has this role become? 
7) In your opinion does the role in examines ethical enforcement makes the 
Ombudsman in Parliament and the government members, if yes would this conflict 
affect the Ombudsman’s function and capacity to redress the administrative 
grievances of the people? 
 
Constitutional Review 
8) The Constitution empowers the Ombudsman to monitor the implementation of the 
Constitution and proposed for constitutional amendments. What is the intent of the 
Constitution: to have the Ombudsman to rectify the practical problem encountered 
in the constitutional implementation by state mechanisms, or to play a role in 
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determining? How the constitutional structure and mechanisms and the exercise of 
state powers should be? 
9) Is it appropriate for the Ombudsman to be a mechanism for referring laws and acts 
of public officials to the Constitutional Court with queries on constitutionality? 
10) Do you consider any aspect of the Ombudsman’s work could overlap with other 
agencies such as the recently established Law Reform Commission, the National 
Human Rights Commission?  
11) How can the Ombudsman add value in relation to the constitutionality checking 
given several specialized bodies are already in place to specifically work on this 
issue? 
 
Promoting good administration and complaints handling 
12) In your opinion as a member of the Senate, has the Ombudsman played a significant 
role to improve the functioning of the administration?  
13) What should be the focus of the Ombudsman:  easing the individual grievances on 
case by case basis or proposing recommendation to rectify the shortcomings in the 
functioning of the administrative system? 
 
Accountability issues 
14) How has the attention of parliament to the Office of the Ombudsman been? How 
have the Ombudsman’s annual reports been considered? 
15) How has the support of parliament to the Office of the Ombudsman been?  Is there 
any response to the Ombudsman’s Special Report, have they been considered by 
parliament? 
16) Are you involved in the process of appointment of the ombudsman in any way? Do 
you have any concerns about the ability of the ombudsman to operate 
independently? 
17) Would your committee be involved in the dismissal of an ombudsman, if that was 
ever necessary? 
18) Do you think the ombudsman is sufficiently accountable for its performance? 
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C. Opinions on current performance 
19) In your capacity as a member of the Senate a mechanism that controls and monitors 
the work of the Ombudsman, has the current role of the Ombudsman been able to 
fulfill the spirit of the Constitution? 
20) Constitution requires that the Ombudsman has several important functions, as 
mentioned in the question above. Should the Ombudsman prioritize these functions? 
21) In order to achieve the intent of the Constitution, should the Ombudsman’s mandate 
be changed or amended? 
22) Is the powers and duties under the Constitution and the role of the Ombudsman is 
appropriate to the current conditions of the country and should there be any 
adjustment? 
23) Do you consider the current mandate assigned by the Constitution too ambitious? 
24) Which of the Ombudsman’s roles or the function and power could/should be 
changed? 
25) In which direction is the institution of Ombudsman moving in a longer term? 
26) What do you consider to be the biggest weakness in the design of your office?  
27) What is, in your opinion, the real challenge to Ombudsman’s role? 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND, B.E. 2550 (2007) 
2. The Ombudsmen 
Section 242. There shall be three Ombudsmen who shall be appointed by the King 
with the advice of the Senate from the persons recognised and respected by the 
public, with knowledge and experience in the administration of State affairs, 
enterprises or activities of common interests of the public and with apparent 
integrity. 
The elected persons to be Ombudsmen shall hold a meeting and elect one among 
themselves to be the President of the Ombudsmen and notify the result to the 
President of the Senate accordingly. 
The President of the Senate shall countersign the Royal Command appointing the 
Ombudsmen. 
The qualifications and prohibitions of the Ombudsmen shall be in accordance with 
the organic law on Ombudsmen. 
The Ombudsmen shall hold office for a term of six years as from the date of their 
appointment by the King and shall serve for only one term. 
There shall be the Office of the Ombudsmen being an agency having autonomy in its 
personnel administration, budget and other activities as provided by law. 
 
Section 243. The provisions of section 2061 and 2072 shall apply mutatis mutandis to 
the selection and election of the Ombudsmen. In such case, there shall be a Selective 
                                                                 
1
 Section 206. The selection and election of judges of the Constitutional Court under section 204 (3) 
and (4) shall be proceeded as follows: 
(1) there shall be a Selective Committee for Judges of the Constitutional Court consisting of the 
President of the Supreme Court of Justice, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, the 
President of the House of Representatives, the Leader of the Opposition in the House of 
Representatives and the President of the Constitutional independent organisations whom e lected 
among themselves to be one in number, as members. The Selective Committee must complete the 
selection under section 204 (3) and (4) within thirty days as from the date a ground for the selection 
occurs and then nominates the selected persons, with their consents, to the President of the Senate. 
The selection resolution shall be by open votes and passed by the votes of not less than two -thirds of 
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Committee of seven members consisting of the President of the Supreme Court of 
Justice, the President of the Constitutional Court, the President of the Supreme 
Administrative Court, the President of the House of Representatives, the Leader of 
the Opposition in the House of Representatives, a person selected at a general 
meeting of the Supreme Court of Justice and a person selected at a general meeting 
of the Supreme Administrative Court and the provisions of section 231 (1) paragraph 
two shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
 
Section 244. The Ombudsmen have the powers and duties as follows: 
(1) to consider and inquire into the complaint for fact-findings in the following cases: 
(a) failure to perform in compliance with the law or performance beyond powers and 
duties as provided by law of a government official, an official or employee of a 
government agency, State agency, State enterprise or local government organisation; 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
the total number of the existing members of the Selective Committee. In the case where there is no 
member in any position or a member is unable to perform his duty and the number of the remaining 
members is not less than one-half thereof, the Selective Committee shall consist of the remaining 
members; provided that the provisions of section 113 paragraph two s hall apply mutatis mutandis; 
(2) the President of the Senate shall convoke a sitting of the Senate for the passing of approval 
resolution to the selected persons under (1) within thirty days as from the date of receipt of the 
nomination. A resolution shall be made by secret ballot. In case of approval resolution, the President 
of the Senate shall tender the nominated persons to the King for His appointment. In the case where 
the Senate disapproves the nomination, whether wholly or partly, it shall be return ed to the Selective 
Committee for reselection. In such case, if the Selective Committee disagrees with the Senate and 
reaffirms its resolution unanimously, the names of the selected person shall be nominated to the 
President of the Senate to present to the King for His appointment, but if the reaffirmation is not 
passed by unanimous resolution, the reselection shall be commenced and it shall complete within 
thirty days as from the date a ground for the selection occurs. 
If it is unable to complete the selection under (1) within the specified period by any cause, the 
Supreme Court of Justice shall, at its general meeting, appoint three judges of the Supreme Court of 
Justice holding a position of not lower than a judge of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Supreme 
Administrative Court shall, at its general meeting, appoint two judges of the Supreme Administrative 
Court to be members of the Selective Committee for the carrying out the duty under (1). 
2
 Section 207. The President and judges of the Constitutional Court shall not: 
(1) be a government official holding a permanent position or receiving a salary;  
(2) be an official or employee of a State agency, State enterprise or local government organisation or a 
director or adviser of a State enterprise or State agency; 
(3) hold any position in a partnership, a company or an organisation carrying out business with a view 
to sharing profits or incomes, or be an employee of any person;  
(4) engage in any independent profession. 
In the case where the general meeting of the Supreme Court of Justice or of the Supreme 
Administrative Court or the Senate, has approved the person in (1), (2), (3) or (4) with the consent of 
that person, the selected person can commence the performance of duty only when he has resigned 
from the position in (1), (2) or (3) or has satisfied that his engagement in such independent profession 
has ceased to exist. This must be done within fifteen days as from the date of the selection or 
approval. If such person has not resigned or has not ceased to  engage in the independent profession 
within the specified period, it shall be deemed that that person has never been selected or approved to 
be a judge of the Constitutional Court and the provisions of section 204 and section 206, as the case 
may be, shall apply  
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(b) performance of or omission to perform duties of a government official, an official 
or employee of a government agency, State agency, State enterprise or local 
government organisation, which unjustly causes injuries to the complainant or the 
public whether such act is lawful or not; 
(c) investigation any omission to perform duties or unlawful performance of duties of 
the Constitutional organisation or agencies in the administration of justice, except the 
trial and adjudication of the Courts; 
(d) other cases as provided by law; 
(2) to conduct the proceeding in relation to ethics of persons holding political 
positions and State officials under section 279 paragraph three3 and section 2804; 
(3) to monitor, evaluate and prepare recommendations on the compliance with the 
Constitution including considerations for amendment of the Constitution as deemed 
necessary; 
(4) to report the result of its investigation and performance together with comments 
to the Council of Ministers, the House of Representatives and the Senate annually. 
Such report shall be published in the Government Gazette and disclosed to the 
public. 
In exercising of powers and duties under (1) (a), (b) and (c), the Ombudsmen shall 
proceed where there is a complaint thereon, provided that the Ombudsmen is of the 
opinion that such act causes injuries to the public or it is necessary to protect public 
interests and, in such case, the Ombudsmen may consider and conduct investigation 
irrespective of a complaint. 
                                                                 
3
 Section 273 para 3. Any violation or failure to comply with ethical standard under paragraph one is 
deemed to be in breach of discipline. In the case where a person holding political position violates or 
fails to comply therewith, the Ombudsmen shall report to the National Assembly, the Council of 
Ministers or related local assemblies, as the case may be, and shall refer the matter, in case of serious 
violation or failure, to the National Counter Corruption Commission for further proceedings and it is 
deemed the cause for removal from office under section 270. 
4
 Section 280. For the purpose of this Chapter, the Ombudsmen have the powers and duties in giving 
suggestion or recommendation in the making of or improving the Code of Ethics under section  279 
paragraph one and enhances ethical consciousness of persons holding political positions, government 
officials and State officials, and have duties to report any violation of the Code of Ethics to the 
responsible person for the enforcement of the Code under section 279 paragraph three. 
In the case where the violation or failure to comply with the ethical standard is made in a serious 
manner or there is a reasonable ground to believe that the responsible may act unfairly, the 
Ombudsmen may conduct inquis ition and disclose the result thereof to the public. 
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Section 245. The Ombudsmen may submit a case to the Constitutional Court or 
Administrative Court in the following cases: 
(1) if the provisions of any law begs the question of the constitutionality, the 
Ombudsmen shall submit the case and the opinion to the Constitutional Court and the 
Constitutional Court shall decide without delay in accordance with the organic law 
on rules and procedure of the Constitutional Court; 
(2) if rules, orders or actions of any person under section 244 (1) (a) begs the 
question of the constitutionality or legality, the Ombudsmen shall submit the case 
and the opinion to the Administrative Court and the Administrative Court shall 
decide without delay in accordance with the Act on Establishment of the 
Administrative Courts and Administrative Courts Procedure. 
 
  
 
 335 
 
Appendix 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Organic Act on Ombudsmen 2552 B.E. (2009) 
 
 ORGANIC ACT ON OMBUDSMEN, 
B.E. 2552 (2009) 
------------------------------ 
 
BHUMIBOL  ADULYADEJ, REX. 
Given on the 10th Day of July B.E. 2552; 
Being the 64th Year of the Present Reign. 
 
 His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej is graciously pleased to proclaim that:  
 Whereas it is expedient to have an Organic Act on Ombudsmen;  
 This Act contains certain provisions in relation to the restriction of right and 
liberty of person, in respect of which section 29 in conjunction with section 31, section 33, 
section 35, section 36, section 45, section 56, section 59 and section 62 of the Constitution of 
the Kingdom of Thailand so permit by virtue of law;  
 Be it, therefore, enacted by the King, by and with the advice and consent of the 
National Assembly, as follows:  
 Section 1.   This Organic Act is called the “Organic Act on Ombudsmen, 
B.E. 2552".  
 Section 2.  This Organic Act shall come into force as from the day 
following the date of its publication in the Government Gazette. 1  
 Section 3.  The followings shall be repealed:  
 (1) Organic Act on Parliamentary Ombudsmen, B.E. 2542;  
 (2) Announcement of the Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional 
Monarchy No. 14, dated 21st September B.E. 2549.  
 Section 4.  In this Organic Act:  
 "Government agency" means Ministry, Sub-Ministry, Department or 
government agency named otherwise but having equal status to Ministry, Sub-Ministry or 
Department;  
 "State agency" means any agency other than government agency, State 
enterprise or local government organisation;  
 "State enterprise" means State enterprise under the law on budgetary 
procedure; 
 "Local government organisation" means local government organisation under 
the law on State administration;  
 "Person holding political position" means a person holding political position 
under the law on counter corruption;  
 "State official" means a government official, official, employee or a person 
working for a government agency, State agency, State enterprise or local government 
organisation and a competent official under the law on regional administration; 
 "Officer" means an official, employee or a person appointed by the 
                                                 
1
 Published in the Government Gazette Vol.126, Part 50 Kor, dated 4th  August B.E.2552(2009). 
 2 
Ombudsmen to perform any duty under this Organic Act.  
 Section 5.  The President of the Ombudsmen shall have charge and control 
of the execution of this Organic Act and shall, with collective approval of the Ombudsmen, 
have the power to issue Regulation or Notification for the execution of this Organic Act.  
 Such Regulation or Notification shall come into force upon its publication in 
the Government Gazette.  
 
CHAPTER I 
Ombudsman 
------------------------------ 
 
  Section 6.   The Ombudsmen under this Organic Act shall have its 
composition, selection, election, approval and term of office as prescribed by the Constitution.  
The Secretariat of the Senate shall be secretariat unit for the execution under paragraph one.  
 Section 7.  The Ombudsman shall be a person recognised and respected by 
the public, with knowledge and experience in the administration of State affairs, enterprises or 
other activities of common interests of the public and with apparent integrity.  
 Section 8.  The Ombudsman shall have qualifications and shall not be 
under any of the prohibitions as follows:  
 (1) being of Thai nationality by birth;  
 (2) being of not less than forty five years of age on the application date; 
 (3) having graduated with not lower than a Bachelor degree or its equivalent; 
 (4) not having been the Ombudsman or Parliamentary Ombudsman; 
 (5) not being a disfranchised person; 
 (6) not being a member of the House of Representatives, member of the Senate, 
Political official, local administrator or member of local assembly; 
 (7) not being or having been a member of political party or person holding any 
other position of political party within three years prior to the application date; 
 (8) not being a judge of the Constitutional Court, judge of the Administrative 
Court, Election commissioner, National Counter Corruption Commissioner, State Audit 
Commissioner or National Human Rights Commissioner; 
 (9) not being bankrupt or dishonest bankrupt; 
 (10) not having been sentenced by a judgment to a term of imprisonment 
irrespective of whether the case becomes final or the sentence has been suspended, except for 
an offence committed through negligence, a petty offence or defamation and such case has not 
become final or the sentence has been suspended; 
 (11) not having been expelled, dismissed or removed from official agency, 
State agency, State enterprise or local government organization on the ground of serious 
violation of discipline; 
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 (12) not having been vacated from office of a member of the House of 
Representatives or member of the Senate upon any decision or resolution under the Constitution;  
 (13) not having been removed from office under the Constitution; (14) not 
being a narcotics addict;  
 (15) not having been ordered by a judgment or an order of the Court that his 
assets shall vest in the State on the ground of unusual wealth or an unusual increase of assets.  
 Section 9.  Apart from vacating office at the end of the term, the  
Ombudsman vacates office upon:  
 (1) death;  
 (2) being seventy years of age;  
 (3) resignation;  
 (4) being disqualified or being under any of the prohibitions under section 8; 
 (5) having been sentenced by a judgment to a term of imprisonment irrespective 
of whether the case becomes final or the sentence has been suspended, except for an offence 
committed through negligence, a petty offence or defamation and such case has not become final 
or the sentence has been suspended;  
 (6) having been ordered by a judgment or an order of the Court that his assets 
shall vest in the State on the ground of unusual wealth or an unusual increase of assets;  
 (7) being under any of the prohibitions under section 207 (1), (2), (3) and (4) of 
the Constitution;  
 (8) being removed from office by the resolution of the Senate.  
 Section 10.  In the case where the President of the Ombudsmen or the 
Ombudsman vacates office, the selection and election therefore shall be completed in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.  
 The President of the Ombudsmen or the Ombudsman who vacates office at the 
end of the term shall remain in office to continue his duties until the new President of the 
Ombudsmen or Ombudsman has been appointed.  
 Section 11.  In the case where the Ombudsman vacates office before term, 
the existing Ombudsmen shall continue their duties.  
 If there are two Ombudsmen left, the senior Ombudsman shall be Acting 
President of the Ombudsmen until the new President of the Ombudsmen has been appointed.  
 Section 12.  In the performance of duties of the Ombudsmen, the President of 
the Ombudsmen and the Ombudsmen shall jointly meet to divide their responsibilities with a 
view to enable each Ombudsman to perform his duties independently and to be accountable for 
his entrusted responsibilities in accordance with the rule and procedure as jointly determined by 
the President of the Ombudsmen and the Ombudsmen, except the case under paragraph three.  
 At the meeting under paragraph one, the President of the Ombudsmen shall 
preside over the meeting. If the President of the Ombudsmen is unable to present at the meeting, 
the senior Ombudsman shall preside over the meeting.  
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 In the performance of duties of the Ombudsmen under section 14, section 15 (5), 
(6), (7) and (8), section 24 paragraph three, section 25 paragraph two, section 32 paragraph two, 
section 33 paragraph two and paragraph three, section 37 paragraph two, section 39, section 41, 
section 42 and section 43 or under other laws, the Ombudsmen shall jointly meet and agree. If 
there is two Ombudsmen left, the existing Ombudsmen shall continue joint meeting and giving 
approval.  
 Section 13.  The Ombudsmen shall have the powers and duties as follows: 
 (1) to consider and inquire into the complaint for fact-finding in the following 
cases;  
  (a) failure to perform in compliance with the law or performance beyond 
powers and duties as prescribed by law of a government official, official or employee of a 
government agency, State agency, State enterprise or local government organisation;  
  (b) performance of or commission to perform duties of a government 
official, official or employee of a government agency, State agency, State enterprise or local 
government organisation, which unjustly causes injuries to the complainant or the public 
whether such act is lawful or not;  
  (c) investigating any omission to perform duties or unlawful performance of 
duties of the Constitutional organisation or agency in the administration of justice, except the 
trial and adjudication of the Court;  
  (d) other cases as prescribed by law;  
 (2) to conduct the proceeding in relation to ethics of a person holding political 
position and State official under section 279 paragraph three and section 280;  
 (3) to monitor, evaluate and prepare recommendations on the compliance with 
the Constitution including consideration for amendment of the Constitution as deemed 
necessary;  
 (4) to report the result of its investigation and performance together with 
recommendation to the Council of Ministers, the House of Representatives and the Senate 
annually. Such report shall be published in the Government Gazette and disclosed to the public.  
 In exercising of powers and duties under (1) (a), (b) and (c), the Ombudsmen 
shall proceed where there is a complaint thereon, provided that the Ombudsmen is of opinion 
that such act causes injuries to the public or it is necessary to protect public interests and, in such 
case, the Ombudsmen may consider and conduct investigation irrespective of a complaint.  
 Section 14.  The Ombudsmen may submit a case to the Constitutional Court 
or Administrative Court in the following cases:  
 (1) if the provisions of any law beg the question of constitutionality, the case 
together with its opinion thereon shall be submitted to the Constitutional Court for 
consideration;  
 (2) if any rule, order or action of any person under section 13 (1) (a) begs the 
question of constitutionality or legality, the case together with its opinion thereon shall be 
submitted to the Administrative Court for consideration.  
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 Section 15.  In the performance of duties under this Organic Act, the 
Ombudsmen shall have the powers:  
 (1) to request a government agency, State agency, State enterprise or local 
government organisation to give, in writing, statement of fact or opinion in concerning with its 
performance or to submit any related object, document, proof or evidence for consideration;  
 (2) to request the superior or officer of the agency under (1), public prosecutor, 
inquiry official or any person to give statement of fact in writing or orally or to submit any 
related object, document, proof or evidence for consideration;  
 (3) to request the Court to submit any related object, document, proof or 
evidence for consideration;  
 (4) to examine any place related to the complaint, but the owner or a person 
having possessory right thereof shall be informed in advance as necessary;  
 (5) to issue regulation determining rule and procedure on receiving of complaint 
for consideration and the regulation on inquiry;  
 (6) to issue regulation determining rule and procedure for the conduct of 
proceedings in relation to ethics of a person holding political position and State official under 
section 37 and section 39; 
 (7) to issue regulation determining rule on expenditure, allowance and travel 
expense of oral evidence and the performance of duty of the officer;  
 (8) to issue any regulation or carrying out any other duty which is prescribed by 
this Organic Act or other laws to be duty of the Ombudsmen.  
 Section 16.  In exercising of powers of the Ombudsmen under section 15, 
regard shall be had to its impact to security of State, public safety or international relation.  
 In the case where the Ombudsmen is unable to inquire into fact in any matter, 
such matter shall be ceased and the Ombudsmen shall report the Council of Ministers, the House 
of Representatives and the Senate for information without delay.  
 Section 17.  The report under section 32 and section 33 shall be made in 
summary without any detail which may disclose confidential information of any person or 
agency unnecessarily.  
 Section 18.  The Ombudsman shall not be liable to both civil and criminal 
liabilities if he exercises the powers and duties under this Organic Act in good faith.  
 Section 19.  A person who gives statement or submits any object, document, 
proof or evidence in concerning with the matter under this Organic Act to the Ombudsmen or 
officer entrusted in writing by the Ombudsmen or a person preparing and disseminating the 
report of the Ombudsmen under section 32, section 33 and section 43 shall not be liable to civil, 
criminal or disciplinary if he discloses information or submits any object, document, proof or 
evidence or prepares or discloses the report, as the case may be, in good faith.  
 Section 20.  In the performance of duties under this Organic Act, the 
Ombudsman and officer shall be the competent official under the Penal Code.  
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 Section 21.  No person shall disclose any statement, fact or information 
obtained from an implementation under this Organic Act, provided that he has been entrusted by 
the Ombudsmen or it is the performance on his official duty or it is beneficial to an examination 
or inquiry or it has to be reported under his powers and duties or it has to be done in accordance 
with the provisions of this Organic Act.  
 Section 22.  Salary, position allowance and other benefits of the President of 
the Ombudsmen and the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with the law on such matter.  
 
 
CHAPTER II 
Complaint and Inquiry 
------------------------------ 
 
Part 1  
Complaint 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 Section 23.  Any person, group of persons and community shall have the 
right to make a complaint to the Ombudsmen in accordance with the provisions of this Organic 
Act.  
 The making of complaint under this Organic Act shall not prejudice to the rights 
of the complainant under other laws.  
 Section 24.  A complaint may be made to the Ombudsmen in writing, orally 
or by other means.  
 In case of a written complaint, it shall have at least the following compositions:  
 (l) name and address of the complainant;  
 (2) cause of complaint together with statement of fact or circumstance in relation 
to the matter under complaint;  
 (3) polite language;  
 (4) signature of the complainant.  
 The rule and procedure for the making of oral and other complaints shall be in 
accordance with the regulation as prescribed by the President of the Ombudsmen.  
 Section 25.  The complainant may submit the complaint to the Ombudsmen 
via the Office of the Ombudsmen in person, by post, by hand or by other means.  
 The rule and procedure on submission of complaint by other means under 
paragraph one shall be in accordance with the regulation as prescribed by the President of the 
Ombudsmen.  
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 Section 26.  In the case where the Committee of the House of Representatives 
or the Senate conducts inquiry or consideration on any matter and it is of opinion that such 
matter is subjected to the powers and duties of the Ombudsmen under this Organic Act, such 
Committee may submit that matter to the Ombudsmen for consideration and the Ombudsmen 
shall submit its preliminary report on the result thereof to such Committee.  
 Section 27.  After having received the matter from the Committee under 
section 26, the Ombudsmen shall have the power to continue its consideration on that matter 
despite such Committee vacates office en masse.  
 
 
Part 2  
Inquiry 
------------------------------ 
 
 Section 28.  The complaint decided by the Ombudsmen of having the 
following characteristics shall be rejected or ceased:  
 (1) being policy of the Council of Ministers as stated to the National Assembly, 
except where the implementation in accordance with such policy being the matter under section 
13 (1) or (2);  
 (2) being the matter that having been filed to the Court or the matter that the 
Court has final judgment or order thereon;  
 (3) not being the matters under section 13 (1) and (2);  
 (4) being the matter relating to personnel administration or disciplinary action of 
government official, official or employee of a government agency, State agency, State enterprise 
or local government organisation, except the matter under section 13 (2);  
 (5) the complainant fails to comply with section 24.  
 Section 29.  The Ombudsmen may reject or cease the complaint related to:  
 (1) corruption in official service;  
 (2) the matter in which the complainant is not an interested person and the 
consideration thereon is not beneficial to the public;  
 (3) the matter submitted after the lapse of two years as from the date the 
complainant knows or ought to know the cause of the complaint and the consideration 
thereon is not beneficial to the public;  
 (4) the matter in which the appropriate remedy or compensation for grief or 
unfairness of the complainant has been given and the consideration thereon is not beneficial to 
the public;  
 (5) the matter in which the complainant fails to give oral statement or present 
evidence or fails to do any act as requested writing by the Ombudsmen within specified period 
and without reasonable grounds;  
 (6) the matter in which the complainant has deceased without heir to continue 
the complaint and the consideration thereon is not beneficial to the public;  
 (7) the matter in which the Ombudsmen has had conclusion, except where the 
new evidence or fact has been found and the consideration result may be changed on account 
thereof.  
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 Section 30.  In case of the complaint that is having been rejected under 
section 28 and the complaint that may be rejected under section 29, the Ombudsmen may submit 
such complaint to related government agency, State agency, State enterprise or local government 
organisation for their appropriate proceedings.  
 Section 31.  The Ombudsmen shall, upon the complaint under this Organic 
Act, finish its consideration without delay and shall enable the complainant, government official, 
official or employee of related government agency, State agency, State enterprise or local 
government organisation to give statement and present evidence in relation to their statement as 
appropriate.  
 An order of the Ombudsmen rejecting or ceasing any complaint together with 
supporting reason thereof shall be informed to the complainant and may, for the performance of 
official service, be sent to related agency for its information.  
 The supporting reason under paragraph two shall clarify in details of fact and 
related law. In case of an order ceasing consideration of a complaint on the ground that an act of 
the government official, official or employee of the government agency, State agency, State 
enterprise or local government organisation is not subjected to section 13 (1) (a) (b) or ( c) or 
section 13 (2), the detailed reason why such act is lawful and fair shall also be clarified to the 
complainant.  
 Section 32.  At the completion of consideration and inquiry on any complaint, 
the Ombudsmen shall prepare and submit the report summarising the fact together with its 
giving opinion and recommendation for the revision thereof to the related government agency, 
State agency, State enterprise or local government organisation for information or 
implementation.  
 In the case where the Ombudsmen is of opinion that despite an act of a 
government official, official or employee of a government agency, State agency, State enterprise 
or local government organisation is compliant with the law, by-law, rule, regulation or 
resolution of the Council of Ministers, but such the law, by-law, rule, regulation or resolution of 
the Council of Ministers induces unfairness or inequality before the law or being the ground of 
discrimination or out of date, the Ombudsmen shall recommend related government agency, 
State agency, State enterprise or local government organisation to cause revision or amendment 
to such law, by-law, rule, regulation or resolution of the Council of Ministers. If the 
recommendation relates to the resolution of the Council of Ministers, the report shall also be 
submitted to the Council of Ministers for information.  
 In the case where the Ombudsmen recommends the agency under paragraph two 
to revise or amend the law, by-law, rule and regulation, if such agency fails to proceed with that 
recommendation within a reasonable period, the Ombudsmen shall inform the law reform 
organisation under the Constitution for further proceedings and shall urgently report that matter 
to the Council of Ministers, the House of Representatives and the Senate for information.  
 Section 33.  In the case where a government official, official or employee of a 
government agency, State agency, State enterprise or local government organisation fails to 
comply with the opinion or recommendation of the Ombudsmen on any matter within a 
reasonable period, the Ombudsmen shall inform the Prime Minister, Minister or the person 
controlling or supervising such government agency, State agency, State enterprise or local 
government organisation so as to have necessary order thereon and to report their 
implementation to the Ombudsmen forthwith.  
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 After having conducted the proceedings under paragraph one for a reasonable 
period but the government official, official or employee of the government agency, State 
agency, State enterprise or local government organisation fails to comply with such opinion or 
recommendation without reasonable ground and that matter is important or relating to public 
interest or the public at large, the Ombudsmen shall urgently submit the report on such matter to 
the Council of Ministers, the House of Representatives and the Senate.  
 Such report shall be disclosed to the public in accordance with the procedure as 
determined by the President of the Ombudsmen.  
 Section 34.  In any matter, if the Ombudsmen is of opinion that there is a 
reasonable ground to suspect of corruption in official service or there is a criminal or 
disciplinary well-grounded, the Ombudsmen shall inform the agency having the power to 
investigate such matter and the superior of a government official, official or employee of related 
government agency, State agency, State enterprise or local government organisation for 
information and further legal proceedings.  
 The agency having the power to investigate the matter and the superior under 
paragraph one shall report their implementation to the Ombudsmen every three months.  
 
 
CHAPTER III 
Inquiry for Constitutional Organs and Judicial Process Organs 
------------------------------ 
 Section 35.  If the constitutional organs and judicial process organs omit their 
duties or perform their duties illegally under section 13 (1) (c), the provisions of Chapter II 
Complaint and Inquiry shall apply mutatis mutandis.  
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
Ethics of a Person Holding Political Position and State Official 
------------------------------ 
 Section 36.  In conducting the proceedings in relation to ethics of a person 
holding political position and State official, the Ombudsmen shall have the powers and duties as 
follows:  
 (1) to give advice or recommendation for the making of ethical standard or 
improving the code of ethics of each kind of persons holding political positions and State 
officials;  
 (2) to enhance ethical consciousness of a person holding political position and 
State official;  
 (3) to report any conduct which is in violation of the code of ethics so as to make 
the person responsible for the enforcement of the code of ethics to make enforcement thereof.  
 For the execution of this Chapter, a government agency, State agency, State 
enterprise and local government organisation shall submitted their established code of ethics to 
the Office of the Ombudsmen within sixty days as from the establishment date thereof.  
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 Section 37.  If there is a complaint that a person holding political position 
violates or fails to comply with the ethical standard under the code of ethics, the Ombudsmen 
shall consider and inquire into fact. In this regard, the provisions of Chapter II Complaint and 
Inquiry shall apply mutatis mutandis.  
 If it appears, upon the completion of consideration and inquiry under paragraph 
one, that a person holding political position violates or fails to comply with the ethical standard 
under the code of ethics, the Ombudsmen shall report the National Assembly, Council of 
Ministers or related local assembly, as the case may be, so as to make enforcement of the code 
of ethics. If such conduct is serious offense, the Ombudsmen shall submit such matter to the 
National Counter Corruption Commission for consideration. In this case, such conduct is 
deemed to be a cause for removal from office under the Constitution.  
 Section 38.  If there is a complaint that a State official violates or fails to 
comply with the ethical standard under the code of ethics, the Ombudsmen shall submit such 
matter to the person responsible for the enforcement of the code of ethics to make enforcement 
thereof.  
 Section 39.  If the Ombudsmen is of opinion that any violation or failure to 
comply with the ethical standard is serious or there is a reasonable ground to believe that the 
proceedings conducted by the responsible person may be unfair, the Ombudsmen may conduct 
inquiry and disclose the result thereof to the public.  
 An inquiry and the disclosure of the result thereof to the public under paragraph 
one shall be in accordance with the regulation as determined by the President of the Ombudsmen 
which having standard or having security of not lower than the standard or security under 
section 31.  
 
 
CHAPTER V 
Monitor, Evaluation and Recommendation  
on an Implementation of the Constitution 
------------------------------ 
 Section 40.  The Ombudsmen may, in monitoring and evaluating an 
implementation of the Constitution, request a government agency, State agency, State enterprise 
or local government organisation to give statement and report on their performance for 
consideration.  
 If it appears, after monitoring and evaluating an implementation of the 
Constitution, to the Ombudsmen that any agency fails to comply with the Constitution in any 
matter, the Ombudsmen shall prepare and submit the recommendation for an implementation of 
the Constitution to the person who controls or supervises such government agency, State agency, 
State enterprise or local government organisation in order to have an order as necessary for each 
case and such agency shall report its performance to the Ombudsmen for information.  
 Section 41.  The Ombudsmen shall conduct evaluation on an implementation 
of the Constitution of all government agencies, State agencies, State enterprises or local 
government organisations annually in accordance with the evaluation rule as determined by the 
President of the Ombudsmen.  
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 The Ombudsmen shall report the evaluation result to the Council of Ministers, 
the House of the Representatives and the Senate for information under section 43.  
 Section 42.  In conducting evaluation on an implementation of the 
Constitution, if the Ombudsmen is of opinion that amendment to the Constitution has to be 
considered, the President of the Ombudsmen shall, with collective approval of the Ombudsmen, 
propose the Council of Ministers, the House of the Representatives and the Senate for further 
proceedings as necessary.  
 
 
CHAPTER VI  
Annual Report 
------------------------------ 
 Section 43.  The Ombudsmen shall submit its annual report to the Council of 
Ministers, the House of the Representatives and the Senate within March of each year and one 
Ombudsman shall state the annual report to the House of Representatives and the Senate 
himself. Such report shall have at least the following information:  
 (1) results of inquiries on all matters together with the advises or 
recommendations given to the government agencies, State agencies, State enterprises or local 
government organisations;  
 (2) implementation of the government agencies, State agencies, State enterprises 
or local government organisations or State officials done or undone in response of the advises or 
recommendations of the Ombudsmen;  
  (3) failures to comply with section 15 of the government agencies, State 
agencies, State enterprises or local government organisations or State officials;   
  (4) violation of or failure to comply with ethical standard of a person holding 
political position and government official;  
 (5) results of monitoring, evaluation and recommendation on an implementation 
of the Constitution;  
 (6) hurdles in the execution of duties of the Ombudsmen.  
 The annual report under paragraph one shall be published in the Government 
Gazette and shall be disclosed to the public in accordance with the procedure as determined by 
the president of the Ombudsmen. In determining of this procedure, the President of the 
Ombudsmen shall determine the measures that may be accessed by the handicapped and old age 
person.  
 The Ombudsmen may, if it deems appropriate, make a report on any specific 
matter to the Council of Ministers, the House of Representatives or the Senate for information if 
it deems that such matter is urgent or beneficial to the administration of State's affairs.  
 Section 44.  The provisions of section 17 shall apply to the making of report 
under section 43.  
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CHAPTER VII  
Penalties 
------------------------------ 
 
 Section 45.  Whoever violates or fails to comply with section 15 (2) shall 
be liable to imprisonment for a term of not exceeding six months or to a fine of not 
exceeding ten thousand Baht or to both.  
 Section 46.  Whoever fights with or obstructs the carrying out of  
duties under section 15 (4) shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of not exceeding one 
year or to a fine of not exceeding twenty thousand Baht or to both.  
 Section 45.  Whoever fails to comply with section 21 shall be liable to 
imprisonment for a term of not exceeding six months or to a fine of not exceeding ten 
thousand Baht or to both.  
 
 
Transitory Provisions 
----------------------------- 
 
 Section 46.  Any act related to the complaint submitted to the 
Parliamentary Ombudsmen under the Organic Act on Parliamentary Ombudsmen, B.E. 2542 
which has been done or has not yet completed shall be deemed to be an implementation 
under this Organic Act.  
 Section 47.  All laws, rules, regulations, notifications or orders enacted or 
issued under the provisions of the Organic Act on Parliamentary Ombudsmen, B.E.  2542 
shall be continued in force in so far as they are not contrary to or inconsistent with this 
Organic Act until the enactment or issuance of the laws, rules, regulations, notifications or 
orders under this Organic Act.  
 Section 50.  The Ombudsmen holding office on the promulgation date of 
this Organic Act shall be the Ombudsmen under the provisions of this Organic Act and shall 
be in office until the expiration of the term of office. In this regard, the term of office shall 
begin on the date the appointment has been made by the King.  
 Section 51. The Office of the Parliamentary Ombudsmen under the Organic 
Act on Parliamentary Ombudsmen, B.E.  2542 shall be deemed as the Office of the 
Ombudsmen temporarily until the law on office of the ombudsmen comes into force.  
 
 
Countersigned by:  
Abhisit Vejjajiva  
Prime Minister  
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Remark:- The reasons for the promulgation of this Organic Act is whereas section 138 of 
the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand requiring the issuance of the Organic Act on 
Ombudsmen and section 242 establishing the Ombudsmen and requiring the qualifications 
and prohibitions of the Ombudsmen to be in accordance with the Organic Act on 
Ombudsmen, it is therefore necessary to issue this Organic Act for the compliance with the 
provisions of the Constitution.  
